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Abstract 
The difficulty of reconciling Hume's use and endorsement of sceptical arguments and 
conclusions with his constructive project of founding 'a science of man' is perhaps the central 
interpretive puzzle of A Treatise of Human Nature. Hume has been interpreted as an entirely 
unmitigated sceptic about induction, causation, personal identity and the external world. His 
sceptical arguments emerge as part of a naturalistic programme to explain fundamental 
human beliefs, but seem to call into serious question the viability of this programme. This work 
is an attempt to understand the relationship between Hume's sceptical arguments and his 
Newtonian ambition of founding a science of human nature. It defends two main theses: that 
Hume's sceptical arguments appear as steps in a more general and systematic argument the 
conclusion of which involves a causal explanation of scepticism itself; and that the scepticism 
of Book One of the Treatise is to be seen not as unmitigatedly destructive but as a part of the 
necessary preparation for the more robustly Newtonian investigations of Books Two and 
Three. Hume's sceptical arguments support the general conception he has of philosophy, and 
of its role and value, which emerges in the conclusion to the first book. I show that Hume's 
exposition of this conception is the conclusion of a complex and systematic dialectic. The work 
is divided into four chapters. In Chapter One, I examine Hume's commitment to the 
experimental method of reasoning and formulate a number of general theoretical principles 
which, I argue, guide the Newtonian investigations of the Treatise. I also assess Hume's 
understanding of what constitutes a good or adequate explanation in science. Chapter Two 
considers Part III of Book One. Here I emphasise the reflexiveness of Hume's extended 
account of the causal relation, acknowledging the constructive programme which leads Hume 
to formulate a set of normative rules for telling what is the cause of what. The remaining two 
chapters deal with Hume's main sceptical arguments concerning the attribution of identity over 
time to bodies and persons. In Chapter Three, I critically consider Hume's account of our 
belief in and idea of continued and distinct existence. The fourth chapter examines the 
supposition of the identity of persons and Hume's bundle theory of the self. I draw and develop 
a number of parallels between these accounts and Hume's account of the idea of necessary 
connection. In the conclusion, I consider the relationship between Hume's use of sceptical 
arguments and the more constructive self-application of causal reasoning in Part III and give 
an account of Hume's notion of true philosophy. 
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The Philosopher is someone who has to cure many diseases of the 
understanding in himself, before he can arrive at the notions of common 
sense. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Preface 
Hume's fortunes as a philosopher have fluctuated enormously since the publication of A 
Treatise of Human Nature in 1739. Hume has been seen as a sceptical philosopher 
concerned with the reductio ad absurdum of the theory of ideas; as a positivist intent on giving 
a reductive analysis of the propositions with which we express our common sense view of the 
world; and, more recently, as a realist or sceptical realist whose commitment to the common 
sense view of the world is accurately reflected in the many passages in which he writes of 
lasting objects and of causal connections between distinct events. None of these views is 
without merit and each has some basis in the text. But the difficulty commentators have had in 
reconciling these interpretations with the whole text of the Treatise and with Hume's other 
works suggests quite strongly that none of them succeeds in telling the whole story about 
Hume's philosophy. In my view, all of them, in one way or another, seriously distort what 
Hume has to say. 
This work is an attempt to redress the balance in Hume's favour by showing that there is a 
greater unity and cohesiveness to his philosophical thinking than is usually thought and by 
taking seriously the number of general theoretical intentions with which Hume sets out on his 
enquiries. My text is Book One of the Treatise. I argue for two main theses: firstly, that Hume's 
sceptical arguments in that book are not isolated and disruptive episodes in the thought of an 
inconsistent and unsystematic philosopher, but indispensable steps in a more general 
argument which reaches its conclusion in the final section of Book One; and, secondly, that 
Hume's scepticism in the first book of the Treatise should be seen not as a destructive force, 
but as an important part of the preparatory investigation upon which Hume intends to found a 
'compleat system of the sciences'(T.xvi). Where other commentators have found in Book One 
of Hume's Treatise a series of brilliant, but discontinuous, and holistically unsatisfactory, 
philosophical arguments, I see Hume's important arguments as part of a general account of 
human belief and commitment which leads him to form a conception of philosophy which both 
serves his scientific ambitions and acknowledges his sceptical concerns. 
The question of how to reconcile Hume's use and endorsement of sceptical arguments with 
his 'Attempt to introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects' is 
perhaps the central interpretive puzzle of Hume's philosophy. Hume has been seen as a 
wholly unmitigated sceptic with regard to certain areas of commitment. The challenge for any 
interpreter is to show why Hume's arguments do not lead him to reject entirely the problematic 
ways in which we speak or think about these areas. Philosophers have been divided on the 
question of whether or not Hume's Newtonian ambitions can withstand the force of his own 
sceptical arguments and conclusions. The general consensus has been that they cannot. 
There has been a tendency among some recent critics either to ignore or to downplay the 
sceptical dimension to Hume's thought. I believe this move in thinking about Hume needs to 
be resisted. The Treatise abounds with sceptical arguments and it is important that we take 
them as seriously as Hume did. I attempt to show the importance of these arguments not only 
to Hume's philosophical perspective but to his general theoretical objective of basing the 
system of the sciences on a foundation 'almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they 
can stand with any security'(T.xvi). 
Hume saw his work as gathering force and persuasiveness as it progressed. The important 
general issues of his philosophy in Book One of the Treatise arise from his treatment of 
particular local problems and are brought to a head only in his conclusion to that book. I follow 
Hume's lead by first taking the local issues of causation, induction, external existence, and 
personal identity, and working my way through them towards the more general issues 
concerning scepticism and Hume's constructive scientific programme. Only by following this 
strategy, I believe, do we get a sound understanding of why the general problems of Hume's 
philosophy emerge as they do. I divide the work into four main chapters, the first of which 
addresses Hume's general methodological concerns and commitments, while the following 
three deal respectively with what I believe are the main areas of Hume's sceptical interest: our 
beliefs about causation, the external world, and the identity of persons. 
In Chapter One, I closely examine the depth and character of Hume's commitment to the 
experimental method of reasoning which he was intent on introducing to the moral sciences. I 
bring out what I think are the general theoretical principles which Hume will make use of 
throughout the Treatise and assess his understanding of what makes for a good or adequate 
explanation in science. In Chapter Two, I consider Part III of Book One, and, in particular, the 
extended causal account of the natural relation of cause and effect, which includes Hume's 
famous argument concerning induction and which reaches a climax with his two definitions of 
causation. The treatment I offer of these themes emphasises the reflexiveness of Hume's 
account, giving weight to the nonsceptical constructive concerns which lead him to formulate 
his set of normative rules by which to judge of causes and effects. The final chapters deal with 
Hume's main sceptical arguments concerning the attribution of identity over time to bodies and 
minds. Hume's account of our belief in the continued and distinct existence of body is critically 
assessed in Chapter Three, while the fourth and final chapter deals with Hume's bundle theory 
of personal identity and the supposition of the identity of persons. I draw some important 
parallels between these accounts and Hume's account of the idea of necessary connection. 
These are developed in the conclusion in which I attempt to clarify the nature of the 
relationship between these sceptical arguments and the more obviously constructive 
intentions behind Hume's reflexive applications of causal reasoning in Part III. 
My debt to those scholars who have worked, and continue to work, in this area is, of course, 
enormous. But I would single out two as being especially important. These are Barry Stroud, 
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whose book Hume remains the most lucid and enquiring introduction to the Treatise, and John 
Passmore, whose classic work, Hume's Intentions, has been a continuous source of 
opposition and inspiration. Among more recent commentaries, I have found Annette Baier's A 
Progress of Sentiments and Don Garrett's Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy 
to be the most penetrating. Their work, like the work of Stroud and Passmore, brings to the 
subject not only an acute critical appreciation, but an imaginativeness and enthusiasm which, 
for this reader, have proved infectious. I would also like to acknowledge the critical help and 
support offered by my supervisors on the project, Professor Alexander Broadie and Dr Philip 
Percival, of the University of Glasgow. Both have played an important part in shaping the 
work. My engagement with Hume began as an undergraduate and it would be ungracious not 
to acknowledge the supportive environment offered by the philosophy department of the 
University of Wales, at Cardiff, and, in particular, by my MPhil supervisor Barry Wilkins who 
introduced me to the study of the history of philosophy and who has continued to offer his 
friendship and advice. I remain in his debt. 
Abbreviations 
TITreatise 
E.lEnquiry 
References to A Treatise of Human Nature are given by page 
number to the LA Selby-Bigge edition, revised by P.H. Nidditch 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). 
References to An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding are 
given by page number to the L.A. Selby-Bigge Edition, revised by 
P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). 
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Chapter One 
Hume's Science and the Study of Human Nature 
Hume describes his Treatise of Human Nature as 'an Attempt to introduce the Experimental 
Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects'. In his introduction to the work, he gives a ringing, 
largely unqualified, endorsement of the scientific method, insisting, in terms fairly typical of the 
mid-18th Century, upon the value of observation and experience. It has been a standard move 
among commentators to identify what Hume understood by the 'experimental method' with his 
understanding of Newton's method. There remains good reason, despite some recent hints at 
revisionism(1), to think that Newton provided Hume with the paradigm for explanatory 
adequacy. Hume, however, has little to say, directly, at least, about what makes one 
explanation better or more complete than another, or what the limits are within which such 
theorising ought to take place. He tells us far less than we would wish about the nature of the 
general 'laws and forces'(E.14) he takes science to be investigating or about how those laws 
and forces relate to the phenomena which they are intended to explain. Hume does, however, 
have a number of general methodological principles and constraints in mind, which, as I mean 
to show, implicitly guide and drive his own attempts at scientific theorising. There may well be 
good reason to revise our picture of Hume's Newtonianism, but the true picture, as I see it, 
places Newton still more pivotally at the heart of Hume's philosophy, not least in guiding 
Hume's understanding of what a good or adequate explanation is in science. The question of 
the depth, niceness and originality of Hume's understanding of Newton, will be a significant 
and recurrent theme in the discussion to follow. There are, of course, a number of other 
important influences on Hume's thought, not least among them, Malebranche and Locke, and 
these too cannot be ignored. Once we have clarified the nature of Hume's conception of 
science and the practice of scientists like Newton, much else to have puzzled commentators 
on Hume's philosophy will be brought into sharp relief. We can begin to pick apart and 
reconstruct the use Hume makes of his general theoretical principles, and gather, more 
exactly, what his intentions are. What I hope to bring out is not only the care with which Hume 
attended to and appreciated Newton's writings, but the respects in which Hume, perhaps 
rightly, reckoned himself a more thoroughgoing and reliable Newtonian than Newton himself. 
It seemed evident to Hume that 'all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human 
nature; and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by 
one passage or another.'(T.xv) Mathematics, natural philosophy and natural religion are all 'in 
some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since they lie under the cognizance of 
men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties'(T.xv). The study of human nature 
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represents the indispensable groundwork for the study of all these sciences, including those 
'whose connexion with human nature is more close and intimate'(T.xv), what we might call the 
moral sciences. As the science of man is the 'only solid foundation for the other sciences', so 
'the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and 
observation'(T.xvi). What Hume proposes is 'a compleat system of the sciences, built on a 
foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any 
security'(T.xvi). While Hume evidently intends his remarks to go some way towards clarifying 
his purpose, if not his strategy, many more questions would appear to be raised here than are 
answered. Some care is needed in appreciating just how Hume understood his proposed 
reconstruction of the sciences. 
Experience and observation do not provide us with foundations in the sense in which 
Descartes looked to offer indubitable metaphysical foundations for a science consisting wholly 
of 'certain and evident cognition'(2). A search for foundations such as these, is, for Hume, as 
misguided as it is hopeless. The sceptical doubt 'both with respect to reason and the senses, 
is a malady, which can never be radically cur'd, but must return upon us every moment, 
however we may chace it away'(T.218). Hume's more modest hope is 'to establish a system 
or set of opinions, which if not true (for that, perhaps, is too much to be hop'd for) might at 
least be satisfactory to the human mind, and might stand the test of the most critical 
examination'(T.272). For Hume, there neither is, nor can be, any metaphysical guarantee that 
our thinking about reality is in harmony with how things really are. The question of whether or 
how our thinking corresponds, in whatever sense, to some ultimate reality or existence, is 
dismissed as 'chimerical' and 'presumptuous'. It is as little a part of Hume's case to suggest 
that sense experience provides us with an unproblematic basis for knowledge. Experience 
does not provide us with a foundation in this sense. The more we probe the received 
foundations of knowledge, however we think of them, the more they give and crumble beneath 
us. The sceptical doubt increases 'the farther we carry our reflections'(T218). Philosophy, as it 
is practised by Hume in Book One, and as he ultimately defends it, has a role, but, as we will 
see in due course, its role is severely circumscribed. 
The 'sole end of logic', Hume writes, 'is to explain the principles and operations of our 
reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas'(T.xv). What Hume proposes, and what 
occupies him in Book One of the Treatise, is an examination of the foundations to which 
science might lay claim, with the ultimate aim of acquainting ourselves more thoroughly with 
'the extent and force of human understanding'(T.xv). The outcome of this course of critical and 
reflective thinking is a sort of 'mitigated' scepticism, an uneasy marriage of reason and 
imagination, which Hume, nevertheless, hopes will provide the reader with the assurance he 
needs to follow him in the enquiries to come. Hume's work in Book One needs to be 
understood as an extended puzzling-out of the problems lying in the way of the more full-
bloodedly Newtonian investigations of Books Two and Three. Bringing the 'logic' of Book One 
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to a close, Hume writes that it is 'now time to return to a more close examination of our 
subject, and to proceed in the accurate anatomy of human nature, having fully explain'd the 
nature of our judgment and understanding'(T.263). Hume's examination of the nature and 
extent of human understanding, his logic, has merely brought him to the point of launching out 
'into those immense depths of philosophy, which lie before me'(T.263). 
The distinction Hume makes between the roles served by Book One, on the one hand, and 
the succeeding two books, on the other, is important, and should be taken seriously, as, 
indeed, Hume intended it to be. That said, it would be a mistake, I think, to take too strictly 
what is, in some ways, a fairly rough-and-ready distinction. The sceptical doubts Hume raises 
in Book One are never entirely disposed of, and recur at points in Books Two and Three, 
almost as reminders of the need for philosophical caution. It will suffice, for the moment, to 
bear in mind that Hume has a number of definite critical aims before him in the first book, as 
well as a definite set of theoretical intentions, which he takes to be preparatory for the more 
constructive Newtonian investigations of the following books. One of the things to emerge 
from this is the distinction Hume draws between his own way of philosophy and the 'several 
systems of philosophy, both of the intellectual and natural world'(T.263) which he considers 
only to dismiss. Hume's conception of the goal and nature of philosophy is what he hopes, 
ultimately, will allow us to move beyond the sceptical doubts he raises in Part IV of Book One, 
restoring, to some extent, the assurance he appeared to have stripped away from our 
fundamental beliefs and practices. What will be explored in this, and in the following chapters, 
is just how Hume thought of philosophy, its value and purpose, as well as the relation between 
this conception, as Hume develops it, and the sceptical doubts he raises. Only with this 
background in mind, can we begin to make sense of what have often seemed the 
unsystematic, even self-contradictory, claims of Book One. It is essential to begin with an 
examination of Hume's methodological strategy, the constraints he takes himself to be 
working within, and the kind of account of explanatory adequacy he has in mind as the test of 
the success and intelligibility of his own theorising. 
1.1 Hume's Methodological Outlook 
Implicit in the description of his work Hume gives at the outset of the Treatise is a contrast 
between 'natural philosophy', what we would now think of as the natural sciences, and 'moral' 
philosophy, which is to say, in Hume's terms, those subjects whose connection with human 
nature is closest and most intimate. The moral sciences are concerned essentially with human 
life and thought, conduct and manners, comprehending 'almost every thing, which it can any 
way import us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament 
of the human mind'(T.xvi). The set of moral sciences consists of 'Logic, Morals, CritiCism, and 
Politics'(T.xvi). There is no question of importance, Hume assures us, 'whose decision is not 
compriz'd' in this new science of man(T.xvi). The science of man is identified with the whole 
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set of moral sciences. There is, however, some little ambiguity in Hume's use of the 
expression 'the science of man' which it is as well to dispose of now. Hume gives the 
expression two different, but easily distinguishable, senses. He sometimes writes of the 
science of man as though it comprised not the whole set of moral sciences but only one 
member of that set, one member upon which all the others are dependent. All the sciences, 
whether moral or natural, according to Hume, are not only comprehended in the science of 
man, but have 'a dependence on the knowledge of man'(T.xv}. It is, Hume says, 'impossible to 
tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were we thoroughly 
acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and cou'd explain the nature of 
the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings'(T.xv}. This, as we 
saw, is 'the sole end of logic': to explain the principles and operations of the understanding, 
and to determine the nature of the ideas upon which it works. In An Abstract of A Treatise of 
Human Nature, Hume makes explicit the relationship he believes holds between his logic and 
the other parts of his putative science. This Treatise, he writes, 'seems intended for a system 
of the sciences. The author has finished what regards logic, and has laid the foundation of the 
other parts in his account of the passions'(T.646}. Since our 'impressions of reflexion', the 
'passions, desires, and emotions, which principally deserve our attention', derive from our 
ideas, it is necessary, Hume thinks, 'to explain the nature and principles of the human mind' 
and 'give a particular account of ideas, before we proceed to impressions'(T.8}. Hume saw the 
logic of Book One as the necessary preparation for the 'accurate anatomy of human 
nature'(T.263}, of human conduct and the passions, which follows. When Hume writes of the 
science of man in this sense he identifies it directly with his logic, rather than with the set of 
moral sciences, which comprises logic, the passions, morals and politics. 
The only solid foundation which we can give to this new science is to base it upon experience 
and observation. Hume proposed to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into 
moral philosophy. He sets out to explain the principles and operations of the understanding, 
the origin and nature of our ideas, on the same basis as he later intends to explain sympathy 
and benevolence, pride and envy, by basing his experiments on 'a cautious observation of 
human life'(T.xix}. Hume supposes that the 'scientific method', which had yielded such 
impressive and unexpected results in the area of natural philosophy, might lead to similarly 
striking discoveries in the moral sciences, if pursued with the same care and caution. The 
relationship between moral science and the experimental method of the natural sciences is a 
complex one, with special implications. The examination of human understanding might, in 
turn, lead to a reform or refinement of the scientific method, making this science 'much 
superior in utility to any other of human comprehension'(T.xix}. Reflection on the rules of the 
understanding which Hume believes the scientific method presupposes can lead to their 
correction and improvement. Hume saw himself as giving a new turn to these investigations. 
While he was clear that the principles and habits of mind upon which scientific practices rest 
could not survive rational scrutiny, it was in no way to his purpose to deny our right to pursue 
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them. As he himself makes clear, the logic of Book One must be read as preparatory to 
investigations of just this sort. 
There was, however, a special difficulty facing practitioners of this new science. Moral 
philosophy, Hume says, has 'this peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in natural, that in 
collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with premeditation, and after such 
a manner as to satisfy itself concerning every particular difficulty which may arise.'(T.xviii-xix) 
To know the effects of one body upon another in a given circumstance, one has only to 'put 
them in that situation, and observe what results from it. But should I endeavour to clear up 
after the same manner any doubt in moral philosophy, by placing myself in the same case with 
that which I consider, 'tis evident this reflection and premeditation would so disturb the 
operation of my natural principles, as must render it impossible to form any just conclusion 
from the phenomenon.'(T.xix) Hume's science of man is not to involve direct experiments of 
the sort characteristic of the experimental natural sciences. Moral scientists must look to the 
uninfluenced behaviour of others, caught up in the ordinary course of their lives, for their data. 
We must, Hume tells us, 'glean up our experiments' from a broad reflection on human life, 
taking them 'as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in 
company, in affairs, and in their pleasures'(T.xix). 
The ultimate nature of mind being as little known to us as that of body, 'it must be equally 
impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and 
exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its 
different circumstances and situations'(T.xvii). The moral scientist labours under no special 
difficulty in being ignorant of the 'true springs and causes of phenomena'(3). The search for 
simple and general principles must proceed on the basis of experience and not pretended 
conjecture as to 'the ultimate original qualities of human nature'(T.xvii). The experimental 
science of man must. following the example of the natural sciences, endeavour to render its 
principles as universal as possible by traCing its experiments 'to the utmost, and explaining all 
effects from the simplest and fewest causes'(T.xvii). Hume saw that the natural sciences, and 
Newton, in particular, had gained what success they had met with by seeking to determine 'the 
laws and forces' by which, for example, 'the revolutions of the planets are governed and 
directed'(E.14). Forces had been used 'with regard to other parts of nature' to explain 
phenomena as diverse as simple chemical reactions and the motion of the tides. There is no 
reason, Hume supposes, 'to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental 
powers and economy, if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution'(E.14). Newton describes 
his own experimental programme in the preface to the Principia as 'from the phenomena of 
motions to investigate the forces of nature, and then from these forces to demonstrate the 
other phenomena'(4). Hume seeks, in a similar vein, to explain the 'operations of our 
reasoning faculty'(T.xix) in terms of the fewest number of psychological general causes(E.30), 
controlled by laws from which, once discovered, other phenomena can be 'demonstrated'. 
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Hume makes explicit the parallel he intends between his principle of association among ideas, 
and Newton's explanation of the motion of bodies in terms of the principle of mutual 
gravitation. Here, Hume writes, 'is a kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be 
found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as 
various forms'(T.12-13). Hume observes his earlier counsel by directing his attention purely to 
the conspicuous effects of this principle. As to the causes, Hume tells us, 'they are mostly 
unknown, and must be resolved into original qualities, which I pretend not to explain'(T.13). 
Newton, in similar terms, concedes that 'the cause of gravity is what I do not pretend to 
know'(5). Nothing, Hume writes, 'is more requisite for a true philosopher, than to restrain the 
intemperate desire of searching into causes, and having establish'd any doctrine upon a 
sufficient number of experiments, rest contented with that, when he sees a farther 
examination would lead him into obscure and uncertain speculations'(T.13). A famous 
passage from Hume's History of England makes clear the debt he considered philosophy 
owed to Newton in this regard. While Newton 'seemed to draw off the veil from some of the 
mysteries of Nature, he showed at the same time the imperfections of the mechanical 
philosophy; and thereby referred her ultimate secrets to that obscurity, in which they ever and 
ever will remain'(6). 'Sight or feeling', Hume writes in the first Enquiry, 'conveys an idea of the 
actual motion of the bodies' but the 'force or power, which would carry on a moving body 
forever in a continued change of place, and which bodies never lose but by communicating it 
to others, of this we cannot form the most distant conception'(E.33). 
Hume, particularly in the Enquiry, but to a degree also in the Treatise, talks uninhibitedly of 
nature being endowed with 'powers' or 'causes', concealed from or 'wholly unknown to 
us'(E.44). Commentators have found claims of this kind difficult to reconcile with Hume's 
apparent suggestions in the Treatise that talk of this sort could not possibly make sense. 
Critics have often understood Hume as offering an account of causation or causal 
connections in nature which reduces them to mere constant conjunctions of like events. On 
this reading, all that is meant by our talk of causation is regularity of succession. There is 
some textual support for the view that Hume subscribed to a regularity theory of causation. In 
all single instances, Hume writes in the Enquiry, 'of the operations of bodies or minds there is 
nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently can suggest any idea, of power or 
necessary connexion'(E. 78). The 'synonyms' of power, cause, necessity or connection(T.157), 
Hume says, are 'absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical 
reasonings or common life'(E.74), except, it would seem, in so far as they are taken to refer to 
'an object, followed by another ... where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects 
similar to the second'(E.76). The problem facing the regularity view of Hume on causation is 
that Hume seems to deny that this is all we mean or can mean by causal connection. The text 
strongly suggests that Hume considered necessary connection to be an essential part of 
causation. There is, Hume tells us, 'a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into 
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consideration; and that relation is of much greater importance, than any of the other two above 
mentioned'(T.77). The relation of necessity or necessitation is what differentiates causal and 
non-causal sequences of events. Hume does not appear to deny that there exist relations of 
this sort. Instead, he tells us that it is impossible 'to give any just definition of cause, except 
what is drawn from something extraneous and foreign to it'(E.76). Hume does not argue that 
the mind possesses no idea of necessity. It turns out that the mind has an idea of necessary 
connection but not as any 'quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an 
infallible consequence of the other'(E.63). Hume rules out the possibility of a priori causal 
inferences. The idea of necessity the mind possesses arises from a 'determination of the 
mind'. The mind mistakes this idea for an idea of natural necessity which it does not possess. 
Hume argues strongly against the possibility of a science based on such perceptions. Causal 
relations, on the view of inductive inference defended in the Treatise, can only be established 
between events found in our experience to be constantly conjoined. All belief about matter of 
fact and 'real existence', furthermore, 'is derived merely from some object, present to the 
memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between them and some other object'(E.46). 
Passages such as these might lead us to expect that Hume took science and scientific belief 
to consist purely in the description of observable causal relations among events. Hume, 
however, makes clear the difference he perceives between the achievements of those 
astronomers who 'had long contented themselves, with proving, from the phaenomena, the 
true motions, order and magnitude of the heavenly bodies' and those of Newton who had 'from 
the happiest reasoning ... also determined the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the 
planets are governed and directed'(E.14). It seems clear from this that the Newtonian method 
Hume endorses goes beyond the straightforward description of observable regularities. We 
cannot, however, ignore the question of how squarely such an interpretation sits with Hume's 
account of causation and his theory of meaning. 
Hume's views on causation are complex and difficult to unpick. A proper treatment of them will 
have to wait until the next chapter. I do not believe that Hume did think of causation as mere 
observable regularity. Hume is much less interested in the question of what, if anything, the 
causal relation is than in the question of what the circumstances are in which an observer 
pronounces related events 'to be connected(E.75). The matter of the existence of causal 
connections in nature is, appropriately enough, left undecided by Hume's analysis. Much, 
though, critically, not all, of the philosophical baggage which accompanies the received view of 
Hume on causation will need, in due course, to be discarded. What I want to suggest in this 
chapter is that there is some consistent sense to be made of Hume's general remarks about 
causation and causal explanation and his considered characterisation of his preferred mode of 
scientific explanation in terms of Newtonian laws and forces. Hume warns in a footnote in the 
Enquiry that in speaking of our 'ignorance of natural powers' he uses the term 'power' in 'a 
loose and popular sense'(E.33). The ordinary run of folk believe 'they perceive the very force 
or energy of the cause, by which it is connected with its effect'(E.69). Hume goes on, in the 
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following few pages, to offer an account of what he terms the 'more accurate explication' of 
the term, as, say, a Newtonian physicist might use it. This would seem to be Hume's 
considered word on the nature of theoretical expressions like 'force' and 'power'. We will see 
shortly how Hume begins to fill out the picture I have sketched here. In the sections that 
follow, I show that while Hume thinks that scientific theories must be founded in experience, 
he is in no ways committed to thinking of them as mere 'natural histories' of phenomena. The 
main problem for such a view seems to be that if we take Hume to subscribe to the view of 
causation and causal explanation which I have characterised as the received one, then it 
appears we must also concede that Hume is committed to the exclusion of forces and like 
entities from scientific explanation. Hume, on the other hand. seems not only to make such 
forces - what he calls 'general causes' - an essential part of scientific explanation, but to self-
consciously endorse the practice as a feature of the Newtonian outlook. I have already 
suggested that Hume had a more plausible and complex view of the explanatory adequacy of 
theories, and the constraints within which they are obliged to work, than is usually thought. 
Hume's critical objection to Newton lies in his perceived contravention of his own self-
prescribed constraints. While Hume and Newton may very well have a common method in 
view, and I would suggest that, to a degree, they do, it will quickly become evident that they 
have rather different goals and different prospective limits in mind for the scientific project. It is 
to these issues that I now turn. 
Hume tells us in the Enquiry that the goal of his science of man is 'to discover, at least in 
some degree, the secret springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its 
operations'(E.6). Individual events can be 'explained' with reference to general laws and 
causes from which the phenomena, in some sense, derive. The task of the moral scientist is 
to explain 'all effects from the simplest and fewest causes'(T.xvii). We must consider the way 
in which Hume thought of such causes and what kind of role he gives them in his 
understanding of the explanatory adequacy of scientific theories. The nub of the question 
concerns the problem of how conclusions making reference to such causes can be the result 
of causal explanation as Hume outlines it in his account of probable inference. The view I 
have begun to sketch needs to be distinguished from the received one. Many commentators 
have been prepared to follow Popper's line in taking Hume to have thought of the outcome of 
scientific theorising as a mere 'digestion of perceptions'(7). Passmore says with confidence 
that empirical science, to Hume, 'is the discovery that things in fact behave in certain ways'(8), 
altogether the view with which Hume himself seems to contrast the happier reasonings of 
Newton. But Passmore is not the only philosopher to have found what Hume says in one place 
to be at odds with what Hume does at another. According to Ayer, Hume subscribed to a 
reading of Newton as a practitioner of 'straightforward induction'(9), abstaining 'from any 
generalisation that was not directly founded upon observed instances'(10). Hume is himself, 
on this view, committed to excluding from scientific explanation any relation or theoretical 
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entity not known by direct observation. Scientific theories, on this view, are simply 
generalisations from observation. 
The idea is that Hume thought of scientific theories as the 'straightforward' outcome of 
'general induction from phenomena'(11). Theories have the status of generalisations which 
'universally agree' with our experiments. Hume's science is in effect reducible to his account of 
causal inference. Causal relations, on this view, can be established only between observable 
contingent regularities. There is no question of an empirical generalisation being deduced or 
'demonstrated' from the phenomena. Two objects, 'tho' perfectly resembling each other, and 
even appearing in the same place at different times, may be numerically different: And as the 
power, by which one object produces another, is never discoverable merely from their idea, 'tis 
evident cause and effect are relations, of which we receive information from experience, and 
not from any abstract reasoning or reflexion.'(T.69) Causal inference alone takes us beyond 
the present circle of our perceptions. Conclusions beyond the impressions of our senses, says 
Hume, 'can be founded only on the connexion of cause and effect, nor can we otherwise have 
any security, that the object is not chang'd upon us, however much the new object may 
resemble that which was formerly present to the senses'(T.74). All arguments from 
experience, we are told, are of the form of causal inferences. Were we to proceed 'not upon 
some fact, present to the memory or senses, our reasonings would be merely hypothetical; 
and however the particular links be connected with each other, the whole chain of inferences 
would have nothing to support it, nor could we ever, by its means, arrive at the knowledge of 
any real existence.'(E.46) The rejection of hypothesis is taken to go hand-in hand with the 
identification of Hume's account of causal inference with his theory of science. Causal 
inferences are limited to sets of like events found conjoined in experience. Writing in the 
Abstract, Hume promises 'to draw no conclusions but where he is authorized by experience' 
and to talk 'with contempt of hypotheses'(T.646). The passages quoted lend some textual 
support to the view that Hume must have understood theories as grounded in experience in 
the same way that causal inferences are. But Hume's rejection of hypotheses at this point 
should give us pause. Far from seriously wishing to expel all hypotheses from science, Hume 
goes on, throughout his work, to make fairly free use of them, sometimes adding his own 
explicit endorsement of the practice. Hume's own understanding of scientific practice would 
suggest that he thought of theories as being somewhat differently, or at least, less 
straightforwardly, grounded in experiment and observation than are causal inferences. The 
crux of the matter, as I see it, is that the general causes of which Hume's own theories are 
composed have much more of the character of hypotheses about them than could be 
supported on the basis of straightforward induction. 
The aim of Hume's science, as Passmore and others have understood it, is the discovery by 
inductive analysis of observable causes or causal relations between observable events. 
Hume's method is straightforwardly modelled on the analysis Newton proposes in the Opticks 
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as consisting in 'making experiments and observations, and in drawing general conclusions 
from them by induction, and admitting of no objections against the conclusions, but such as 
are taken from experiments or other certain truths. For hypotheses are not to be regarded in 
experimental philosophy.'(12) Hume can be seen in the Treatise 'tracing up' his 'experiments' 
to explain the phenomena 'from the simplest and fewest causes'(T.xvii). What are the sorts of 
phenomena Hume is interested in explaining? I have already characterised Hume's main 
concern in his discussion of causation and causal inference as being with the circumstances 
in which an observer pronounces like events to be causally connected. The explanation Hume 
offers has two main components. In the first place, he offers an account of instances of the 
regular succession of events in the world; in the second, he describes the change that takes 
place in the mind of the observer when apprehending an instance of this sort. When many 
'uniform instances' occur, and event A is found always to be followed by event S, we then 'feel 
a new sentiment or impression, to wit, a customary connexion in the thought or imagination 
between one object and its usual attendant; and this sentiment is the original of that idea 
which we seek for'(E.78), which is to say, the idea of necessary connection. We feel a 
'determination of the mind' to pass in expectation from one event to its 'usual attendant', which 
we express in pronouncing the two events to be causally connected. Hume provides us with a 
psychological explanation of causal inference grounded not in reason, but in what he calls 
'custom' or 'habit'. Reason, in the Treatise, is considered as another 'kind of cause, of which 
truth is the natural effect'(T.180). After a repetition of similar instances, 'the mind is carried by 
habit, upon the appearance of one event to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it 
will exist'(E.75). Hume's conclusion is that inductive inference is an effect of 'habit'. Whenever 
the repetition of any act or operation produces 'a propensity to renew the same act or 
operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we 
always say, that this propensity is the effect of custom.'(E.43) In doing so, 'we pretend not to 
have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human 
nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects'(E.43). The 
regularities found in the transitions made from one idea to another are the result of custom or 
habit. Custom 'determines' us, after the constant conjunction of two objects, to expect 'the one 
on the appearance of the other'. We can give no reason why these principles are as they are, 
no 'cause of this cause'(E.43), for 'we can give no reason for our most general and refined 
principles, beside our experience of their reality'(T.xviii). Nothing, Hume tells us near the 
outset of the Treatise, is more requisite for the true philosopher than to 'restrain the 
intemperate desire of searching into causes' where 'farther examination would lead him into 
obscure and uncertain speculations'(T.13). 
How then are we to think of the general causes of phenomena, causes like habit and custom, 
which Hume thinks of as our 'most general and refined principles'? Hume would want to avoid 
the suggestion that he seeks to 'explain' the transitions of the imagination from one idea to 
another in terms of a propensity of the mind to such transitions. Recourse to a propensity of 
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this sort would mark a readmittance of 'occult' qualities or forces, offering, in Passmore's 
words, 'a mere name for our ignorance'(13). If this were all Hume were doing then habit would 
no more explain the transition than the nourishment given by bread is 'explained' by its 
nutritive quality or 'faculty'(14). Hume is aware of the fact. His remarks amount to a self-
prescription which, as we will shortly see, he is careful to follow. It is by means of 'occult' 
qualities and forces, Hume writes, in a caustic note to his discussion 'Ot the ancient 
philosophy' in the Treatise, that 'philosophers set themselves at ease, and arrive at last, by an 
illusion, at the same indifference, which the people attain by their stupidity, and true 
philosophers by their moderate scepticism. They need only say, that any phaenomenon, which 
puzzles them, arises from a faculty or an occult quality, and there is an end of all dispute and 
enquiry upon the matter'(T.224). Should we think of Hume's general causes as the outcome, 
well-founded or not, of straightforward induction? If we accept the thesis that Hume's science 
is entirely reducible to his account of causal inference then, clearly, we should. But if all Hume 
has it in mind to do is to give a name to the conjunction of inference and regular succession 
then recourse to propensities like habit would seem not only to add nothing to the explanation 
but to violate Hume's own self-conscious strictures against occult qualities. 
The account Hume gives of causal inference grounds causal relations in observed constant 
conjunctions. The limits of causal inference are set by the limits of what can be observed. Can 
the conclusion that inductive inference is an effect of habit or custom be itself the outcome of 
an inference of this sort? It seems clear to me that it could not be. Habit, in the sense in which 
Hume understands it, is not observable. Since we never, strictly speaking, observe habit or 
custom, how, in this case, do we acquire the relevant habit of inference? What is required is a 
conjunction between the effect, the phenomenon of causal inference, and its cause, Hume's 
'principle' of human nature, habit. Hume makes it clear that it is not the observable repetition 
or regular succession that is the cause of the inference. As the new idea 'arises from a 
number of similar instances, and not from any single instance, it must arise from that 
circumstance, in which the number of instances differ from every individual instance. But this 
customary connexion or transition of the imagination is the only circumstance in which they 
differ. In every other particular they are alike.'(E.78) The principle is what causes the observer 
to form an expectation of an event on the appearance of its usual attendant. All inferences 
from experience 'are effects of custom, not of reasoning'(E.43), products, in other words, of 
the imagination. The problem is that the general cause or principle, habit or custom, is not 
observable and so could never form an observable constant conjunction with its effect, the 
phenomenon of causal inference. Hume should be read as offering a causal account of causal 
inference, in as much as his investigation is tilted at the 'discovery' of general causes, but the 
conclusion of that account could not itself be the outcome of an inductive inference. 
Hume sees the aim of science as the explanation of all effects from the simplest and fewest 
causes. What has been shown so far is that Hume's thesis that causal inference is an effect of 
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habit is not to be thought of as the result of causal inference. How else then are we to think of 
Hume's appeal to habit? With Hume's counsel of caution as to the invocation of occult 
qualities in mind, we need to consider what Hume understood habit to be and how his 
recourse to it is intended to explain the phenomena in question. If Hume's theory of causal 
inference cannot itself be reduced to straightforward induction, we must ask how else we are 
to think of it, and, indeed, of the other conclusions which compose Hume's theory of human 
nature? Hume thought scientific theories had to be grounded in experience, but not, I would 
suggest, as he thought causal inferences must be. How are we to think of this grounding? 
Hume provides us with a valuable clue to his thinking in a passage from the Enquiry. It is 
certain, Hume writes, that 'we here advance a very intelligible proposition at least, if not a true 
one, when we assert that, after the constant conjunction of two objects - heat and flame, for 
instance, weight and solidity - we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the 
appearance of the other. This hypothesis seems even the only one which explains the 
difficulty, why we draw from a thousand instances, an inference which we are not able to draw 
from one instance, that is, in no respect, different from them.'(E.43) Hume explicitly describes 
his own theory of causal inference as hypothetical. If we take what Hume says here seriously, 
we should expect the theory he offers to be rather more than straightforwardly descriptive. 
Hume says as much. His conclusion, as he presents it, is 'if not a true one' at least 'a very 
intelligible' one. The suggestion is worth taking seriously. I made the point earlier that Hume's 
theories had rather more of the character of hypothesis about them than could be supported 
by straightforward induction. We have begun to see that Hume did not think of his theories in 
this way. I want now to fill out that earlier suggestion. The discussion broaches another 
important difficulty which I will mention here. Hume regards his hypothesis as explanatory. It 
compares favourably with the only rival hypothesis Hume considers because of its greater 
explanatory completeness(15). The kind of explanation Hume has in mind must go beyond the 
bare description of observed regularities. His explanation of phenomena in terms of general 
causes would appear to transcend the phenomena themselves. Hume seems to have seen 
that a theory must somehow do this if it is to avoid merely redescribing the phenomena in 
question. The problem is that, on the face of it, talk of general causes such as habit, and other 
theoretical entities which playa part in Hume's theorising, would seem to violate the strictures 
of Hume's own theory of meaning. I have already noted that Hume makes fairly free play with 
the language of secret or concealed causes. What is required is some account of the meaning 
of these terms which reconciles the critical constraints Hume places on theorising with his 
relaxed use of the language of powers and forces. These issues will be addressed in due 
course. We need first to understand Hume's thought on hypotheses. 
Despite Hume's promise in the Abstract to 'talk with contempt of hypotheses', he not only 
makes ready use of them, but, on occasion, makes his endorsement of the practice explicit. 
To illustrate his 'hypothesis' as to the causes of pride and hurnility in Book Two, Hume invites 
us 'to compare it to that, by which I have already explain'd the belief attending the judgments, 
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which we form of causation'(T.289). A little later in the same book, he writes that these 
'phaenomena, when duly weigh'd, will be found convincing proofs of this hypothesis'(T.34S). 
All belief arises from the association of ideas, Hume says, 'according to my 
hypothesis'(T.112). On other occasions, as we have seen, Hume is more prepared to endorse 
Newton's apparently sweeping rejection of hypotheses in science. Hypotheses, Newton says, 
'are not to be regarded in experimental philosophy'(16). The practice of induction, he tells us, 
'may not be evaded by hypotheses'(17). Newton's apparent verdict on hypotheses has been 
received as the keynote of his empiricism. Hume has very often been read as expelling or 
seeking to expel, in terms strikingly similar to Newton's, all hypothetical argument from 
philosophy. It is a fundamental part of Hume's methodological outlook, as he presents it in the 
Treatise, to reject 'any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of 
human nature'(T.xvii). This would suggest that Hume's rejection of hypotheses is perhaps not 
as sweeping as Newton's appears to be. It at least marks a significant qualification of that 
position. A conclusion like this sits uneasily with my earlier contention, and Hume's own 
suggestion, that he and Newton had, for the most part, a common method in view. 
Fortunately, neither Hume nor Newton has as flawed or inconsistent a view as the highly 
selective comparison of passages would suggest. Newton's remarks on method prove as 
unreliable a guide to his actual practice as, very often, do Hume's. The overwhelming concern 
of both, I think, is not, as they would on occasions have us believe, with the expulsion of 
hypotheses from science, but with the proper regulation of their use. 
An early letter written by Newton explicitly acknowledges the role he took hypotheses to play in 
his method and gives a robust defence of his position. The 'best and safest method of 
philosophizing', Newton writes, 'seems to be, first to inquire diligently into the properties of 
things, and establishing those properties by experiments and then to proceed more slowly to 
hypotheses for the examination of them.' Hypotheses, he goes on, 'should be subservient only 
in explaining the properties of things, but not assumed in determining them'(18). Hypotheses, 
Newton tells us, may be 'assumed' only in so far 'as they may furnish experiments'(19). 
Newton's hypothesis about ether in the Opticks is an example of a hypothesis with little other 
than assumption to support it(20). The idea seems to be that while hypotheses can be allowed 
exceptionally to prompt or 'furnish' experimentation, they must not be used to avoid it or to 
disavow its findings. Newton allows a limited role even for more or less speculative sorts of 
conjecture such as that concerning ether. It may not be too much of an exaggeration to 
suggest that Newton's methodological strictures about hypotheses are intended more for the 
education of his readers and scientific rivals than for the guidance of his own scientific 
practice. His promise not to feign hypotheses occurs not as a preliminary to his investigations 
but as an afterthought, in the second edition of the Principia(21). He is, in any case, very far 
from endorsing Thomas Reid's verdict that Newton had shown 'that hypotheses ought to have 
no place in the philosophy of nature'(22) or indeed in 'genuine philosophy' of any kind. Rsid 
took the apparently sweeping verdict of the PrinCipia as a literal rejection of hypotheses of all 
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forms. According to Reid, a cause must be shown to exist before it can playa part in scientific 
theory. If the cause assigned to the phenomena cannot be shown to our satisfaction to exist, 
the theory of which it forms a part must be discarded. Reid's view would appear to leave 
Newton in the embarrassing position of forming 'hints' or hypotheses about light and ether 
which, from his own strictures, he must have known should never have been formulated. In 
Reid's view, the only assertions admissible in science are those for which experimental 
confirmation is already available. I think it is clear, however, that Newton had another 
programme in mind, one which, implicitly at least, endorsed the use of conjecture in 
explanation of natural phenomena. 
There is reason to suppose that Newton's sensitivity to the use of hypotheses was a late 
development in his thinking, one with terminological rather than practical implications for his 
work(23). In a paper sent to John Locke three years after the publication of the Principia, 
Newton describes his laws of motion as '[H]ypotheses'(24). In later editions of the Principia, 
the nine propositions termed hypotheses at the beginning of the third book of the 1687 edition 
are called either 'Phaenomena' or 'Regulae Philosophandi'. Three entries described as 
hypotheses remain still in the second and third editions, despite the presence of Newton's 
most explicit strictures on the matter. The explanation for the obvious obscurity of Newton's 
verdict lies, I think, in his concern to clear himself of association with what he thought of as the 
inadmissible use of hypotheses, rather than with any use at all. Newton's anxiety over such an 
association leads him, unhappily, to issue a verdict which, as it stands, makes a nonsense of 
his own methodology. The problem for interpreters is to sort out the inadmissible from the 
admissible. The important point for Newton, as he presents it in the above passages, is not so 
much that hypotheses must always be preceded by observation and experiment, although 
they must be if they are to be more than mere 'hints', as he describes them, but that their use 
must not be allowed to pre-empt or obscure the collection of observational data. When 
Newton tells us that hypotheses are 'not to be regarded in experimental philosophy' he has in 
mind hypotheses which are, in his words, 'assumed' in determining the 'properties of things'. 
The properties must first be established by experiments, before we proceed to hypotheses in 
explanation of them. Newton's distaste for hypotheses could be more happily expressed as a 
distrust of purely speculative explanatory theories which neglect or ignore experimental 
evidence. Newton's concern, I think, is to put a distance between his own scientific work and 
the practice of those speculators who take their bare conjectures as the basis for their 
experiments. 'As in Mathematics,' Newton writes in the Opticks, 'so in Natural Philosophy, the 
Investigation of difficult Things by the Method of Analysis, ought ever to precede the Method of 
Composition. This Analysis consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing 
general Conclusions from them by Induction, and admitting of no Objections against the 
Conclusions, but such as are taken from Experiments, or other certain Truths. For 
Hypotheses are not to be regarded in experimental Philosophy.'(25) Not 'to regard hypotheses' 
means not to admit it as an objection to a conclusion formed on the basis of induction that it is 
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in conflict with any other proposition not 'taken from Experiments'. It is no point against a 
conclusion derived from Newton's method of analysis and composition that an alternative 
conclusion can be conceived of by the imagination. Newton is concerned that this pOint should 
not be lost on his rationalist opponents. By way of analysis, he writes, 'we may proceed from 
Compounds to Ingredients, and from Motions to the Forces producing them; and in general, 
from Effects to their Causes, and from particular Causes to more general ones, till the 
Argument end in the most general. This is the Method of Analysis: And the Synthesis consists 
in assuming the Causes discover'd, and establish'd as Principles, and by them explaining the 
Phaenomena proceeding from them, and proving the Explanations'(26). In his fourth Rule of 
Reasoning in the Principia Newton warns: 
In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions inferred by 
general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, 
notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such 
time as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more 
accurate, or liable to exceptions. This rule we must follow, that the 
argument of induction may not be evaded by hypotheses. (27) 
The conceivability of any alternative hypothesis should not prevent a proposition grounded 
systematically in the way Newton describes being regarded as 'very nearly true'. Note that 
Newton allows that scientific propositions might be 'made more accurate' as 'other phenomena 
occur'. Our attachment to a given hypothesis should not prevent us from admitting any 
exception which occurs 'from Experiments'. Our assertions remain, in an important sense, 
revisable. Hypotheses of the inadmissible sort are those which seek, as Newton says, to 
'evade' the 'argument of induction'. The main business of natural philosophy, as Newton 
describes it in the Opticks, is 'to argue from Phaenomena without feigning Hypotheses, and to 
deduce Causes from Effects, till we come to the very first Cause, which certainly is not 
mechanical'(28). Newton, as this passage suggests, is not entirely free of the rationalist 
baggage he is attempting to discard. He does, however, make quite clear elsewhere in the 
Opticks that argument from experiments and observations can 'be no demonstration of 
general conclusions; yet it is the best way of arguing which the nature of things admits of'(29). 
There remains, for Newton, some little attraction to rationalism, not least in the ways in which 
he thinks of the aim and scope of science, for which Hume is concerned to take him to task. It 
is, nevertheless, his rationalist opponents that Newton has in mind in his apparently general 
denunciation of hypotheses. It is this that must be borne in mind in sorting out the important 
procedural questions posed by Newton's methodological remarks. The 'feigned' hypotheses of 
the speculators are those of Descartes and the Cartesians. Newton wants to distinguish his 
own method of analysis and synthesis from fanciful hypothetical schemes of which Descartes' 
theory of vortices is usually thought a leading example(30). What Newton recommends is a 
reversal of the order of investigation which treats the settlement of metaphysical questions 
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such as that of the existence of God as preparatory to the beginning of natural science proper. 
Newton's objection is not that we are wrong to ask such questions. Where we go wrong is, 
more basically, in failing to 'deduce' causes from effects, in illicitly introducing a speculative, 
empirically vacuous assumption at, or in place of, the stage of analysis. 
Newton's concern is that the method of analysis ought always to precede the method of 
composition. The right point at which to introduce a hypothesis is once the business of 
analysis is complete, at least in so far as circumstances allow. Phenomena must be 
accounted for 'notwithstanding any contrary hypothesis'. Observation and experiment must 
always precede hypothesis and generalisation. This is the case with any admissible, 
explanatory hypothesis. The point was not lost on other scientists and philosophers of 
Newton's time. Robert Hooke, a contemporary and sometime antagonist of Newton's, and a 
member of the Royal Society, spoke of the Society's considered avoidance of 'Dogmatising, 
and the espousal of any Hypothesis not sufficiently grounded and confirm'd by 
Experiments'(31). John Locke makes the same point in a little more detail in his Essay. 
Hypotheses, he tells us, if 'well made', may often 'direct us to new discoveries'. We should not, 
however, 'take one up too hastily, (which the Mind, that would always penetrate into the 
Causes of Things, and have Principles to rest on, is very apt to do,) till we have very we" 
examined Particulars, and made several Experiments, in that thing which we would explain by 
our HypothesiS, and see whether it will agree to them a": whether our Principles will carry us 
quite through, and not be as inconsistent with one Phenomenon of Nature, as they seem to 
accommodate, and explain another.'(32) Locke, like Newton, disparages the speculative use 
of hypotheses as 'foundations of reasoning, or verities to be contended for'(33), while 
endorsing their use in explanation of data already collected by experiment and observation. 
Unless hypotheses are preceded by careful observation they wi" remain 'suppositions taken 
up gratis'(34). Locke's objection to Descartes' 'hypothesis' that 'the soul always thinks'(35) is 
that it merely begs a question of fact. Whether that 'Substance perpetually thinks, or no, we 
can be no farther assured, than Experience informs uS ... The Question being about a matter of 
fact, 'tis begging it, to bring, as proof for it, an Hypothesis, which is the very thing in dispute: by 
which one may prove any thing'(36). He who 'would not deceive himself, ought to build his 
Hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by sensible experience, and not presume on 
matter of fact, because of his Hypothesis, that is, because he supposes it to be so'(37). A 
sound methodology wi" reject the 'high priori method' of Descartes in favour of the 'plain 
historical method' of Robert Boyle and Sir Isaac Newton. 
Similar sentiments to those Locke presents are, indeed, to be found in the work of his friend 
and intellectual mentor, Boyle. Some recent scholarship has given us reason to suppose 
Boyle's influence to have extended in a significant way to Hume(38). There can be little doubt 
that Hume was well-acquainted with Boyle's work. The corpuscular hypotheSis invoked by 
Boyle, as we" as by Hooke and Newton, is one of the few Locke is prepared to entertain. 
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Locke writes favourably of the hypothesis as 'that which is thought to go farthest in an 
intelligible Explication of the Qualities of Bodies'(39}. While we can by no means come to 
discover the 'Texture and Motion' of the hidden parts of bodies(40}, the hypothesis of the 
existence of insensible particles or corpuscles in motion gives the most comprehensive 
explanation of the qualities and actions of bodies available, comprising, most importantly, the 
most puzzling and apparently anomalous cases, for example, the fact of the same water 
feeling hot to one hand and cold to another( 41 }. 
The function of hypothesis, according to Boyle, is 'to render an intelligible account of the 
effects, or phenomena proposed'(42}. The terms in which the corpuscularian theory is 
presented by Boyle make clear its conjectural character. The account is not offered as a true 
one but merely as the most 'intelligible' one which systematizes the greatest range of 
phenomena. The hypothesis has to do with the concealed or unobservable causes of 
phenomena. There are some hints in Locke and Boyle as to what might guide us in 
conjecturing intelligibly as to the existence of unobservables. A 'wary Reasoning from 
Analogy', Locke tells us, is 'the best conduct of rational Experiments, and the rise of 
Hypothesis', where 'we can only guess, and probably conjecture'(43} as to the causes of 
phenomena. Analogy with something already familiar from experience is the 'only help we 
have' in forming judgments and conjectures as to unknown and unobservable causes. The 
'insensible' mechanism identified by a hypothesis should be suggested by analogy with some 
familiar part of our experience. The 'minutest fragments', Boyle explains, are, by analogy with 
the largest masses, 'endowed each with its peculiar bulk and shape'(44}. The unobservable 
mechanism responsible for the qualities and action of bodies is identified with the sensible 
'primary' qualities of body. It is only, Locke writes, by 'observing that the bare rubbing of two 
Bodies violently upon one another, produces heat, and very often fire it self, we have reason to 
think, that what we call Heat and Fire, consists in a violent agitation of the imperceptible 
minute parts of the burning matter'(45}. As we will see, Hume too goes some way in endorsing 
the use of analogical reasoning, but has much more definite ideas about where the limits of 
such reasoning are to be drawn. 
I have already suggested that Hume thought of scientific theories as something more than 
mere natural histories of phenomena or statements of constant conjunctions. Hume's 
conclusion that habit is the cause of causal inference cannot be supported on the basis of 
straightforward induction. He characterises his own conclusion as hypothetical: a 'very 
intelligible' if not a true proposition. The explanation of phenomena in terms of general causes, 
powers and principles seems, of necessity, to go beyond the phenomena themselves. The 
Hume of the Enquiry tells us that the aim of his science is 'to discover, at least in some 
degree, the secret springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its 
operations'(E.6). Hume's methodological position in the Enquiry is substantially the same as 
that presented by him in the Treatise(46). Any 'hypothesis', Hume writes in the Treatise, that 
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'pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be 
rejected as presumptuous and chimerical'(T.xvii). In the Enquiry, Hume writes that the 
'ultimate springs and principles' of natural phenomena are 'totally shut up from human 
curiosity and enquiry'. The principles of elasticity, gravity, 'cohesion of parts' and the 
'communication of motion by impulse' are 'probably the ultimate causes and prinCiples which 
we shall ever discover in nature'(E.30). The chief difficulty in reconciling the methodologies of 
the two works lies in making consistent sense of Hume's account of causation in the Treatise 
and his continued use, most striking in the Enquiry, of the language of unobserved principles, 
powers and Newtonian forces. What I have begun to suggest is that Hume thought of his 
hypothesis that habit is the cause of causal inference as an empirically-grounded conjecture to 
do with the existence of a 'secret' or 'conceal'd' prinCiple. Hume characterises his 
philosophical thought as being about the 'discovery' of these principles or general causes. 
Hume's own theories are couched in terms of such unobservable entities. Before fleshing out 
these suggestions I want to consider, more generally, how Hume thought of hypotheses, and 
where, and under what circumstances, he thought their use admissible and explanatory. 
There remains, in particular, the problem of interpreting Hume's apparently outright and oft-
noted rejection of hypotheses in science. Hume has been read as accepting a view of 
hypotheses that is close to the one Reid attributed to Newton. Such a view would embarrass 
Hume as much as it would have embarrassed Newton, had he seriously entertained it. 
Nevertheless, the apparent discrepancy on Hume's part can be accounted for in the same 
way as we accounted for it in Newton. Hume, like Newton, is prepared to allow in hypotheses, 
but only under the appropriate conditions. In his more cautious moments, he is much more 
careful to distinguish those hypotheses with which he is happy to work from those 'that 
pretend to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature'(T.xvii). He smartly reproves 
those philosophers who have fallen into the error 'of imposing their conjectures and 
hypotheses on the world for the most certain principles'(T.xviii). Hume nonetheless saw that 
his science of human nature required a much less arid methodological ground from which to 
flourish than that envisaged by Reid. The contrast is a particularly vivid one. Where Reid saw 
Newton's achievement in terms of the strictures with which he appeared to have strictly bound 
the scientific enterprise, Hume found in Newton's methodological outlook a fertile place in 
which theory and conjecture could find root and flourish, though within limits which the 
scientist must be careful to guard. Had Hume observed Reid's strictures he could never have 
formulated his hypothesis that habit is the cause of causal inference. Hume would have been 
led to reject the whole substance of his science of man as well as the better part of empirical 
science as he understood it. Writing in his History, Hume warmly commends Boyle's work on 
hydrostatics, Which, he says, contains 'a greater mixture of reasoning and invention with 
experiment, than any other of his works; but his reasoning is still remote from the boldness 
and temerity which has led astray so many philosophers'(47). The endorsement of Boyle's 
invention is striking here, as is the contrast Hume draws. The contrast he has in mind lies, I 
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think, between the careful use of hypotheses in explanation of data collected by 
uncontaminated experiment and observation, exemplified in the work of Boyle and Newton, 
among others, and the 'most extravagant' conjectures or 'inventions' of the rationalists, mere 
'reasonings upon a supposition', lacking 'the authority of the memory or the senses'(T.83), yet 
taken for 'the most certain principles'. Hume is happy to refer to parts of his own theory as 
'hypotheses'. The exact 'conformity of experience to our reasoning', he says, is 'a convincing 
proof of the solidity of that hypothesis, upon which we reason'(T.338). Hume agrees with 
Newton that only those hypotheses which seek to evade or take the place of the authority of 
experience should be outlawed from science. The formulation of hypotheses must be 
preceded by careful experiment and observation of the phenomenon. It cannot be used as a 
substitute for them. 
Hume thinks of scientific theories as composed of hypotheses. He carefully distinguishes the 
science of Newton, as he understands it, from the mere description of phenomena with which 
previous philosophers had contented themselves. Newton's outstanding achievement lay in 
his explanation of the motions of bodies in terms of 'laws and forces'. In order to be 
explanatory a theory must transcend the phenomena to be explained. It cannot merely 
redescribe them. Hume both recognised the breadth and originality of Newton's achievement 
and sought, to the best of his abilities, within the field of the moral sciences, to emulate it. Had 
Hume thought to do no more than offer an accurate description of phenomena then recourse 
to principles like habit would appear only to mark a readmittance of occult qualities or forces, 
merely lending a name to our ignorance. Explanations in terms of occult qualities, powers or 
propensities say nothing yet give the appearance of settling 'all dispute and enquiry upon the 
matter'(T.224). I have suggested that Hume has a different programme in mind for his science 
of man. There remains, however, plenty of work to be done on the question of what makes for 
a good or adequate explanation. We need now to turn to the question of how Hume thought 
explanation couched in terms of unobservable 'general causes' explained the phenomena. 
Hume, I believe, had a number of general principles in mind. 
Of Newton's four rules for the conduct of reasoning in philosophy, Hume singles out the 
principle of parsimony as Newton's 'chief rule of philosophising'(E.204). It is, Hume says, 
'entirely agreeable to the rules of philosophy, and even of common reason; where any 
principle has been found to have a great force and energy in one instance, to ascribe to it a 
like energy in all similar instances'(E.204}. Newton's third rule states that the qualities of 
bodies 'which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be 
esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever'(48}. Writing in the Treatise, Hume 
observes that 'in the course of nature' we find 'that tho' the effects be many, the principles, 
from which they arise, are commonly but few and simple, and that 'tis the sign of an unskilful 
naturalist to have recourse to a different quality, in order to explain every different 
operation'(T.282). To invent, Hume goes on, 'without scruple a new principle to every new 
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phaenomenon, instead of adapting it to the old; to overload our hypotheses with a variety of 
this kind; are certain proofs, that none of these principles is the just one, and that we only 
desire, by a number of falsehoods, to cover our ignorance of the truth.' The variety of our 
principles and their inability to account for much in the way of phenomena is an indication that 
the principles in question are not 'just'. An acceptable theory will be one which explains 'every 
different operation' in terms of the fewest and simplest causes or principles. It is, Hume tells 
us, 'an inviolable maxim in philosophy, that where any particular cause is sufficient for an 
effect, we ought to rest satisfied with it, and ought not to multiply causes without 
necessity'(T.578). The best explanation will be the one which sufficiently accounts for the 
operations of phenomena in terms of the fewest sorts of cause or principle. The test of a 
theory's adequacy, Hume suggests in his discussion of habit, is its comprehensiveness, its 
capacity to account for all the phenomena of a given sort, and in particular, the more puzzling 
or apparently anomalous cases. The hypothesis that it is reason that is responsible for the 
phenomenon of causal inference is rejected on just these grounds. The task for the 
experimental science of man, as Hume announces it in his introduction to the Treatise, is to 
render its principles 'as universal as possible' by tracing its experiments 'to the utmost, and 
explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes'(T.xvii). 
Hume's expressed intention in the Treatise is to explain the operations of the understanding in 
terms of the 'simplest and fewest' psychological causes; causes which, like the forces of 
Newton, were 'governed and directed' by laws from which other phenomena could be 
'demonstrated'. His principle of the association of ideas can be used to 'demonstrate' or 
explain other phenomena, such as the belief in the continued and independent existence of 
body, which in turn stand in support of the original theory. Hume thinks that the derivation of 
phenomena from laws like the one from which the phenomena of belief in body can be 
demonstrated explains because it systematises phenomena which would otherwise appear 
various and disconnected. To suggest that phenomena are subject to a force is to say that 
they can be demonstrated from such laws. A theory is more or less explanatory according to 
the degree to which it succeeds in systematising a set of phenomena in terms of the fewest 
general laws. An acceptable explanation will be one which puts phenomena in wider, more 
general law-governed patterns, with as little multiplication of general causes or principles like 
habit as is necessary. The phenomena in question are explained by being subsumed under 
psychological laws. The 'utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive 
of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a 
few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and 
observation'(E.30). We may, Hume continues, 'esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if, by 
accurate enquiry and reasoning, we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or near to, 
these general principles', placing them, in other words, in increasingly general law-governed 
patterns. 
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Unobservable entities like habit are, for Hume, an essential ingredient of explanations of this 
sort. Hume tells us that he hopes to discover 'at least in some degree' the 'secret springs and 
principles' of human nature. Scientific theories are sets of hypotheses concerning hidden or 
concealed causes like habit by which 'the human mind is actuated in its operations'(E.6). 
Hume insists on a distinction between the mere description of phenomena and their 
explanation in terms of forces, principles and laws. Explanatory hypotheses, while closely, and 
crucially, related to the inductive generalisations they are intended to explain, go beyond them. 
What guides us in drawing up hypotheses to do with unobservable principles or causes, and, 
in particular, assigning terms to our causes, Hume thinks, is analogy. I suggested earlier that 
Hume went some way with Boyle and Locke in endorsing the use of analogical reasoning. 
Theoretical terms, like habit, while referring to no observable object, must, nevertheless, be 
identified by analogy with some cause with which we are already familiar. This, Hume makes 
clear, is very much the case with his principle of 'habit': 'For wherever the repetition of any 
particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without 
being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we always say, that this 
propensity is the effect of custom.'(E.43}. Theoretical entities, like habit, though unobservable, 
are identified, by analogy, with known features of impressions. The propensity to repeat an 
action or behaviour is commonly termed an effect of habit or custom. Hume makes clear what 
is not intended by the use of the term: 'By employing that word, we pretend not to have given 
the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human nature, which 
is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects.'(E.43) The analogous 
nature of his principle to a cause with which we are already well-enough familiar is what 
guides and, to Hume's mind, justifies, his choice of terms. It is certain, Hume goes on, that 'we 
here advance a very intelligible proposition at least, if not a true one'(E.43). 
Hume endorses the use of analogical reasoning in science. His remarks on the subject or on 
its special logic are sparse and unsystematic. All our reasonings concerning matters of fact, 
Hume tells us, 'are founded on a species of Analogy, which leads us to expect from any cause 
the same events, which we have observed to result from similar causes'(E.104). He does, 
however, want to make sure that the practice is not abused. His prime example of abuse is 
drawn from Newton. Hume sees Newton's argument from design as an example of a 
hypothetical argument from experience not sufficiently supported by analogy. Hume's 
Dialogues present a reading of Newton's argument drawn directly from Colin Maclaurin's An 
Account of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophical Discoveries(49). The argument Hume has 
Cleanthes present pivots on the analogy drawn between the natural world and the works of 
human designer-builders. The world, in particular, resembles 'one great machine, subdivided 
into an infinite number of lesser machines'(50}. Its parts are every one 'adjusted to each other 
with an accuracy, which ravishes into admiration all men, who have ever contemplated 
them'(51). In the case of machines we know that this precise 'adapting of means to ends' is 
the result of 'human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence'(S2). Since the effects in these 
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two cases are in all important respects similar we may infer 'by all the rules of analogy, that 
the causes also resemble' and that the intelligent designer of nature 'is somewhat similar to 
the mind of man'(53). Hume has Philo respond with a restatement of his own position. The 
exact similarity of cases, Philo says, 'gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event; and a 
stronger evidence is never desired nor sought after. But whenever you depart, in the least, 
from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last 
bring it to a very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty.'(54) Hume 
writes in similar terms in the Enquiry, that where 'the causes are entirely similar, the analogy is 
perfect, and the inference, drawn from it, is regarded as certain and conclusive'. But where 
'the objects have not so exact a similarity, the analogy is less perfect, and the inference is less 
conclusive; though still it has some force, in proportion to the degree of similarity and 
resemblance. '(E.1 04) It is this latter principle that Hume invokes to refute Newton's position. If 
we see a house, 'we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder, 
because this is precisely that species of effect, which we have experienced to proceed from 
that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears such a 
resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the 
analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking, that the utmost you can 
here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause'(55). The 
departure from the 'similarity of the cases' makes the reasoning liable to 'error and 
uncertainty'. The object in this case is so singular, and without parallel in our experience, that 
to show that the universe had been the product of a mind-like intelligence would require 
experience of the origin of other worlds, other universes. We have, in this case, no experience 
at all from which an analogous cause could be inferred. From so inadequate a base, analogy 
could lead us to any number of equally plausible, but no more convincing, alternatives. We are 
left only with the devalued currency of conjecture. Experience alone, Philo concludes, 'can 
point out...the true cause of any phenomenon.'(56) 
Despite what we have found to be their broad and far-reaching agreement on the correct 
method to be pursued in the sciences, Hume and Newton disagree, implicitly, on the question 
of the aims and scope of the scientific problem. While Newton, as Passmore has put it, 
'regretfully' puts aside hypotheses to do with the 'inner nature' of objects as 'not yet "deducible 
from the phenomena"; Hume rejects them outright'(57). Newton is able to envisage science 
advancing from the phenomena to more and more general causes until it comes, at last, to 
the 'first cause'. For Newton, science still holds out the possibility for the sort of necessity the 
rationalists saw as a part of explanation. In his view, the scientific method presupposes a 
simple and well-ordered natural scheme resting on a rational, intelligible design. He never 
doubts that science will, in time, be capable of uncovering the ultimate causes of phenomena, 
their 'inner' natures. Hume believes it a profound mistake to think of science as targeted on 
any such thing. The rationalist ideal of explanation is a chimera. The notion of truth has little 
part to play in scientific explanation. No philosopher, Hume writes, 'who is rational and 
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modest, has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of any natural operation, or to show 
distinctly the action of that power, which produces any single effect in the universe.'(E.30) 
Success in the natural sciences lay in the reduction of our principles or general causes to 'a 
greater simplicity'. But as to the causes of these general causes, we need not trouble 
ourselves, nor should we think of science as targeted on their discovery. The 'ultimate springs 
and principles' remain 'totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry'(E.30). It is not much 
to Hume's point to deny that there are such 'ultimate' causes and principles. He does not do 
so. He wants merely to say that they can play no part in scientific explanation, nor, for that 
matter, need they. Hume adopts a Newtonian model of explanatory adequacy, within which 
'laws and forces' are the ultimate explainers of phenomena. Forces like gravity and elasticity 
are 'probably the ultimate causes which we will ever discover in nature'.(E.30) The most 
perfect philosophy of the natural kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer'(E.31). 
Hume's hypotheses are not concerned with 'the true springs and causes' of phenomena. He 
rejects outright, at the outset of the Treatise, any hypothesis 'that pretends to discover the 
ultimate original qualities of human nature'(T.xxi). The 'powers and forces' by which the course 
of nature is 'governed' are 'wholly unknown to us'(E.54). Hume insists upon the impossibility of 
our ever apprehending the sort of ultimate connection between cause and effect which natural 
philosophers as astute as Boyle and Newton still, at times, wrote of science as being targeted 
on. Locke declared that natural philosophy might still be 'capable of being made a science'(58) 
akin to mathematics were the search for 'first causes' or 'real essences' pushed far enough. 
For Hume, such speculations have no place in experimental philosophy. We have, and can 
have, no appreciation of what it would be like to apprehend a fact that carried implications for 
other facts of a sort. This was the lesson he believed he had drawn from Newton. Scientific 
hypotheses can say nothing about the essential, original nature of matter. Hume, 
nevertheless, continues to speak of hidden and secret causal powers. The aim of his science 
is 'to discover, at least in some degree, the secret springs and principles, by which the human 
mind is actuated in its operations'(E.6). Forces or general causes are an essential part of what 
Hume thinks of as scientific explanation. The problem for interpreters of Hume is to reconcile 
this language of causal endowment, which is an undeniable part of Hume's work, with his 
theory of ideas, and, in particular, its application to the question of the origin of our idea of 
causation in the Treatise. All our ideas, Hume tells us in the Abstract, 'are derived from our 
impressions, or strong perceptions ... we can never think of anything we have not seen without 
us or felt in our own minds'(T.647-8). We have no impression and so can have no idea of the 
'conceal'd' powers and forces of which Hume writes. He would appear to be committed to the 
thesis that talk of this sort cannot possibly make sense and so, one would suppose, to its 
inevitable expulsion from scientific discourse. Hume, however, not only makes fairly free play 
with such talk but is happy to describe these causes as 'secret' and 'wholly unknown to us'. 
Far from intending the expUlsion of such terms from experimental philosophy, Hume, as we 
will now see, was at pains to find a place for them. 
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The key to understanding Hume on this point lies, I believe, in an important footnote in the 
Enquiry. Hume warns us that in speaking of our 'ignorance of natural powers' the term 'power' 
is to be understood in 'a loose and popular sense'(E.33). The 'generality of mankind' suppose 
themselves acquainted with 'the very force or energy of the cause'(E.69), some 'quality, which 
binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the 
other'(E.62). We have, of course, no conception of such a quality, nor any idea of what it 
would be like to do so. Hume uses the term in this 'loose and popular' way when he wishes to 
stress our ignorance of 'natural powers'. The idea we have of causal powers as hidden or 
concealed is 'very uncertain and confused'(E.77). He promises a more 'accurate 
explication'(E.33) of the nature of terms like force and power which should prove more 
satisfactory to the philosophically-minded. Hume refers us to Section VII where he intends 'to 
fix, if possible, the precise meaning of these terms, and thereby remove some part of that 
obscurity, which is so much complained of in this species of philosophy'(E.62). His concern in 
these passages of the Enquiry is to offer some account of what Newton and other 
experimental scientists meant by causal power. While Hume continues to restate the thesis of 
the Treatise that we have no adequate idea of active power in objects, the Enquiry is notable 
for Hume's insistence upon and defence of the language of Newtonian 'laws and forces'. The 
suggestion is that experimental philosophers should follow the example of Newton in using 
these terms only to 'mark' the observable effects of a cause and not signify the causal power 
itself(59). We need not 'examine at length the vis inertia which is so much talked of in the new 
philosophy, and which is ascribed to matter. We find by experience, that a body at rest or in 
motion continues for ever in its present state, till put from it by some new cause; and that a 
body impelled takes as much motion from the impelling body as it acquires itself. These are 
facts. When we call this a vis inertia, we only mark these facts, without pretending to have any 
idea of the inert power; in the same manner as, when we talk of gravity, we mean certain 
effects without comprehending that active power.'(E.73) Hume seems here to accept that 
there are real and 'active' powers or forces such as gravity, which science can, he supposes, 
'in some degree' uncover. This is, indeed, what science is really targeted on. But he is just as 
clear that science cannot tell us what these causes are, cannot, in other words, give us the 
'cause of these general causes', but can only inform us of what they do. It is, Hume writes, 
'allowed by all philosophers, that the effect is the measure of the power'(E.77). In Hume's 
more 'accurate explication' of these terms, 'causal powers' and 'forces' are understood, 
indirectly, in terms of their effects, and not in terms of what they are. Of this we have but the 
most distant, 'obscure and uncertain'(E.62) idea. We can define causal powers, strictly 
speaking, only in terms of their observable effects, of which our ideas are clear and 
determinate. Gravity and its counterparts are 'probably the ultimate causes and principles 
which we shall ever discover in nature'(E.30). 
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Newton was greatly troubled at the accusation of Leibniz and others that he had failed to say 
what gravity was(60). The 'force' of mutual gravitation appeared to Leibniz to mark a 
readmittance of occult qualities, 'propensities' the effects of which were known but whose 
cause and real nature remained mysterious. The cause of gravity, Newton admitted, 'is what I 
do not pretend to know'(61). Newton evidently shared some of Leibniz's concern. He was 
aware of the awkwardness of failing to say what the cause of gravity was while denying that 
gravity was an occult property of the sort he explicitly rejects. He makes his position clear in 
the Principia when he writes that he does not affirm gravity to be anything 'essential to 
bodies'(62). Gravity can be understood only indirectly, in terms of its effects. Nothing is 
intended as to its 'minute parts' or essential nature. The phenomena cannot be dismissed on 
the grounds that they fail to provide real explanation as the rationalists thought of it. Hume 
takes up Newton's hint but he desires greater methodological clarity. Newton appeared to 
leave open the rationalist ideal of explanation as a realistic goal for science. Hume's point is 
that these 'true springs and causes' are permanently and unreachably 'shut up from human 
curiosity'. It is a mistake to think of science as converging on such 'ultimate causes'. They are 
not only 'unknown' but 'entirely incomprehensible'(E.77). We have no conception at all of the 
sort of connection the rationalists saw science as targeted on(63). What Newton had 
achieved, while not the end or final condition of science, was, Hume appreciated, the only sort 
of thing that could be achieved by science. Nothing, Hume says, is 'more requisite for a true 
philosopher, than to restrain the intemperate desire of searching into causes'(T.13). 
1.2 Ideas and Association 
Hume attempts to explain a number of mental phenomena as the effects of the principles of 
the association of ideas and impressions. He saw a clear parallel between what he called the 
'principles of union or cohesion among our simple ideas'{T.12) and the principle of mutual 
gravitation in terms of which Newton had explained the motions of the planets. Here is a 'kind 
of ATTRACTION', Hume promises, 'which in the mental world will be found to have as 
extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various 
forms.'{T.12-13) The analogy, however, has no real work to do in Hume's system. Hume has 
no mathematical formulae comparable to the mathematical laws from which Newton 
'demonstrated' the behaviour of bodies, and little is to be gained from pressing the pOint much 
further than Hume himself does. We stand to gain a good deal more from taking seriously the 
general parallel Hume has in mind between the nature of the scientific project and that of his 
own enterprise. A more exact and, I think, quite deliberate analogy is being drawn between the 
aims and constraints of natural and 'moral' enquiry. I characterised Hume's chief concern in 
Book One of the Treatise as being with the discovery of the principles and operations of the 
understanding, and with the origin and nature of its ideas. The principles of the association of 
ideas and impressions are the principles with which Hume wants to explain our fundamental 
beliefs. Mental phenomena, these beliefs among them, are to be thought of as natural events, 
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governed by laws and principles, which the empirical scientist might hope, 'to some degree', to 
discover. In doing so, he pretends not to explain the 'original qualities of human nature'(T.13). 
As Hume makes clear, we succeed only in deluding ourselves when we think of science as 
targeted on the discovery of such qualities. Science can inform us only of what these 
principles do, not of what they are, and in the case of the principle of the association of ideas, 
the effects 'are every where conspicuous'(T.13). As with the natural sciences, the only 'solid 
foundation' for Hume's new science is provided by experiment and observation. By cautiously 
and judiciously collecting and comparing his experiments, the scientist of human nature can 
reasonably hope to found a science not only the equal in certainty and scope of the natural 
sciences but, for the reasons I explored earlier(64), 'much superior in utility to any other of 
human comprehension'(T.xix). 
The operations of the imagination in separating and uniting its simple ideas are guided, Hume 
says, by 'some universal principles, which render it, in some measure, uniform with itself in all 
times and places'(T.1 0). The 'natural relations' of resemblance, spatial and temporal 
contiguity, and cause and effect, guide and constrain the freest flights of the imagination, 
conveying the mind from 'one idea to another'(T.11), as a picture 'naturally leads our thoughts 
to the original'(E.24). The simplicity of Hume's account of these relations satisfies one of his 
demands for theoretical adequacy. The effects of this 'secret tie or union'(T.662), we are told, 
'are none more remarkable, than those complex ideas, which are the common subjects of our 
thoughts and reasoning, and generally arise from some principle of union among our simple 
ideas.'(T.13) Association ties together our simple ideas to form complex ones. Although 
'nothing is more free' than the imagination, its ideas are not 'entirely loose and 
unconnected'(T.10). Some 'associating quality' ensures that events in the mind fall out 
regularly along well-worn associative tracks. This 'bond of union' is best regarded, Hume 
thinks, as a 'gentle force'(T.1 0) which causes one idea or impression 'naturally' to 'attract' or 
'introduce' its 'correlative'(T.269). 
The 'uniting' principles of the imagination are not to be thought of as 'inseparable connexions'. 
The laws of association can at best be said to 'commonly prevail' when one idea is connected 
with another in the imagination. There is no necessity about the relation. Hume, as one would 
expect, shuns all 'obscure and uncertain' speculation as to the 'ultimate causes' of his 
principle of association. Enquiry will be best employed, he tells us, 'in examining the effects' 
rather than the causes of the principle(T.13). Hume considered himself the first philosopher to 
have 'attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association'(E.24), the 'natural 
relations' responsible for the association of ideas. If anything can entitle the author of the 
Treatise to the 'glorious name' of 'inventor', Hume writes in the Abstract, "tis the use he makes 
of the principle of the association of ideas, which enters into most of his philosophy'(T.661-2). 
His theory of association is fundamental to the science of man. It is these principles of the 
association of ideas Which, Hume believes, explain the origin of the passions, as he describes 
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them in Book Two. Hume, however, is inclined to put the case much more strongly than that. 
The principles of association are, Hume says, 'the only ties of our thoughts' and really are 'to 
us the cement of the universe'(T.662). 
Hume offers an associationalist account of belief. Beliefs arise as a result of the interaction of 
the principles of association with certain features of our experience. Hume defines belief as 'A 
LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION.'(T.96) The 
'additional force and vivacity' of a belief comes from the 'PRESENT IMPRESSION' to which it 
is related. Hume explains the transition from 'original impression' to 'the idea of the connected 
cause or effect'(T.84) in terms of an association of ideas. Vivacity is transferred from an 
impression to the idea of its regular associate sufficient to make that idea a belief. Hume 
makes belief 'more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cognitive part of our 
natures'(T.183). All probable reasoning 'is nothing but a species of sensation'(T.1 03). Belief is 
more a matter of 'feeling, or sentiment'(T624) than of reason, and feeling, Hume explains, is 
conveyed from impreSSion to idea by the mechanism of association. All our beliefs are the 
result of the operation of certain psychological principles. Hume nevertheless wants to 
distinguish those beliefs which he considers good or more reasonable from those he 
considers mere prejudices or superstitions(65). Beliefs are proportioned by Hume according to 
rules which appear to give warrant to ascriptions of degrees of probability. Nothing is more 
dangerous to reason, Hume tells us, 'than the flights of the imagination, and nothing has been 
the occasion of more mistakes among philosophers'(T.267). We are to distinguish between 
those 'irregular' principles of the imagination which 'are observ'd to take place only in weak 
minds' and those which are 'permanent, irresistable, and universal'(T.225), such as the 
general rules 'by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and 
effects'(T.149). Hume, nevertheless, expects us to draw from his work the moral that many of 
our most fundamental beliefs, as well as much of our philosophy, rest on the 'irregular' 
operations of the imagination. The problem for Hume, and for his interpreters, is to see how, if 
at all, he can find the scope within his system to make the sorts of adjudications among beliefs 
he insists upon. I will attempt a solution to this problem in the closing sections of the chapter. 
We need, first of all, to sketch an outline of the framework within which Hume puts the 
aforementioned questions and with which he hopes to resolve them: his theory of ideas. 
The basic components of the mind are, for Hume, as for his immediate predecessors, 
perceptions. or impressions and ideas. All the 'perceptions' of the human mind, Hume says, 
'resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS.'(T.1) 
Ideas are the fainter, less forceful 'images' of the impressions of the senses 'in thinking and 
reasoning'(T.1). The perceptions which enter the mind 'with most force and violence, we may 
name impressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and 
emotions. as they make their first appearance in the soul.'(T.1) These are among the 
fundamental elements of Hume's account of mind. Hume's difficulty, and in some ways, his 
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chief purpose, in Book One of the Treatise, is to explain how, from so unpromising a base, we 
come to think of ourselves and our world as we do. Complex ideas, according to Hume, are 
not confined to actually-experienced complex impressions. Simple ideas can be combined in 
novel and original ways. The principles of association guide the mind in forming, on the basis 
of a strictly limited number of ideas, a system of beliefs which, in significant ways, goes 
beyond them. The mind contributes actively to the ways in which the world appears to us. The 
natural operations of the imagination give rise to 'fictions' to which no feature of reality 
corresponds. Fictions, such as the belief in the continued existence of the objects of sense, 
'bestow on the objects a greater regularity than what is observ'd in our mere 
perceptions'(T.197). Hume's concern is to explain how the mind makes do with what it gets, 
and what it does with those ideas it has. 
In Part I of Book One, Hume makes a number of distinctions among what he calls 'the 
elements of this philosophy'(T.13) which will prove to be of the greatest importance to the 
exposition to follow. Having introduced his most basic distinction among perceptions, Hume 
further distinguishes between simple and complex impressions and ideas. Complex ideas can 
be analysed into simple ones which can be traced back to the simple impressions to which 
they correspond. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the basic elements of 
thought and the basic elements of experience. Simple perceptions 'are such as admit of no 
distinction nor separation'(T.2). Complex impressions and ideas 'are contrary to these, and 
may be distinguished into parts'(T.2). Hume has surprisingly little to say about the nature of 
the simples into which complex perceptions can be analysed, but he does give us a valuable 
clue as to the sort of analysis he has in mind. Although we find a particular colour, taste and 
smell to be 'united together' in the complex idea of an apple, "tis easy to perceive they are not 
the same, but are at least distinguishable from each other.'(T.2) The idea is a complex one 
because its elements can each be separated one from the others. It is not clear from this 
whether or not Hume considers these qualities to be the ultimate simples into which the 
complex idea of the apple can be divided, or if the division is to proceed wholly along 
perceptual lines until we arrive at qualities which are genuinely simple. It matters more to 
Hume, at this point, to make clear that distinguishable perceptions are always separable(66). 
We can, however, learn something more of how Hume construes the separability of ideas and 
the sort of analysis he has in mind for them, by considering his treatment of ideas of colour, 
or, more exactly, of shades of colour. Ideas of colour, perhaps surprisingly, provide Hume with 
his paradigm of perceptual simplicity. It is important to appreciate why Hume thinks of ideas of 
colour in this way. 
The missing shade of blue is typical of the sort of quality Hume thinks of as simple. Hume 
describes one 'contradictory phaenomenon' to the thesis that all our simple ideas are 
preceded into the mind by simple impressions(T.5-6). Supposing a person to have become 
acquainted 'with colours of all kinds, excepting one particular shade of blue', Hume suggests 
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that it would be possible for that person 'to raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, 
tho' it had never been conveyed to him by his senses'(T.6). Commentators have been 
understandably unsettled by the curious way in which Hume's handles this apparent counter-
example(67). His admission would appear to seriously undermine what Hume, after all, 
regards as a 'general maxim'(T.6), and, indeed, the supreme principle of his theory of ideas. 
An empirical generalisation is apt to be refuted by even a single exceptional instance. For all 
that, the instance is clearly not as 'particular and singular' as Hume believes. Could we not, 
analogously, 'raise up' instances of a missing tone or taste, or missing shades of every other 
colour? Hume is happy to dismiss the example on the grounds of its apparent singularity. It 
has struck critics that Hume might easily have dispensed with it in another way: by dismissing 
it as a genuine counter-example to his thesis(68). Hume might well have treated ideas of 
shades of colour as complex rather than simple ideas. The suggestion is that apparently 
simple perceptions, like colours, should be seen as complex perceptions involving relations to 
other perceptions of the sort. On the basis of a complexity of this sort, Hume could allow that 
ideas of colour can sometimes be derived from other related ideas without any extra input 
from the senses. He could still, quite plausibly, deny that we can form an idea of a shade of a 
colour with which we are entirely unfamiliar. 
Hume continues to regard ideas of particular colours as simple, even after he has shown that 
we can raise up ideas of shades of colour on the basis of our experience of other shades and 
colours(69). The imagination, Hume admits, 'when set into any train of thinking, is apt to 
continue, even when its object fails it, and like a galley put in motion by the oars, carries on its 
course without any new impulse.'(T.198) It seems to me that Hume must have had it in mind 
to set certain limits to the extent to which the imagination might continue on without fresh 
impulse. These, I believe, have to do with Hume's insistence upon the separability of different 
or distinguishable ideas. Hume thought that every simple idea had to have a direct and 
distinguishable precedent among impressions. A complex idea is one which can be analysed 
into simple properties each of which can be traced independently back to simple impressions. 
The difficulty with treating ideas of shades of colour as complex lies in distinguishing 
adequately among its supposed parts. Let us take as obvious candidates for separation, the 
tone and brightness of a colour. Because neither one can exist without some measure of the 
other it is not possible adequately to distinguish nor, then, to separate one from the other. 
Brightness and tone cannot function as simple ideas. The shade of colour to which they 
belong cannot be analysed further and so, for Hume, meets the criterion for simplicity. Ideas, 
Hume tells us bluntly in Book Three of the Treatise, 'never admit of a total union, but are 
endowed with a kind of impenetrability by which they exclude each other'(T.366). Hume insists 
upon the perfect separability of all our simple ideas. All ideas that are separable are 
different(T.24). Hume nevertheless continues to talk of perceptions of 'colour, taste, heat, cold' 
and so on, as though they comprised qualitatively identical parts. Resemblances among them 
immediately 'strike the eye, or rather the mind'(T.70). The instance of the missing shade of 
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blue would seem to be as clear an example as one could wish for of the sort of perception 
which comes related to other perceptions within the same sense modality. Hume, 
unfortunately, gives little explicit attention to the detail of the distinction between simple and 
complex perceptions. The precise drawing of the distinction seems to have mattered little to 
him. What is, nevertheless, and for good theoretical reasons, of the first importance to Hume 
is to argue that all our simple ideas are essentially separable from one another. 
Another important distinction, though one which does most of what work it has to do in the 
later books of the Treatise, is drawn by Hume within the class of impressions. Impressions, he 
tells us, 'may be divided into two kinds, those of SENSATION and those of REFLEXION'(T.7). 
The first sort arises 'in the soul' from 'unknown causes', striking upon the senses and causing 
us to 'perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other'. The 
second 'is derived in a great measure from our ideas'. When the idea of pleasure or pain 
'returns upon the soul', it 'produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and 
fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it'(T.7-8). 
All impressions are either impressions of the senses or impressions of reflection. Impressions 
of sensation are, however, in an important sense, more basic than their counterparts. 
Impressions of reflection occur only because we have already experienced impressions of 
sensation. All the materials of the mind derive, ultimately, from impressions of sensation. 
A number of ambiguities attend Hume's drawing of these important distinctions. Hume is 
somewhat careless in the detail of his theory of ideas. He expects that 'it will not be very 
necessary to employ many words' in explaining his first distinction between impressions and 
ideas, since everyone 'will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking'(T.1-2). 
The difference between impressions and ideas is 'easily distinguished'(T.2) since this is just 
the difference between thinking about and perceiving something which we all acknowledge in 
our own experience. Hume appeals to experience to support his suggestion that there is a 
one-to-one correspondence among impressions and ideas. The distinction between complex 
and simple perceptions allows Hume to continue to insist upon this neat correlation while 
acknowledging that many of our complex ideas have no direct correspondent. We can easily 
see Hume's reasons for drawing his distinction in the way he does. If all the components of 
the mind are perceptions, or impressions and ideas, and all our ideas, whether simple or 
complex, are ultimately derived from the simple impressions to which they correspond, then 
everything that can be an object of thought can be seen to have its origin in feeling or the 
impressions of the senses. Hume sees his theory of ideas as counting decisively against the 
doctrine of innate ideas, the thesis that there exist in the mind ideas derived from neither 
sensation nor reflection. The question 'concerning the precedency of our impreSSions or 
ideas', Hume tells us, 'is the same with what has rnade so much noise in other terms, when it 
has been disputed whether there be any innate ideas, or whether all ideas be derived from 
sensation and reflection.'(T.7) 
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The 'first proposition' of the science of man, as Hume describes it in the Abstract, 'is that all 
our ideas, or weak perceptions, are derived from our impressions, or strong perceptions; and 
that we can never think of anything we have not seen without us or felt in our own 
minds.'(T.647-8) All our ideas or 'more feeble impressions', Hume tells us in the Enquiry, 'are 
copies of our impressions or more lively ones'(E.19). Feeling or sensation is the ultimate 
source of all the materials of thought. Hume characterises the difference between thinking and 
feeling as a difference in the force and liveliness with which the perceptions 'enter' the mind. 
When we examine the contents of the mind we find they can be roughly distinguished into two 
sets on the basis of their force and liveliness. Hume, however, seems unhappy in drawing the 
distinction solely in these terms. It is not impossible, he admits, that our ideas might, on 
occasion, approach impressions in their forcefulness and liveliness. Hume appears to be 
aware of the unreliability and hence the inadequacy of the grounds he initially offers for the 
distinction. He suggests a second way in which the distinction might be drawn. By the name 
'impressions', Hume says, he understands 'all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they 
make their first appearance in the soul'(T.1). We can divide perceptions up on the basis of the 
order in which they occur. All the perceptions of the mind, Hume says 'are double'(T.3). To 
every simple idea there corresponds a more lively simple impression which resembles it. The 
idea of red 'which we form in the dark', Hume says, 'and that impression, which strikes our 
eyes in sun-shine, differ only in degree, not in nature'(T.3). We may satisfy ourselves on the 
point, Hume tells us, by running over as many cases as we may. What we find is not only a 
straightforward correlation between all our simple ideas and all our simple impressions, but a 
priority among them, such that the impression always occurs prior to the idea to which it 
corresponds. While force and liveliness provide us with a useful, though not always reliable, 
means with which to draw the distinction, it is primarily on the basis of temporal priority that 
perceptions are to be distinguished as either impressions or ideas. The difficulty for Hume is 
that in arguing for the causal priority of impressions over ideas he must assume that it is 
possible to distinguish impressions and ideas in terms other than those of priority. It must be 
possible, in the first instance, to distinguish impressions and ideas adequately on the basis of 
their forcefulness and liveliness, and solely upon that basis. 
Impressions are causally prior to ideas. Hume has yet, at this stage of the Treatise, to discuss 
causation. His theory is, however, very much in evidence in these early passages. Having 
discovered the relation of resemblance to obtain, in general, between these 'two species of 
perception', Hume turns to the question of 'how they stand with regard to their eXistence, and 
which of the impressions and ideas are causes and which effects'(T.4}. We can ascertain 
which of two constantly conjoined events is the cause and which the effect by considering the 
order in which they occur. Whichever of the two sorts of thing occurs first in the conjunction is 
to be considered the cause, whichever occurs second, the effect. The constant conjunction of 
resembling perceptions, writes Hume, 'can never arise from chance; but clearly proves a 
34 
dependence of the impressions on the ideas, or of the ideas on the impressions.' To know on 
which side the dependence lies we need only consider 'the order of their first appearance'. We 
find that simple impressions always precede their correspondent ideas into the mind and 
never appear in the 'contrary order.'(T.4-5) The constant conjunction of perceptions is 'a 
convincing proof, that the one are the causes of the other; and this priority of the impressions 
is an equal proof, that our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our 
impressions .'(T .5) 
Simple ideas are the effects of the simple impressions to which they correspond. The general 
distinctions Hume offers can be read, quite plausibly, as steps in an inductive argument for the 
general proposition: That al/ our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple 
impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.'(T.4) The 
copy principle is perhaps the most important in Hume's system and is the one which has, for 
Hume, the greatest utility. It is certainly the most interesting and most often discussed general 
claim of his theory of ideas. Hume presents his principle not, as some have suggested, as an 
a priori or 'logical' claim about the preconditions for understanding(70), but as the conclusion 
of an evidentially well-grounded inductive argument(71). He uses it, with most effect, to 
explode the pretensions and suppositions of philosophers who take themselves to have an 
idea or ideas which they could not possibly have. It is, Hume says, 'impossible to reason justly, 
without understanding perfectly the idea concerning which we reason; and 'tis impossible 
perfectly to understand any idea, without tracing it up to its origin, and examining that primary 
impression, from which it arises.'(T.74-5) The first components of thought, according to Hume, 
are simple ideas. Simple ideas are caused by simple impressions. If we suspect a piece of 
reasoning of being unjust in the sense Hume has in mind we need only trace up the origin of 
the problematic idea to its correspondent impression. Where no impression can be produced 
we are led to conclude that the reasoning in question is unjust. There neither is, nor, very 
often, could there be, an impression of the sort required for the existence of the supposed 
idea. This procedural principle plays a crucial, largely negative, role in the general strategy 
Hume develops in order to deal with problems like causation and personal identity. It allows 
Hume to dispose unfussily of a number of troublesome philosophical questions and positions. 
The copy principle, which both underlies and justifies Hume's strategy in these cases, has 
seemed to many to stand on rather unconvincing foundations(72). It rests, as we have already 
begun to see, on two main premises. It is to the question of the sorts of ground Hume is able 
to offer for these premises and for his general conclusion that I wish now to turn. 
Hume argues that to every simple idea there corresponds a simple impression which it 
resembles and that there is an apparently invariable temporal priority among pairs of 
'resembling perceptions'. He thinks that from these two facts he can infer a third proposition: 
that all our simple ideas 'in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions'(T.4). 
The inference appears to be a good one within Hume's system. But what kinds of evidence, if 
35 
any, does Hume adduce for his two premises? Hume makes clear that his argument is 
supported by two main sorts of evidence. To convince ourselves of the claim that there exists 
an exact one-to-one correspondence among our simple ideas and impressions we need only 
undertake a fresh review of the contents of our minds. To know 'on which side the 
dependence lies' we need to consider 'the order of their first appearance'(T.5). We find 'by 
constant experience' that the impression is always prior to the idea to which it corresponds. 
This is the lesson Hume draws from an examination of his own experience. Impressions are 
always followed into the mind by their correspondent ideas, but ideas never precede their 
correspondent impressions into the mind. 
Hume looks to a second source of evidence to support his general claim that impressions are 
causally prior to ideas. The priority thesis is confirmed, Hume thinks, by the 'plain and 
convincing phaenomenon' that where the senses are in some way dysfunctional so that no 
impressions are to be had, no ideas are to be had either(T.5). The same general point can be 
seen to hold even for cases where one's senses function normally. If one has never 
experienced the taste of pineapple, one will have neither the impression, nor the idea of the 
taste of pineapple(T.5). Hume thinks that our inability to have an idea or mental image of a 
taste or visual sensation without having first had the taste or sensation in question supports 
his thesis that ideas are derived from impressions. 
A number of commentators have raised questions about the sort of support Hume can give for 
his argument(73). There are good prima facie reasons for questioning its adequacy. These 
have to do with the nature of the support Hume offers for his principle and the sort of job it is 
to do in his system. Hume provides some inductive evidence for the copy theory but it is, by its 
nature, inconclusive. Anthony Flew objects that while Hume's psychological thesis might well 
be true, Hume cannot be in a position to know that it is so. His suggestion is that Hume must 
be in a position to be certain of the truth of the general proposition that all impressions are 
causally prior to ideas if the use to which he puts the copy theory in the remainder of the 
Treatise is to be warranted. This is not a point about the strength of the inductive evidence 
Hume adduces. Flew admits that Hume's theory has some inductive support. What Hume 
needs, according to Flew, is a different sort of support altogether, an a priori principle 
depending not upon the truth of 'certain contingent facts' about people, but 'on the meanings 
of the terms employed to state it.'(74) What Hume is looking for, Flew believes, is an 
argument showing that no idea whatever could possibly arise in the mind without the prior 
occurrence of its correspondent impression. No inductive argument could convince us of this. 
Hume's argument falls significantly short of supplying the sort of support for his principle which 
Flew thinks it requires. Hume openly acknowledges the inconclusiveness of his argument. He 
unabashedly introduces counter-examples to his thesis. Hume's willingness to admit as an 
exception the instance of the missing shade of blue shows, at the very least, that he does not 
36 
rule out the possibility of an idea arising in the mind without a precedent impression. If what 
Flew says is correct, Hume is on very slippery ground indeed. But to conclude the matter here , 
as Flew does, would be to do Hume a significant injustice. Before damning Hume, we should 
attempt to see the question from his own perspective. Hume makes no claim for the necessity 
of his thesis. He nowhere suggests that his principle embodies a necessary proposition. There 
are no appreciable signs of his being unhappy with the sort of evidence available to him. It is 
obvious from what Hume has to say about the possibility of a priori knowledge of causal 
relations(T.86) that he does not, nor, in good faith, could he, think of his claim as an a priori or 
necessary one. He does not present it as a necessary truth about the human mind but, as we 
have seen, as a well-grounded causal inference supported by what he obviously thinks are 
some unexceptionable facts about human life. The copy principle is confirmed both by direct 
self-observation and by what we know from common experience about human beings. It is, 
Hume thinks, a bald and uncontroversial fact that we know of no reports, whether first or 
second-hand, of the blind experiencing ideas or images not related to the previous input of the 
senses. The conviction borne of self-observation is strengthened by the absence of either first 
or second-hand reports to the contrary. This represents, for Hume, some good inductive 
evidence in support of the copy principle. It is strengthened by the success Hume thinks he 
gains later in the book in accounting for the origin of a number of our basic concepts and 
beliefs. But none of this is conclusive evidence for the principle. Hume's argument fails to 
establish that all simple ideas whatever are causally dependent on simple impressions. In 
Hume's favour, though, it must be said that he shows every sign of being aware of the fact. He 
presents what evidence he can in support of what he thinks is a contingent feature of human 
experience. He makes, to my knowledge, no stronger claim. The fact that we have always 
found it to be the case that impressions precede their correspondent ideas into the mind 
means that we might 'reasonably hope', in applying the lesson of past experience, to remove 
all dispute concerning the 'nature and reality' of a contested idea(E.22). 
Hume goes on to employ his principle in challenging the legitimacy or 'reality' of certain 
problematiC or disputed ideas. It has seemed to commentators that Hume's procedure here is, 
if not wholly unacceptable, at least deeply puzzling. How can what Hume has either said or 
shown warrant the use to which he puts the copy theory in the remainder of the Treatise? 
Hume must surely rest his key methodological strategy on something more than a reasonable 
hope. Hume's position may not be as difficult to defend as, at first glance, it seems. Recent 
work by Don Garrett suggests a possible defence(7S). Garrett observes that when Hume uses 
the copy principle to argue against the existence of an idea, he does not appeal merely to the 
absence of the impression, but to the fact that no perception could possibly meet the demands 
placed implicitly upon it. The point is worth entertaining. It is not merely that we have no 
apprehension of, for example, necessary connection, but that we have no conception of what 
it would be to apprehend a fact with the implications it would need to have. In this, as in other 
cases, Garrett suggests, an exception to the copy prinCiple would mean the admittance of a 
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mean the admittance of a perception which could not, even in principle, resemble an 
impression. Hume is careful never to argue merely from the absence of the original 
impression. While the copy principle is a crucial part of Hume's procedure, his reliance upon it 
is not complete. In arguing against the existence of an idea, Hume makes clear not only that 
the impression is absent, but that no perception whatever could possibly meet the demands 
being made on its behalf. The desire for an idea of a certain sort often reflects, for Hume, a 
desire for a certain sort of apprehension which no perception could possibly satisfy(76). 
There is no doubt that the copy theory represents an important, not to say, indispensable, part 
of Hume's general strategy. He presents the principle that every simple idea is copied from an 
antecedent impression as the conclusion of a strong inductive inference. I have tried to explain 
why, despite the inconclusiveness of his arguments, Hume presents his theory with as much 
confidence as he does. Hume neither asks, nor does he suggest that he envisages a need, for 
a stronger form of support. The use to which he puts the copy principle gives us no reason to 
suppose that he thought of it as embodying an a priori or necessary proposition. This much, I 
think, can be said in Hume's defence. What I want to consider now is whether, and upon what 
basis, Hume's 'experiments' lend the sort of inductive support to his theory it needs. To do this 
we need to bring some of the deeper structure of Hume's theory of ideas into view. We need, 
in particular, to understand the sorts of commitment entailed by the doctrine. The nature of 
those commitments quickly becomes clear once we begin to probe the theoretical basis upon 
which Hume's experiments support the proposition that every idea is preceded into the mind 
by a correspondent impression. It is important to note the extent of Hume's entanglement. 
What I want to suggest is that Hume's discomfort with his finished position stems from a 
number of commitments which are an indispensable part of the doctrine of ideas and from his 
inability or reluctance to conceive of an alternative. The sort of theoretical constraints Hume is 
working under are clear from the kinds of assumptions he must make before taking his 
experiments as supportive of his general position. As we will see, they support the theory only 
on the basis of these assumptions being either true or in some way justified(77). 
Hume tells us that we cannot form an idea or mental 'image' of the taste of a pineapple 
without having first had experience of the taste of pineapple(78). This evidence is intended to 
support the premise that all simple ideas are preceded into the mind by simple impressions. It 
may seem at first glance that it does so and in a very obvious way. But this is not all that is 
going on. The evidence supports the premise only on the basis of the assumptions, first of all, 
that to taste a pineapple is to have a perception before the mind, and, second of all, that those 
perceptions which are before the mind when we are having sense perceptions such as tasting 
are impressions. It is important to note the extent of Hume's reliance on these assumptions. 
On the face of it, the most the phenomena Hume presents might be said to confirm is the 
lesser thesis that simple ideas, of the taste of pineapple or the colour red, are preceded into 
the mind by tasting pineapple or seeing red. If we cannot safely assume that in tasting 
38 
pineapple, for example, I am having a perception, and that that perception is an impression, 
Hume's thesis as to the temporal priority of impressions has not been supported. 
Let us take the second of the two assumptions first. Hume wants to say that the perceptions 
which are before the mind when I see red, or taste orange, are impressions. Hume must 
assume, for the purposes of his argument, that it is possible to distinguish impressions and 
ideas on some basis other than the order in which they occur. Hume, as I remarked earlier, 
needs to make out his distinction adequately on the basis of the liveliness and forcefulness of 
our perceptions(T.1). I can conclude, on this basis, that the lively and forceful perception I 
have of the taste of orange is an impression, and its fainter, less forceful appearance in 
thought, an idea. Assuming that this first ground for the distinction is adequate, Hume can 
take the phenomena he describes as evidence for the general proposition that simple 
impressions precede simple ideas into the mind. 
Hume is confident that the distinction he is drawing is one to which we will all readily assent. 
The 'common degrees' of our 'resembling perceptions' are, Hume thinks, 'easily 
distinguished'. This is just the distinction between feeling and thinking about something which 
we all acknowledge as a feature of our experience. We need only remind ourselves of it. 
Hume is happy to draw the distinction in a rough and perfunctory sort of way. The distinction is 
too obvious and too familiar to require much explanation. This may be true. But it is not, in 
itself, very much to the point. The obviousness of the distinction may explain its ready 
acceptance but it does not tell us how, and precisely upon what basis, it is to be drawn. This is 
surely what Hume needs to do. However, almost as soon as he has expounded it, Hume 
raises a significant doubt about its reliability as a means of distinguishing impressions and 
ideas. Hume concedes that 'it is not impossible but in particular instances' the force and 
liveliness of our resembling perceptions may 'very nearly approach each other. Thus in sleep, 
in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our 
impressions'(T.2). Our impressions are likewise at times 'so faint and low' that 'we cannot 
distinguish them from our ideas'(T.2). Hume adds, rather unconvincingly, it seems to me, that 
impressions and ideas are nevertheless, in general, 'very different'. Hume's discomfort with 
the distinction as it stands is evident. Force and liveliness, Hume admits, do not provide wholly 
adequate or conclusive grounds for the distinction. The forcefulness and liveliness of our 
ideas in dreams or during delirium can often be indistinguishable from that of our impressions. 
This has unfortunate consequences for Hume. If all that distinguishes an impression from an 
idea is the forcefulness or liveliness with which it strikes the mind, it seems that Hume is 
pushed to conclude that at least some of the perceptions which are before the mind when it is 
thinking are impressions. In the same way, if all an idea is is a faint or less forceful perception, 
Hume must admit that at least some of the perceptions which are before the mind in seeing, 
tasting, smelling, and so on, are ideas. 
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Hume's discomfort is understandable. The problem he has lies in making a distinction among 
kinds of perception, purely on the basis of the degree of force and liveliness with which the 
perceptions strike the mind. Hume admits that this criterion for the distinction is inadequate. It 
does not give us a reliable means with which to determine whether a given perception is either 
an impression or an idea. This is what Hume is looking for. It might seem, at first sight, that 
Hume has a better candidate to hand in the criterion of temporal priority. Hume does, indeed, 
make the distinction in these terms. This is another way in which it can be drawn. But it does 
not give Hume what he needs. Hume wants to explain how it is our impressions differ from our 
ideas. He cannot characterise the difference in terms of the temporal priority among 
resembling perceptions. If the distinction were made in this way, then whichever perception, of 
a corresponding pair, was to enter the mind first, could properly be called an impression, 
irrespective of its degree of force and liveliness. No experiments would be needed to establish 
the point. Hume would have wasted a good deal of time in attempting to do so. 
What Hume needs to tell us is how feeling or perceiving something differs from thinking or 
reasoning about it. He must do this before his experiments can support the proposition that 
impressions are temporally prior to ideas. Hume must therefore show that it is possible to 
distinguish between impressions and ideas on grounds other than priority. This is what he 
consistently attempts to do. Impressions and ideas, he tells us, 'differ only in their strength and 
vivacity'(T.19). The component parts of impressions and ideas 'are precisely alike. The 
manner and order of their appearance may be the same. The different degrees of their force 
and vivacity are, therefore, the only particulars, that distinguish them.'(T.319) We must be able 
to sort a perception into one or other class simply from an inspection of 'the perceptions 
themselves'(T.2n). This is the line Hume consistently held to, despite his own questions as to 
its likely adequacy. It is important to see that Hume's options are severely compromised. Once 
he has characterised the difference between thinking and feeling as a difference in kinds of 
perception he has more or less restricted himself to the sort of answer which he in fact gives, 
and which, by his own admittance, is less than adequate(79). 
Impressions, for Hume, are those perceptions which are before the mind when one is feeling 
or perceiving something. This is a crucial paint for Hume because it is the link between feeling 
and having impressions which allows him to direct his chief methodological principle against 
the doctrine of innate ideas. It is probable, Hume writes in the Enquiry, that 'no more was 
meant by those, who denied innate ideas. than that all ideas were copies of our 
impressions'(E.17n). It would have been obvious to Hume that if impressions are 
characterised purely in terms of their precedence over their correspondent ideas, the doctrine 
of innate ideas survives unscathed. Hume will have shown only that a perception of a certain 
sort ;s the effect of another, of a different sort. which mayor may not be innate. The copy 
theory is decisive in settling the question of innate ideas because, for Hume, it shows that all 
our ideas derive, in one way or another. from sensation. Hume presents the claim as a 
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conclusion drawn from observation and experiment. Hume thinks he can show that all the 
materials of thought have their origin in experience. It is only because of the connection 
between feeling or perceiving something and having impressions that Hume can confidently 
use the copy principle in justification of his general strategy in challenging the legitimacy of 
certain of our supposed ideas. The principle that every simple idea is the effect of a simple 
impression has no real theoretical force at all if ideas are taken to differ from their 'precedent 
perceptions'(E.17n) only in the order in which they occur. 
We can now see how little room Hume has left to manoeuvre in. Hume might have avoided 
some of his difficulties by finding some other means of making the distinction between 
impressions and ideas. The criterion of precedence appeared to be the best candidate(80). 
But this can be of no use to Hume. Neither can he distinguish impressions and ideas in terms 
of their causes. The 'ultimate cause' of the impressions of the senses is, Hume admits, 
'perfectly inexplicable by human reason'(T.84). It will never be possible to decide 'whether they 
arise immediately from the object, or are produc'd by the creative power of the mind'. Hume 
can only hope to make the distinction by pOinting up differences in 'the perceptions 
themselves'. Hume commits himself to such a view, as well as to all the difficulties which 
attend it, when he characterises the difference between impressions and ideas as a difference 
between kinds of perception. Hume, therefore, has good theoretical reasons for attempting to 
distinguish thinking and feeling in terms of the force and liveliness of our perceptions. To hear, 
smell, taste, see, as much as to think or to reason, is, for Hume, to have a perception before 
the mind. The same can be said of any mental phenomenon. This is the central assumption of 
Hume's theory of ideas. Unfortunately, Hume offers little or no argument for it. We find none, 
at least, where we might most expect or hope to find it: in Hume's exposition of the 'elements 
of this philosophy'(T.13). When Hume does argue in support of the assumption, his 
arguments are perfunctory and unconvincing(T.210-1/226-7). It would be both unrealistic and 
unfair to think of these as the foundations upon which Hume bases his philosophical edifice. 
Hume, at least, does not seek to present them in this way(81). A more likely explanation is 
simply that Hume thought the assumption too obvious a truth to require much argument. This, 
indeed, is the line Hume appears to take. It is, he says, 'universally allow'd by philosophers, 
and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its 
perceptions or impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by 
those perceptions they occasion'(T.67). This assumption has not stood up well. Its results are 
notoriously sceptical. The doctrine of ideas makes it difficult to see how we can know anything 
about the external world or about the degree to which our perceptions adequately represent it. 
What, precisely, the sceptical results of this theory are, and what we are to make of them, will 
be the topic of a later chapter. It is important, for now, to note that Hume is arguing from within 
a philosophical tradition, with a not unreasonable expectation that the assumptions he makes 
will be shared by his readers. I have attempted to point up the sort of work these assumptions 
are doing within Hume's philosophy. The demands they make upon Hume, and the difficulties 
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they present him with, will, I trust, become clear as I proceed to consider his application of the 
copy principle and his theory of ideas. 
Hume presents the correspondence and resemblance between impressions and ideas as 
basic features of human experience which can be discovered by direct observation. The 
'component parts' of corresponding pairs of impressions and ideas are, Hume tells us, 
'precisely alike'(T.319). It may also happen that the 'manner and order' of their appearance are 
the same. This is the case with memories. The order and composition of our present ideas 
correspond to the order and composition of their original impressions. When there is no 
correspondence between the order of the idea and our original impressions, we say the idea is 
a product of the faculty of the imagination. This is how Hume presents the distinction between 
remembering something and imagining it. Ideas of memory preserve the order and structure 
of their original impressions. Ideas of the imagination vary the form and content of their 
impressions. Hume identifies another difference between these two sorts of ideas. We find by 
experience, Hume says, 
that when any impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its 
appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: 
either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first 
vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea; 
or when it inti rely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty 
by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the 
MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION.'(T.8-9) 
Ideas of memory are said by Hume to be 'much more lively and strong' than those of the 
imagination. When we recall a past event 'the idea of it flows in upon the mind in a forcible 
manner; whereas in the imagination the perception is faint and languid, and cannot without 
difficulty be preserv'd by the mind steddy and uniform for any considerable time.'(T.9) Ideas of 
memory are 'intermediate' between impressions and ideas. This is how Hume thinks of the 
difference between ideas. Ideas differ from impressions, and from one another, in terms of 
their different degrees of force and vivacity(T.96). Perceptions can be assessed and classified 
along the lines of the degree of vivacity or force and liveliness with which they enter the mind. 
Our stronger or more lively perceptions pass on a share of their vivacity to their fainter or less 
forceful copies. Association regulates the transfer of vivacity from one idea to another. Hume's 
discussion of the basic entities and faculties of mind reflects his concern with simplicity as a 
test of the adequacy of a theory. He uses the transfer of force and vivacity to explain causal 
inference and other phenomena involving belief. Belief, for Hume, is to be thought of as 
differing from mere conception in terms of its greater force and vivacity. Belief, he tells us, 
'super-adds nothing to the idea. but only changes our manner of conceiving it. and renders it 
more strong and lively'(T.1 01). Beliefs are formed as a result of the operations of the 
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imagination. The force and vivacity by which they are distinguished from other ideas is 
communicated to them by a present impression. The relation between impression and idea 
conveys the vivacity 'by an easy transition' from impression to idea. Without the present 
impression 'the attention is not fix'd, nor the spirits excited'(T.290). 
Hume's characterisation of belief as the product of the idea-forming faculty of the imagination 
may strike some readers as odd, given the frequent contrast he draws between imagination 
and reason, but Hume's meaning is both deliberate and precise. He explains somewhat later 
in the Treatise that he has in mind two distinguishable but related senses of the term. 'When I 
oppose the imagination to the memory', Hume writes, 'I mean the faculty, by which we form 
our fainter ideas. When I oppose it to reason, I mean the same faculty, excluding only our 
demonstrative and probable reasonings.'(T.117n) When he uses the term in the first sense, 
Hume has in mind the faculty which is responsible for the production of all our non-memory 
ideas, including beliefs, as well as for reasoning or argumentation. When he writes of the 
imagination in the second sense, he means to contrast some of the ways in which the 
imagination forms its ideas with those it forms by demonstrative or probable reasoning. Hume 
does not think of the two senses as referring to two separate faculties. He rejects the 
Cartesian distinction between pure intellect, on the one hand, and sense and imagination, on 
the other. The faculty of reason, or of reasoning, or making inferences and demonstrations, is 
not, for Hume, to be thought of as a faculty separate from the imagination, but as one aspect 
of the way in which the imagination forms ideas(82). It is in the second sense that Hume 
speaks when he contrasts the operations of the imagination with those of the understanding, 
for, as Hume makes clear, the understanding is 'founded on the imagination, or the vivacity of 
our ideas'(T.265). The understanding, indeed, is nothing other than 'the general and more 
establish'd properties of the imagination'(T.267). 
Beliefs differ from most of the ideas of the imagination. We may, Hume tells us, 'mingle, and 
unite, and separate, and confound, and vary our ideas in a hundred different ways'(T.96). The 
imagination is at liberty to separate and unite whatever ideas it likes 'in what form it 
pleases'(T.10). Belief merely changes our manner of conceiving these ideas. The mind can be 
guided by the regularities it finds in its experience in forming beliefs, and to this degree be 
constrained by them, but the imagination can also form original complex ideas to which no 
correspondent exists among our simple impressions. Its ideas are not, however, 'entirely loose 
and unconnected'(T.1 0). It is impossible, Hume says, that the same simple ideas should 'fall 
regularly into complex ones (as they commonly do) without some bond of union among 
them'(T.10). There must be some principle or principles governing the order of ideas in the 
imagination, some 'associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces another'(T.1 0). 
Hume presents the near correspondence of different natural languages as evidence for the 
operation of some 'uniting principle' among our simple ideas. In combining and separating the 
simple copies of the impressions of sensation and reflection, Hume finds, whether in belief, or 
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in the freer flights of the imagination, the mind is guided by what Hume calls laws of 
association. There are, Hume thinks, three natural relations or principles of association: 
resemblance, spatial and temporal contiguity, and cause and effect. The imagination is led to 
recombine or re-associate those simple ideas whose correspondent simple impressions it has 
perceived to be either spatially or temporally contiguous, related as cause and effect, or by 
their resemblance to one another. No relation 'produces a stronger connexion in the fancy' 
than cause and effect(T.11). It is only causation, Hume writes, 'which produces such a 
connexion, as to give us assurance from the existence or action of one object, that 'twas 
follow'd or preceded by any other existence or action'(T.73-4). A relation, it is explained, 'is 
that quality, by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination'(T.13). The natural 
relations of the imagination are responsible for the striking regularities we find to obtain among 
the sorts of transitions we make from idea to idea, and from idea to belief. The laws of 
association are the fundamental laws governing the behaviour of Hume's basic entities. 
Hume's suggestion is that most, if not all, of what goes on in the imagination can be 
accounted for in terms of the association of ideas. The effects of the three relations of 
association are, Hume tells us, not only remarkable, but 'everywhere conspicuous'(T.13). 
Hume was not the first philosopher to invoke the notion of association among ideas, although 
he considered himself to be the first to have attempted to enumerate all the general principles 
according to which it operated. He uses the term much as it had been used by Locke, though 
with somewhat different effect. Some of our ideas, Locke writes in a section added to the 
fourth edition of the Essay, 'have a natural correspondence and connexion one with 
another ... Besides this there is another Connexion of Ideas wholly owing to Chance or Custom; 
Ideas that in themselves are not at all kin, come to be so united in some Mens Minds, that 'tis 
very hard to separate them, they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time 
comes into the Understanding but its Associate appears with it; and if they are more than two 
which are thus united, the whole gang always inseparable shew themselves together.'(83) 
Locke does not give any examples of these 'natural' correspondences. He is more concerned 
with the 'unnatural connexions' owing to 'chance or custom' which seem to carry with them 'as 
natural an evidence as self-evident truths themselves'. Custom, he tells us, 'settles habits of 
Thinking in the Understanding, as well as of Determining the Will, and of Motions in the 
Body'(84). Locke, however, sees the phenomena of association not as an indispensable 
feature of the way in which human beings think about and experience the world, but as a 
'disease of the mind' to be cured rather than explained(85). Another formative influence on 
Hume's thinking about association is likely to have been Malebranche. The parallels here are, 
if anything, even more striking. Like Hume, Malebranche stresses both the importance of 
imagination and its tendency to operate out of habit. Like Locke, he speaks of 'natural 
connections' among ideas, contrasting them with the necessary connections discovered by the 
intellect(86). Whenever any two ideas or perceptions are found to be regularly conjoined in our 
experience, the imagination is led to habitually associate the one with the other, mistaking, 
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very often, the natural connection of the mind, for a necessary connection between objects or 
events. The 'natural connections' of the imagination, while the 'principal cause' of human 
error(87), nevertheless, are 'necessary to the preservation of life'(88). For Hume, too, the 
relations of idea-association are a natural source of error. Nothing, Hume says, 'is more apt to 
make us mistake one idea for another, than any relation betwixt them, which associates them 
together in the imagination, and makes it pass with facility from one to the other.'(T.202) The 
easy slide of the imagination from one idea to its regular associate explains, for Hume, our 
tendency to mistake constant conjunction for necessary connection. The mind takes the idea it 
has, an idea arising merely from a 'determination of the mind', an association of constantly 
conjoined ideas, for an idea of necessary connection between natural objects(89). The 
principles of mental association guide us in forming complex perceptions which take us far, 
and in significant ways, beyond the impressions to which they can be traced. To us, however, 
these relations are not only the main source of the complexity of our ideas, but of the 
coherence and orderliness of our experience. The relations of resemblance, contiguity and 
causation are 'the only bonds that unite our thoughts together, and beget that regular train of 
reflection or discourse, which, in a greater or less degree, takes place among all 
mankind'(E.50). 
'So far as regards the mind', Hume writes in the Abstract, 'these are the only links that bind the 
parts of the universe together, or connect us with any person or object exterior to ourselves. 
For as it is by means of thought only that any thing operates upon our passions, and as these 
are the only ties of our thoughts, they really are to us the cement of the universe, and all the 
operations of the mind must, in a great measure, depend upon them.'(T.662) The principles of 
association 'cement' together the simple elements of experience, organising and 
systematising the constant flux of events in the mind. Whereas previous philosophers, such 
as Locke and Malebranche, had recognised the importance of association or the 'natural 
relations' of the imagination, Hume was the first of the moderns to attempt to show how, and 
on the basis of what 'universal principles', these relations operate. He offers an elaborate 
working out and classification of the ways in which the natural relations cause ideas to come 
into our minds. Association represented for Hume the solution to the problem of how, from so 
limited a stock of original impressions, we come to form the complex ideas and beliefs about 
ourselves and the world that we do. He made rather stronger claims for its importance than 
either Locke or Malebranche. For Hume, the connection of ideas 'owing to Chance or Custom' 
is not, as Locke thought, the 'curable' exception, but the rule. Hume shows how the principles 
of association construct our complex passions. In Book Two of the Treatise, Hume invokes 
the relation of resemblance to explain why grief and disappointment 'give rise to anger, anger 
to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole circle be compleated.'{T.283) 
Hume seems to have thought that most of the complicated and various phenomena of human 
mental life, belief among them, could be accounted for in terms of psychological association. 
Even in our 'wildest and most wandering reveries, nay in our very dreams', Hume writes in the 
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Enquiry, 'we shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but 
that there was still a connexion upheld among the different ideas, which succeeded each 
other.(E.23) The more instances we examine, Hume thinks, 'the more assurance shall we 
acquire, that the enumeration, which we form from the whole, is complete and entire.'(E.24) 
Hume's account of belief and the causes of belief is given against the same general 
background against which he made sense of the difference between ideas of memory and 
ideas of imagination(90). Hume introduces his discussion of the causes of belief by remarking 
'that when any impression becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to such 
ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and 
vivacity'(T.98). Belief is a special case of the sort of association by which liveliness is 
transferred from an impression to an idea. Hume makes clear that his main concern in the 
sections dealing with belief is with the sort of belief which attends causal association or 
probable reasoning. We cannot be induced to believe in any matter of fact, Hume thinks, 
without being first acquainted with either its cause or its effect. Hume characterises belief of 
this sort in terms of the force and vivacity of an idea. But it is important to note that this is a 
characteristic also of ideas of memory and other sorts of judgment. Degrees of belief or 
assent can be characterised in terms of degrees of force and vivacity. Ideas of memory, as we 
saw, enjoy the greatest degree of vivacity, being, in this sense, 'intermediate' between an 
impression and an idea. Judgments of an 'unphilosophical probability' are communicated only 
a small share of force and liveliness. In all these cases, Hume says, 'the evidence diminishes 
by the diminution of the force and intenseness of the idea. This therefore is the nature of the 
judgment and probability'(T.154). Causal judgments based on an experienced conjunction of 
pairs of events are attended by a degree of probability and so, of 'force and intenseness', 
somewhere between the ideas of memory and of weak probability. This is the strongest kind 
of causal belief. It is with our belief or assent to judgments of this sort that Hume's theory of 
belief is concerned. 
Hume appears to have thought of belief of this sort almost exclusively as belief about 
unobserved matters of fact. The transition the mind makes from observed impression to 
unobserved idea in belief is explained by Hume as an effect of the association of ideas. The 
greater force and liveliness of a present impression conveys to the idea of its absent associate 
an additional force and vivacity sufficient to make it a belief. Belief is therefore defined by 
Hume as 'A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT 
IMPRESSION'(T.96). This provides Hume with his paradigm case of belief. Hume makes a 
number of general remarks about 'the nature of belief, or the qualities of those ideas we 
assent to'{T.94). Belief, Hume says, 'does nothing but vary the manner, in which we conceive 
any object'(T.96). When we affirm the existence of God, for example, we might think that we 
join an idea of existence to the idea of God's other qualities, but, in fact, 'we simply form the 
idea of such a being, as he is represented to us' and 'make no addition to or alteration on our 
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first idea'(T.94). When I think of God and when I believe in God's existence 'my idea of him 
neither encreases nor diminishes'. This must be so, according to Hume, for were it not, I could 
not distinguish between believing in and merely thinking about the same thing. Any alteration 
to the 'parts or composition' of an idea changes it into an idea of something else. The same 
idea, Hume concludes, can only be varied 'by a variation of its degrees of force and 
vivacity'(T.97) , and not by any change in its content. 
Hume distinguishes between belief and conception in the same way he distinguished between 
impressions and ideas, and the ideas of memory and the imagination. Nothing enters into this 
operation of the mind 'but a present impression, a lively idea, and a relation or association of 
the fancy betwixt the impression and idea'(T.1 01). Hume finds belief to involve an inference of 
sorts. The present impression does not have this 'extraordinary' effect by its own 'proper 
power and efficacy'. We must 'in every case have observ'd the same impression in past 
instances, and have found it to be constantly conjoin'd with some other impression'(T.1 02). 
The basis for 'BELIEF of the existence of any object', Hume tells us, is provided by a sort of 
association which communicates sufficient force and vivacity to make an idea a causal belief. 
The high degree of force and vivacity associated with this sort of belief is seen only where 'the 
conjunction is found by experience to be perfectly constant, and when the object, which is 
present to us, exactly resembles those, of which we have had experience'(T.154). In these 
circumstances, belief 'arises immediately, without any new operation of the reason or 
imagination'(T.102). When we are accustomed to finding two impressions regularly conjoined, 
the appearance of one of the impressions, leads the mind to form 'a more vivid and intense 
conception' of its regular associate. This is how belief in any unobserved matter of fact is to be 
thought of. When I am convinced of any argument or opinion, "tis only an idea, which strikes 
more strongly upon me. When I give the preference to one set of arguments above another, I 
do nothing but decide from my feeling concerning the superiority of their influence.'(T.1 03) 
Hume concludes that it is not the argument-forming faculty of reason that is the source of 
probable reasoning but custom or habit. All probable reasoning, Hurne writes, is 'nothing but a 
species of sensation'(T.103). In the case of propositions 'that are prov'd by intuition or 
demonstration', Hume says, 'the person, who assents, not only conceives the ideas according 
to the proposition, but is necessarily determin'd to conceive them in that particular manner, 
either immediately or by the interposition of other ideas'(T.95). In the case of probable 
reasoning or causal inference there is no intermediate idea or operation. Hume dismisses 
what he thinks are the only candidates for such an idea. The inference is immediate. A belief 
'which attends the present impression, and is produc'd by a number of past impressions and 
conjunctions' arises, Hume writes, 'immediately, without any new operation of the reason or 
imagination. Of this I can be certain, because I never am conscious of any such operation, 
and find nothing in the subject, on which it can be founded. Now as we call every thing 
CUSTOM, which proceeds from a past repetition, without any new reasoning or conclusion, 
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we may establish it as a certain truth, that all the belief, which follows upon any present 
impression, is deriv'd solely from that origin. '(T.1 02) All arguments from experience take the 
form of causal inferences and causal inference, Hume explains, is based not on reason, but 
on custom or habit. Belief, Hume tells us, 'is more properly an act of the sensitive than of the 
cognitive part of our natures'(T.183). It seems that nature 'by an absolute and uncontroullable 
necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel'(T.183). 
Hume, nevertheless, wants to fix some general rules 'by which we ought to regulate our 
judgment concerning causes and effects'(T.149). Hume, like Newton, takes the object of 
science to be very largely to do with the discovery of causal connections in nature. He 
attempts to follow Newton in setting down a number of rules to determine when an object or 
event might properly be thought the cause or effect of another. Hume sets down eight rules 
which he says are 'form'd on the nature of our understanding, and on our experience of its 
operations in the judgments we form concerning objects'(T.149). These rules go significantly 
beyond the rules of reasoning established by Newton. Hume uses them to distinguish 
'philosophical' from 'unphilosophical probability'. They state the conditions under which 
ascriptions of probability are warranted, and tell us how the 'wise man proportions his belief to 
the evidence'(E.11 0). Hume thinks that it is natural for human beings to form habits of 
expectation on the basis of past conjunctions of events. He offers a set of rules for making this 
sort of inference based on well-established, well-observed associative habits of mind: A cause 
must be contiguous with and prior to an effect with which it has been observed to be 
constantly conjoined; it must be both necessary and sufficient to produce its supposed effect; 
if several different objects produce the same effect, the cause must be some quality which we 
discover to be common among them; if an effect arises from one but not another 'resembling' 
cause of a given effect, there must be some determinate point of difference in the causes; if 
an effect is found to increase or diminish with its cause, then some presence or absence of a 
part of the cause must be always attended by a correspondent presence or absence of a part 
of the effect; if an object exists for any amount of time without the object which is its supposed 
cause, that object is not its cause(T.173-17S). 
Hume's formulation of these rules would suggest, at the very least, that he does not believe 
that in probable reasoning we take no more into account than constant conjunctions of events. 
Our causal beliefs can be subject to significant correction. The mind, Hume says, 'having 
form'd another observation concerning the connexion of causes and effects, gives new force 
to its reasoning from that observation; and by means of it can build an argument on one single 
experiment, when duly prepar'd and examin'd'(T.131). The picture Hume gives us is much 
more subtle and more carefully nuanced than is usually thought(91). The same general rules 
which lead us to conclude from p and q that r, will also lead us, upon further enquiry, to 
conclude that from p and q follows r only on the basis of y. Hume continues to account for the 
natural and subtle ways in which we judge of causes and effects after he has presented the 
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argument in which he is usually thought to have denied all warrant to inference of this 
sort(T.88-91). The formation of these general rules proceeds, Hume thinks, from 'those very 
principles, on which all judgments concerning causes and effects depend'(T.147). This is all 
the 'LOGIC' which, Hume says, he sees fit to employ in his reasoning: 'Our scholastic 
headpieces and logicians shew no such superiority above the mere vulgar in their reaSOn and 
ability, as to give us any inclination to imitate them in delivering a long system of rules and 
precepts to direct our judgment in philosophy.'(T.17S) The rules, being 'supply'd by the natural 
principles of our understanding', are 'very easy in their invention, but extremely difficult in their 
application'. It is only in so far as causation 'is a natura/relation', Hume tells us, that we are 
'able to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it'(T.94). Our reasonings about causation, 
as a natural relation, are based on the same natural associative relations as are all reasonings 
concerning matters of fact. Hume is giving a causal explanation of the 'accustom'd unions' 
formed by habit in the imagination. The eight rules of reasoning are just the natural habits of 
causal reasoning 'methodized and corrected'(E.162). 
A reflection upon general rules 'keeps us from augmenting our belief upon every encrease of 
the force and vivacity of our ideas'(T.632). From these general rules 'we learn to distinguish 
the accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes'(T.149), and so, to correct the 
imagination, and attribute to a belief a 'full conviction', though its 'want of resemblance, or 
contiguity, may render its force inferior to that of other opinions'(T.632). Resemblance and 
contiguity, nevertheless, have some effect on the imagination, and that effect too is to be 
attributed to general rules or principles of the imagination. The opposition of these two 
principles 'produces a contrariety in our thoughts, and causes us to ascribe the one inference 
to our judgment, and the other to the imagination. The general rule is attributed to our 
judgment; as being more extensive and constant. The exception to the imagination; as being 
more capricious and uncertain'(T.149). The distinction is, however, purely nominal, since both 
sorts of belief are products of the general rules of the imagination. The understanding just is 
'the general and more establish'd properties of the imagination'(T.267). Our general rules then 
are 'in a manner set in opposition to each other'. When an object appears that resembles any 
cause 'in very considerable circumstances' the principles of the imagination naturally carry it to 
form 'a lively conception of the usual effect'. Hume describes this as 'the first influence of 
general rules'. However, when we review this act of mind 'and compare it with the more 
general and authentic operations of the understanding' we find it to be 'irregular' and 
'destructive of all the most establish'd principles of reasonings; this is the cause of our 
rejecting it' and is, Hume says, the 'second influence of general rules'(T.149-50). The same 
general rules of the mind produce both the 'judgments' and the 'exceptions' of the imagination. 
Both sorts of belief are the products of the imagination. What is it about the 'second influence' 
of general rules which makes it preferable to the first? One answer which appears to be open 
to Hume is to argue that these more 'extensive and constant' general rules are necessary for 
the preservation of order and regularity in our thinking. Hume distinguishes 'in the imagination 
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betwixt the principles which are permanent, irresistable, and universal; such as the customary 
transition from causes to effects, and from effects to causes: And the principles, which are 
changeable, weak, and irregular'(T.225). The former are, Hume says, 'the foundation of all our 
thoughts and actions, so that upon their removal human nature must immediately perish and 
go to ruin.'(T.22S). The latter are 'irregular' and 'capricious'. The first influence of general rules 
is the result of principles 'of an irregular nature'(T.150), found, Hume thinks, 'only to take place 
in weak minds'(T.225). The second sort of influence of general rules is what makes our 
thinking regular and systematic. This appears to be Hume's considered view. However, if we 
press him on our preference for regularity, and ask why we should prefer a regular set of 
beliefs to an irregular one, it seems that Hume can only answer, as he does, that the vulgar 
are guided by the latter and the wise by the former. 
General methodological principles 'such as the customary transition from causes to effects, 
and effects to causes' are drawn then from our observation of the rational practices of the 
wise. The wise man, Hume says, 'considers which side is supported by the greater number of 
experiments: to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his 
judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability'(E.11 0). The vulgar, on 
the other hand, take things 'according to their first appearance' and 'are commonly guided' by 
the first sort of influence of general rules. Hume's position seems very vulnerable. Who, we 
may well ask, are we to consider 'the wise', and who the 'vulgar'? If Hume's answer is that the 
wise are those who follow these general methodological rules his position begins to look 
appallingly circular. Hume recommends these general rules to us on the basis of the 
'disposition and character of the person' who subscribes to them. We must already be in a 
position to know who the wise are. What is at issue, according to John Passmore, is whether 
there is such a thing as 'superior wisdom'(92). Hume's account would seem to have ruled this 
out. Philosophical probability, as much as unphilosophical probability, depends upon what 
Passmore calls 'a trick of the mind'. In neither case is there 'objective implication'. We are led 
to the conclusion we form by 'a merely psychological operation'(93). In the end, Passmore 
writes 'psychology triumphs. Empirical reasoning fades away; it is found to be nothing more 
than the habitual procedure of those persons we choose to dignify as 'the wise' or 'the 
philosophical'. The logical problem - how can empirical reasoning be justified? - vanishes as 
unanswerable.'(94) 
In Passmore's view, Hume's position fluctuates hopelessly between giving an account of belief 
which places all our beliefs about matters of fact on the same footing, and saying that some of 
those beliefs are more rational or better-justified than others. His attempt to justify his general 
rules fails, according to Passmore, because of the obvious Circularity of Hume's efforts to 
dignify the beliefs and practices of the wise. Other critics have insisted on reading Hume's 
rules for judging of causes and eHects in a mildly ironic or sceptical light, given 'the new and 
signal contradiction' Hume claims to have discovered 'in our reason'{T.150). The 'triumph of 
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the imagination'(95) seems concomitant with the defeat of normative reasoning of any sort. A 
view like this one has serious implications for philosophy and Hume is unlikely to have 
overlooked the irony of enumerating the normative rules upon which the practice is to 
proceed. However, the sceptical view is clearly not one to which Hume considers himself 
committed. Hume continues to reason about causal association and to freely make use of his 
rules of reasoning. The matter for Hume is neither as stark nor as hopeless as Passmore 
suggests. Let us look again at the detail of his charge. Hume's theory only succumbs to 
circularity if the only test Hume can look to in justifying those procedures is the observance of 
the rules which constitute them. I think it is obvious that Hume does not do this. I do not think 
that he needs to. There are other tests to which a given method can be subjected apart from 
its adherence to its own rules(96). General rules are formed on the basis of reflection not only 
upon actual methods but upon their consequences. The truth conditions of my belief that the 
sun will rise tomorrow are external to the belief and to the method by which it is arrived at. 
Hume's rules for judging of causes and effects are themselves supported by inductive 
reasoning concerning the past predictive success of its rules. The wise man, Hume says, 
'considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments' and to that side he 
inclines. The success of the method depends therefore on something other than the 
observance of the set of procedural rules to which it is subject. Hume thinks that any human 
being who reflects upon these cognitive mechanisms will come quite naturally to endorse 
those practices which are inductively successful. Reflection leads us to approve of those 
associative habits which are successful and to reject those that are not. 
In all reasonings from experience 'there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by 
any argument or process of the understanding'(E.41). We can have no fully rational 
justification for trusting the tendencies of the imagination. Hume, nevertheless, seeks to 
regulate the jUdgment, in accordance with rules set down for the avoidance of the errors to 
which the unregulated imagination is prone. If the mind is not engaged by reason in its 
judgments 'it must be induced by some other principle of equal weight and authority'(E.41). 
This is the interesting and important question to which Hume is addressing himself. Hume is 
concerned with what sort of warrant or authority we can give our causal reasonings once the 
intellect has been ruled out as a possible source. It is because causation is a natural relation 
that we can continue to reason causally about it. The essence of causal reasoning lies in a 
'propensity' fixed by custom 'to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant'(T.165). 
While certain of our vulgar propensities may be corrected by reflection, and the observance of 
general rules, it was obvious to Hume that 'custom takes the start, and gives the biass to the 
imagination'(T.148). Hume rejects the idea that the intellect operates as an independent idea-
forming faculty. Reason 'when it acts alone ... entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest 
degree of evidence in any proposition in philosophy or common life'(T.267-8). It would have 
been obvious to Hume that the kind of demand Passmore is making is one which could never 
be met. The methodologist must either formulate his rules in a purely arbitrary way, stipulating 
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principles a priori, without reference to human need or nature, or attempt to form them on the 
basis of a 'cautious observation' of the actual practices of natural scientists, and of their 
successes and failures. This is indeed what Hume attempts to do. He believes that we will 
look in vain to find some authority for these laws which is not, in some sense, of our own 
making. Our habits of inference and the basic operations of the understanding have their 
basis in our own natures. General rules are obtained from a reflection upon these procedures, 
and upon their success or failure. Hume is not troubled by the absence of any rationally 
demonstrable standards of judgment. He does not think that by grounding the authority for 
causal reasoning in our natures and experience he has undermined it. The methodologist can 
still discriminate between methods which yield correct predictions and methods which do not. 
His own procedure rests on making explicit those rules which are followed in successful 
practice. Hume's rules for judging of causes and effects are those rules which are both 
produced and supported by inductive reasoning. This, Hume thinks, is the only feasible 
approach which a methodologist can take. Without 'consulting experience' all we may say is 
that 'any thing may produce any thing'{T.173). Methodological rules are formed 'on the nature 
of our understanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form 
concerning objects'{T.149). By bringing these rules into relief, Hume hopes not only to make 
causal thinking more regular and systematic, but to show why causal reasoning takes the form 
it does and has the special role it has in our cognitive lives. 
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description of Hume's theory of causation as 'occasionalism minus God'(p.xxii). In Chapter 
Two I offer reasons for questioning the justness of Lennon's claim. 
90.Hume's satisfaction with the theory of belief presented in the Treatise was short-lived. By 
the time he came to write the Abstract, Hume entertained serious doubts about the adequacy 
of his characterisation of belief in terms of force and vivacity. His worries are reflected in the 
changes he was led to make to the account of belief presented in the first Enquiry. In the 
appendix to the Treatise, Hume offers what amounts to a recantation of a critical feature of the 
theory presented in that book. He admits to an error in having characterised the difference 
between two ideas of the same object as a difference in degrees of force and vivacity: 'I 
believe there are other difference among ideas, which cannot properly be comprehended 
under these terms. Had I said, that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their 
different feeling, I shou'd have been nearer the truth.'(T.636) Hume's dissatisfaction seems, in 
large part, to stem from the much-observed inability of his theory to characterise belief in 
terms which would sufficiently distinguish it from other mental phenomena, such as the ideas 
of poetry or madness. It is common, Hume says, 'both to poetry and madness, that the 
vivacity they bestow on the ideas is not deriv'd from the particular situations or connexions of 
the objects of these ideas, but from the present temper and disposition of the person'(T.630). 
Hume continues to think that an opinion or belief differs from a mere conception 'not in the 
nature, or the order of its parts, but in the manner of its being conceiv'd'(T.628) An idea 
'assented to feels different from a fictitious idea'(T.629). It is this different feeling which, Hume 
says, 'I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, 
or steadiness. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to 
express that act of mind, which renders realities more present to us than fictions, causes them 
to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and 
imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, 'tis needless to dispute about the 
terms'(T.629). Hume seems to be moving away from a characterisation of the feeling of belief 
in terms of force and vivacity, and towards a more explicitly functional account, to be given in 
terms of the 'superior influence' of a belief on 'the passions and imagination'. Ideas which are 
beliefs are to be distinguished solely by their effects. Hume appears to have given up on his 
attempt in the Treatise to offer a unified view of belief, memory, the imagination and the 
senses. I have characterised the simplicity of that account as an important part of Hume's 
explanatory programme. Hume's acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the basic 
dimensions along which he makes his critical distinctions marks, I think, a significant change 
in his ambitions and in his confidence in his own project. I do not seek to make much of the 
point here. For the purposes of this work, we must treat Hume's account of belief as it appears 
in the body of the Treatise. It is this remarkable account alone that I attempt to characterise. 
91.Commentators have tended either to ignore or under-value the rules 'by which to judge of 
causes and effects' that Hume presents in Section XV of Part III. Jonathan Bennett, op.cit., 
p.302, claims that Hume has ignored the sort of causal judgments 'which look interrogatively 
rather than confidently towards the future'. Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word (Oxford: 
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Clarendon Press, 1984), p.211, asserts that 'we are more subtle than Hume suggests: we 
take more into account than regular succession of similar events'. There are good prima facie 
reasons for questioning the accuracy of these and like views of Hume on causal judgment. 
92.John Passmore, op.cit., p.60. 
93. Ibid. 
94. Ibid. 
95.Robert J. Fogelin, Hume's Scepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1985), p.53. 
96.The point is made by James Noxon, op.cit., pp.86-88. 
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Chapter Two 
Causality, Reason and Causal Inference 
No part of A Treatise of Human Nature has excited as much critical attention, or inspired as 
much disagreement, as Part III of Book One, in which Hume presents his account of 
non demonstrative or probable reasoning. It is among the least well understood sections of the 
Treatise. Much of the misunderstanding stems from the reading of Hume's two main 
arguments, his argument concerning induction and his so-called 'regularity' definition of 
causation(1). A good deal of the debate surrounding these arguments bears little relation to 
what Hume is attempting to do in Part III. Hume treats of a number of interrelated notions, 
including inductive inference, causation, reason and probability, and presents a number of 
connected, mutually-supportive arguments, before bringing his story to its climax with his two 
'definitions' of causation. His arguments concerning induction and causation arise as part, and 
as a result, of his sustained treatment of what is, for him, the most important operation of the 
mind: causal inference. Despite this, commentators have usually preferred to consider Hume's 
argument concerning induction and his self-styled definitions of causation as independent and 
free-standing pieces of argumentation(2). The standard appreciation of these arguments is 
typified in Fogelin's description of them as Hume's 'sceptical attack on induction and his 
attempted regularity definition of causation'(3). These arguments are of obvious importance to 
Hume. They retain their pivotal position in the Enquiry and in the Abstract. They are also of 
significant interest to present-day philosophers and to historians of philosophy. A large and 
impressive secondary literature has been built up around them. Much of this literature has 
read Hume either as a contemporary or as a positivist, concerned to deny all rational warrant 
to our inductive practices and to reduce causation to mere regularity of succession among 
events(4). I believe this interpretation of Hume to be wrong. A number of commentators have 
clearly shown that this approach, if not flatly at odds with much of what Hume has to say, is, at 
best, a poor and partial representation of it(5). But it is far from clear what we are to replace 
the 'standard' view with. So far, no really satisfactory picture has emerged. The nonsceptical 
or sceptical realist view of Hume is inadequate and itself needs replacing(6). The standard 
sceptical view is wrong-headed and one-dimensional, though it too has its proponents. What I 
propose in this chapter is an appreciation of Hume's two main arguments which keeps them 
firmly within the sights of their author and his general intentions, and which, I believe, takes us 
some little way towards relieving the interpretive impasse that besets Hume scholarship in this 
area(7). 
The traditional sceptical interpretation of these arguments is not without textual support, but it 
faces a number of difficulties. The arguments emerge as part of an extended discussion 
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which not only endorses and presupposes causal reasoning, but appears as a prelude to, and 
not as a part of, Hume's discussion of sceptical systems. Causal inference is construed as a 
species of the association of ideas and impressions. As such, it concerns most human beliefs 
concerning matters of fact. All our beliefs about the unobserved are the result of a customary 
transition from observed to unobserved matters of fact, founded on the relation of cause and 
effect. This finding is of the first importance to Hume and to the account which follows. He 
does not regard it as undermining his own causal analysis of causation and causal inference. 
The examination of the causal relation presented by Hume in Book One, Part III of the 
Treatise makes ready and persistent use of obviously causal notions. Much else in the 
Treatise can be read in the same way. There is also textual evidence against the view that 
Hume adopted a regularity theory of causation. Hume distinguishes between the mere 
redescription of regularities among events and their explanation in terms of 'laws and 
forces'(E.14}. There are 'hidden and 'conceal'd' forces in nature which the natural scientist 
might hope 'in some degree' to discover. Hume sees his science of man as targeted on 
explaining the operations of the understanding in terms of the 'simplest and fewest' causes. 
These points alone are enough to place the standard 'Humean' view under considerable 
suspicion. But there are other problems facing these readings. There is an obvious 
interpretive difficulty with treating as independent two arguments which are not only parts of 
the same complex dialectic, but are mutually-supportive and inter-dependent. The argument 
concerning induction paves the way for the analysis of causation which follows it. Hume's 
explanation of the idea of necessary connection treats it as a product of causal inference. 
Necessary connection is what distinguishes causal from non-causal sequences of events. 
One event is inferred from another on the basis of the presumption of a necessary connection 
between them. To ignore the obvious relations of these arguments to each other and to the 
general drift of the discussion in Part III is already to risk the 'displacement' of Hume's 
arguments into other less-friendly contexts(8}. 
These initial points aside, there are no convincing prima facie reasons for taking Hume's 
intentions in Part III to be radically sceptical ones. Hume makes inductive inferences both 
during and after the argument in which he is usually thought to have denied all warrant to 
them. He offers eight rules which state the conditions under which ascriptions of probability 
are warranted. He makes explicit the intended contrast between 'philosophical' and 
'unphilosophical' probability. The Treatise is itself styled ~n Attempt to introduce the 
experimental Method of reasoning into Moral Subjects'(T.xi}. It would be odd indeed if Hume 
was to deny warrant to the sort of reasoning which he is intent on introducing to moral 
subjects and which he proceeds to make use of throughout the Treatise. If we add to this the 
conspicuouS absence of the sort of confession of sceptical hopelessness which afflicts Hume 
in all the darker moments of his philosophy, we can easily see the weight of the burden of 
proof which lies with the defender of the standard sceptical view. 
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The crucial section of Part III in which Hume presents his 'sceptical attack on induction' in fact 
contains not a single direct reference to scepticism of any sort(T.88-91). The highly sceptical 
thesis that inductive argument is unjustified or epistemically worthless is never presented. We 
have to wait until Part IV for Hume's extended treatment of scepticism and sceptical subjects. 
A number of recent commentators have taken the view that Hume is not a sceptic about 
induction at all but has, instead, only a limited, and rather less ambitious, objective in mind for 
his famous discussion(9). This nonsceptical view has some plausibility. It rests, it seems to 
me, in all of its various forms, on a textually-supported distinction between deductive or a priori 
'reason' and 'reason' in a broader sense, inclusive of probable reasoning or causal inference. 
In the pages dealing with induction, Hume is held to have restricted the use of reason to a 
priori or demonstrative reasoning(1 0). The idea is that while Hume does not think that 
inductive reasoning can provide the sort of certainty or necessity characteristic of 
demonstrative reasoning, he leaves the question of the broader reasonableness of induction 
more or less untouched. I argue for the rejection of this view. I also argue that Hume is in no 
way committed to the radically sceptical thesis that inductive arguments are epistemically 
worthless. On this view, Hume is guilty of gratuitously adopting an unargued-for assumption 
concerning the conditions under which inductive arguments could be warranted. He is meant 
to have argued for the worthlessness of inductive argument on the basis of the presumption 
that only deductively valid arguments are good or justified. I think it is clear that Hume did not 
do this. The conclusion of Hume's argument concerning induction can be read as answering a 
straightforward question as to what 'determines' to make indlJctive inferences without 
committing him to a position on the question of its justification. It is still open to Hume to argue 
for the justification of induction and this, I find, is precisely what he does. 
2.1 The Argument Concerning Induction 
The main topic of Part III of the first book of the Treatise concerns the nature of our 
reasonings concerning matters of fact. Hume begins Part III by distinguishing our 'knowledge' 
of those relations 'such as depend entirely on the ideas' from our merely 'probable' reasonings 
concerning relations 'such as may be chang'd without any change in the ideas'(T.69). Hume is 
prepared, even at this early stage of his discussion, to sort knowledge and probability into 
separate epistemological categories. The first sort of relations, that is, the relations of 
resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity, fall under the 
province of intuition, or, in the case of quantitative relations, demonstration, and are the only 
'objects of knowledge and certainty'(T.70). The demonstrative sciences of algebra and 
arithmetic are the only ones in which we can 'carry on a chain of reasoning to any degree of 
intricacy, and yet preserve a periect exactness and certainty'(T. 71). Our judgments 
concerning matters of fact involve the tracing of the relations of identity, contiguity in time and 
place, and cause and effect(T.73), relations which do not depend entirely upon 'the ideas', and 
which yield conclusions which are merely probable and do not amount to knowledge. Hume 
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makes clear that of these three relations, the only one 'that can be trac'd beyond our senses' 
to inform us of absent or unobserved 'existences and objects' is causation(T.74). He tells us in 
the Enquiry that all transitions from observed to unobserved matters of fact are 'reasonings' 
which are 'founded' on the relation of cause and effect(E.26). The majority of our factual 
beliefs are of this sort. Hume announces that his broad purpose in the corresponding 
passages of the Enquiry is 'to enquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of 
any real existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the 
records of our memory'(E.26). This, I think, is also Hume's main concern in Part III of Book 
One of the Treatise. Hume's investigation of causal reasoning and his argument concerning 
induction emerge within the context of his concern with the nature of probable reasoning. The 
treatment of the Enquiry finds the question to arise very naturally from the distinction Hume 
first makes between 'relations of ideas' and 'matters of fact'(E.25-6). In the Treatise, Hume 
comes to the question in a rather more roundabout manner. Having dispatched the question 
of knowledge in the opening section, Hume devotes the remaining sections to a consideration 
of probability and probable reasoning. 
Hume later explains that he is using 'probability' in an unusually broad sense in order to 
include all nondemonstrative arguments in his treatment. These include not only those 
arguments from causes and effects which are still 'attended with uncertainty'(T.124), but those 
that amount to 'proofs'. Probability turns out to be inclusive of all our reasonings concerning 
matters of fact. The general contrast Hume draws is between causal inference and 
demonstration or deductive reasoning. Hume is concerned with the character of all 
nondemonstrative inferences. Judgments of this sort, while on occasions enjoying a status 
approaching or equal to certainty, nevertheless do not produce knowledge. This is the 
province of the demonstrative sciences. Hume describes 'knowledge' as 'that evidence, which 
arises from the comparison of ideas'(T.124). Only intuition or demonstrative reason produces 
knowledge. Reason in this sense is construed as 'a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural 
effect'(T.180). The scope of demonstrative reason is very limited. It is concerned only with the 
discernment, by intuition or demonstration, of connections between ideas. It is in deference to 
the contrast with reasoning of this sort that Hume is obliged to comprehend all our arguments 
from causes and effects under the same general heading of 'probability'(11). To 'mark the 
several degrees of evidence' which attend judgments of this sort Hume distinguishes 
probability from 'proof'(T.124). When he writes of probability in its narrowest sense he has in 
mind judgments the evidence for which is still attended by uncertainty. Hume treats of this sort 
of probability in Sections XI and XII of Part III. In its broadest sense, 'probability' also includes 
judgments of probability which are 'entirely free from doubt and uncertainty' and should be 
regarded as proofs. It is with cases such as these that Hume is most concerned. Causal 
inferences based on a constant conjunction of events and a present impression of one of 
those events are attended by the greatest degree of certainty. Inferences of this sort produce 
the strongest kind of causal belief. The communication of force and vivacity by the causal 
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association of present impression and associate-idea ensures that the liveliness of the idea-
belief increases and diminishes according to the strength of the evidence. In judgments of 
probability in the narrower sense some of that communicated vivacity is lost through what 
Hume calls 'contrary experiments'(T.135). These effects produce only an 'imperfect belief': a 
belief whose vivacity is somewhere intermediate between that of 'perfect' beliefs and pure 
conjectures. Hume appreciates that many of our causal beliefs are like this. When he uses 
reason in its broadest sense he intends it to include both demonstrative arguments and proofs 
and probabilities. Animals can, in this sense, be said to reason from present impressions and 
to found their 'judgment' on past instances(T.178). Reasoning, in this sense, comprehends 
any sort of inference or customary transition from one belief to another(12). Causation turns 
out to be the only relation upon which we reason which does not depend solely on the ideas. 
Cause and effect is the relation upon which we reason in all our judgments concerning 
unobserved events and 'existences'. Nondemonstrative inference is always based on this 
relation. When both objects are present to the senses 'along with the relation we call this 
perception rather than reasoning'(T.73). Only causation can take the mind beyond what is 
immediately present to the senses to 'discover the real existence or the relations of 
objects'(T.73). In Section II of Part III, Hume announces his intention to consider the source of 
the idea of causation. It is, Hume says, 'impossible to reason justly, without understanding 
perfectly the idea concerning which we reason'(T.74). To understand the idea in question we 
must 'see from what origin it is derived', and this, for Hume, means the examination of the 
impressions from which the idea arises. He makes clear in Section II that more than temporal 
priority and spatio-temporal contiguity is involved in recognising these relations(13). There is 'a 
NECESSARY CONN EX ION to be taken into consideration; and that relation is of much 
greater importance, than any of the other two above-mention'd'(T.77). We do not always 
regard two objects related by contiguity and priority as cause and effect. Hume recognises the 
problem of distinguishing accidental from non-accidental regularities. An important part of 
Hume's discussion of induction concerns the recognition of non-accidental sequences. There 
must be some other feature essential to the causal relation in virtue of which we distinguish 
causal from non-causal sequences of events(14). Yet when Hume comes to discover the 
nature of this necessary connection by an examination of the 'known qualities' of objects, he 
finds no relations but those of contiguity and succession(T.77). Not finding the idea of 
necessary connection 'in the objects', we are compelled to 'beat about all the neighbouring 
fields, without any certain view or design', in the hope that an examination of 'some other' 
questions 'will perhaps afford a hint, that may serve to clear up the present difficulty.'(T.78). 
It is the causal relation which Hume wants to 'explain fully' before passing from 'the subject of 
the understanding' onto other subjects(T.74). To 'reason justly' we must understand the idea 
concerning which we reason. Hume's natural move is to look for the origin of our idea of the 
relation among his original impressions. He begins with a single case of the relation but is 
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immediately faced with a difficulty: he can find impressions accounting for only two of the three 
features he thinks essential to the relation. Hume begins, in his roundabout way, to 'beat 
about' in the adjoining fields in the hope of supplying the deficit in his explanation. It soon 
becomes clear that Hume's main interest in the idea of necessary connection lies in the basis 
and warrant it might be thought to supply to inferences from cause to effect and from effect to 
cause. It is within the context of his examination of the operation of the human mind Hume 
terms 'causal inference' that the argument concerning induction arises. But Hume comes to 
the question indirectly. He first sets out to consider two neighbouring questions of some 
significance: 'For what reason we pronounce it necessary, that every thing whose existence 
has a beginning, shou'd also have a cause?' and 'Why we conclude, that such particular 
causes must necessarily have such particular effects; and what is the nature of that inference 
we draw from the one to the other, and of the beliefwe repose in it?'(T.7B}. These questions 
are, in one way or another, pursued by Hume throughout the next fourteen sections of the 
Treatise. They mark an important shift in emphasis away from the search for an original 
impression of necessary connection in experience and towards an examination of the nature 
of the inferences we make from cause and effect and, crucially, of what determines us to 
make them. This is the beginning of the remarkable and important account of causal inference 
in which Hume attempts to show how the idea of necessity arises from the inferences we 
make rather than the other way around. This is a crucial change of tack on Hume's part. It 
marks his abandonment of the search for any necessity in the objects which could provide a 
basis for the justification of inference from perceived to unperceived. Hume rejects it along 
with the possibility of grounding a priori inferences about unobserved matters of fact in 
relations between ideas. Our experience gives us no basis for this sort of inference. Causes 
do not imply their effects. There is no object, Hume remarks later in Part III, 'which implies the 
existence of any other if we consider these objects in themselves, and never look beyond the 
ideas we form of them. Such an inference wou'd amount to knowledge, and wou'd imply the 
absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving any thing different'(T.B6-7}. Because all 
distinct ideas are separable 'there can be no impossibility of that kind'. We will revisit this 
argument of Hume's shortly. Suffice to say, for the moment, that it is with these sorts of 
issues, and with this sort of general strategy, in mind that Hume turns to the first of his two 
questions. 
In Section III Hume argues that we can never demonstrate the necessity of a cause without 
'shewing at the same time the impossibility there is, that any thing can ever begin to exist 
without some productive principle'. This latter proposition, he says, is 'utterly incapable of a 
demonstrative proof'(T.79}. Since all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and the 
ideas of cause and effect are 'evidently distinct', the separation 'of the idea of a cause from 
that of a beginning of existence, is plainly possible for the imagination(T.79-BO}. The possibility 
cannot be refuted 'by any reasoning from mere ideas'(T.BO}. It cannot therefore be 
demonstrated that it is 'absolutely' impossible for something to begin to exist without a cause. 
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Hume's important general conclusion is that it is not 'from knowledge or any scientific 
reasoning' that 'we derive the opinion of the necessity of a cause'(T.82). When Hume talks of 
'scientific reasoning' he has in mind demonstration which, together with intuition, provides 'the 
foundation of science'(T.73). The opinion can arise only from 'observation and experience'. 
Questions could certainly be raised about the adequacy of Hume's rather perfunctory 
treatment of this argument(15). But Hume is more concerned to underline the latest shift in 
emphasis which he now feels he is entitled to make. We must therefore ask 'how experience 
gives rise to such a principle? or, since, Hume tells us, the same answer will serve in both 
cases, 'Why we conclude, that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular 
effects, and why we form an inference from one to another? 
Hume's aim in Section III seems to have been the apparently modest one of discrediting one 
possible answer to the question of what determines us to believe that every event must have a 
cause. When he comes to offer his own positive answer to the question he makes it 
abundantly clear where his real interests lie and what his agenda will be for much of the 
remainder of Part III. Hume is less concerned with the question of how experience gives rise 
to the opinion of the necessity of causes, than with the pressing problem of why we conclude 
that a particular cause must necessarily have a particular effect. He does not attempt a direct 
answer to the question of how experience produces the belief in the causal maxim. It is the 
inference from cause to effect and the nature of its evidence that interests him. The 
explanation Hume offers of our beliefs about particular causes and effects can, in turn, be 
pressed in reply to the first question. Once we understand how it is experience gives rise to 
the conviction that one event must produce another, we will also have understood how 
experience can produce our belief in the necessity of causes. Hume antiCipates at least one 
important part of the treatment of inductive argument he presents in Section VI(16). Our belief 
in the necessity of causes is derived not from deductive reasoning, from either intuition or 
demonstration, but must instead 'arise from observation and experience'(T.82). The first stage 
of Hume's strategy is the same: he offers a negative argument designed to discredit one 
possible answer to the question he is asking. In both cases it is to reason in its narrowest 
sense that Hume looks for an alternative to his own view, and in both cases reason is found 
wanting. By the time he turns from Section III to Section IV of Part III, Hume has already, in 
Fogelin's words, 'abandoned the idea of grounding our causal inference in the idea of a 
necessary connection' in favour of 'giving an account of our idea of necessary connection 
through the use of transparently causal notions'(17). 
Hume begins Section IV of Book One, Part III of the Treatise by reminding us that although 
the mind 'in its reasonings from causes or effects carries its view beyond those objects, which 
it sees or remembers, it must never lose sight of them entirely, nor reason merely upon its 
own ideas, without some mixture of impressions, or at least of ideas of the memory, which are 
equivalent to impressions.'(T.82) Hume has already announced his intention ot giving a full 
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explanation of the one relation which takes us beyond our senses(T.74). One part of this 
explanation consists in accounting for those features of our experience which give rise to 
causal inference. Hume's attempt to discover 'some relation among objects'(T.75} from which 
the idea of necessity could be derived has foundered prematurely and Hume will put aside the 
problem of accounting for our idea of necessary connection until Section XIV. Necessity was 
given special attention because it was thought to provide a possible basis, a 'just 
foundation'(T.90), for inferences from cause to effect and from effect to cause. But the 
question of the derivation of the idea of causation is only one part of the 'full explanation' of the 
causal relation Hume presents in Part III. Hume appreciates that an explanation like the one 
he is giving must also account for how, and upon what basis, the causal relation takes us 
beyond the impressions of the senses(18). Hume now turns to the important task of explaining 
how, by what, and under what conditions, the mind is 'determined' to pass from the idea or 
impression of one object to 'the idea or belief of another'(T.92}. 
Hume's purpose in Section IV is to sort out the component parts of our reasonings concerning 
cause and effect. He turns first to the conditions under which we make such inferences. 
Inferences from causes to effects involve both an idea which is not present as an impression 
and an 'immediate perception of our memory or senses' from which vivacity is communicated 
to the inferred belief. All our 'reasonings' concerning matters of fact involve a sort of inference 
to the unobserved. When both objects are present to the senses together with the relation, the 
operation of mind which relates them is more properly called 'perception' rather than 
reasoning(T.73). Causal inference is to be thought of as a species of the association of ideas 
and impressions. Vivacity is transferred from present impression to associate-idea in a degree 
sufficient to make that idea a belief. Beliefs resulting from causal inference enjoy both a 
greater probability and a greater degree of vivacity than purely conjectural or 'hypothetical' 
reasoning about causes. Any 'chain of argument or connexion of causes and effects' must first 
be founded either on the authority of the memory or senses or upon the testimony or 
impressions of others, themselves 'founded on those characters or letters, which are seen or 
remember'd'(T.83). Without this foundation there would be 'no belief nor evidence'. All the 
inferences in which Hume is interested start with an impression or idea of memory, which is 
'equivalent to impressions', and proceed to a belief or enlivened idea of something not present 
to the senses or memory. Inferences based on the relation of cause and effect are described 
by Hume variously as 'probable' or 'moral' reasonings, or as 'reasonings concerning matters of 
fact'. Some caution is required in construing these sorts of arguments as narrowly inductive. 
Hume does not construe inductive arguments primarily as inferences from particular cases to 
general or universal conclusions. His concern, particularly in the Treatise, is with predictive-
inductive inferences, which is to say, in other words, with inferences from particular cases to 
singular conclusions, for example, from 'All past instances of As have been Bs' to 'This A is a 
B'(19}. He takes this as his paradigm case for all inferences of this sort. On the few occasions 
when Hume uses the term 'induction', he uses it not in the modern sense but in the broadest 
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sense to include any sort of inference or nondemonstrative argument to a factual conclusion. 
As his various examples suggest, when he speaks of causal inference he usually has in mind 
inferences to singular conclusions. In the interests of brevity, as well as of consistency, I will 
follow the convention of using the terms 'induction' and 'inductive' as general terms inclusive 
both of this sort of inference and inference from particular cases to general conclusions. 
Hume's chief concern in Section VI is with predictive-inductive inferences or inferences to 
singular conclusions but it is obvious that he intended the conclusions he drew about 
inferences of this sort to be drawn also for inferences to general or universal conclusions. 
Hume is interested in the foundation of the transition the mind makes from observed to 
unobserved matters of fact(20). In Section V he considers what he calls 'the first act of the 
judgment' which, he thinks, provides the basis for causal reasoning(T.86). All our arguments 
concerning causes and eHects consist not only in a present impression of the senses or 
memory but in 'an idea of that existence, which produces the object of the impression, or is 
produc'd by it.'(T.84) There are then three things that want explaining: the original impression; 
the transition to the idea of connected cause or eHect; and the nature and qualities of that 
idea. He turns first to the original impression and to the nature of the assent upon which 
inductive arguments are founded. The belief or assent which, Hume says, always attends the 
memory and senses 'is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present; and this 
alone distinguishes them from the imagination'(T.86). Hume is preparing the ground for the 
account of causal inferences in terms of custom and transferred vivacity that follows. This 
vivacity or 'force and liveliness' of our 'original' perceptions constitutes the first act of judgment 
and 'lays the foundation of that reasoning, which we build upon it, when we trace the relation 
of cause and eHect'(T.86). It is the vivacity of the perceptions presented by the faculties of 
memory and sense which gives them their role in the production of belief. Belief 'or assent', in 
this case, is nothing but 'the vivacity of those perceptions they present'. Vivacity is transmitted 
from the original impression to the idea or belief which is the conclusion of a causal inference. 
Hume also highlights another factor in increasing the vivacity of perceptions and, so, of 
inducing belief. An idea of the imagination may acquire, by repetition alone, 'such a force and 
vivacity, as to pass for an idea of the memory' and have 'the same influence on the mind as 
nature, and infixing the idea with equal force and vigour'(T.86). The frequent repetition of lies 
can lead the liar 'to come at last to believe and remember them, as realities'(T.86). 
The stage is now set for Hume to turn from the first component of his explanation to the all-
important question of the nature of the transition the mind makes from original impression or 
idea to the idea of a connected cause or eHect. This is the topic of the famous Section VI 'Of 
the inference from the impression to the idea'(T.86). Nothing testifies more to the importance 
of this section to Hume's account than the care with which he has prepared the ground for it. 
The conclusion of Section V was that it was the force and liveliness of the original perception 
which accounted for its role in belief and as the 'foundation' of all our reasoning from cause 
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and effect. This is an important conclusion within Hume's causal story and within his theory of 
belief. He next asks what it is that causes the transition of the mind from the impression to the 
idea of its connected cause or effect. He writes later in Part III that his intention has been to 
explain those arguments 'which are deriv'd from the relation of cause and effect, and which 
are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty'(T.124). The question arises very naturally within 
the sort of account Hume has been giving. His first move is to deny that we make the 
inference on the basis of an inspection of the original perception or object alone. This would 
mean that we had derived the inference 'merely from a survey of these particular objects, and 
from such a penetration into their essences as may discover the dependency of the one upon 
the other'(T.86). Hume argues against the possibility of such a demonstration in much the 
same way as he did in arguing against the demonstrative certainty of the opinion that every 
event must have a cause. Hume's argumentative strategy is the same. An apprehension of 
this sort would imply the impossibility 'of conceiving any thing different'(T.87). However, as all 
distinct ideas are clearly separable, "tis evident there can be no impossibility of that kind.' It is 
perfectly possible for us to conceive of an event having some cause or effect other than the 
one it has. When we pass from a present impression to the idea of any object, 'we might 
possibly have separated the idea from the impression, and have substituted any other idea in 
its room.'(T.87) Hume's point is not merely that one is conceivable without the other, but that 
nothing in the one implies or gives us grounds to believe in the existence of the other if we 
consider 'the objects in themselves'(21). The point is made clearer in the Abstract, where 
Hume writes that it 'is not anything that reason sees in the cause, which makes us infer the 
effect'. Such an inference would amount to a demonstration, but, since the mind 'can always 
conceive any effect to follow from any cause', it is easily seen that no such demonstration is 
possible(T.650). Hume appears to have thought that the apprehension of a causal connection 
between events would put one in a position to make a priori certain claims about the way in 
which those events will turn out in the future(22). But, since all distinct ideas are in principle 
separable, there can be no apprehension with implications of this kind. It follows from the 
success of Hume's previous argument that it is not possible to deduce from the survey of one 
object or event the existence of another or to discover, a priori, any 'natural' connection 
between a cause and its effect. Once again the crucial move comes next. It can only be 'by 
EXPERIENCE' that 'we can infer the existence of one object from that of another'(T.87}. The 
conclusion of this part of Hume's story is that all probable arguments must be founded on 
experience. 
If we are not determined by deductive or demonstrative reason in the inference then we can 
only have been determined by experience. This was the moral swiftly drawn by Hume in 
Section III where it was experience that was found to determine our belief in the necessity of 
causes. It is only on the basis of experience that we can infer the existence of an object from 
that of another. When it comes to accounting for the nature of that experience Hume already 
has the resources to hand. The power of habit and repetition in augmenting the vivacity of our 
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perceptions was remarked in Section V. Hume returns to the point now. We remember that 
we have had frequent experience of the existence of one sort of object and that that 
experience has always been attended by that of another class of object the members of which 
have always 'existed in a regular order of contiguity and succession with regard to them'(T.87). 
When we remember the 'species of object we call flame' we naturally call to mind the 'species 
of sensation we call heat which has always attended the first object: 'Without any further 
ceremony, we call the one cause and the other effect, and infer the existence of the one from 
that of the other.'{T.87) We can now add to the relations of contiguity and succession 
discovered between cause and effect in Section II a third: 'This relation is their CONSTANT 
CONJUNCTION. Contiguity and succession are not sufficient to make us pronounce any two 
objects to be cause and effect, unless we perceive, that these two relations are preserv'd in 
several instances.'{T.87) Hume presents the claim that we make causal inferences under 
these circumstances as a straightforward generalisation about human experience. He has 
now discovered, from 'several instances' of cause and effect, what he had failed to discern in 
his examination of the single case: the source and nature of that necessity 'which makes so 
essential a part' of our idea of the causal relation. Hume is confident that this new relation will 
enable us to see how the idea of necessary connection is generated. We may now, he says, 
'see the advantage of quitting the direct survey of this relation' since there are hopes that 'by 
this means we may at last arrive at our propos'd end'(T.87). 
Hume is, nevertheless, quick to temper his optimism with due caution. The 'new-discover'd' 
relation of constant conjunction seems, he says, 'to advance us but very little in our way'. It 
seems evident 'at least at first sight' that the 'mere repetition' of instances can 'only multiply, 
but not enlarge the objects of our mind' and so can never produce 'any new original idea, such 
as that of a necessary connexion'(T.88). Hume reminds us of the search for the idea of 
necessary connection which he began in Section II. He thinks that he now has the resources 
with which to show how our idea of necessity is generated. The earlier change of tack away 
from the search for an impression of necessary connection in the objects is to be fully 
vindicated. The problem Hume has lies in showing how 'mere' repetition can produce in us an 
idea of anything other than repetition. He nevertheless retains a hope that the explanation to 
follow might show how the idea of necessary connection is generated and that the experience 
of constant conjunction will somehow playa part. Hume puts aside his worries about necessity 
almost immediately, suggesting, with rather more guile than uncertainty, that it might 'appear 
in the end, that the necessary connexion depends on the inference, instead of the inference's 
depending on the necessary connexion'(T.88). He immediately turns back to the question 
which he has been promising to answer since Section IV: of 'the nature of that inference, and 
of the transition from the impression to the idea'(T.88). Hume is mostly interested in the 
mechanism by which causal inferences occur in the circumstances he has described. The 
question of the origin of the idea of necessary connection is at once set aside in favour of the 
question of what it is that determines us to make causal inferences. 
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Hume has already established to his satisfaction that the transition is founded on experience 
and, in particular, on the remembrance of constant conjunction. His next question is: 'Whether 
experience produces the idea by means of the understanding or by the imagination; whether 
we are determin'd by reason to make the transition, or by a certain association and relation of 
perceptions'(T.88-89}. The idea in this case is not, of course, the idea of necessary 
connection, but the lively idea or belief which is the outcome of a causal inference. When 
Hume contrasts the imagination with reason or the understanding, he usually has in mind all 
the operations of the imagination, excluding argumentation and the forming and judging of 
inferences. Reason and the imagination are considered as the two possible determinants of 
causal inference. Hume has already shown how strictly limited the mind is in the different sorts 
of ways in which it can form new ideas. For reasons to which I have already adverted, I will 
leave aside for the moment the question of which of the two senses of 'reason' Hume is 
employing here in favour of a statement of Hume's argument. 
If reason determined us, Hume says, it would proceed upon the principle 'that instances, of 
which we have had no experience, must resemble those, of which we have had experience, 
and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same'(T.89}. The determination 
of inductive inference by reason requires that the proposition be founded on argument and this 
argument must, according to Hume, be of one of two sorts - it must be derived either from 
knowledge or from probability. It is easily seen that there can be no demonstrative or 
knowledge-yielding arguments to prove the principle of the uniformity of nature since we can 
'at least conceive a change in the course of nature; which sufficiently proves, that such a 
change is not absolutely impossible. To form a clear idea of any thing is an undeniable 
argument for its possibility, and is alone a refutation of any pretended demonstration against 
it'(T.89). Hume refers us to the argument he has already made use of to show that 'all 
reasonings concerning cause and effect, are founded on experience'(T.650). He next looks to 
probable argument as a source of the principle. Probability 'as it discovers not the relations of 
ideas, consider'd as such, but only those of objects, must in some respects be founded on the 
impressions of our memory and senses, and in some respects on our ideas.'(T.89) The 
'connexion' or relation of cause and effect is the only one on which we can form a just 
inference from one object to another and, so, is the only one which can take us beyond the 
'immediate' impressions of the senses and memory(T.89}. Our idea of cause and effect can 
be derived only from experience 'which informs us, that such particular objects, in all past 
instances, have been constantly conjoin'd with each other'(T.90). As soon as one object is 
supposed present in its impression, we 'presume on the existence of one similar to its usual 
attendant'(T.90}. Probability is, therefore, 'founded on the presumption of a resemblance 
betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and those, of which we have had 
none; and therefore 'tis impossible the presumption can arise from probability.'(T.90} 
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All probability is founded on the presumption or supposition that 'the future will be conformable 
to the past'(E.35). Hume immediately draws the moral that 'the same principle cannot be both 
the cause and effect of another', or, in other words, that a principle cannot be established on 
the basis of an argument whose acceptability depends upon its presumption(T.90). The 
uniformity principle(23) cannot. therefore, arise from probability. Should we attempt to evade 
Hume's conclusion by suggesting that after the experience of constant conjunction we have 
found an object to be endowed with a 'power of production' which necessarily implies its 
effect, and which provides a 'just foundation' for causal inference, the question still arises of 
why, on the basis of our experience of past regularities, we form any conclusion beyond 
them(T.90-1). Not only does 'reason' fail us 'in the discovery of the ultimate connexion of 
causes and effects, but even after experience has inform'd us of their constant conjunction, 
'tis impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason, why we shou'd extend that experience 
beyond those particular instances, which have fallen under our observation. We suppose, but 
are never able to prove, that there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we 
have had experience, and those which lie beyond the reach of our discovery.'(T.91-2) Any 
attempt at the 'proof' of this last supposition by probable arguments, Hume writes in the 
Enquiry, 'must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point 
in question'(E.35-6). Since reason cannot show us 'the connexion of one object with another', 
even after the observation of a constant conjunction in all past instances, Hume turns to the 
other source of ideas and belief he recognises: the imagination. When the mind 'passes from 
the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, it is not determin'd by 
reason, but by certain principles, which associate together the ideas of these objects, and 
unite them in the imagination.'(T.92) The inference depends solely on the relations of 
association which cause the mind to pass 'from one object to another, even tho' there be no 
reason to determine us in that transition'(T.92). 
Hume presents versions of this argument in the Abstract and in Section IV of the Enquiry. The 
fuller and, in many ways, clearer, version of the Enquiry, nevertheless preserves much the 
same structure and draws much the same conclusion. A good deal, however, is left out, and it 
is only in the Treatise that Hume presents the argument within the context of his complex 
account of the causal relation. Commentators need to be alive to the dangers of transplanting 
the argument of the Treatise into the context of the Enquiry. I have tried to show how much of 
our understanding of the argument depends upon an appreciation of the nourishment and 
support it receives from other parts of Hume's extended treatment of probability and probable 
reasoning. Hume rightly thought his argument concerning induction among the outstanding 
achievements of his philosophy. It has proved to be of enduring philosophical interest. 
Nevertheless, beyond the acknowledgment of its importance(24), there is surprisingly little 
agreement as to how it is to be understood. I have already adverted to a number of the 
interpretive pOSitions entertained by commentators. In the next few sections I proceed to a 
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critical examination of several of the most important and influential readings. I want, first of all, 
to consider what I have characterised as the standard or Humean view. 
On the standard view, Hume's argument presents a radically sceptical thesis about induction. 
Hume is supposed to have argued for the unwarranted ness or epistemic worthlessness of 
inductive argument. In doing so, we are informed, he became the first philosopher to pose the 
problem of the justifiability of inductive inference. Beliefs arrived at by means of inductive 
arguments are unreasonable or rationally unjustified. Stroud appears to defend one version of 
this view. He describes Hume's rejection of reason or the understanding as the source of 
causal inference as 'his most famous sceptical result'. Hume is said to have condemned as 
'unjustifiable a whole mode of inference or pattern of reasoning'(25). I have already argued 
that there are good prima facie reasons for questioning this view(26). Before amplifying these 
arguments, I want to consider a highly influential, and, some have thought, quite decisive, 
argument for the Humean view of Hume's argument concerning induction. D.C. Stove's 
argument is typical in a number of respects of the sceptical sort of reading(27). He accuses 
Hume of gratuitously adopting premises from which he derives a wholly unwarranted 
conclusion about the reasonableness of most of our beliefs about matters of fact. Roughly 
speaking, Stove takes Hume's view of induction to be that the premises of an inductive 
argument never increase the probability of its conclusion being true. While the case Stove 
presents is far from exceptional, having a number of important precedents, the rigour with 
which he prosecutes it is, and so, in the interests of even-handedness, it is to Stove that we 
ought first to turn. 
Stove interprets Hume as arguing for the conclusion that all inductive arguments are 
unreasonable on the basis of a tacit premise stating that only deductively valid arguments 
make their conclusions more probable. Hume's 'inductive scepticism' reduces to the former 
claim, considered by Stove to be a judgment of the 'irrelevance' of premises concerning 
observed objects to the probability of conclusions concerning unobserved objects(28). Stove's 
argument is complex and detailed, but its main elements can be neatly summarised. His 
treatment focuses on the nature of the presumption or presupposition upon which, Hume 
says, all probability is founded. Sometimes, Stove says, 'when we say of an argument from p 
to q, that it presupposes r, our meaning is as follows: that, as it stands, the argument from pta 
q is not valid, and that, in order to turn it into a valid argument, it would be necessary to add to 
its premisses the proposition r.' This is the sense in which Stove believes 'presuppose' occurs 
at the point in Hume's argument when he suggests that all probable arguments presuppose, 
or are 'founded on the supposition', that unobserved instances resemble observed ones. 
Stove's suggestion is that the uniformity principle is presupposed in the sense that it is what is 
necessary to make an inference deductively valid. Stove asks us to consider a 'predictive-
inductive inference', typical of the sort Hume is interested in, from 'This is a flame, and all of 
the many flames observed in the past have been hot' to 'This is hot'(29). The argument, Stove 
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writes 'is invalid as it stands. Nor could it be turned into a valid argument without the addition 
of some further premiss which will have the effect of saying that (at least in respect of heat) 
flames yet unobserved resemble observed flames.' The addition of the uniformity principle is 
needed if this argument is to be 'turned into a valid one'(30). What Hume wants to show, 
according to Stove, is that the premises of inductive arguments do not make their conclusions 
more probable. But all he has shown, at least on the basis of those premises which he makes 
explicit, is that inductive arguments never produce conclusions which are deductively valid: 
what Stove calls 'inductive fallibilism'. Hume draws his unwarranted sceptical conclusion on 
the basis of a suppressed premise that only deductively valid arguments lend support to their 
conclusions. All we need do to avoid being committed to inductive skepticism is to suppose 
that there are inductive arguments which are merely probable. 
When Hume tells us that all probable arguments 'proceed upon' the presumption of a 
resemblance between those objects of which we have had experience and those of which we 
have not, what he means to say, according to Stove, is that inductive arguments are invalid as 
they stand, 'and it would be necessary, in order to turn them into valid arguments, to add to 
their premisses the Resemblance Thesis'(31}. Hume is a 'deductivist' in as much as he taCitly 
assumes the thesis that only deductively valid arguments are reasonable. Stove looks to what 
is, I think, the critical section of Hume's argument. Hume argues that if reason determined us 
to make the transition in question it would proceed upon the principle or supposition that 
nature is uniform(T.89}. Stove's idea is that Hume thinks of the uniformity principle as a 
'middle term' without which the inference would be deductively invalid and, so, on the basis of 
the tacit premise, unwarranted(32}. Hume infers inductive scepticism from inductive fallibilism 
on the basis of his tacitly assuming the 'thesis of deductivism'. Hume's inductive scepticism, 
the thesis that inductive arguments are all unreasonable or rationally unjustified, follows from 
this assumption and a second premise stating that inductive inferences are invalid. This last 
premise is what Hume is meant to have established in arguing that the uniformity prinCiple can 
arise from neither probable nor demonstrative reasoning, as he puts it. No argument of any 
kind can establish that nature is uniform. Stove's conclusion is that Hume infers from his 
premises the highly sceptical thesis that no proposition about the observed is a reason to 
believe any contingent fact about the unobserved. Hume's procedure in moving from inductive 
fallibilism, the position which Stove in good faith takes Hume to have established, to inductive 
scepticism, depends entirely upon his tacit commitment to the thesis that the only good 
argument is a good (or valid) deductive one. 
Stove's interpretation has been influential. There are, nevertheless, good textual grounds for 
resisting his conclusion, a number of them, I think, quite decisive. Stove goes on to argue that 
Hume's crucial deductivist premise is false, and that his conclusion is, therefore, unwarranted. 
I do not take issue with this argument of Stove's. I am more interested in the allegation that 
Hume is committed to deductivism and, on those grounds, to the highly sceptical conclusion 
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he is meant to have drawn on its basis. I will turn shortly to the allegation that Hume held a 
thesis like the one Stove identifies as 'inductive scepticism'. If it can be shown that Hume did 
not hold the critical premise then Stove's case will have been effectively shortcircuited. What 
is the textual and historical evidence for thinking that Hume was committed to deductivism? 
Stove rests his claim very largely on the sense he thinks is to be assigned to 'presuppose' in 
his 'translation' of the crucial passages of Section VI(T.89-90). It may seem too obvious a 
point to require much argument. It certainly has seemed obvious that all inferences of this sort 
are invalid as they stand and that something like the uniformity principle would be what was 
needed to make them valid. A number of recent critics, Stroud and Peter Millican among 
them, have argued that Stove, Mackie and others, have taken too restrictive a view of the 
senses in which the uniformity principle could be 'presupposed' in argument(33). Stove's view 
is that when Hume states that probable arguments presuppose or 'proceed upon'(T.89) the 
supposition of the uniformity principle he must mean that the addition of the premise is what is 
required to make an invalid argument deductively valid. Stove is on fairly solid ground when it 
comes to recasting the principle as a 'medium' or 'middle term' in an inference. In the Enquiry, 
Hume writes that there is required 'a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an 
inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument'(E.34). Where Stove goes wrong, 
according to Millican, is in supposing that in talking about 'a medium' Hume must have in mind 
the middle term of an 'exclusively deductive' form of inference. There are good reasons for 
thinking Hume would have blanched at such a view. Hume acknowledges Locke as the 
source of the distinction between knowledge and probability he draws in the Treatise and 
reiterates in the Enquiry(E.56). What we find in Locke is not only a toleration of 'mediums' or 
'middle terms' in probable reasoning, but an explicit statement of their role. Probability, 
according to Locke, 'is nothing but the appearance of such an Agreement, or Disagreement, 
by the intervention of Proofs, whose connexion is not constant or immutable, or at least is not 
perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the 
Mind to judge the proposition to be true, or false, rather than the contrary.'(34) Probability 
differs from knowledge not in terms of the 'intervention', or not, of 'proofs', but in terms of the 
nature and strength of the connexion between the proofs(35). A demonstration shows the 
agreement or disagreement of ideas by the intervention of proofs which have 'a constant, 
immutable, and visible connexion with one another'(36). Proofs are merely those 'intervening 
Ideas, which serve to shew the Agreement of any two others'(37). Locke also writes of these 
proofs as 'mediums', observing that in demonstration there must be a remembrance of 'the 
Intuition of the Agreement of the Medium, or intermediate Idea, with that we compared it with 
before'(38). In the following section, he writes that there are other ideas 'whose Agreement, or 
Disagreement, can no otherwise be judged of, but by the intervention of others, which have 
not a certain Agreement with the Extremes, but a usual or likely one: And in these it is, that the 
judgment is property exercised, which is the acquiescing of the Mind, that any Ideas do agree, 
by comparing them with such probable Mediums. '(39) Locke goes on, in terms revisited by 
Hume in Section XI of Part III, to distinguish this sort of probability which, he says, 'Assent as 
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necessarily follows' as 'Knowledge does Demonstration'. Far from taking mediums or middle 
terms to be restricted to use In demonstrative arguments, Locke makes explicit the role he 
takes them to play in probable argument. Hume's preference for the 'logic' of Locke, taken 
with his endorsement of the distinction Locke draws between probability and knowledge, must 
give us some textual and historical grounds for resisting Stove's view(40). But it is not 
decisive. Millican has shown only that Stove's assumption that Hume must have thought of 
mediums or intermediate Ideas as middle terms, whose connections with premise and 
conclusion are deductively certain. is 'historically unwarranted'. If we are to show decisively 
that the crucial deductivist premise is one that Hume did not and could not have held we must 
look in more detail at the text. 
A second textual objection to Stove concerns his charge that Hume recognised only one form 
of inference. Hume is supposed to have held that only deductively valid arguments lend 
support to their conclusions. There are no arguments which make their conclusions merely 
more probable. According to Stove. then. there is, for Hume, only one kind of inference: 
inferences which necessitate the truth of their conclusions, given the truth of their premises, 
which are, in other words. deductively valid. The supposition that there are probable 
arguments, and that among them are some inductive ones, is, Stove believes, all that is 
necessary to deflect Hume's sceptical attack on induction. Despite the confidence with which 
Stove presents his claim. he can point to very little direct textual support for the view that 
Hume recognised only demonstrative forms of inference(41). There is, however, a good deal 
of evidence for the view that Hume recognised both demonstrative and probable-inductive 
inferences. There is no doubt that Hume considered there to be more that one sort of 
argument. Stove could hardly deny that Hume identifies both probable and demonstrative 
forms of reasoning. His response is to suggest that Hume's concern in making the distinction 
is not with the 'degree of conclusiveness' of the arguments, but with 'the epistemological 
character of the premises'(42). The kind of interest which Hume displays in his explicit 
discussions of probability in Sections XI to XIII of Part III is dismissed by Stove as 'an 
empirical, psychological interest, rather than a logico-philosophical and evaluative one'(43). 
The distinction is 'a material and descriptive one' concerned with distinguishing those 
arguments the premises of which are necessarily true from those the premises of which are 
contingent. Hume's considered position remains, according to Stove, that there are no 
probable inductive arguments, or, in other words, no inductive arguments which lend 
something less than full support to their conclusions. 
I think Stove's reading can be resisted on strong textual grounds. There is an obvious tension 
between Stove's position and the one Hume defends in Part III and elsewhere in the Treatise. 
Much of the evidence for holding that Hume distinguishes two sorts of inference seems, in the 
light of Stove's reading, equivocal. There, remains, nevertheless, evidence enough to show 
that Hume did not always talk of 'probability' and 'probable' argument in the sense suggested 
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by Stove. In the first place, Hume's later argument concerning 'scepticism with regard to 
reason' appears to be based on the supposition that a set of premises can lend a conclusion a 
degree of support or probability varying between 0 and 1 (T, 180-3). Hume shows how 
extended chains of reasoning produce less and less assurance in a conclusion in proportion 
to the number of successive new examinations' that attend it. until. at last. there remains 
'nothing of the onglnal probabillty'(T.182). Let us suppose that we have formed an original 
judgment to which we assign the probability 1 and that we have considered in that case the 
probability of error Involved In our calculation, 'we are oblig'd by our reason to add a new doubt 
deriv'd from the possibility of error In the estimation of the truth and fidelity of our 
faculties'(T.182). But this new estimation is itself founded on probability and so weakens 
further the evidence, which IS Itself weakened by another doubt of the same kind, and so on in 
infinitum. No mat1er what the strength of our original conviction 'it must infallibly perish by 
passing thro' so many new examinations, of which each diminishes somewhat of the force 
and vigour'(T, 182-3). A Similar presupposition would seem to be made in Hume's discussion 
of 'probability' and 'probable argument' In Sections XI to XIII of the Treatise and in Section VI 
of the Enquiry, Stove dismisses the sections dealing with probability as 'an inessential part of 
Hume's philosophy of Inductlon'(44). They nevertheless suggest quite strongly that Hume 
considered the premises of some arguments to lend a degree of support to their conclusions, 
The sections should be read as attempts to explain how probable arguments can supply 
differing degrees of warrant for their conclusions. 
Stove may still argue that Hume's intention in these passages is psychological rather than 
evaluative, Fortunately. we can point to other passages which. to my mind, settle the matter. 
Hume writes that the 'wise man proportions hiS belief to the evidence'(E.11 0), where the 
evidence is still 'attended with uncertainty' and the resultant belief 'imperfect'(T.135). He 
'weighs the opposite experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater 
number of experiments: to that side he inclines. with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he 
fixes his jUdgment, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability'(E.111). There 
can be little doubt that Hume intended to endorse the judgments of the 'wise man'(45), In 
Section XV of Part III Hume presents his list of 'rules by which to judge of causes and effects', 
with which we are to distinguish philosophical from unphilosophical probability, Hume makes it 
perfectly clear that arguments can lend different degrees of support to their conclusions, He is 
concerned with the causes of all our habits of inference, perfect and imperfect, and seeks to 
explain them on the basis of the same principles(T, 124). It would require a significant 
distortion of the text to read Hume as being concerned merely with the psychological 
explanation of why philosophers judge of these arguments in the way they do. 
A final passage from the Treatise should suffice to settle the question. Hume writes that while 
a demonstration is 'either irresistible, or has no manner of force'. in probabilities 'difficulties 
can take place, and one argument counter-ballance another, and diminish its authority'(T,31). 
79 
Hume is quite obviously making the point that, in contrast with demonstrative arguments, 
probable inferences can and do vary in force. Not all reasons for belief are deductively 
sufficient. There can remain little doubt that Stove is simply wrong to say that Hume identified 
the lack of full support for a conclusion with its epistemic worthlessness. Hume, at least, is in 
no doubt that probable arguments can vary in force and warrant according to the strength of 
their premises, and that, if we are wise, we will proportion our belief to the evidence they 
present. 
The weight of textual evidence against Stove's position is considerable. This becomes clearer 
when we review the stages of the argument concerning induction as Hume summarises them 
in the Abstract. Hume first argues that it is not anything 'that reason sees in the cause, which 
makes us infer the effect', on the grounds that 'the mind can always conceive any effect to 
follow from any cause' and that 'whatever we conceive is possible'(T.650). Whenever a 
demonstration takes place, the contrary is impossible, and implies a contradiction, and so, 
Hume concludes, all our reasonings concerning causes and effects must be founded on 
experience. What is striking about this argument is the fact that Hume might easily have used 
it, at this early stage, to conclude, on the basis of the deductivist assumption, that all inductive 
arguments are unreasonable: the sceptical thesis Stove presents as the over-all conclusion of 
Hume's argument(46). It is perfectly conceivable, and, therefore, possible, for the conclusion 
of any inductive inference to be false, while its premises are true. Hume could easily, and 
straightforwardly, have concluded, on the basis of the conceivability of an inference from 
observed to unobserved having true premises but a false conclusion, that the inference is not 
one that reason, in the demonstrative sense, determines us to make. Wherever a 
demonstration takes place 'the contrary is impossible'(T.650). Hume, however, goes on to 
consider the potential sources of rational support for the supposition upon which, he says, all 
reasonings from experience are founded(T.651). Hume, of course, considers two possible 
sources of rational support for the principle that nature is uniform, including probable 
argument. This is, again, difficult to square with the allegation of deductivism. Hume's 
procedure would be odd in a philosopher committed to the view that the only good sort of 
argument is a deductively valid one. If Stove is right in attributing the deductivist thesis to 
Hume, he ought never even to have considered the possibility of there being a probable 
inductive support for the principle. Not only does Hume go on to restate the distinction 
between his two basic sorts of argument, but he is quite clearly prepared to countenance the 
possibility that the principle be supported by probable reasoning. Thus, Hume is able to 
conclude, as he does in the Abstract, that there can be no proofs 'by any probable arguments, 
that the future must be conformable to the past'(T.651). 
So far, we have seen that Stove's position cannot be supported on either textual or historical-
textual grounds. The interpretation cannot, however, be dismissed for these reasons alone. 
Stove's stronger claim is that Hume's argument only makes sense on the basis of his 
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subscribing to the thesis of deductivism. Stove's view is that when Hume states that probable 
arguments proceed upon the supposition that the course of nature continues uniformly he 
must mean that the addition of this principle is what is needed to turn a bad or invalid 
inference into a good or deductively valid one. The idea is, in Stove's own words, that the 
uniformity principle is what is necessary to 'turn it into a valid argument'(47). Once again, there 
are good grounds for resisting Stove's interpretive point. In the first place, it is obviously not 
the case that the uniformity principle is necessary to turn the invalid argument into a valid one. 
As Stroud points out, there are indefinitely many ways of adding premises to make 'a 
previously invalid argument deductively valid', of which the simplest would be to add the 
conclusion to the premises(48). Stroud's complaint is that, on this understanding of 
'presuppose', Hume's requirement is a purely logical one which could be satisfied trivially 
without reference to the basis upon which one could know or have reason to believe the 
conclusion(49). It is not clear that Stroud is right to separate the question of logical validity 
from the 'epistemic' notion of certainty in this way(50). The conclusion of a deductively valid 
argument can be regarded as certain relative to the truth of its premises. Nevertheless, once 
we acknowledge Hume to be making what is at least in part, an epistemic, rather than a purely 
logical point, the question of which assumptions about inference are being made by Hume 
seems more open(51). Stove's view of the sense in which an inference can be founded on a 
'supposition' can perhaps account for the epistemic character of Hume's concerns but it is still 
to be seen whether this is the best, or only, alternative. The baldness of Hume's claim that all 
reasonings from experience are based upon the supposition of uniformity has led many 
commentators to side with Stove. The statement of the principle in the Treatise is strong 
enough to give some support to the view that Hume is interested in what could turn a good 
inductive argument into a good deductive one. Hume writes that if reason determined us to 
make the inference, it would proceed upon the principle that instances of which we have had 
no experience must resemble those of which we have had experience(T.89). But, taken 
literally, such a priniciple would transform not only good inductive inferences into deductively 
valid ones, but bad inductive inferences too. This seems an implausible reading of the sort of 
presupposition Hume has in mind for probable argument. I have already shown that the 
textual and historical support for the deductivist view is slight. But this by itself, in the absence 
of any plausible, better-supported alternative, is not enough to wholly discredit Stove's 
account. Can we account for the epistemic character of the supposition without characterising 
its role in purely logical terms? Why, in other words, should Hume think that probable 
arguments presuppose the uniformity principle unless he is working within a deductivist 
understanding of inference? Fogelin is right to say that the text is somewhat underdetermined 
on this matter(52). Stroud, however, offers his own alternative interpretation which is worth our 
while considering, if only to show quite clearly the nature and extent of the options available to 
Hume. 
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Stroud begins by explaining Hume's sense of 'presuppose' as follows: 'To say that an 
inference is "founded" on a particular supposition is to say at least that no one will be justified 
in inferring the conclusion from the premisses unless he is also justified in believing the 
supposition on which the inference is "founded'''(53). This initial formulation is broad enough to 
accommodate a number of different views about the character of the inference, and the nature 
of the justification, involved. Why, Stroud goes on to ask, does Hume think that inferences are 
founded on the uniformity principle in that sense? One possibility, we have seen, is that Hume 
thinks inferences from the observed to the unobserved are invalid without it. Stroud has left 
this, among other options, open. If this is what Hume believes, then he must also believe that 
we have no reason to believe anything unless we also have a reason to believe something 
that logically implies it. If this is all Hume means then, as Stroud points out, he can only be 
said to have shown that' if no one is ever justified in believing a proposition unless he is 
justified in believing something that logically implies it, then no one is ever justified in believing 
anything about the unobserved.'(54) This conclusion falls significantly short of establishing the 
sceptical conclusion that all inductive inferences are unreasonable or rationally unjustified. 
Stroud's argument only really works on the basis of Hume having subscribed to a conclusion 
like the one Stove attributed to him. There are other reasons for rejecting the deductivist 
interpretation. We saw that Hume does not believe an inference must be deductively valid in 
order to be good or, to some degree, warranted. He recognises that there are inferences the 
premises of which lend less than full support to their conclusions. On these grounds alone, 
some alternative reading, which makes sense within the structure of Hume's argument, and 
does not attribute to Hume an unwarranted and textually-unfounded assumption, is desirable. 
Stroud, I think, has it in mind to provide just such an alternative. Hume, according to Stroud, 
exploits another aspect of the 'traditional conception of reason' which allows him to form a 
really sceptical conclusion without making the unwarranted assumption that all reasons must 
be deductively sufficient(55). Let us suppose, with Stroud, that someone who has observed a 
constant conjunction of events and is presently observing one of the events forms a belief that 
its usual conjunct will now occur: 'The man might believe it for some very bad reason, 
completely unconnected with his past and present experience of As and Bs. Or he might have 
made a lucky guess. So something else must be true of him as well. It would seem that, if he 
is to be reasonable in believing that a B will occur, he must somehow take his past and 
present experience with respect to As and Bs as a good reason to believe that a B will 
occur.'(56) But even if the man does believe that what he has experienced gives him good 
grounds for believing that a B will occur, and even if this last belief is true, it still does not 
follow that the man's belief is reasonable or rationally justified.(57) It seems to Stroud that if 
the belief that a B will occur is to be reasonable, and if the man's belief that what he has 
experienced provides good grounds to believe that a B will occur is to be part of his reason for 
believing it, then his believing that what he has experienced provides good grounds for the 
belief that a B will occur must itself be reasonable or rationally justified(58). If he cannot show 
that it is, then he cannot, on this understanding of 'reasonable', be said to have made a 
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reasonable or justified inference from observed to unobserved at all. This 'self-conscious' and 
'potentially regressive' aspect of the notion of reason may well, Stroud thinks, be 'what Hume 
is focussing on in the traditional conception'(59). 
By focusing on this aspect of reasonableness, Hume could support his claim that reasonable 
belief about the unobserved requires something more than past observation of constant 
conjunctions of events and a present impression of one of those events, without committing 
himself to the sort of thesis about deductivism which we found to sit so awkwardly with the 
text. A 'fully rational agent', on this view, is 'not one who proceeds rationally only at the last 
step'(SO). Hume is able to ask whether one can have a belief that is reasonable in this sense, 
and form a sceptical conclusion about it, without assuming that all good reasons are 
deductively sufficient ones. Stroud's view fits in well with the over-all structure of the argument. 
Hume can make the charge that probable argument 'presupposes' the thing that is at issue 
without committing himself to the view that this thing is what is necessary to make the 
argument deductively valid. Probable arguments presuppose the thing at issue in the sense 
that the beliefs that support the original belief are subject to the same sorts of doubts as that 
original belief. I find Stroud's response, both on structural and textual grounds, extremely 
powerful. The main interpretive difficulty facing it seems to be the construction he places on 
the uniformity principle(S1). Stroud characterises it as the proposition that the past experience 
of a conjunction of As and Bs, along with an observed A, is good reason to believe that B will 
occur(S2). In other words, in order to be justified in believing, on the basis of the two premises, 
that B will occur, one must be justified in believing that the past instances, of which one has 
had experience, provide good grounds for the belief about future or unobserved instances. 
This would not, of course, give us a deductively valid inference to the conclusion that B will 
occur. It is still possible that B will not occur and this ties in very well with Hume's belief, 
implicit in his discussion of his 'rules by which to judge of causes and effects', that inductive 
inferences are fallible, even on the basis of the 'supposition'(S3). What is needed for a 
reasonable belief about B is a reasonable belief that what has been observed is a good 
reason for believing that B will occur. Stroud's difficulty is that this is not equivalent to what 
Hume says is required for a reasonable belief in these circumstances. Hume says that what is 
required is a principle which says that 'those instances of which we have had no experience, 
must resemble those, of which we have had experience'(T.89). The strength of Hume's claim 
here seems to give some credence to the deductivist view. The principle is less definitely 
formulated in the Enquiry. Hume seems to have thought that the same presupposition could 
be expressed as well by saying 'that the future will be conformable to the past'(E.35) or that 
the past be a 'rule for the future'(E.38). This seems closer to Stroud's suggestion that Hume is 
claiming that one must reasonably believe that what one has observed is good grounds for 
one's beliefs about the unobserved. Indeed, this could be read as a fairly loose paraphrase of 
what Hume has in mind when he writes that instances of which we have experience must 
resemble those of which we have no experience: 'To say that the murderer must have only 
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four toes on the left foot is to indicate that what you already know is good or conclusive reason 
to believe that about the murderer, and not just that he does have only four toes on the left 
foot'(64). No one who has observed a constant conjunction of events A and B, and is presently 
observing A, will reasonably believe that B unless he also believes reasonably that what he 
has experienced is 'a good or conclusive' reason for believing B. The sceptical upshot of this 
is that, on the conception of reason or reasonableness Hume's treatment of presupposition 
suggests, we can have no good reason for believing that what we have experienced is good 
grounds for belief about what we have not. Stroud's suggestion makes good sense not only of 
the different ways in which Hume puts his claim, but of the role it plays in the structure of 
Hume's argument. The reasonableness of inductive inferences will, on this understanding, 
have been undermined if it can be shown that what is needed for a reasonable belief that B 
will occur is, in addition to an observed constant conjunction of As and Bs and a presently 
observed A, a reasonable belief that what has been observed is a good reason to believe that 
B will occur, and that no one could ever come to reasonably believe that(65). 
These are strong, and, I think, decisive, textual and philosophical grounds for resisting Stove's 
interpretation of Hume's argument. My strategy in challenging Stove's reading of Hume's 
conclusion was to undermine, textually and historically, his attribution to Hume of the crucial 
but unwarranted assumption that only deductively valid arguments lend support to their 
conclusions. I found that this aspect of Stove's interpretation should be rejected, together, I 
suggested, with the thesis that Hume held a radically sceptical view of induction. There, 
nevertheless, remains the possibility that Stove's highly sceptical reading of Hume's 
conclusion could be defended on independent textual grounds. If it can be shown that Hume 
held induction to be unreasonable or epistemically unwarranted, then this is surely evidence 
for the view that Hume held some other tacit assumption about what is or is not reasonable, 
that would have allowed him to draw a conclusion which, on the basis of his explicit premises, 
he was not entitled to draw. This view has been resisted, and, to my mind, effectively refuted, 
by a number of recent commentators(66). These writers have, by and large, taken the view 
that Hume intended his argument concerning induction not as a sceptical attack on induction, 
but as an attack on a restrictedly deductivist conception of the reasonableness of induction. 
Hume's argument is to be read as deflationary rather than destructive of the claims of 
induction. While these authors have been prepared to allow that Hume's argument is, indeed, 
intended to show that inductive arguments are deductively invalid, one of the two premises 
from which Stove thinks Hume derived his radically sceptical conclusion about induction, they 
have resisted attributing to Hume the deductivist assumption, the second of Stove's 'sceptical' 
premises. Hume is supposed to have argued for something like inductive fallibilism. So, far 
from being a deductivist, or subscribing to a thesis like the one Stove describes, Hume is 
concerned with the refutation of deductivism. This position is exemplified by, among others, 
Beauchamp and Rosenberg. They write that, although Stove's interpretation of Hume is 
directly opposed to their own, they are broadly in agreement with him in holding that Hume has 
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established a case for what both they and Stove term 'inductive fallibilism', and that this 
position 'is not, as some have alleged, trivial'(67). Stove's claim, they continue, conforms to 
their thesis that '''Hume's scepticism concerning rationalism" is a measured and proper 
antidote to the excess of that philosophical view'. The 'larger purpose' of Hume's argument is 
to attack the 'rationalistic' conception of reason. The 'whole point' of Hume's discussion of 
whether the uniformity principle can be established by argument, according to Scott Arnold, 'is 
to see whether invalid predictive-inductive inferences can be "cured" of their invalidity by being 
transformed into acceptable deductively valid counterpart inferences'(68). Hume's 'sceptical 
fire' was directed 'at those who would claim more for causal (inductive) reasoning than it could 
deliver'(69). 'Inductive fallibilism', according to both Scott Arnold and Beauchamp and 
Rosenberg, alone describes the sceptical position attributable to Hume. The problem of 
induction 'is simply not to be found in Hume's philosophy'(70). 
A number of textual considerations tell against the standard or Humean interpretation of the 
argument concerning induction as committing Hume to the radically sceptical thesis that 
inductive arguments are epistemically worthless. The Treatise is subtitled ~n Attempt to 
introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects'(T.xi). The experimental 
method is largely inductive. Hume could not, therefore, call into question the epistemic worth 
of inductive inference without calling into question his own procedure in the Treatise. Causal 
reasoning is presupposed in much of the argument of the Treatise, before, during, and after 
the argument in which he has usually been thought to have denied all warrant to them. Hume 
turns immediately from his discussion of induction to a consideration of the nature and causes 
of belief(T.94-106). He continues to make inductive inferences throughout the remainder of 
the Treatise, even formulating a set of rules by which, he believes, we ought to regulate our 
judgment concerning causes and effects. Hume makes free use of all of these rules. From 
his first tracing of the causal dependency of ideas upon impressions, much of the argument of 
the Treatise can only be read as a causal investigation of the operations of the understanding. 
The justification of many of the claims of the Treatise would seem to depend upon at least 
some inductive inferences being themselves justified. At times, Hume is prepared to make this 
commitment explicit. One who concludes somebody to be near him 'when he hears an 
articulate voice in the dark, reasons justly and naturally; tho' that conclusion be derived from 
nothing but custom'(T.225). When we infer a cause 'immediately' from its effect 'this inference 
is not only a true species of reasoning, but the strongest of all the others'(T.97n). Sections XI 
to XIII of Part III of the Treatise suggest strongly that Hume not only considered there to be 
arguments which gave less than full support to their conclusions, but was prepared quite 
openly to endorse those in which belief is proportioned to the evidence. In the Enquiry, HUme 
writes that the evidence resulting from testimony 'admits of a diminution, greater or less, in 
proportion as the fact is more or less usual'(E.113). The uncritical reliance on testimony is 
attacked, among other forms of 'prejudice' and 'superstition', as 'unphilosophical', and 
contrasted with the more 'philosophical' reasonings concerning causes and effects he 
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identified with his eight rules. These rules are intended to tell us when and under what 
circumstances inductive inferences are well-grounded. It seems obvious that, at the very least, 
Hume did not consider his argument concerning induction to seriously undermine his own 
causal analysis, or the project of introducing the experimental method into the moral sciences. 
It could be argued that this is all these passages do establish. It may still be possible to 
reconcile the standard sceptical interpretation of Hume's argument with Hume's use and 
explicit endorsement of inductive inference on the grounds that inductive inference, however 
unreasonable, is nevertheless, for Hume, psychologically inevitable(71). We are under a 
psychological compulsion to continue making inductive inferences, even after we have found 
them to be epistemically worthless. But this move, while not entirely without precedent in 
Hume's philosophical writing, seems rather at odds with what Hume has to say in Section VI 
and with the way in which he says it. We might, at the very least, expect Hume to 
acknowledge, in Section VI or in one of the remaining sections of Part III, that this is what he is 
doing. But he makes no such admission. Hume does not include his argument among the 
sections dealing with 'sceptical systems' and subjects in Part IV(T.180-263). He refrains from 
describing his argument as 'sceptical' and shows no sign of being aware of the damage his 
sceptical assault on induction is supposed to have wrought. Hume's intentions in Part III do 
not seem to be sceptical at all. Hume's own psychological account of causal inference is 
based on inductive argument. All our reasonings concerning cause and effect are founded on 
the same natural relation of association which is under examination. Far from issuing in a 
general pessimism about the reasonableness or justifiability of induction, the upshot of these 
investigations is the formulation of a set of normative rules by which to judge of causes and 
effects. Hume's scepticism is little in evidence in Part III, and when Hume does eventually 
raise the question, it is not to endorse the conclusions of 'that fantastic sect'(T.183), but to 
defend a 'true' or 'mitigated' form of scepticism the result of which is not the radical rejection of 
our 'rational' practices, but a due 'diffidence' both in our doubts and in our convictions(T.273). 
The nonsceptical views to which I have already adverted are all, it seems to me, based, in one 
way or another, on a distinction Hume in supposed to have drawn between deductive or a 
priori reasoning and 'reasoning' in a broader sense, inclusive of all sorts of probable argument, 
to which Hume also subscribed. In the section dealing with induction, Hume is said to have 
used 'reason' in what Beauchamp and Rosenberg call 'his stipulatively restricted sense'(72). 
Hume shows 'first that demonstrative reasoning does not yield factual results and, second, 
that induction is not marked by the logical necessity attending demonstrative reasoning'(73). 
Hume's argument can finally be characterised as 'a frontal assault on rationalist assumptions 
that at least some inductive arguments are demonstrative'(74). He wants only to show that 
inductive reasoning can provide neither 'self-evident certainty', nor 'the logical necessity that 
uniquely characterizes demonstrative reasoning'(7S). Hume has no intentions of drawing a 
sceptical conclusion about induction at all. The sort of 'reason' in which Hume is interested in 
H6 
his discussion of induction, Baier writes, is 'restricted to the faculty of intellectual intuition and 
demonstration, that which can discern "intelligible" connections'(76). Hume adopts this 
'rationalist' sense of 'reason' purely in order to dismiss it. There is some textual support for the 
view that, occasionally in his writing, Hume insisted upon a distinction between species of 
reasoning. Hume describes formal reason, or the reasoning of the demonstrative 'sciences', 
as 'a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect'(T.180). This is the faculty of mind which 
produces 'knowledge', of which Hume treated in Section I of Part III. When Hume talks of 
'reason' in this sense he has in mind the faculty responsible for the discernment, by intuition or 
demonstration, of relations of ideas. It is also clear that Hume uses 'reasoning' in a much 
broader way to include any sort of transition or inference to a vivacious or enlivened idea. It is 
in this sense that Hume is able to write of the 'reasoning faculty of brutes' and animals, as well 
as of human creatures(T.176}. The actions of a dog in avoiding fire or shunning strangers 
'proceed from a reasoning, that is not in itself different, nor founded on different principles, 
from that which appears in human nature'(T.177}. From the tone of his voice, 'the dog infers 
his master's anger, and foresees his own punishment'(T.178). These 'reasonings' derive not 
from 'reason', in the first of Hume's two senses, but from custom. Hume's negative 
conclusions concerning induction are directed not at the institution itself, but at 'reason' in the 
first of these two senses. Despite his use of 'reasoning' in this broader, highly inclusive, sense 
in a number of places in Part III, Hume is supposed to have restricted his use, in the crucial 
passages of Section VI, and in his discussions of probable 'argument' and other forms of 
'ratiocination', to the former sense. I do not take issue with the claim that Hume made a 
distinction along these lines, and in something like these terms. But I do not think that Hume's 
use of 'reason' in Section VI of Part III is either as restrictive as these commentators have 
suggested, or as loose and inclusive as the proposed alternative sense of 'reasoning' might 
suggest. 
What is at issue is the question of the sense in which Hume thought of inductive arguments as 
being not 'determined by reason'. On the view being considered, what Hume has in mind 
when he writes that probable arguments are not 'determined by reason' is that inductive 
inferences are not deductively valid: 'inductive fallibilism'. Beauchamp and Rosenberg say 
explicitly that Hume, in their opinion, restricts reason to 'a priori reason' or 'the discernment of 
ideas and their relations (Le., to deductive reasoning and intuitive derivation of nonsynthetic a 
priori propositions)' in those contexts 'where he directly discusses the nature of induction'(77). 
What is the evidence for believing Hume used 'reason' in this way in the crucial passages of 
Section VI? The first difficulty for the view is that, as Baier acknowledges(78), when Hume is 
not discussing induction directly, he either uses 'reason' in a broader sense to include both 
demonstrative and probable argument, or makes it quite explicit that he is doing otherwise. 
When he introduces his argument concerning scepticism with regard to reason, for example, 
Hume makes clear that it is with reason as it regards the 'demonstrative sciences' that he is 
concerned(T.180). Hume follows the same sort of procedure when uses the term 'probability' 
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in a narrower-than-usual sense in Section XI of Part 11I(T.124). Hume warns his readers that 
he will be using the term in a special sense, noting that 'in the precedent part of this discourse' 
he has followed the 'method of expression' of those philosophers who distinguish knowledge 
and probability. The influence of Locke on this aspect of Hume's thought is, as I have already 
noted, made manifest in the Enquiry(E.24). His remarks there are to be read as a reiteration 
of his acknowledgment, in the Treatise, of Those philosophers, who have divided human 
reason into knowledge and probability'(T.124). Locke is the acknowledged source of Hume's 
initial distinction between demonstration and probability, and of his use of the term 'reason' to 
include arguments and inferences of both kinds. Reason, according to Locke, operates with 
both knowledge and probability or 'opinion'. It is responsible for probable and demonstrative 
inference. It consists, Locke says, 'in nothing but the Perception of the connexion there is 
between the Ideas, in each step of the deduction, whereby the Mind comes to see, either the 
certain Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas, as in Demonstration, in which it arrives 
at Knowledge; or in their probable connexion, on which it gives or with-holds its Assent, as in 
Opinion.'(79). Locke uses the term 'for a Faculty in Man, That Faculty whereby Man is 
supposed to be distinguished from Beasts, and wherein it is evident he much surpasses 
them'(80). He treats reason as the faculty which discovers certainty or probability by deduction 
or inference from the ideas acquired from sensation and reflection. Hume, I think, has in mind 
the same use of 'reason' as denoting the faculty of mind inclusive of, and responsible for, all 
argument and inference, whether probable or demonstrative. For the moment, I observe only 
that this is the usage of the term 'reason' which Hume appears to be endorsing. He identifies 
this usage with the common 'method of expression' which he has followed 'in the precedent 
part' of the Treatise, which includes, of course, the argument concerning induction. The 
restricted sense of the term Hume is supposed to have followed in Section VI would mark a 
significant departure from this usage. Yet Hume neither stipulates, nor gives us any clue, that 
this is what he understands by the term in this context, or that he has in mind any sort of 
deviation from the common usage. 
A second difficulty for this nonsceptical view concerns the structure of Hume's argument 
concerning induction. Hume's argument, as he presents it both in the Treatise and in the 
Enquiry, suggests very strongly not only that Hume recognised two sorts of inference, but that 
he considered both as possible sources of support for the principle that nature is uniform. 
Summarising his argument in the Abstract, Hume claims not only that it is not possible to 
'demonstrate, that the course of nature must continue uniformly the same', but that there are 
no 'proofs' by 'any probable arguments, that there is this conformity betwixt the future and the 
past, and therefore can never prove it'(A.652). Whether we take Hume's 'deductivism' in these 
passages to be feigned or real, it seems extremely difficult to square it with Hume's resort to a 
possible probable support for the uniformity principle. The argument, as Hume presents it in 
the Abstract, clearly features two main stages. In the first, Hume argues that it is not 'any thing 
that reason sees in the cause, which makes us infer the effect' on the grounds that 'the mind 
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can always conceive any effect to follow from any cause'(T.650). As I have already noted, 
Hume could quite straightforwardly have concluded, on the basis of the conceivability of an 
inductive inference having true premises and a false conclusion, that this sort of inference is 
not one that reason, in the demonstrative sense, determines us to make. Whenever a 
demonstration takes place, the contrary is impossible, and implies a contradiction(T.650}. If all 
Hume has in mind in saying that probable arguments are not 'determin'd by reason' is that 
they are not deductively valid then he could have drawn this conclusion much earlier, on the 
basis of the first stage of his argument, without arguing, as he does in the second stage of his 
argument, that the uniformity principle cannot be supported by an argument using either 
inductive or demonstrative sorts of inference. Hume's strategy in the second stage is to 
consider whether the uniformity principle can be founded on either one of two sorts of 
argument. Hume considers all the arguments upon which, he supposes, the proposition may 
be founded. These, he tells us, must be of two kinds, since they 'must be deriv'd either from 
knowledge or probability'(T.89). His procedure consists in showing that the principle can be 
justified by neither one. But even if Hume had been successful in showing that the uniformity 
principle could be given a probable support of some kind, this would in no way show that 'at 
least some inductive arguments are demonstrative' - the possibility Hume is supposed to be 
arguing against. All 'certainty', Hume tells us, 'arises from the comparison of ideas, and from 
the discovery of such relations as are unalterable, so long as the ideas continue the 
same'(T.79). Probable arguments produce a lesser 'degree of evidence' than demonstrative 
ones(T.124} and so can provide neither the 'self-evident certainty' nor the 'logical necessity' 
that Beauchamp and Rosenberg say 'uniquely characterizes demonstrative reasoning'(81). 
Hume, it would appear, has no reason even to raise the possibility of finding a probable 
argument to support the uniformity principle, if his aim is to show that inductive inferences 
cannot be turned into deductively valid ones. The question is strictly irrelevant to the position 
he is supposed to be attacking. The problem for the nonsceptical view is that it is unable to 
account adequately either for Hume's insistence on considering both demonstrative and 
probable argument as the source of the principle, or for the presence of an argument to the 
conclusion that the uniformity principle cannot, in Hume's own words, 'arise from 
probability'(T.90}. 
The third and, perhaps, chief difficulty for the anti-rationalist view concerns the terms in which 
Hume presents the conclusion of his argument. Hume writes, in summary of his findings, that 
'even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no 
reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had 
experience'(T.139). He gives a similar account of his conclusion in the Abstract 'We can give 
no reason for extending to the future our experience in the past, but are entirely determined by 
custom, when we conceive an effect to follow from its usual cause'(T.654). Hume's conclusion 
appears to be that we can have no reason whatever for believing that events of which we have 
had experience will resemble those of which we have had none. This is a much stronger 
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conclusion than the one attributed to him by Beauchamp and Rosenberg. Hume is supposed 
to have concluded only that 'there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those 
instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had 
experience '(82). This modest conclusion, which Hume draws part-way through the second 
stage of his argument, and then only in reiterating his 'foregoing method of reasoning' in stage 
one, could hardly be said to warrant Hume's own assessment of the force and originality of the 
conclusions of the two stages of his argument: 'I say, let men be once fully convinc'd of these 
two principles, and this will throw them so loose from all common systems, that they will make 
no difficulty of receiving any, which may appear the most extraordinary'(T.139). The strength 
of this claim would scarcely be credible in a philosopher who had done no more than argue for 
a form of inductive fallibilism(83). Hume obviously takes himself to have argued for a 
conclusion radical enough to have thrown men 'loose from all common systems'. It is not, in 
my view, deductivism, or rationalism, that bears the brunt of Hume's scorn, but the pervasive 
view of reason, exemplified by Locke, as a faculty of intellectual 'light' or insight, a guide for 
conduct and a source of 'certain definite principles of action'(84), whereby man 'much 
surpasses' animals(85). 
Hume expresses his conclusion in a number of different ways. In the Treatise he writes that 
when the mind 'passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of 
another, it is not determin'd by reason, but by certain principles, which associate together the 
ideas of these objects, and unite them in the imagination'(T.92). In paraphrasing the 
conclusion of the argument of the Enquiry, Hume writes: 'that, even after we have experience 
of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded 
on reasoning, or any process of the understanding.'(E.32). A few pages later he makes a 
somewhat different point when he writes that 'it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose 
the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are, to 
appearance, similar'(E.39). It is not 'by any process of argument or ratiocination', in other 
words, that we come to believe that instances of which we have had experience will resemble 
those of which we have had none. All our inferences from experience, therefore, involve a 
step 'taken by the mind which is not supported by any argument or process of the 
understanding'(E.41). Hume forms the same general conclusion, on the same argumentative 
basis, in the Abstract. Even after the experience of 'many repeated effects' of a sort, Hume 
writes, 'there is no argument, which determines me to suppose, that the effect will be 
conformable to past experience. The powers, by which bodies operate, are entirely unknown. 
We perceive only their sensible qualities: and what reason have we to think that the same 
powers will always be conjoined with the same sensible qualities? 'Tis not, therefore, reason, 
which is the guide of life, but custom.'(T.652) The main features of this line of thought can be 
sketched roughly as follows: Having established that the determination of inductive inference 
by reason would proceed upon the principle that nature is uniform, Hume asks whether there 
are any arguments upon which the proposition might be founded. Hume considers all the 
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arguments that might be supposed to 'found' the principle, which he sorts into two classes. 
Finding that neither sort of argument can be used to support the principle, Hume concludes, 
quite generally, that inductive inferences are not 'determin'd by reason', or, as he puts it in the 
Enquiry, by 'any process of argument or ratiocination'(86). Hume is able to conclude that in all 
probable argument there is a step taken which is not supported by any 'argument or process 
of the understanding'(E.41). 
Hume is interested in the question of whether or not we adopt induction on the basis of any 
process of argument 'or ratiocination'. In giving the answer he gives, Hume arrives at the 
position usually thought of as Hume's 'scepticism about induction'. Hume does not, however, 
consider the upshot of his argument to be sceptical. It seems obvious that Hume did not 
consider his argument concerning induction to undermine either his own causal examination 
of probable argument and the causal relation, or his endorsement of scientific induction. The 
reason for this is that Hume has no intention of calling into question the epistemic warrant of 
induction, at least, not in Section VI of Part III. Hume's argument is, in my view, by no means 
the 'sceptical attack on induction' it has been portrayed as being. Hume's ambitions for the 
argument are clearly stated and carefully prosecuted. He argues not that our reliance on 
induction is unreasonable, in the sense of being unjustified or without epistemic value, but that 
it is not 'reasoning' or the inference-forming faculty of reason which 'engages us' to suppose 
the past to resemble the future, and, so, to expect 'similar effects' from similar causes(E.33). 
His concern is with what causes or 'determines us' to make inductive inferences, rather than 
with the further evaluative question, which, to my thinking, goes unasked until late in Part IV of 
Book One of the Treatise. Hume asks, in a quite general way, whether it is reason that 
determines us, noting that, if it does, it will proceed by argument, and that that argument must 
'proceed upon' the supposition of a proposition itself founded on argument. Hume uses 
'reason', both in Section VI, and throughout the Treatise, to denote the faculty of mind 
responsible for the making of inferences and the forming of arguments, whether 
demonstrative or probable. He follows the common 'method of expression' of Locke in taking 
reason to be the faculty which produces both sorts of argument. His dispute with Locke 
concerns the notion that reason is a faculty of intellectual 'perception', a kind of 'natural 
Revelation', whereby 'Man' is distinguished from 'Beasts'. Locke thinks of all probable 
argument as proceeding on the basis of a perception of the connection between the 'proofs' or 
mediate ideas in 'every step of a Discourse, to which it will think Assent due'(87). Reason, 
according to Locke, perceives the 'certain or probable Agreement, or Disagreement of any two 
other /deas'(88). Probability is the appearance of an agreement or disagreement 'by the 
intervention of Proofs'(89). It is to Locke's notion of reason as an autonomous intellectual 
faculty, capable of 'perceiving' the 'connexions' between the proofs of a probable argument, in 
the same way as it 'perceives' the relations of 'necessary' connection in each step of any 
demonstrative argument, that Hume takes exception. Hume shows that in any probable 
argument or 'process of the understanding' there is a step taken by the mind which 'is not 
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supported by any argument'. The step is supplied not by reason but by instinct. Any argument 
for the reliability of induction would proceed upon the supposition of the uniformity principle 
and for this principle there can be no satisfactory argument. Hume considers that any such 
argument would have to be of either one of two kinds: probable or demonstrative. There can 
be no demonstrative argument because it is always conceivable, and, for Hume, therefore, 
possible, that an inductive argument have true premises but a false conclusion. There can be 
no probable argument for the proposition because probable arguments are founded on the 
same principle, and the same principle cannot be 'both the cause and effect of another'. 
Because an argument must of one of these two kinds, Hume is able to conclude that no 
argument can 'found' the uniformity principle and, so, that it is not by argument that we are 
'determin'd' to take up induction. 
Any probable argument involves a step which, irrespective of the question of its 
reasonableness or justifiability, proceeds not from argument or reason, but from custom and 
instinct. We are 'determined by CUSTOM alone to suppose the future conformable to the 
past'(T.652). This is a conclusion of critical importance within Hume's philosophy. Reason 
was, to Locke, the dominant guide for conduct and belief, a reliable and autonomous 
touchstone for knowledge and 'opinion', and a guide to action. It is, I believe, Hume's objection 
to this view of reason, that, for him, justifies his appraisal of his own conclusion as one likely to 
throw man 'loose from all common systems'(T.139). Reason, Hume says emphatically is not 
'the guide of life'. Reason is neither autonomous, nor dominant, in the way Locke 
supposed(T.186). Custom alone 'determines the mind, in all instances, to suppose the future 
conformable to the past. However easy this step may seem, reason would never, to all 
eternity, be able to make it.'(T.652) Hume's central point is not any sceptical thesis about 
induction, but the claim that it is by the imagination, and not by any means of the 
understanding, that we are determined to make the transition from cause to effect or effect to 
cause. Hume writes, later in the Treatise, that his intention in displaying the arguments of 
those 'fantastic' sceptics who attempt to undermine demonstrative reasoning by showing how 
successive assessments of the probability of error diminish their probability 'to nothing', had 
been merely to show 'that al/ our reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriV'd from 
nothing but custom'(T.183). Reason, in Hume's inferential-faculty sense, does not engage us 
to make inductive inferences. Hume nevertheless continues to refer to inductive inferences as 
'reasonings'. He uses the term broadly in referring to any 'inference' or customary transition 
from idea or impression to belief. But the term carries no normative weight. 'Reasoning' can 
be sensitive and instinctual. Hume's position is that while inductive inferences belong to a 
certain class of reasonings, they are not, as a class, determined or produced by the faculty of 
reason, or by any higher process of reasoning. This is not, however, to say that they are 
unjustified or epistemically worthless. This is not entailed by Hume's argument and Hume, as 
was noted, gives no indication that he thinks it is. 
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The upshot of Hume's argument concerning induction is not scepticism. Hume's concern in 
Section VI is not with the reasonableness or justifiability of inductive inference, nor is his 
interest in the question, in any explicit way, normative. Hume is giving a straightforward 
answer to the straightforward question of what it is that determines us to take up induction. It 
is quite clear that Hume does not assimilate the reasonableness or justifiability of inductive 
argument to its being a product of reason or reasoning. He nowhere suggests that inductive 
inferences are reasonable only if they are determined by reason. This, I think, explains how 
Hume is able argue forcefully that we have 'no reason' for making inductive inferences, while 
relying extensively and unequivocally on their conclusions. The well-grounded ness of most of 
the claims of the Treatise depends upon at least some inductive arguments being justified. 
Hume's causal investigation leads him to formulate as rules many of the principles of 
reasoning which he makes use of in the preceding sections and in those that come after it(90). 
He treats probable arguments as varying in force and warrant. Hume has placed a constraint 
on what it is for an inference to be reasoning, not on what it is for an inference to be justified. 
Determination by reason or reasoning would require that we argue with reasons 'at every 
step'. The question of the reasonableness of inductive argument has not been raised, still 
less, settled. Hume has argued to the conclusion that we do not adopt inductive reasoning on 
the basis of any theoretical argumentation or process of the understanding. If reason 
determined us it would proceed upon the principle that nature is uniform, and this principle can 
be produced neither by demonstration, nor by any probable argument. Hume's concern is with 
what causes us to adopt inductive inference. He treats the argument-forming faculty of reason 
as one possible determinant of causal inference among others. This is not to say that the 
practice of induction is unreasonable or that we do not have good inductive evidence for 
believing the procedures of experimental science to be better or more reliable than those of 
rationalist speculation or guesswork. Hume agrees that we do. But we cannot show the 
reliability of induction by reasoning about it unless we already accept that induction is reliable. 
We can give no supporting argument for our reliance on induction which does not itself rely 
upon it. Hume's discussion may well invite the theoretical question of the justification of 
induction, but it does not settle it. 
Hume has argued that our adoption of induction is not the result of reasoning or ratiOcination, 
on the grounds that any probable argument involves a step 'not supported by any argument or 
process of the understanding', but by a strong natural instinct. Hume's conclusion concerns 
the causes of inductive inference rather than the question of its justification. Should we then 
conclude, with Beauchamp, Mappes and Rosenberg, that the problem of induction is not to be 
found in Hume's philosophy? Hume presents his conclusion as an important thesis about what 
'determines' us to make causal inferences. The argument, as presented in both the Enquiry 
and the Treatise, stresses the conclusion that it is not reason that determines us to make 
inductive inferences. Hume argues that it is 'custom or a certain instinct of our nature'{E.159) 
that causes us to make inferences from unobserved to observed causes or effects. It is clear 
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that the problem Hume is addressing in Section VI is not the problem of the justification of 
induction. It does not follow from the fact of our inductive inferences being determined by 
custom that they are unjustified. Subsequent attempts to produce a justification for our 
reliance on induction that does not presuppose that reliance are, nevertheless, clear 
responses to Hume's argument, or, at any rate, to aspects of it. Philosophers have attempted 
to show that it is possible to establish the reliability of induction by argument without begging 
what is in question, without, in other words, presupposing the reliability of probable argument. 
Hume's argument quite obviously militates against this possibility. But this upshot of Hume's 
argument is not, in itself, sceptical. Hume is very far, about as far as can be, from suggesting 
that the reasonableness of induction depends upon its justification by argument. 
This is not to say that Hume is unaware of the normative question. This would be unlikely in a 
philosopher as astute as Hume, and rather unfortunate in a philosopher many of whose 
important conclusions depend upon inductive inferences being justified at least some of the 
time. Hume does raise the question, but not in Part III, and not as a direct result of the 
argument of Section VI. Hume alludes to the problem first, and fleetingly, in Section IV of Part 
IV, returning to it, once more, in Section VII, the conclusion of the first book of the Treatise. 
Hume expresses some of the sceptical sentiments which philosophers like Stove have been 
prepared to attribute to him in Section VI of Part III. Hume writes that the 'intense view of these 
manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and 
heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no 
opinion even as more probable or likely than another.'(T.268-9) Hume's conclusion follows the 
restatement of an argument(T.266) from Section IV of Part IV in which Hume complains that 
there is 'a direct and total opposition betwixt...those conclusions we form from cause and 
effect, and those that persuade us of the continu'd and independent existence of body'(T.231). 
When we reason from cause and effect, we are led to conclude, on the basis of arguments 
showing the mind-dependency of both secondary and primary qualities, that 'neither colour, 
sound, taste, nor smell have a continu'd and independent existence', and so that 'there 
remains nothing in the universe, which has such existence'(T.231). There is thus a 'direct and 
total opposition' between 'reason' and the senses. Although these two operations are 'equally 
natural and necessary in the human mind .... in some circumstances they are directly 
contrary'(T.266). Hume clearly believes this contrariness or 'opposition' calls into question the 
epistemic value of causal inference since it leads him to conclude that he can no longer look 
upon any opinion as 'more probable' than another. SceptiCism breaks in upon Hume not as a 
consequence of his argument concerning induction, but as a result of the direct opposition he 
believes he has discovered among those principles of the imagination which he has described 
as 'permanent, irresistable, and universal', and distinguished from those which are 
'changeable, weak, and irregular'(T.225). The 'principles of custom and reasoning' which are 
received by philosophy are those which are 'the foundation of all our thoughts and actions, so 
that upon their removal human nature must immediately perish and go to ruin'(T.225). It is on 
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these grounds that Hume defends the reasonableness of induction. Inductive method is a part 
of that framework of beliefs and practices governed by principles which are either unavoidable 
or necessary to the conduct of life. Hume's real scepticism about inductive argument emerges 
only when this sense of reasonableness, and this tidy framework, seems threatened. Hume's 
response is to attempt to discriminate between the operations of the imagination responsible 
for 'illusion' and 'contradiction' and those which are steadier and more regular. We cannot do 
this by adhering merely to the understanding or 'more establish'd properties of the imagination' 
since we have found, in Section I of Part IV, that 'the understanding, when it acts alone, 
entirely subverts itself'(T.267}. But if we establish it as a rule that 'no refin'd or elaborate 
reasoning is ever to be receiv'd' we cut ourselves off from 'all science and philosophy'. We 
have no choice left 'but betwixt a false reason and none at all'(T.267}. Nature, fortunately, 
suffices to 'cure me of this of this philosophical melancholy and delirium'. But Hume is not 
prepared to rest at this. He is still willing to give philosophy 'the preference to superstition of 
every kind of denomination'(T.271}. A just philosophy, in contrast to superstition, can provide 
us with only 'mild' and 'moderate' sentiments. A 'true' philosopher or sceptic will 'be diffident of 
his philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical convictions'(T.273}. Philosophy, if just, 
can instil in the philosopher only a due modesty and 'deference to the public'(T.274). Hume's 
claims need to be understood with some care. The philosopher, in recognising that he can 
save himself from 'total scepticism' only by means of a 'singular and seemingly trivial property 
of the fancy'(T.268), takes on some of the 'gross earthy mixture' of common life(T.272). The 
upshot of this is a diffidence and caution, as much about what one doubts, as about what one 
believes. The aim of philosophy has become a kind of reflexive self-consciousness. Greater 
self-consciousness means that we are more confident in endorsing those rules which, like the 
rules of inductive argument, can survive their own scrutiny. The 'true' sceptic is engaged in a 
search for rules of reasoning which can bear up under their own survey(91). Hume recognises 
that any defence of reasoning must, ultimately, involve reasoning. It is a token of a rule's 
adequacy that it can endure its own reflexive examination. Habits of mind become endorsable 
rules only when they have been found to survive the test of evaluation from their own point of 
view. By weighing up our doubts as carefully as our convictions, we might still hope to 
'establish a system or set of opinions, which if not true (for that, perhaps, is too much to be 
hop'd for) might at least be satisfactory to the human mind, and might stand the test of the 
most critical examination'(T.272). 
2.2 Hume and the New Hume 
John Mackie describes Hume's theory of causation as '[T]he most significant and influential 
single contribution' to the subject(92), yet there is surprisingly little general agreement among 
philosophers as to how the theory is to be understood. Most commentators agree that Hume 
is saying, or attempting to say, something of importance about causation, but they differ wildly 
in their appreciation of his aims, procedure and conclusion, and of the merits of his argument. 
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Part of the blame for this must undoubtedly lie with Hume himself. Important parts of Hume's 
procedure, and his presentation of his conclusions, can seem willfully obscure, and even 
perverse. His statements of intent seem clear enough, but the surface lucidity of these 
passages quickly gets lost among the labyrinthine intricacies of Hume's argument. Hume 
presents his account as the centre-piece of his investigations in Book One of the Treatise. He 
poses a number of different questions about the important relation of cause and effect, 
pursuing them, in one way or another, throughout the sixteen sections of Part III. Hume's 
theory begins with a search for the impression from which the idea of necessary connection 
was supposed to be derived, and ends with his two 'definitions' of a cause as '[A]n object 
precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are 
plac'd in like relations of precedency to those objects, that resemble the latter' and as 'an 
object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one 
determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a 
more lively idea of the other'(T.170). Hume offers similar, though not identical, 'definitions' in 
the Enquiry. In each case they are presented as the outcome of an argument concerning the 
idea of necessary connection. His intention, he says, is to 'collect all of the different parts of 
this reasoning, and by joining them together form an exact definition of the relation of cause 
and effect, which makes the subject of the present enquiry'(T.169). Few commentators have 
thought that what Hume gives us amounts to an 'exact definition' of cause. The main elements 
of the definitions can be roughly summarised in the following way: The first 'philosophical' 
definition identifies causation with regularity of succession, what Hume terms 'constant 
conjunction'; the second 'natural' definition identifies causation with the inferability of one 
'object' or event from another, appealing to the psychological association of ideas from which, 
as Hume will argue, the idea of necessity arises. I will return shortly to the controversial and, in 
many ways, central, question of the nature, origin and importance of this idea. I turn first to a 
number of familiar difficulties for Hume's account. 
The chief difficulties arising from Hume's statements of his double-definition of cause are too 
well-known to require much introduction. Some of the leading objections to Hume's account 
will be dealt with directly in this chapter. For the moment, I remark merely, together with a 
number of other commentators, that the definitions are neither strictly equivalent, nor 
coextensive(93). The point does not require much argument. The two definitions are obviously 
not synonymous or intensionally equivalent. It might be replied that although the definitions are 
not logically equivalent to each other, it is nevertheless a fact that where one applies, the other 
does also, that they are, in other words, coextensive. But it seems clear that this is not the 
case. There are circumstances in which either one of the two could apply where the other 
does not. Not every instance of regular succession produces an association in the mind. The 
constant conjunction of two objects or events could satisfy the first definition without ever 
having been observed to do so, without, that is to say, satisfying the second definition. 
Conversely, the second definition might equally well be satisfied without the first. We 
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sometimes declare two objects to be causally related after only a few 'experiments', or, in 
some cases, on the basis of 'one experiment' of a kind(T.1 05). In cases like these, a 
psychological association results from a survey of objects, but the objects do not instantiate 
the kind of regularity that would satisfy the first definition. The chief interpretive difficulty for 
scholars of Hume's writings on causation is that of accounting for the presence of two 
'definitions' of the same crucial concept which are neither intensionally nor extensionally 
equivalent. Hume appears either to contradict himself or to offer different, nonequivalent 
definitions of two different relations. The latter option can be swiftly dismissed on textual 
grounds. Hume is adamant that the two definitions provide 'different views of the same 
object'(T.169-70). It is quite clear from the text that Hume offers two obviously nonequivalent 
definitions relating to the same concept or object, both of which, he claims, are, in some 
sense, correct. As I will go on to argue, there are good textual grounds for thinking Hume 
endorsed both definitions. Nevertheless, the appearance of conflict in Hume's system has led 
a number of commentators to treat Hume's account either as comprising two distinguishable 
theories, or as endorsing as correct only one of the two definitions. I consider these views in 
the sections to follow. There are good textual grounds for resisting both of them. It might seem 
from this that we are missing something important in Hume's account, and that this something 
has to do with how Humean definitions of relations work or are meant to work. There is 
something in this suggestion. It too will be developed in what remains of this chapter. 
Equally important, though, to a just reading of the text, and to an appreciation of what Hume is 
attempting to do, is an understanding of the argument which leads up to the two definitions. It 
seems to me that both traditional and revisionist interpretations omit to consider in sufficient 
detail the extended argument of which the two definitions are the undoubted climax. Hume's 
attempts to 'define' causation need to be taken for what they are: as steps in a more general, 
highly reflexive and subtle piece of argumentation. We need, in other words, to consider 
closely the nature of Hume's theory, the part played by the two definitions within it, and, in 
particular, the sense in which they are the summation of the foregoing parts of Hume's 
reasoning. To do so we need to fix our attention on the crucial parts of Hume's account which 
provide him with the raw materials for the two definitions. I argue for the rejection of any 
account which seeks either to split Hume's theory into two more or less self-subsistent parts, 
or to ignore one half of what Hume has to say about causation. Both these views, 
unsurprisingly, end up attributing to Hume a position he does not hold. In this section, I reflect 
upon some of the main difficulties urged against Hume's explanation of the causal relation, 
arguing, against a number of them, that Hume's theory has been significantly and conSistently 
miscast, and offering, in turn, what I think is a more plausible and less problematic alternative 
view. I will begin, however, by sketching a number of other attempts to shed light on the 
structure of Hume's argument and the nature of the two definitions. 
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Commentators have responded in a number of different ways to the difficulty, or, perhaps, the 
challenge, of making sense of these two definitions within a unified theory. Some have 
preferred to treat Hume's theory of causation as confined only to the first of his two definitions. 
Hume's chief purpose in making out the first philosophical definition is supposed to have been 
to show up the error of including any relation of necessity in an analysis of the causal relation. 
A move like this one is usually associated with the Humean or positivist reading of Hume's 
theory of causation. On this interpretation, Hume's theory of causation is, on the whole, 
motivated by scepticism. Strawson refers to this as the 'standard account' of Hume's views on 
the subject(94). Hume is said to be presenting a metaphysical thesis about what causation 'in 
the objects' is, and concluding that it is nothing but the regular succession of phenomena. 
Ayer sums up what he thinks is Hume's thesis with the phrase 'in nature one thing just 
happens after another'(95), and this, according to Ayer, and others, is all Hume believes there 
to be to causation(96). Hume has offered a reductive analysis of the meaning of causation, 
designed to show that propositions about causes can be analysed, without loss of content, into 
ones about regularity of succession. The first definition alone really defines the causal relation. 
The second can be read as a psychological reflection on causation so-defined. I argue later 
that Hume's projectivism about causation does not commit him to this sceptical thesis. The 
standard interpretation significantly distorts Hume's intentions, as well as his conclusions. It 
does not sit well with Hume's earlier observation that apart from contiguity and succession 
'[T]here is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into consideration'(T.77), nor with his 
later remark that '[A]ccording to my definitions, necessity makes an essential part of 
causation'(T.407). It would be surprising to find Hume defending a regularity theory of 
causation having already argued against it. As we will see, there are other, equally strong, 
textual reasons for rejecting the Humean view. 
The obvious difficulty in squaring a reductive interpretation with Hume's frequent talk of 
'conceal'd' and 'secret' causal powers in nature, and his explicit endorsement of causal 
explanation in terms of 'laws and forces'(E.14), has led some commentators to question what 
was, until fairly recently, the orthodox reading of Hume on causation. Among them are those 
philosophers who argue that Hume is a realist or a 'sceptical-realist' about causes or causal 
connections(97). These commentators, in my view, rightly, allow that, for Hume, we do have 
an idea of necessary connection and that that idea has an important, not to say, pivotal, role to 
play within his causal theory. The view that Hume sought only, or, primarily, to explain how we 
fall into the error of including necessary connection in our definition of cause can be rejected 
on good textual grounds. The evidence for thinking that this is, at best, a very partial, and 
unnecessarily negative, rendering of what Hume has to say, is especially strong. It seems 
much more plausible to acknowledge, in line with the text, that Hume not only believes that we 
have an idea of necessary connection, but that he dedicates a good deal of his time to 
accounting for it. Proponents of the sceptical-realist view, nevertheless, face a serious 
difficulty in reconciling a straightforward realist reading of Hume's remarks about causal 
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powers and forces with a theory of meaning which seems to deny that talk of this sort can 
make sense. While such objections are not fatal to the realist view, they are compelling 
grounds for caution. Considerations such as these take us to the heart of the matter. In what 
follows, I argue for the rejection of both the 'standard' and the 'sceptical-realist' views, and for 
their replacement with something truer to Hume's intentions, and to the overall structure of his 
argument in Book One, Part III of the Treatise. The crucial interpretive difficulty, as I see it, lies 
in making some consistent sense of Hume's account of the origin of our idea of necessity and 
his endorsement of a view of Newtonian science as advancing, in some sense, beyond the 
mere redescription of phenomena. Whether or not Hume can, in good faith, avoid being 
committed to the view that in talking of causes or causal connections we are somehow 
making a mistake remains then, for the moment, an open question. 
It will be useful to begin by seeking some perspective on Hume's general strategy and the 
procedure he follows in deriving the two definitions of cause and in framing his explanation of 
the origin of our idea of necessity. In Section II of Part III, Hume sets out to 'explain fully' the 
relation of cause and effect, and, that we might 'reason justly', to trace to its source the idea of 
causation 'concerning which we reason'(T.74). Hume's concern is with the relation by which 
the mind is engaged when it makes causal inferences. Hume is in no doubt as to the 
importance of this relation. It is the only one of the three natural relations depending 'not upon 
the mere ideas' which involves a form of 'reasoning' as distinct from mere 'perception'(T.73). 
All our reasonings concerning matters of fact, including our reasonings on and about 
causation, turn out to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. Its effects are very 
special. Cause and effect is the only relation which can be 'traced beyond our senses' to 
inform us of 'existences and objects' which we do not see or feel(T.74). Of the three 'natural' 
forms of association, only causation produces belief. Hume's interest is, for reasons obvious 
from the sort of project he is engaged in, directed towards an analysiS of this important 
relation. Hume's analysis is, importantly and transparently, from the beginning of Part III, an 
analysis of the relation itself, as well as of the idea 'concerning which we reason'. It is a 
serious mistake to think of Hume as being wholly, or primarily, concerned with the analysis of 
linguistic meaning. The picture, for Hume, is much broader, and much less negative. 
I have argued that Hume's argument concerning induction does not commit him to a radically 
sceptical view of causal inference. The argument, I suggested, should be read as part of an 
extended defence of the role the imagination plays in our cognitive lives. Hume's argument 
arises as one phase, albeit an important one, of the analysis of the causal relation he began in 
Section II. We have already seen the value of taking Hume's discussion of causation as one 
move in a more far-reaching and ambitious enterprise. Hume provides a useful summary of 
the conclusions of this phase of his discussion of causation in Section XII. Hume writes: 'That 
there is nothing in any object, consider'd in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a 
conclusion beyond it, and, That even after the observation of the frequent or constant 
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conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object 
beyond those of which we have had experience.'(T.139) This restatement makes clear, once 
again, the two-stage nature of Hume's argument. Hume concludes, first of all, on the familiar 
grounds that any effect can be conceived to follow any cause, that it is nothing that reason 
'sees' in the cause that makes us infer the effect, and, second of all, that the mind, in making 
causal inferences, is not determined by the argument-forming faculty of reason. The mind is 
determined in the transition by certain principles of the imagination or the association of ideas. 
The conclusion, as I understand it, is a straightforward answer to an important question arising 
within cognitive psychology. The rejection of reason as the source of the belief that nature will 
continue uniformly the same is part of Hume's causal account of what faculty of mind 
produces what mental phenomena. One important corollary of this part of our discussion can 
be brought out now. Hume can be cleared of the serious charge of having confused the 
genetic question of the causal explanation of belief with the normative question of its 
justification(98). Hume, at least for the purposes of Section VI, is much more interested in 
'reason' as one possible and plausible answer to the genetic question of what it is that causes 
us to make inductive inferences. I argued strongly for the view that Hume's primary concern is 
with the question of whether it is reason or the associative principles of the imagination that 
causes or determines us to adopt induction. Both of these alternatives are live answers to the 
same question. In answering the question of what causes us to make causal inferences, 
Hume is careful not to prejudge the question of the authority or legitimacy of beliefs deriving 
from either source. Once 'reason' has been rejected, on the grounds that argument cannot 
produce the principle upon which the inferential faculty of reason would proceed if it 
determined us, Hume can turn to the other belief-source of which, he says, he has already 
taken note, the 'natural' principles of the imagination(T.92). It is, he says, the 'principles of 
union among ideas' which 'make us pass from one object to another, even tho' there is no 
reason to determine us to that transition'(T.92). Hume is now free to examine the nature of the 
association and of the belief to which the transition is made. This is the subject of Hume's 
enquiries in Sections VII, VIII and IX of Book One, Part III. 
Hume has quite a lot to say about how and under what conditions the associative principles of 
the imagination do determine us to make inductive inferences. We need to note not only the 
manner in which Hume characterises this form of association, but the language he uses to do 
it. Of particular importance to us is the manner in which Hume distinguishes causation from 
other sorts of 'natural' association. Hume sketches the sort of distinction he has in mind in 
Section IX. As already noted, causal inference, for Hume, is a species of the association of 
ideas in which, uniquely, vivacity is transmitted from an impression to an associate-idea 
sufficient to make that idea a belief. Belief, for Hume, differs from mere or simple conception 
in being 'a more vivid and intense conception of an idea, proceeding from its relation to a 
present impression'(T.1 03). When any impression becomes present to the mind 'it not only 
transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a 
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share of its force and vivacity'(T.98). Association by cause and effect is distinguished by 
Hume from association by either resemblance or contiguity in terms of the strength of the 
determination of the mind to pass from one object to another and of the force and vivacity of 
the related idea. The 'influence' of contiguity and resemblance is 'very feeble and 
uncertain'(T.109) in comparison with the influence, or, as Hume has it, the 'determination', of 
cause and effect. Hume explains the power of the original impression to produce a belief in 
the existence of its associate not 'by its own proper power' but in terms of a background of 
experienced constant conjunctions. We must 'in every case' have found 'the same impression' 
to be 'constantly conjoin'd with some other impression'(T.1 02). It is the repetition of resembling 
past instances that augments the vivacity of the idea and makes it a belief. It is only because 
of this effect that association by cause and effect can produce belief. Once the mind has been 
exposed to a constant conjunction of events, it moves naturally and easily from the idea or 
impression of one to the idea of the other. The belief which attends 'the present impression, 
and is produc'd by a number of past impressions and conjunctions', Hume says, arises 
'immediately, without any new operation of the reason or imagination'(T.1 02). The thought 
passes from impression to idea without 'choice or hesitation'(T.11 0). When the mind is faced 
with a perfect correlation of past conjunctions, it is, in effect, determined by custom to infer the 
existence of one from the appearance of the other(T.156). 
The determination of the mind which takes place in causal inference, and which we feel as an 
impression of reflection, arises from our experience of repetition. The discussion of causal 
inference and belief in Section VI of Part III concentrated on cases of belief in which the 
correlation is perfect and the argument is, as Hume says, 'entirely free from doubt and 
uncertainty'(T.124). In Sections XI to XIII, he shows how the 'same principles', or the same 
general hypothesis about the causes of belief, can be used to explain the origin of another 
'species of reasoning'(T.124) and belief, the evidence for which is 'still attended with 
uncertainty'. Hume intends these sections to stand in confirmation of the theory outlined in 
Section VI, and in the following few sections. The sections 'Of the probability of chances' and 
'Of the probability of causes' show how, when our experience of correlations is 'mixed' or 
'imperfect', an 'imperfect belief' is produced(T.135). In these cases, the vivacity transferred 
from impression to idea-belief is of a lesser degree to that communicated in the case of a 
perfect correlation, and the attendant conclusion, on the same basis, less probable. Since 
Hume has explained belief as a matter of custom, founded on the perceived resemblance of 
pairs of objects, "tis not strange the want of resemblance shou'd overthrow what custom has 
establish'd, and diminish the force of the idea, as much as that latter principle encreases 
it'(T.114). A 'contrariety of experiments' produces not a change in the content of a belief, but a 
change in its force and vivacity. Probabilities start out as proofs, but weaken in their force and 
fixity as contrary experiments are found. Where the habit of expectation formed on the basis 
of past conjunctions is perfect, our ideas, Hume explains, not only have a greater share of 
force and vivacity, but are of a more settled order(T.1 08). Our beliefs about such existences 
101 
as 'lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory' can only be derived from custom and 
experienced constant conjunction and so must take on and reflect the orderliness and 
constancy of the experience upon which they are based. When a 'contrariety of experiments' 
breaks in upon this constancy, our former confidence is destroyed, and only an, at best, 
'imperfect' belief is possible. It is this constancy in our experience that accounts for the 'fixt 
and unalterable' nature of the ideas we get by causal inference, each of which, Hume says, 
takes its place in the imagination 'as something solid and real, certain and invariable'(T.11 0). 
The same constancy explains the feeling of determination which attends causal association 
where a correlation has been found to be perfect. In these cases, the causal factors of custom 
and the association of cause and effect fix or determine rather than merely influence the belief 
in question. Anything other than constant conjunction in our experience can merely influence 
the mind in its transitions, producing an impression of reflection of a certain 100seness(T.408) 
in the association. As we will see, Hume picks up the language of psychological determination 
and reflection again in the crucial Section XIV, 'Of the idea of necessary connexion'. Hume will 
use the feeling of determination or constraint we experience in the customary transition from 
cause to effect in explaining our mistaken view of necessity as a feature of the 'known 
qualities' of objects. 
Hume continues to develop and examine the associationalist causal thesis he argued for in 
Section VI, in Sections VII and VIII, and in the sections dealing with probability. Hume's 
account of the causal relation is unflinchingly causal. Causal inference is itself a causal 
process which can be investigated as we investigate other causal phenomena. It is important 
to note that this is the way in which Hume thought of his account. As early as Section III, we 
find Hume presenting an account of the relation, and of the idea of necessary connection 
which enters into it, which is, in Fogelin's words, 'transparently causal'(99). Hume's analysis of 
the relation has been explicitly causal, and explicitly couched in causal terms, since Section III 
of Part III. Hume's theory of causation is itself causal. When Hume sets out to hunt down our 
idea of the causal relation, and, of necessary connection, in particular, he turns immediately to 
the impressions which are the causes of the simple ideas in question. Hume's conclusions in 
Part III are the result of a sequence of reflexive causal inferences. As I will argue shortly, and 
in much greater depth, Hume is presenting a causal explanation of how and under what 
conditions we come to think of two objects or events as causally connected. He goes on to 
offer a causal account of the idea of necessity, and a definition of causation as a natural 
relation in which the causal term 'determines' occurs(1 00). Hume's procedure here seems 
worryingly circular, and, indeed, would be, if Hume was offering a definition of cause in 
anything like a contemporary sense of the term(101}. The psychological relation of ideas to 
which Hume appeals in the second definition of a cause is itself a causal relation. It is not, 
however, clear that Hume has that much to worry about, even on the basis of this statement of 
the case. Hume has a number of options open to him in avoiding the charge of circularity. He 
can either argue that what occurs in the definition is not the term but the impression of 
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determination(102), or he can identify cases of determination by appealing to the feature of 
constant conjunction adverted to in the first definition(1 03). This second alternative would be 
in line with the self-referential nature of Hume's account. What is clear is that Hume does not 
regard the presence of the term as a defect of his definition, but, in Baier's words, 'as a part of 
the self-referential subtlety of the whole account'(1 04). A good deal depends upon the 
conditions under which Hume thinks a definition of a relation has been successful. Hume 
would be in more of a difficulty if he thought of definition in what Kemp Smith calls 'the strict 
logical sense'(1 05), the sense in which the definition states the precise and complete meaning 
of the term. Doubts Hume has as to the adequacy of the definitions, and their appeal to 
'objects foreign to the cause', might suggest that he does not think of them in this way. 
Hume's definitions are stated, it seems to me, in terms of what has to be the case in order for 
a causal relation to be successfully identified. This is not quite what we would now expect of a 
definition. The issues here are complex. Before we can tackle them head-on, we need a 
greater grasp of how Hume thought of them, and how they come to arise in his argument. We 
need, in particular, to look to the text for more evidence of how Hume thought of definitions 
and of the conditions under which he thought a definition adequate or successful. 
Hume tells us early on in the Treatise that our ideas of relations are among the more 
remarkable effects of the association of ideas(T.13). Our ideas of the relations which guide 
our associations of ideas are themselves the products of association. It is because the causal 
relation is a natural relation that we can reason upon it and draw inferences from it(T.94). One 
object is 'naturally' related to another if the idea or impression of the one leads the mind 
naturally, or as a matter of course, to form an idea of the other. It is cause as a natural relation 
that leads us to draw inferences about matters of fact and, so, guides us in forming our idea of 
cause as a 'philosophical' relation, a relation 'implying contiguity, succession, and constant 
conjunction'(T.94). Our idea of the causal relation is itself the result of reflexive causal 
inferences founded on the natural relation of cause and effect. The distinction between natural 
and philosophical relations is of the utmost importance to Hume. All relations, according to 
Hume, are philosophical relations. To say of two objects that they are related by a 
philosophical relation, is to say that any relation at all holds between them. Among these 
relations which, Hume appears to think, number seven in all, there are some relations by 
which one idea 'naturally introduces' another in the imagination(T.13). Of the three natural 
relations or principles of association, resemblance, contiguity and cause and effect, we find by 
experience, 'that belief arises only from causation, and that we can draw no inference from 
one object to another, except they be connected by this relation'(T.1 07). Hume undertakes an 
analysis of this relation in order to show how we are able to form inferences and derive new 
beliefs about matters of fact which take us beyond what we either see or feel. It is with the 
source of the idea of this relation that Hume is concerned from near the outset of Part III, and 
which Hume has already gone a significant way to discovering by the time he comes to 
discuss induction in Section VI. 
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Hume tells us that the idea of the causal relation 'must be deriv'd from some relation among 
objects'(T.75). Hume's interest is in the relations which obtain between those objects or 
events which we consider to be causally connected. He finds the causal relation to involve the 
relations of contiguity and temporal priority, together with another, rather more mysterious, 
relation. Of these three relations, which Hume believes to be 'essential' to our idea of 
causation, it is the element of necessity or necessary connection in which he is principally 
interested. Hume gives this relation special attention, beginning in Section III in which he 
discusses our belief in the necessity of causes. The idea of necessary connection is of special 
importance to Hume, as it was to a number of other philosophers, notably, Nicolas 
Malebranche. It was this connection that was thought to license our projection of past 
regularities into the future. The foundation necessary connection was thought to provide for 
inferences from cause to effect gives Hume's pursuit of the notion its rationale. Hume 
eventually argues that we can have no perception of necessary connection in nature on the 
grounds that such a perception would 'amount to a demonstration, and wou'd imply the 
absolute impossibility for the one object not to follow, or to be conceived not to follow upon the 
other'(T.161-2). This is the thesis which is usually thought to constitute the core of Hume's 
theory of causation. But Hume was not the first philosopher to argue against the possibility 
that necessary connections could be given in experience. Malebranche, for example, finding 
the notion of a necessary connection between mind and body 'unintelligible', argued that we 
could get no idea of power from our notions of body and mind, and turned, instead, to the 
causal activity of God for the source of the idea(106). He argued that the mind perceives a 
necessary connection 'only between the will of an infinitely perfect being and its effects. 
Therefore, it is only God who is the true cause and who truly has the power to move 
bodies'(107). Malebranche believed that since all causal connections are necessary, and no 
other cause is necessarily followed by its effect, the only cause is the will of God. The deity is 
supposed, in Hume's words, to be 'the prime mover of the universe' who 'by a continu'd 
exertion of omnipotence, supports its existence, and successively bestows on it all those 
motions, and configurations, and qualities, with which it is endow'd'(T.159). What we think of 
as causation in nature, according to Malebranche, just is the regular succession of sorts of 
objects or events(1 08). Natural causes 'are only occasional causes that act through the force 
and efficacy of the will of God'(1 09). There is no doubt that Hume's account of causation owes 
a number of significant debts to Malebranche(110). Above all, Malebranche took the important 
step of denying intelligibility to a number of presumed causal connections. Nevertheless, 
Hume appears to want to resist the regularity thesis about causation to which he believes 
Malebranche and the Cartesians committed(E.14). The conclusion that all there is to 
causation just is regularity of succession is, Hume thinks, unavoidable on the basis of the 
rejection of innate ideas and Malebranche's assumption that ideas reveal how reality is. The 
'supposition of a deity', Hume writes, 'can serve us in no stead, in accounting for that idea of 
agency, which we search for in vain in all the objects, which are presented to our senses, or 
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which are internally conscious of in our own minds'(T.160}. If we do have an idea of power, it 
must be derived from the known qualities of objects, but, since there is 'nothing in known 
qualities, which can produce' such an idea, we must conclude, on the basis of an assumption 
like the one Hume attributes to Malebranche, that there are no real causal connections in 
nature. Hume, I suggest, remains critical of Malebranche and of the crucial assumption he 
believes him to be making. The interesting question for interpreters is whether Hume makes 
this assumption, or one like it, which would commit him to a regularity thesis about causation, 
the thesis which has been so often attributed to him. I will argue that he does not. I have 
already suggested a number of textual reasons for rejecting the regularity-theorist reading of 
Hume on causation. Some of these will be developed more fully. The chief difficulty facing my 
own reading lies, as we will see, in reconciling Hume's account of our idea of necessary 
connection with his talk of hidden and concealed natural causes, and with his professed 
endorsement of Newtonian science. 
Finding no impression among the 'known qualities of objects' which could account for the idea 
of necessary connection, Hume turns to an examination of other questions which, he hopes, 
might 'afford a hint' concerning the nature of the idea(T.78}. As early as Part III, Section III, 
Hume is prepared to reject the notion that any idea or relation of ideas could rationally ground 
our causal inferences. Having dispensed with the possibility of finding in the objects any 
impression which could account for the idea of necessary connection, Hume is free to turn to 
the questions of why we conclude that particular causes must necessarily have particular 
effects, and of what is the nature of the inference we make from one to the other. These are 
questions which Hume, in one way or another, continues to pursue throughout the rest of Part 
III. His task remains that of explaining the nature and origin of our idea of necessary 
connection. Having argued against the possibility of finding any necessary connection in 
nature which could serve as the basis for such an idea, Hume is forced to advance on his 
quarry by a rather less direct route. Hume's concern in Section VI, and in the sections which 
immediately follow it, is with the nature, causes and effects of inductive reasoning. These 
sections constitute Hume's complete explanation of how and under what circumstances we 
come to form beliefs and draw inferences about unobserved matters of fact. As we have 
already noted, the important change in the direction of Hume's argument came much earlier. 
As early as Section III, Hume abandoned the search for an impression or idea of necessity in 
the objects which could serve as the basis for the prOjection of past regularities into the future, 
turning instead to the question of how the idea of necessary connection can arise from causal 
inference(T.78}. Hume has already armed himself with most of the materials he will need to 
show how our idea of necessity arises, and how we come to take it for something that it is not, 
by the time he introduces his discussion of inductive argument. The suggestion at the outset 
of Section VI is that the 'new relation' of constant conjunction will somehow supply the deficit 
in our idea of cause. Hume's considered view is that our complex idea of the causal relation 
comprises ideas of the relations of contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction, as well, it 
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seems, as the further element of necessary connection. Hume promises that "twill appear in 
the end, that the necessary connexion depends on the inference, instead of the inference's 
depending on the necessary connexion'(T.88). He is, however, faced with the problem of 
explaining how 'from the mere repetition of any past impression' any 'new original idea, such 
as that of a necessary connexion' can arise(T.88). This is the problem with which Hume 
introduced his discussion of inductive inference, only to leave off giving a direct answer until 
Section XIV. Hume's worry took the form of explaining how repetition could produce the 
'original' idea of necessary connection. In Section VI, Hume attempted to explain the nature 
and importance of the form of inference from which, as he will go on to argue, that idea arises. 
It turns out that by following Hume's rather indirect route we can come to see how the idea can 
be derived from constant conjunction, or, more accurately, from the determination of the mind 
by which we are constrained to form the idea of a certain object upon the appearance of its 
usual attendant(T.156). To see how we get this extra element we need to turn to Hume's 
argument concerning necessary connection and to the lengthy Section XIV of which Hume's 
two definitions of causation are the eventual summation. 
Hume finds that the transition we make from observed to unobserved matters of fact occurs 
only after we have observed a constant conjunction of two sorts of thing, and received an 
impression of one of the conjuncts. When the cause is present, Hume writes in the Abstract, 
'the mind, from habit, immediately passes to the conception and belief of the usual 
effect'(T.656). Beliefs about unobserved matters of fact arise from custom, as a result of 
experienced repetition. Custom presupposes the perceived resemblance between sequences 
of events. When we observe either one of a pair of objects found to be constantly conjoined in 
our experience, there is little we can do to prevent the idea of its 'usual attendant' occurring, 
and no process of reasoning can either lead us to or prevent us from forming that idea in 
these circumstances. Custom alone 'determines' us to make the past the 'standard of our 
future judgements'. All our 'reasonings in the conduct of life' are of this nature(T.650). There 
are three circumstances that Hume finds requisite to every cause. In considering the motion 
communicated from one billiard ball to another, as 'perfect an instance' of the relation of cause 
and effect 'as any which we know'(T.649), Hume writes, we 'find nothing but contiguity, priority 
in the cause, and constant conjunction'(T.656). It is, however, 'commonly suppos'd', that 
beside these circumstances, there is a necessary connection between the cause and effect 
and that the cause possesses 'a power, or force, or energy'(111). It is this supposition - the 
notion that a certain cause not only will, but must, have a certain effect - that Hume is 
interested in explaining(112). The question of the idea which is to be annexed to these terms 
is the chief difficulty in Hume's account. Finding himself, once more, obstructed in his pursuit 
of the idea of cause by the absence of any perceived connection between cause and effect, 
Hume can only repeat the question which he last posed directly in Section VI: 'viz. What is our 
idea of necessity, when we say that two objects are necessarily connected together'(T.155). 
Hume promised that it would turn out that necessary connection would depend on the 
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inference, rather than the inference's depending on the necessary connection(T.88). He is 
now in a position to tell us how, on the basis of observed repetition, we get the idea of 
necessity we have, and how we project that idea back onto the regularities which caused it. 
Hume's first step is to remind us of the principle formulated earlier, and noted at length in 
Chapter One, that every idea is copied from some preceding impression of sensation or 
reflection. As we have no idea that is not derived from an impression, we must look for the 
impression from which the idea of necessity is derived. Hume observes that in all single 
instances in which two objects are supposed to be placed in the relation of cause and effect, 
there is nO third relation beside contiguity and succession from which the idea of necessary 
connection might be derived. Hume refers us back to his earlier argument to show that 
demonstrative reasoning can never make us conclude that a cause is always necessary to 
every new existence(T.78-82). A perception of necessary connection in nature would 'amount 
to a demonstration' and, so, would imply the impossibility of one object not following upon the 
other(T.161-2). But, as Hume has already argued, any cause and effect pair being 
distinguishable, and, hence, separable, it is always conceivable, and, therefore, possible. for 
any cause to have any effect whatever. All our reasonings a priori 'will never be able to show 
us any foundation for this preference'(E.30). Hume turns instead to classes of instances, 
adding the constant conjunction of objects within a class, to the relations of contiguity and 
succession already adverted to(113). At first sight, Hume says, 'this seems to serve but little to 
my purpose. The reflection on several instances only repeats the same objects; and therefore 
can never give rise to a new idea. But upon farther enquiry I find, that the repetition is not in 
every particular the same, but produces a new impression, and by that means the idea, which 
I at present examine. '(T .155) 
Only after the repeated observation of conjunctions of pairs of events do we form an 
impression of necessary connection. In cases where the same object is always conjoined with 
the same event, the mind is, upon the appearance of the object, 'determin'd by custom to 
consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon account of its relation to 
the first object'(T.156). In cases like this, one receives a new impression or sentiment, a 
feeling of 'determination', which, Hume says, 'affords me the idea of necessity'(T.156). The 
impression of necessity arises from that circumstance in which classes of cases differ from 
singular cases. After frequent repetition of resembling instances, the mind is determined to 
move from one idea or impression to the idea of its usual conjunct, and it is from our 
impression of this feeling of determination that the idea of necessary connection arises. The 
impression from which the idea of necessity is derived is an impression of reflection. Since 
'reason' or, as Hume puts it in the Enquiry, 'reasoning a priori'(E.27), can never give rise to it, 
the idea of necessity must be derived from experience, and, as there is no impression 
convey'd by our senses which can produce the idea, it must be derived from 'some internal 
impression'. There is no 'internal impression' or impression of reflection 'which has any 
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relation to the present business, but that propensity, which custom produces, to pass from an 
object to the idea of its usual attendant. This therefore is the essence of necessity.'(T.165) We 
must either concede that we have no idea whatever of 'force and energy' or necessity, and 
that these words are therefore without signification, or concur in Hume's view that 'they can 
mean nothing but that determination of the thought, acquir'd by habit, to pass from the cause 
to its usual effect'(T.657). 
Hume's conclusion, and its relation to the remainder of the argument and to the two 
definitions, need to be considered with some care. Hume has argued that while we have an 
impression and idea of causal necessity as an internal impression or feeling of determination 
to pass from one idea to another, we have no impression or idea of necessity or necessary 
connection as an extra relation found in or between pairs of objects related by contiguity, 
priority and constant conjunction. The idea of necessity we have is not produced by any new 
instance of relation found to obtain between the related objects. The 'several instances of 
resembling conjunctions' which lead us to the idea of necessary connection 'are in themselves 
totally distinct from each other, and have no union but in the mind, which observes them, and 
collects their ideas'(T.165). The 'repetition of similar instances' does, nevertheless, give rise to 
a new impression. Hume describes the idea of necessity as 'the effect of this observation' of 
instances of resembling conjunction, and as 'nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or 
a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another'(T.165). To a degree, it is 
quite clear what Hume has in mind in this and in similar passages in the Enquiry(E.75). But 
there is some considerable equivocation in what Hume wants to say here and in how he says 
it. He appears to tell us that the experience of constant conjunction gives rise to the idea of 
necessity by producing a new internal impression of the determination of the mind to pass 
from one object to the thought of another in cases where a perfect correlation of events has 
been observed. Since, as Hume has already suggested, mere repetition can produce nothing 
new in the objects themselves, it must be from some new impression in the mind(T.165) that 
the idea arises. This new impression, it seems, is, simply, the determination of the mind to 
pass from one object to the idea of its usual attendant. Hume is not entirely consistent in what 
he says here, nor does he appear entirely comfortable with it. We can easily see why if we 
consider, more closely, the implications of what Hume seems to be saying. 
Hume writes of the determination of the mind to pass from an idea or impression of some 
object or event to a belief or idea of some other object with which it has been regularly 
conjoined. This describes a typical Humean cause-and-effect pair. In this case the relation is 
between one complex mental event, the observation of constant conjunction and a present 
perception of one of the conjuncts, and another, the belief that its usual attendant will occur. 
The remarkable feature of the above passage is that Hume appears, at first sight, at least, to 
identify what he terms 'the determination of the mind' directly with the impression of necessity 
or necessary connection from which the idea arises. The 'determination of the mind to pass 
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from one object to its usual attendant' must, Hume says, 'be the same with power and 
efficacy'(T.165) Necessity, he adds, 'is nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or a 
determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another'(T.165). He writes, in the 
Enquiry, that 'the customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual 
attendant' is the 'sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary 
connexion'(E.75). This is not only puzzling, but is, as Stroud points out, taken literally, quite 
incoherent. Stroud observes that Hume appears to be arguing 'that, since the idea of 
necessary connection comes into the mind only as a result of one mental occurrence's 
causing another, and since according to the theory of ideas the cause or source of every idea 
is an impression, therefore the one event's causing another is the impression from which the 
idea of necessary connection is derived'(114). The suggestion requires that all that is 
understood by 'determination of the mind' is one event in the mind causing another, in the way 
I have described above. This is even more explicit in the passage from the Enquiry. Hume 
seems to say that since one mental event causing another is the cause of the idea of 
necessity, it must be an impression of cause or determination from which the idea of causal 
necessity arises. If this is all Hume has in mind, then his position is incoherent because, as he 
has amply shown, it can make no sense to talk of one event's causing another being an 
impression. It is difficult to see how the internal impression can be the determination of the 
mind. A transition from 'one object to its usual attendant' is not an additional impression. 
When Hume writes of a customary transition from one to another he has in mind only the 
regular and orderly conjunction of events in the mind. We can speak of the occurrence of pair 
of events, and of the order in which they occur, and 'trace up' the impressions to which these 
ideas correspond, but we can have no impression, and hence, no idea, of one causing the 
other. 
To be fair to Hume, he makes other, more plausible, or, at least, more consistent, attempts to 
characterise the impression in question, though these too have their difficulties. Hume seems, 
at times, to want to suggest that the idea of necessity is derived from a feeling of 
determination, an impression of the connection between a cause-and-effect pair. The 
suggestion is that rather than identify the inference or determination of the mind with an 
impression, Hume thinks we have an awareness or impression of the causal or necessary 
connection between mental events from which the idea of necessity can be derived(115). A 
number of passages support this reading. Hume sometimes says that we 'immediately feel a 
determination of the mind'(T.165). In the Enquiry, Hume writes that 'we feel in the mind' the 
'connexion' by which 'the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to 
expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist'(E.7S). There is a strong suggestion 
in this last passage that what we have is an impression of necessary connection between two 
events in the mind. This, again, is rather perplexing. Hume provides us with textual grounds 
for ascribing more than one position to him, but, this alternative, like the last; has little to 
recommend itself, either to us or to Hume. The reasons for this should already be obvious. 
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Taken literally, Hume would appear to allow that there is at least one example of a causal 
connection between events of which we can have an impression. As I have already noted, this 
is not an alternative that Hume would have been willing to tolerate. Hume expressly denies 
that there are any necessary connections, whether between physical or mental objects or 
events, that we can apprehend. His reasons for saying so have to do with the impossible 
consequences of any such apprehension(116). He clearly argues for the thesis that there is no 
independent impression of power accompanying the motions of the body or the acts of the 
mind. His most explicit statement of this position occurs in the Enquiry, shortly before his 
restatement of the two definitions of cause presented in the Treatise. It might be thought, 
Hume writes, that we 'are every moment conscious of internal power' when we 'feel. .. by the 
simple command of our will, we can move the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our 
mind' and that from this apprehension we 'acquire the idea of power or energy'(E.64). 
However, when we proceed to examine this 'pretension' we find that this 'influence' is a 'fact, 
which, like all other natural events, can be known only by experience, and can never be 
foreseen from any apparent energy or power in the cause, which connects it with the effect, 
and renders one the infallible consequence of the other'(E.64-5). To apprehend a necessary 
connection between mental events would be to apprehend a 'fact' which would, so to speak, 
cast a writ over all future events of the sort, and, for Hume, of course, no apprehension can 
have this consequence. We may conclude from the whole, Hume writes, 'that our idea of 
power is not copied from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves, when we 
give rise to animal motion', nor are we 'conscious of a power or energy in our own minds, 
when, by an act or command of our will, we raise up a new idea, fix the mind to the 
contemplation of it, turn it on all sides, and at last dismiss it for some other idea'(E.67). It is our 
failure to find any relation of necessary connection between causally related objects that gives 
rise to Hume's problem in the first place. 
It is clear that Hume could not mean to say that our idea of necessity is derived from an 
impression of the necessary connection between two mental events. I do not think that either 
one of the two alternatives sketched above captures Hume's meaning. We can bring out quite 
clearly why Hume, on occasions, writes as though they do. Hume could mean, quite simply, 
and rather more plausibly, that the mind, in making its customary transition from cause to 
effect, or effect to cause, has, in addition to the enlivened idea of one of two conjoined events, 
a certain feeling of constraint or determination in the transition. It is this feeling of expectation 
or inevitability that we then project onto pairs of conjoined events in describing one as the 
cause of the other. This avoids saying that one event's causing another is the impression in 
question, and need not commit Hume to saying, as, at times, he appears to, that the 
impression from which the idea of necessity arises is itself an impression of necessary 
connection. It seems quite clear that Hume would not want to say either of these two things. 
This impression or feeling of determination enters the picture only after we have had 
experience of the constant conjunction of pairs of resembling perceptions and have an 
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impression of one of them. This is how Hume explains the move we make from the perceived 
repetition of 'similar instances' to the new impression of necessity. We do not get the 
impression every time we observe a conjunction of objects. This part of what Hume has to say 
is quite clear. The idea of necessity is derived from an impression we have only because we 
are caused to infer an effect from a cause on the basis of experienced constant conjunction. 
This is one important thread in the story which leads up to the two definitions of a cause. 
Hume states his position relatively clearly. He has more difficulty in saying what exactly it is, if 
anything, the mind contributes to this relation. 
The gist of what Hume wants to say is fairly clear. As we have seen, Hume makes reference 
to the determination of the mind, and to what determines it, throughout the latter sections of 
Part III of Book One, and in Section VI, in particular. His use of the term is always roughly the 
same. Hume tells us that in cases where we have observed a constant conjunction of events 
and have an impression of one of the events 'the thought is always determin'd to pass' to the 
idea of its conjunct 'without any choice or hesitation'(T.11 0). We have an impression or feeling 
accompanying the transition which can be described as a feeling of determination or 
constraint. The 'objects' which the relation of cause and effect presents seem 'fixt and 
unalterable'(T.11 0). The association 'feels' constrained in cases where there has been a 
perfect correlation among past events. We have a feeling of the inevitability of the transition 
which we project onto the world in the form of an expectation that, given a constant 
conjunction of As and Bs, and a present impression of an A, a B must occur. The problem for 
Hume lies in characterising this feeling of inevitability as an impression without saying that at 
least one relation of necessity has been found to obtain independently between objects in the 
mind. Hume wants to avoid suggesting that we are aware of one object causing another or 
that we have an impression of necessary connection between those objects. He means to say 
that the source of our idea of necessity just is this feeling of constraint or inevitability, this 
impression of reflection, that arises after the observation of the constant conjunction of events. 
The complexities set in when Hume attempts, as, on the basis of his theory of ideas, he must, 
to account for this feeling of inevitability in terms of an impression of reflection. He wants to be 
able to say that in inference we feel we are determined to form the belief we do, that we have 
an impression that this transition is inevitable, but he needs to say this in terms of an 
impression of inevitability. It is not surprising that he is led, on occasions, to characterise this 
impression as being something like a direct experience of necessary connection, although, as 
we have seen, this is the answer he wants, at all cost, to avoid giving. He finds himself 
pressed to say that, although we have no impression of necessity, we have an impression of 
inevitability or determination which is something like it. He tells us far too little about how he 
thinks this case differs from those other cases which he has dismissed. What Hume needs is 
some way of expressing the thought that we experience the transition from cause to effect as 
inevitable without saying that we have a direct impression of inevitability. Hume, however, 
remains clear on one important point. We get the idea of necessity only because our minds 
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react in certain ways to certain features of our experience, features which include contiguity, 
succession and constant conjunction, but not necessary connection. Hume's main interest lies 
in the epistemological question of how the mind is led, upon the 'appearance' of one object or 
event, 'to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist'(E.75}, and to project this 
expectation and this belief onto the world. His concern with the question of why we ascribe 
necessity to things in the world which exhibit none of the relevant features tends, for the most 
part, to express itself through the search for the idea of the relation which we so ascribe. 
Nevertheless, the explanation of how we come to believe that a certain event must occur on 
the basis of the occurrence of another is the epistemological core of Hume's account. His 
theory of ideas betrays him into attempting to give an explanation of the content of this 
'internal impression' of inevitability which the constraints he has imposed on himself would 
seem not to allow for. 
The central thought here is clear enough. In describing a relationship between two events as 
causal we project a response we have to other features of our experience onto a particular 
conjunction of events. These features include contiguity, priority, and constant conjunction, but 
not necessary connection. The repeated experience of the regular succession of 'similar' sorts 
of events produces an association of ideas, which results in the 'determination' of the mind to 
pass from the idea or impression of an event of one sort to the enlivened idea of its associate. 
We do, however, 'commonly suppose' there to be a fourth feature or 'quality', which we tend to 
ascribe to objects so related - what Hume describes synonymously as power, efficacy or 
necessary connexion. He defines power as 'that very circumstance in the cause, by which it is 
enabled to produce the effect'(E.67-8}; and efficacy as 'that very quality, which makes 
[causes] be follow'd by their effects'(T.156}. According to Hume, we have no idea of necessity 
as such. We get the idea of power or efficacy from 'what we feel internally' when the mind is 
led 'upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant'(E.75}. The mind 
mistakes the idea of necessity which it does possess for an idea of necessary connection as 
'that quality' in or between 'the objects' which makes causes 'be follow'd by their effects'. 
Exposed to the constant conjunction of resembling pairs of objects the mind cannot help but 
form an idea of one upon the appearance of the other. It is this reaction to certain regular 
features of our experience that the mind projects back onto the world when it describes one 
event as the cause of another. 
The idea of necessity which we ascribe to the objects and events around us derives from the 
impression the mind gets when it is caused, by a 'perfect' habit of association, to infer the 
existence of one object from the impression of another of which it is conscious. Hume 
accounts for this association, and for its peculiar 'fixity' and 'settled order', in terms of the 
regular succession of 'similar instances'. He attempts to show that we would never get the 
idea of necessity were it not for certain events in the mind which occur as a result of our 
observation of the constant conjunction of similar events. The idea we get when our minds are 
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caused to infer an effect from a cause, or a cause from an effect, is projected beyond its 
source in the mind onto events in the world to give us some of our mistaken ideas about 
necessity. Hume concludes that '[U]pon the whole, necessity is something, that exists in the 
mind, not in objects; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, consider'd 
as a quality in bodies. Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but that 
determination of the thought to pass from causes to effect and from effects to causes, 
according to their experienc'd union'(T.165-6). The tendency to ascribe this relation to the 
objects is explained by the 'great propensity' the mind has 'to spread itself on external objects, 
and to conjoin them with any internal impressions, which they occasion'(T.167). This same 
propensity 'is the reason, why we suppose necessity and power to lie in the objects we 
consider, not in the mind, that considers them'(T.167). In showing up the falsity of this 
supposition, Hume claims to have uncovered the 'most violent' paradox, that the 'efficacy or 
energy of causes is neither plac'd in the causes themselves, nor in the deity, nor in the 
concurrence of these two principles; but belongs entirely to the soul, which considers the 
union of two or more objects in all past instances'(T.166). 
Hume is, at last, in a position to 'collect all the different parts of this reasoning, and by joining 
them together form an exact definition of the relation of cause and effect'(T.169). He now 
presents his two definitions which, he says, present 'a different view of the same 
object'(T.170). We may define a cause, according to Hume, either as philosophical or a 
natural relation. He proceeds to give the following definitions of a cause as '[A]n object 
precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are 
plac'd in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter'; 
and as 'an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of 
the one determines the mind to form a more lively idea of the other'(T.170). It is not 
immediately obvious how these definitions relate to the argument concerning necessary 
connection of which they are the outcome. Hume presented that argument as a search for the 
idea of necessary connection which, he says, makes so essential a part of our idea of cause. 
The implication of Hume's earlier remarks seemed to be that necessity must play some part in 
any adequate definition of causation(T.77). This is the view taken by Kemp Smith(117). Yet it 
must be admitted that the first definition contains no reference whatever to necessity, while the 
second may be said to do so, but only obliquely. I have already discussed some of the 
difficulties arising from Hume's double-definition of cause(118). I want to consider some of the 
interpretations which have been pressed upon Hume as a result of these difficulties, before 
attempting to resolve them. 
Hume's two definitions of cause are, as we saw, neither intensionally nor extensionally 
equivalent. The upshot of this is that if we take Hume's definitions to express, or be intended 
to express, the full meaning of the term, then only one, or neither, but not both, of the 
definitions can be strictly correct. A number of commentators have latched onto Hume's 
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distinction between philosophical and natural definition, in order to identify Hume's theory of 
causation exclusively with the first of Hume's two definitions(119). According to Robinson, only 
the first of Hume's two definitions is to be regarded as the correct one(120). Only the first 
philosophical definition should be read as Hume's 'definition of the cause-effect relation' 
embodying, as, according to Robinson, it does, Hume's analysis of the causal relation 'as 
nothing more than an instance of general uniformity of concomitance between two classes of 
particular occurrences, and as quite independent of any association of ideas which mayor 
may not exist in human minds'(121). The second 'definition' is not strictly a definition at all, but 
'simply a restatement of the proposition that the (already defined) cause-effect relation is a 
natural relation, in a somewhat elliptical formulation'(122). Hume's chief interest, in the 
argument concerning necessary connection, has been to show how we are mistaken in 
supposing the causal relation to involve necessary connection, and to explain the origin of this 
'philosophical error'. This is roughly the standard or Humean view of Hume on causation. 
Hume is supposed to have offered a metaphysical thesis about causation as something 
existing in the objects, arguing that causation just is the regular succession of phenomena. 
The causal relation is, according to Robinson, just a philosophical relation, and to define it as 
a philosophical relation is, simply, to define it. Hume's theory of causation can be aptly 
characterised as a sort of reductive analysis of the concept of cause, according to which, 
propOSitions about causes can be analysed into ones about regularity of succession, without 
any loss of content. All we can either understand or mean by causation just is the regular 
succession of events. 
There are convincing textual grounds for resisting the view that Hume identified causation 
exclusively with the philosophical definition of a cause. In the first place, Hume continues to 
insist, both before and after his statement of the two definitions, that necessity or necessary 
connection 'makes an essential part of causation'(T.407). Hume is supposed to have used the 
second definition merely to restate that the already-defined causal relation is a natural relation, 
but this is scarcely credible on the evidence of the text(123}. Hume describes the two 
definitions as each presenting a 'different view of the same object'(T.170). In concluding 
Section XIV, Hume reiterates his contention that both these statements be considered as 
definitions of the same relation(T.172). He gives us no reason whatever to suppose that the 
second definition is, in actual fact, only a psychological comment on causation as defined in 
the first, and to characterise his intentions in this way is to seriollsly misrepresent them. There 
are good textual grounds for thinking that Hume could not have thought his first definition 
alone sufficient to define causation in the sense of giving the full and exact meaning of the 
term. In Section II, Hume identifies necessary connection as one of three relations essential to 
the relation of cause and effect, describing it as being 'of much greater importance, than either 
of the other two'(T.77}. In the Enquiry, he writes that it is no! possible 'to define a cause, 
without comprehending, as a part of the definition, a necessary connexion with its 
effect'(E.95). Hume has argued that the impression from which the idea of necessity is derived 
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is the impression of reflection or feeling of determination the mind gets as a result of 
experienced repetition, yet neither the idea, nor the impression from which it arises, is 
mentioned in the first definition. We have decisive grounds for rejecting the view that Hume 
thought that the first definition alone could adequately or correctly define causation(124). 
Hume argues that we can never perceive a necessary connection between two objects or 
events in any single instance of conjunction. But he does not conclude from this that we have 
no idea of necessity. Necessity, he says, is something 'that exists in the mind, not in 
objects'(T.165). This does not, and cannot, mean that, for Hume, we do actually perceive the 
necessity of the connection between events in the mind. Hume wants to avoid saying this. If it 
were true, we could get the idea of necessity directly from an independent internal impression 
of necessary connection, without the need of the experience of constant conjunction. Hume 
wants to say that we only get the idea of necessity because of certain happenings in the mind 
which are the result of certain features of our experience. We mistakenly take an idea which is 
the indirect result of the regularities displayed in nature for an idea of the cause of those 
regularities. The suggestion on the table is that this projectivism of Hume's somehow commits 
him to the sceptical view that all there is to causation is regularity of succession. Hume is 
supposed to have argued, on the basis of an assumption John Wright identifies with 
Malebranche's account of necessary connection(125), that because we have no idea of 
necessary connection in the objects there are no such connections in nature. Malebranche is 
supposed to have taken the line that our ideas adequately represent reality, and, argued, on 
that basis, and on the basis of his criterion for the apprehension of a 'true cause', for the 
rejection of any causal connection in nature apart from that between God's will and its effects. 
Wright argues that this first assumption is not one that Hume makes. There are good grounds 
for taking Wright's suggestion seriously. Hume makes quite clear in the Enquiry the distinction 
he has in mind between the mere redescription of phenomena and their explanation in terms 
of unobserved causal 'powers', 'laws and forces'(E.14). There is no doubt that Hume intends 
to endorse the latter. Another remarkable feature of the Enquiry is the number of references 
Hume makes to 'hidden', 'secret' and 'conceal'd' causal powers in nature(126). This could 
hardly be said to fit with the view that, for Hume, causation in nature just is the regular 
succession of events. It suggests quite strongly that Hume does not have it in mind to deny 
that causes in nature exist. 
This is the line taken by Wright. Wright argues strongly for what he calls the 'sceptical-realist' 
view of Hume on causation, the view that, for Hume, there is something more to causation in 
nature than mere regularity of succession. Hume 'advocates and operates in terms of a belief 
in real physical causation and a representative theory of perception' and takes these to be the 
'important ontological beliefs underlying science'(127). Wright takes the view that Hume 
adopted Malebranche's understanding that knowledge of necessary connection is essential to 
an awareness of causal power, together with his conclusion that all we ever perceive in nature 
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are constant conjunctions of events, only to resist the view that this is all there is to causation 
in the objects(128). We have already noted evidence in support of the view that Hume is not a 
regularity theorist about causation. We need to consider what weight we are to attach to such 
evidence. Wright's reading rests largely on his understanding of Hume's attack on what he 
understands to be the view of Malebranche. Hume's discussion 'Of the idea of necessary 
connexion' is, according to Wright, directed 'against contemporary theories which sought "to 
rob nature, and all created beings, of every power"(E. 71 )'(129). Malebranche gives a number 
of arguments to show that apparent causal relations between natural phenomena are not 'true 
causes', but only occasions on which the 'one single cause that is truly a cause' has acted in 
effecting change(130). All so-called causal relations, or 'secondary causes', in nature, and all 
the volitions of the mind, are what Malebranche calls 'occasional causes'(131). The only true 
or primary cause is God. This, in very broad strokes, is the argument Hume criticises in the 
Treatise(T.159-161). Hume is supposed by Wright to have attacked not only Malebranche's 
doctrine that causal power, being absent from matter, 'must lie in the DEITY'(T.159), but the 
assumption Wright alleges Malebranche made that all ideas, whether of matter or of the 
supreme being, are adequate to the reality they represent. Something like this thesis may be 
what Malebranche has in mind when he writes that a true cause 'is one such that the mind 
perceives a necessary connection between it and its effect'(132). It is on the basis of this 
assumption that Malebranche is supposed to have drawn the conclusion that there is no 
'power or efficacy in any objecLneither in body or spirit, neither in superior nor inferior 
natures'(T.160). This is the conclusion Hume is understood to be rejecting. According to 
Wright, although Hume endorses Malebranche's understanding of true causation as involving 
necessary connection, he resists the suggestion Wright ascribes to Malebranche that our 
ignorance of such causes implies their non-existence. Hume argues that 'the principle of 
innate ideas being allowed to be false', the supposition of a deity 'can serve us in no stead, in 
accounting for that idea of agency, which we search for in vain in all the objects, which are 
presented to our senses, or which we are internally conscious of in our own minds'(T.160). 
The same course of reasoning which led 'these philosophers'(133) to conclude that matter is 
not 'endow'd with any efficacious principle, because 'tis impossible to discover in it such a 
principle', ought also to have led them to 'exclude it from the supreme being', and, so, to 
conclude that 'they have no adequate idea of efficacy in any object'(T.160). The upshot of this, 
and the alleged assumption that our ideas acquaint us with the essence God, as well as with 
the essence of matter, would be the denial of causal power or etficacy to either secondary or 
primary causes. Hume, according to Wright, wants to challenge this assumption in order to 
resist the sceptical conclusion that all there is to causation is constant conjunction. While 
Hume is in agreement with Malebranche in repudiating the suggestion that we have any direct 
perception of necessary connection between natural or mental events, or, on that basis, any 
idea of the power by which a cause produces its effects, he resolutely rejects the sceptical 
conclusion to which he is supposed to have thought Malebranche committed. 
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Wright reads Hume as adopting Malebranche's suggestion that knowledge of necessary 
connection is the criterion for awareness of causal power, and endorsing his finding that we 
find nothing in any single instance of relation by cause and effect which amounts to a 
perception of necessary connection. Hume argues that the occasionalist theory of causation is 
committed, on the basis of its assumptions, to a regularity thesis about causation, and then, 
according to Wright, for the rejection of this conclusion on the basis of a rejection of one of 
those assumptions. Hume regarded such reasoning as leading to the 'entirely Pyrrhonian' 
conclusion 'that there are no real forces in nature'(134}. Nevertheless, according to Wright, 
Hume accepted 'the basic Cartesian requirement of a "true" cause, namely, that there must be 
a necessary connection between cause and effect'(135}. This is a surprising conclusion and 
one, I suggest, which should be resisted. While Wright modifies this conclusion by suggesting 
that, for Hume, the mind can have a general idea of power only by having an idea of a specific 
power, I do not think he captures the nub of Hume's argument against occasional ism, or picks 
up on Hume's attempts to cast doubt on the idea of necessary connection Malebranche uses. 
According to Wright, when Hume talks of hidden and concealed powers and forces in nature, 
he means much the same as did Malebranche when he characterised true causation in terms 
of a relation of ideas. But it seems clear from the way in which Hume presents his critique of 
occasionalism that it is this idea that he has it in mind to place under suspicion. Hume writes 
that there is no question which has caused more dispute among philosophers than 'this 
concerning the efficacy of causes', adding that, before entering into these disputes, 'it wou'd 
not have been improper to have examin'd what idea we have of that efficacy, which is the 
subject of the controversy'(T.156}. Hume's intention, as I read him, is to show that we have no 
understanding of what it is for one object or event to be causally dependent upon another. 
This is about as far from the thesis Wright ascribes to him as can be. Wright nevertheless 
makes several acceptable points. Hume does not accept the assumption that ideas need 
adequately represent reality, and, it is certainly true that he follows Malebranche in arguing 
against the possibility of there being any direct perception of necessary connection between 
causally related events. But Hume nevertheless rejects outright the notion that we have any 
idea of necessary connection as a relation between ideas. The impression or feeling of 
determination from which the idea of necessity we have is derived is not an impression of one 
event's causing another or of the connection between them. Our idea of necessity is simply an 
idea of that feeling of inevitability or expectation which the mind happens to project onto 
particular conjunctions of events. Hume's deeper point, in my view, is that we have no idea of 
necessary connection or causal power along the lines envisaged by Malebranche and the 
Cartesians. Wright does not pick up on this important thread at all, and he is led, in my 
opinion, to seriously misrepresent what Hume has to say. Once we have a clearer notion of 
the subject matter and logic of Hume's argument, it becomes obvious that Hume is not 
arguing for anything like the sceptical-realist thesis Wright attributes to him. 
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Wright's reading of Hume on causation has been questioned, and, I think, quite decisively 
refuted, in a recent article by Martin Bell(136}. Bell argues that in order to arrive at his 
interpretation of Hume on causation, Wright has had to read Hume's critique of occasional ism 
in a way that requires Hume to have misunderstood Malebranche on an important doctrinal 
point. Bell's point is that, having made the mistake in his own reading of Malebranche, Wright 
is quick to ascribe the same erroneous view to Hume(137}. Hume's criticism of Malebranche's 
occasionalism is supposed to have taken the form of arguing that, from the absence of any 
idea of power or necessary connection through our ideas of matter or of the supreme being, 
and on the basis of the assumption that we are 'perfectly acquainted'(T.159) with the essence 
of matter and the essence of God through our ideas, Malebranche is committed to the view 
that there is no power or necessity either in matter or in the supreme being(138). Wright's view 
is that since Hume accepted the first premise, and rejected the conclusion, he must also have 
rejected the second premise Wright ascribes to Malebranche. The problem for Wright's view, 
as Bell points out, is that this is not a premise Malebranche held. Although Malebranche did 
hold the view that we know bodies through our ideas, and Hume does resist this view, 'he did 
not hold that we know God through our ideas of him, and he would have denied the premise 
that Wright thinks Hume attributed to him'(139). Malebranche's own position is fairly clear from 
the text. He writes that although we know God 'through himself' and 'by a direct and immediate 
perception', our knowledge of Him 'in this life is very imperfect'. Our knowledge of 'corporeal 
things', on the other hand, 'is through their ideas, i.e., in God, since only God contains the 
intelligible world, where ideas of all things are located'(140). Malebranche, in other words, 
would not be committed to the view that because we have no idea of necessary connection 
through our idea of God, there are no true causes in reality. Fortunately, we have to hand a 
more plausible reading of Hume's argument which avoids committing us to the view that he 
misread Malebranche on a key piece of doctrine(141}. What Hume meant, according to Bell, 
when he complained that 'the same course of reasoning' would lead the occasionalist to the 
conclusion that there is no causal power at all, once the doctrine of innate ideas was rejected, 
was 'the use of the doctrine that if the mind cannot perceive necessary connections when it 
consults its ideas of putative causes and effects, then these are not true, real causes'(142). If 
the doctrine of innate ideas is false, then the occasionalists would be forced to deny that God 
is a true cause, on the basis that it is not possible to discover in Him any 'efficacious 
principle'(T.160). The conclusion follows, for occasionalists, 'precisely because they hold that 
to discover true causation is to consult one's ideas and perceive that relation of ideas which 
they mean by "necessary connection"'(143). 
Bell's view fits neatly with the one I sketched above. Hume's concern in the passages dealing 
with occasionalism and Malebranche's doctrine of cause is not to do with the avoidance of the 
regularity outcome that threatens the 'Cartesian' theory of causation, but with the account 
Malebranche gives of the ideas the mind possesses. On Bell's reading, Hume's target is not 
the occasionalist denial of the 'efficacious principle' to matter, and the failure of that theory to 
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avoid extending that thesis to all phenomena, but the criterion Malebranche adopted for the 
existence of causal power. Malebranche argued that the perception of necessary connection 
was the criterion for the existence of causal power. Hume objects that, with the doctrine of 
innate ideas discounted, and given the failure of experience to discover any necessary 
connections between events, Malebranche and other occasionalists would be committed to 
the view that there are no true causes, either in matter or in the deity. To avoid so 'absurd and 
impious' an opinion, the occasionafist need only conclude 'from the very first, that they have no 
adequate idea of power or efficacy in any object; since neither in body nor spirit, neither in 
superior nor inferior natures, are they able to discover one single instance of it'(T.160). Far 
from endorsing 'the Cartesian criterion of power', as Wright suggests he does, Hume is 
suggesting that we have no 'adequate idea' of such a power 'in any object'. This is the 
conclusion of Hume's argument, and here, I would suggest, is where Hume's real interest lies 
in these important passages. 
It should be obvious that none of the passages Wright cites support his thesis in the way he 
believes them to. According to Wright, Hume accepts Malebranche's criterion for the 
existence of causal power, but attempts to avoid the sceptical conclusion he thinks him 
committed to, by arguing that the ideas the mind has do not adequately represent reality. 
Wright believes that by rejecting the Cartesian assumption that our ideas reveal 'the essence 
or true nature' of reality, Hume is able 'to reject the Cartesian argument which leads to the 
conclusion that there is no power or force in material events'(144). When Hume writes that 
'necessity makes an essential part of causation'(T.407) what he is supposed to have in mind 
is something of which we have no clear idea at all. By employing the Cartesian criterion of 
necessary connection, Hume reaches the same conclusion as Malebranche: that we have no 
idea of causation in 'corporeal things'. But he is supposed to have resisted the ontological 
conclusion of his predecessors by denying that the absence of any necessary connection 
between our ideas need apply to the objects to which they correspond. I have argued that 
Hume's intentions are, in fact, very different. Far from arguing for the existence of real causes 
in the sense in which Malebranche understood them, Hume's concern is to deny that we have 
any idea of power so understood. Hume denies that we have any perception of necessary 
connection between material events. He reaches the same conclusion about our perception of 
power or true causation in physical objects as the Cartesians. But the point of Hume's 
argument is not the epistemological one Wright ascribes to it, but the rejection of the idea 
itself. The mind, according to Hume, does not perceive the sort of intelligible relations between 
ideas that would make possible a priori certain judgments about unobserved matters of fact. 
This was the sort of inference which the perception of the intelligible connection between 
events was thought to occasion. Hume rejects it outright. All our actual ideas being distinct 
and separable we could never 'be able to pronounce from a simple view of the one, that it 
must be follow'd or preceded by the other'(T.161). Hume, of course, allows that we suppose 
'some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the 
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greatest certainty and strongest necessity'(E.75}. But he makes clear that when he talks of 
power or efficacy in this way, he has in mind what he calls the 'loose and popular' sense of the 
term(E.33}. His two definitions of cause follow on from the 'more accurate explication' of the 
term(145}. Wright cites Hume's observation that necessity makes 'an essential part of 
causation'(T.407}. But the idea of necessity Hume has in mind here is not the necessity of 
Malebranche and the Cartesians, but the idea he says is derived from an impression of 
reflection, a peculiar feeling of expectation or inevitability, that accompanies the mind's 
customary transition from cause to effect or from effect to cause. It is this idea of necessary 
connection that the mind mistakes for an idea which it does not possess. The mind has no 
idea of causal power or necessary connection, as Malebranche understood it, at all. The 
'generality of mankind' imagine that 'they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by 
which it is connected with its effect, and is for ever infallible in its operation', and acquire, 'by 
long habit', the expectation that one will follow infallibly from the other(E.69), but we only 
deceive ourselves 'when we imagine we are possest of any idea of this kind, after the manner 
we commonly understand it'(T.161). 
The mind has an idea of necessity or necessary connection but it is not the idea that 
Malebranche believed it to possess. Hume continues to regard necessary connection as 
essential to the causal relation, but he rejects the Cartesian notion of necessity, in favour of an 
idea arising from happenings in the mind which are the result of experienced constant 
conjunction. We have no idea of the sort of connection between objects or events which would 
ground a priori inferences and, so, give sanction to our inductive practices. The manner 'in 
which bodies operate on each other' remains 'entirely incomprehensible' to us(E.72). Nothing 
is more evident, Hume claims, 'than that the human mind cannot form such an idea of two 
objects, as to conceive any connexion betwixt them, or comprehend distinctly that power or 
efficacy, by which they are united'(E.161). We draw our idea of the power or necessary 
connection we ascribe to objects and their relations from 'what we feel internally in 
contemplating them'(T.168-9}. This represents strong textual evidence against the view that 
Hume believed necessity in the 'loose and popular' sense to make 'an essential part of 
causation'. I do not mean to defend the positivist view of Hume on causation. I see no reason 
to suppose that what Hume was offering was a reductive analysis of the concept. It is, to say 
the least, misleading to portray Hume as a regularity theorist about causation. The difficulty for 
this view is that Hume not only makes necessity an essential part of our idea of causation, but 
explicitly rates it of much greater importance than any of the other relations involved(T.77). 
Nevertheless, the sceptical-realist view itself faces serious difficulties arising from its demand 
that we have an understanding of causal power or necessary connection which Hume seems 
quite explicitly to argue we cannot have. Hume makes it perfectly clear that we have no 
impression and hence no idea of what it is for one event to be necessarily connected with 
another. A number of attempts have been made to deal with this difficulty for the sceptical-
realist account(146). The most prominent among them is that presented by Galen Strawson. 
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Strawson rests his case on a distinction drawn from the Treatise which, he believes, can allow 
us to talk intelligibly of causal powers without committing us to claiming to have had an 
impression which Hume quite plausibly argues we cannot have. He points to a passage in 
which Hume seems to argue that there are some things of which we cannot 'conceive', of 
which we have no idea, yet which we can very well 'suppose' to exist. We may well 'suppose in 
general', Hume writes, 'but 'tis impossible for us distinctly to conceive, objects to be in their 
nature any thing but exactly the same with perceptions'(T.218). Hume makes the same pOint, 
in somewhat different terms, earlier in the Treatise. The farthest we can go in conceiving of 
external objects, he says, 'when suppos'd specifically different from our perceptions, is to form 
a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects. Generally 
speaking we do not suppose them specifically different; but only attribute to them different 
relations, connexions and durations'(T.68). We are able to form a 'relative idea' of things 
specifically different from those we comprehend directly, and so, according to Strawson, can 
talk intelligibly of causes in nature as something more than mere constant conjunctions of 
phenomena(147). Hume is supposed to have left room within the framework of his theory of 
ideas for us to mean more by causation 'in the objects' than regularity of succession. We can 
form a relative idea of natural necessity, and so talk intelligibly of it, without having any 
'descriptively contentful'(148) idea of what it is. Although, in other words, we have no direct 
conception of what it is for one event to be causally dependent upon another, we may 
suppose that there is something, of which we have no idea, which is responsible for the 
regularities with which we are familiar. We have a relative idea of whatever it is 'in virtue of 
which reality is regular in the way it is'(149). Strawson provides an example of the kind of idea 
he has in mind. One has 'a referentially efficacious but in a sense contentless and hence 
"merely relative" idea of something x' in cases where one has an idea of a something 'and one 
can refer to it only as, say, "whatever it was caused this mess". One has no positive 
conception of the nature of x'(1S0). In the same way, Strawson believes, we can talk 
informatively about causal power or necessary connection in objects, although we have no 
impression and, hence, no positively contentful idea, of what we speak of. 
The problem facing Strawson's analysis is that there is very little textual support for attributing 
this view to Hume, and none at all where we might most expect or hope to find it. The 
distinction between relative and specific ideas is certainly drawn by Hume, but only in the 
context of his discussion of our idea of body, and, even there, Hume gives every appearance 
of attaching little weight to it. The farthest we can go towards a conception 'of external 
objects', Hume tells us, is 'to form a relative idea of them'. We may 'suppose', but we can 
never 'distinctly conceive' objects to be different from the perceptions which represent them. 
Hume makes no use of the distinction in his discussion of causation, nor does he so much as 
refer to it in these important sections. He has good theoretical reasons for not doing so. 
Where Hume does employ the distinction it is, significantly, in the context of objects, and 
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never of relations. This is important. The kind of approach Strawson has in mind might be said 
to work better, or more naturally, where the relative idea in question is an idea of an object. 
But the idea of necessary connection is an idea of a relation. Hume is concerned not with 
whatever objects happen to stand in a certain relation to each other, but with the relation itself. 
So, the first thing we need to note is that the matter is not as straightforward as we might 
suppose to be the question of 'whatever it was caused this mess'. Strawson oversimplifies the 
case. We are not concerned with the cause, or causal objects, in this sense, but with the 
actual connectedness of cause and effect: something of which, for Hume, we have, and can 
have, no experience. 
We can begin to see why this difference should be significant to Hume if we turn to the 
passages Strawson cites in support of his interpretation, and, in particular, to the context in 
which they arise. In neither of the two passages quoted above is Hume making out what could 
be termed a positive case for relative ideas as a way of understanding an object relationally, 
even though we lack any direct conception of it. In the earliest of the two passages(T.67-8), 
the context is given by Hume's insistence upon the impossibility 'for us so much as to 
conceive or form any idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions'. Let 
us 'chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe', Hume says, 
we never 'can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appear'd in 
that narrow compass'. Hume's concern is with the impossibility of the human mind conceiving 
anything 'specifically different' from its perceptions, and, while he seems to allow that we may 
'suppose' something to exist which is specifically different, he is scathing about the results: 
'Generally speaking we do not suppose them specifically different; but only attribute to them 
different relations, connexions and durations'. In the second passage(T.218), Hume is just as 
dismissive of such a move: 'Philosophers deny our resembling perceptions to be identically 
the same, and uninterrupted; and yet have so great a propensity to believe them as such, that 
they arbitrarily invent a new set of perceptions, to which they attribute these qualities'. Hume's 
emphasis, once again, is on the impossibility of our advancing 'a step beyond ourselves' and 
understanding or conceiving of anything specifically different from the set of perceptions we 
start from. In the only other original reference to relational ideas in the Treatise, Hume writes 
that 'as every idea is deriv'd from a preceding perception, 'tis impossible our idea of a 
perception, and that of an object or external existence can ever represent what are specifically 
different from each other. Whatever difference we may suppose betwixt them, 'tis 
incomprehensible to us; and we are oblig'd either to conceive an external object merely as a 
relation without a relative, or to make it the very same with a perception or impression.'(T.241) 
In each case, Hume introduces the notion of a relative idea of external eXistence, as 
something specifically different from those qualities we already know, only to rubbish its 
effects. The philosophers who make such suppositions 'arbitrarily invent a new set of 
perceptions' or attribute new relations to the old set. Whatever difference we suppose to 
obtain between perceptions and objects, their specific difference remains 'incomprehensible to 
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us'. Hume invokes the distinction between supposing and conceiving something to exist, only 
to dismiss the suggestion, made by Strawson and other recent commentators, that it can in 
any way add to our understanding of the objects in question to form a supposition of their 
existence. It would be surprising to find Hume taking these overwhelmingly pessimistic and 
sceptical passages as the basis for a form of sceptical-realism. Not only does Hume make no 
reference to the distinction in his discussion of causation, but, where he does make use of it, 
his use is about as remote from the use to which a sceptical realist should have put it, as one 
could imagine. 
Strawson gives Hume's distinction between conceiving and supposing a specific difference 
between an object and an impression a crucial place within Hume's philosophy. Although, as 
Strawson admits, it follows from the theory of ideas that we can never form any 'genuinely 
contentful conception' of an external object, 'it is still an intelligible supposition that there 
should be such things'(151). It is on the basis of this supposition, Strawson thinks, that Hume 
is able to 'mean something like Causation, at least in the sense of genuinely referring to 
it'(152), and to formulate a relative idea of something 'in virtue of which reality is regular in the 
way it is'(153). Hume's realism can be characterised in the claim 'that there is something 
'external' or 'out there' just in the sense of being independent of, or something other than, our 
perceptions - something which somehow gives rise to our perceptions, and is the reason why 
they are as they are'(154). Something like this claim may well characterise Hume's view. I 
have argued that it is no part of Hume's brief to deny that there exist causes. But unless we 
understand the sorts of demands that are placed on a fact of the sort Strawson has in mind, 
we will not have understood Hume's reasons for dismissing the effects of Strawson's 
supposition, nor will we have properly characterised Hume's main interest in causation. This is 
more than a matter of emphasis. If we cannot grasp Hume's reasons for insisting upon the 
impossibility of conceiving of the sort of fact Strawson identifies with 'fundamental 
forces'(155), then we will run the risk of attaching as much significance to Hume's realism 
about causation as we attach to his scepticism, and this, I suggest, would be a fundamental 
error(156). 
Strawson's position is objectionable on a number of fronts, but its most decisive refutation has 
been provided by Simon Blackburn. Blackburn argues that Strawson is betrayed into 
underestimating the theoretical pressures on the kind of fact that WOUld, as he puts it, 'soothe 
away inductive vertigo', by a failure to adequately distinguish between what he calls a 'thick 
nexus' and a 'thick straightjacket'(157). To see the point clearly we need to get a clear grasp 
of the distinction Blackburn has in mind. There are, he says, two things that might be asked of 
'thick' causation(158). On the one hand, when we think of a causally related pair of events, 'we 
want there to be a further fact than (mere) succession, or even mere regular succession of 
these kinds of event', a fact making it so that 'when the first happens the second must 
happen'(159). Blackburn terms this the desire for a causal nexus. On the other hand, when we 
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shift our gaze to the 'whole ongoing course of nature', we feel that the pattern of regularities 
would be too much of a coincidence unless there is something in virtue of which it is regular in 
the way it is. We want there to be some ultimate cause, or 'thick straightjacket', whose 
'existence at one time guarantees constancies at any later time'(160}. This is what Hume 
terms an 'ultimate connexion'(T.91}. Blackburn is quick to point out how peculiar a fact any 
fact that dispels this 'inductive vertigo' must be. It would have to be something the 'continuing 
efficacy' of which was subject 'to no possibility of change or chance of failure'(161}. For this 
reason, it is important to separate out the question of the desire for a causal nexus from the 
question of the desire for a straightjacket. 
Blackburn's suggestion is that Strawson conflates the desire for a nexus with the desire for a 
straightjacket, and, overlooking the additional demands on a straightjacket fact, thinks he can 
point to what he terms 'fundamental forces' as a fact with this sort of 'potency'. The notion of 
Causation, Strawson says, should be included 'in the class of fundamental, non-sensory 
properties of reality' which 'we attribute to objects and which are essentially constitutive of our 
fundamental (pre-scientific) conception of their nature'(162}. Strawson uses one term 
'Causation' for a thick nexus and a thick straightjacket. Hume, on the other hand, is very much 
aware of the distinction and makes his awareness clear in the text. He writes in the Enquiry 
that experience 'only shows us a number of uniform effects, resulting from certain objects, and 
teaches us that those particular objects, at that particular time, were endowed with such 
powers and forces.' When an object with similar sensible qualities appears, 'we expect similar 
powers and forces, and look for a like effect...But this is surely a step or progress of the mind 
that wants to be explained. When a man says, I have found, in all past instances, such 
sensible qualities conjoined with such secret powers: And when he says, Similar sensible 
qualities will a/ways be conjoined with similar secret powers, he is not guilty of a tautology, nor 
are these propositions in any respect the same.'(E.37) Hume recognises that whatever the 
connection between events at one time, it is something that may change. Even were the 
appeal to experience to decide 'that that very object, which produc'd any other, was at that 
time endow'd with such a power ... [it] can never prove, that the same power must continue in 
the same object or collection of sensible qualities; much less, that a like power is always 
conjoin'd with like sensible qualities'(T.91). All our ideas being distinct and separable, it is 
conceivable, and, therefore, possible, that the same 'powers and forces' which operated on an 
object at one point in time, will not operate in the future. The appeal to past experience 
'decides nothing in the present case' and 'at the utmost' can only prove that a connection held 
between events at one time. 
Hume makes the distinction in order to underline his conviction that 'if there be any suspicion 
that the course of nature may change ... all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to 
no inference or conciusion'(E.37}. But it also supports Blackburn's contention that the 'ongoing 
regularity and constancy even of a thick nexus between one kind of event and another is just 
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as much a brute contingent regularity as the bare concatenation of events'(163}. In both 
cases, there is something 'that can engender the inductive vertigo'. Hume is clear that 
something could satisfy the desire for one without satisfying the desire for the other. He, 
nevertheless, repeatedly talks of the perception of 'thick' causal connections as though any 
such apprehension could make possible a priori certain judgments regarding unobserved 
causes and effects. Hume writes as though the idea of power or causal connection could only 
be an idea of necessary connection where '''necessary'' implies that it belongs to the kind of 
which a priori knowledge is possible'(164). This aspect of Hume's procedure has been 
criticised by a number of commentators, including Craig and Strawson. Strawson writes that 
one reason for Hume's confidence in his assertion that an impression of necessity is 
unavailable 'is that his conception of what something would have to be like in order to count 
as an idea of Causation or power or necessary connection in the objects is so demanding that 
it turns out to be simply obvious that nothing could ever count as such an idea, or such an 
impression'(165). Craig complains that it 'looks as if he has just ignored what the modern 
reader will think of as an obvious prima facie possibility, that there is a necessity, stronger than 
concomitance but weaker than the deductive, and it is of this that we are seeking the 
impression and idea'(166). Craig accuses Hume of doing no more than ruling out the 
possibility of an apprehension of necessity by making the conditions for such an apprehension 
unmeetably strict. Perplexingly, Hume appears not only to overlook the distinction between a 
nexus and a straightjacket, but to adopt an arbitrary assumption in order to derive a 
conclusion that is, on the face of it, unwarranted. Blackburn suggests a plausible answer to 
the puzzle. 
Blackburn suggests that Hume 'sees that nothing would really count as apprehension of a 
particular "must" unless it carried with it implications of uniformity for the general case'(167). 
What this means is that, for Hume, to apprehend that an event of one sort must follow from an 
event of another on one occasion, is to apprehend that it must always do so. If an observation 
cannot be said to do this for 'the general case' then nothing at all can be said of it in so far as 
guaranteeing outcomes goes. To see a 'must' in one instance of conjunction, to see, in other 
words, that when one event occurs, the other must follow, is to see that it will hold for every 
pair of events of those kinds. One could not see that one event must happen, given the other, 
without seeing 'something with general implications', and this, in turn, 'makes it hard to see 
how a particular nexus could be an object of observation.' How could any time-limited 
observation apprehend 'something that essentially casts its net over the whole of space and 
time?'(168). Blackburn's explanation makes plausible sense of the apparent 'muddle' Craig 
finds in Hume's thought on causation. Hume rules out the possibility of any thick causal 
connection being apprehended not because he arbitrarily makes the standard for full 
apprehension the prohibitively strict one of making possible a priori certain judgments about 
unobserved matters of fact, but because he saw that to apprehend any kind of connection 
implying that one event must follow another is to apprehend a fact with implications for all and 
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future events of those kinds. Someone 'apprehending a straightjacket for what it is' will 'know 
the timeless "must" that it guarantees. He will be apprehending the impossibility that events 
should ever transpire otherwise'(169). 
Hume argues that a perception of power or necessary connection in or between events would 
'amount to a demonstration, and wou'd imply the absolute impossibility for the one object not 
to follow, or to be conceived not to follow upon the other'(T.161-2). He thinks that even the 
apprehension of a particular thick connection between events must carry implications for the 
general case. This makes it difficult to see how even a particular nexus could be an object of 
observation. Any apprehension of a thick connection would have to have the consequence of 
enabling the subject to make a priori certain judgments concerning other events of the same 
sorts. Perception of a connection of this sort would 'amount to a demonstration', and, since the 
distinctness and separability of all ideas shows that such a demonstration is impossible, this is 
a perception which we cannot possibly have. Hume's concern is to show that we can have no 
idea of necessity or necessary connection understood in this way. He leaves no room for the 
lesser claim 'to have apprehended a particular, but not necessarily timeproof, thick 
connexion'(170). Strawson's failure to distinguish a thick nexus from a thick straightjacket 
explains his contention that the supposition of 'fundamental forces' can in some way dispel our 
fears about the collapse of the ongoing course of nature and for the legitimacy of our inductive 
practices. Hume makes clear that such a supposition can in no way help us. Not only have we 
no idea of the sort of 'ultimate connexion' that would be needed for such a straightjacket, but 
we have no conception of what it would be for such a connection to obtain between events. 
Hume does not deny that there may be 'several qualities' in objects with which we are entirely 
unacquainted, but he rubbishes the effects of such a supposition by adding that 'if we please 
to call these power or efficacy, 'twill be of little consequence to the world'(T.168). The desire 
for the sort of knowledge that would result if the mind had ideas of these connections is 
dismissed by Hume as 'presumptuous and chimerical'(T.xvii). The most natural science can 
hope to do 'is to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater 
simplicity, and to resolve the main particular effects into a few general causes, by means of 
reasonings from analogy, experience and observation'. As to the cause of these 'general 
causes', we 'should in vain attempt their discovery; nor shall we ever be able to satisfy 
ourselves, by any particular explication of them. These ultimate springs and principles are 
totally shut off from human curiosity and enquiry'(E.30). The most perfect natural philosophy, 
he says, 'only staves off our ignorance a little longer'(E.31). 
The mind does possess an idea of necessity and it is this idea which, Hume argues, it 
mistakes for an idea of that 'quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one 
an infallible consequence of the other'. We have a choice 'either to assert, that nothing can be 
the cause of another, but where the mind can perceive the connexion in its ideas of the 
objects: Or to maintain, that all objects, which we find constantly conjoin'd, are upon that 
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account to be regarded as causes and effects'(T.248). Hume continues to believe that 
necessity makes an essential part of causation as we understand it, but he replaces the 
Cartesian idea of necessary connection with an idea of necessity drawn from the impression 
of reflection the mind gets when it makes an inference on the basis of the impression of one of 
two constantly conjoined objects or events. The idea of necessity which the mind possesses is 
derived from the impression or feeling of determination it gets when its experience of the 
constant conjunction of two sorts of events causes it to infer the existence of one from an 
impression of its usual attendant. The 'several instances of resembling conjunctions' leads the 
mind to its notion of power or necessary connection(T.165). Hume uses the idea to explain 
how the mind 'spreads itself upon the world', forming habits of expectation, which it then 
projects upon the particular conjunctions of events in its experience, even though the events 
themselves 'seem entirely loose and separate'(E.74). He does not deny that there exist 
unknown causes, nor does he claim to be able to analyse causal propositions into 
propositions about the constant conjunction of phenomena. Looked at from this perspective, it 
can easily appear that Hume is offering two theories of causation, one to do with the evidence 
for a causal inference, and one to do with its effects on the mind(171). Hume's real intentions 
are very different. He does not argue for the abandonment of the Newtonian language of 
powers and forces. He is more interested in causally explaining how it is the mind comes to 
see the world in terms of causal connections, and to use the vocabulary it uses to describe it, 
faced with a reaHty which has none of the representational features our causal language leads 
us to expect. The idea of necessary connection the mind has arises from the regular 
succession of events in its experience. It has no idea, or, at best, a very 'obscure and 
uncertain' idea, of what it is that causes these regularities. It gets its idea of power from 'what 
we feel internally' as a result of these observed regularities. Our idea of necessary connection 
is an effect of those regularities. These are the two interconnected, and causally 
interdependent, parts of the causal story that Hume traces up as far as his two definitions. 
Hume continues to insist that the mind must have an idea of necessary connection if it is to 
have any idea of the causal relation. Lacking any adequate idea of necessity or causal power 
as whatever is responsible for the regular succession of phenomena in nature, the mind 
substitutes for it an idea drawn from the regularities themselves. As already noted, neither of 
Hume's two 'definitions' of a cause can be said to be definitions in the sense of fully and 
accurately stating all that we mean by the term. There is good textual evidence for believing 
that Hume did not think of them as strict definitions. Hume admits in the Enquiry that 'it is 
impossible to give any just definition of cause, except what is drawn from something 
extraneous and foreign to it(E.76). Instead, the two definitions are intended to distinguish and 
encapsulate the two sides of the extended causal story sketched above. The part of Hume's 
story summed up by the first 'regularity definition' concerns the natural regularities which 
determine the mind in its customary transition from cause to effect. The second 'natural' 
definition of cause emphasises the contribution the mind makes to our apprehension of the 
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world. What the mind gives us is, of course, the idea of necessity as 'nothing but that 
determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects and from effects to causes, 
according to their experienc'd union'(T.166). The idea of necessity the mind has resembles 
the impression or feeling of determination from which it is derived. It does not represent or 
resemble any change or feature of the regularities themselves. The second definition 
describes the change that takes place in the mind when it is exposed to the regular 
succession of events. We go on to conduct our plans and expectations in accordance with our 
projection of this idea onto conjunctions of events. We can still form theories and make 
predictions on the basis of the regularities we find in nature, defining scientific laws and forces 
strictly on the basis of their supposed effects(E.77n), without pretending that we represent to 
ourselves any property or relation between objects when we do so. The first definition gives 
the empirical part of the story. It describes the non-causal reality which is the cause of the 
mind's reaction. It is only because the mind has experienced the constant conjunction of 
events that it is moved to form the idea of causal necessity. Hume is careful to keep intact the 
balance between what the world contributes and what the mind projects. The way the mind is 
depends upon experienced features of the world, and the way in which the mind apprehends 
the world is dependent upon features of those mental effects. Hume separates out the 
different aspects of this discourse, but they are nevertheless interdependent parts of the same 
causal story. If we are to avoid ascribing to Hume philosophical theses which he would not or 
could not have held we must remember to treat them as such. 
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Chapter Two 
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Stove, Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973). 
S.The case against is presented by, among others, Tom L. Beauchamp and Alexander 
Rosenberg, Hume and the Problem of Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); 
N.Scott Arnold 'Hume's Scepticism about Inductive Inference' in Journal of the History of 
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Philosophy, Vol. 21, No.1, 1983, pp.31-55; and Janet Broughton, 'Hume's Skepticism about 
Causal Inferences' in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1983, Vol. 64, No.1, pp.2-18. 
6.Proponents of the sceptical realist or 'New Humean' view include Edward Craig, The Mind of 
God and The Works of Man (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) pp.69-130; Galen Strawson, 
op.cit.; and John P. Wright, The Sceptical Realism of David Hume (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1983). 
7.1 refer, once again, to the impasse in the debate between proponents of the traditional 
sceptical and sceptical realist or nonsceptical views, particularly evident between the so-called 
Humean and New Humean positions on Hume on causation. 
8.Robert J. Fogelin, op.cit., p.38. 
9.1 have in mind the work of Beauchamp and Rosenberg, op.cit., Arnold Scott, op.cit., and, 
most recently, Annette Baier, op.cit. Significant variations of the sceptical view are presented 
by Robert. J. Fogelin, op.cit., and Don Garrett, op.cit. 
10.See, for example, Beauchamp and Rosenberg, op.cit., p,43. 
2.1 The Argument Concerning Induction 
11.lt is worth making the point here that if critics like Baier, Beauchamp and Rosenberg, and 
Arnold, are correct about what Hume's argument concerning induction is meant to establish, 
Hume would appear to beg or even to settle the question at issue decisively several pages 
before the section in which he presents it. The conclusion that causal inference does not give 
us knowledge as demonstration does was already argued for at T.86-7. Baier, op.cit., p.63, 
admits that what Hume says here appears to 'prejudge the question of whether causal 
inference can be recast as sound deductive argument', the question he is supposed to be 
answering in the section on inductive argument. 
12.Don Garrett, op.cit., p.85, points out that Hume's use of 'reason' here is rather close to that 
of Locke. 'Reason', Locke says, is 'the discovery of the Certainty or Probability' of propositions 
and truths, op.cit., IV.xviii.2. For Locke, as, in the most part, for Hume, reason is to be 
considered the faculty of mind responsible for both knowledge and probability. 
13.Barry Stroud, op.cit., pp.43-4, observes that Hume has failed to establish that contiguity is 
'a necessary condition for two things' being related as cause and effect'. Hume claims that 
'nothing can operate in a time and place, which is ever so little remov'd from those of its 
existence'(T.75). Although distant objects 'may sometimes seem productive of each other' we 
still 'presume' there to be a chain of causes 'contiguous among themselves'. The problem for 
Hume is that he needs to show that we always get an impression of contiguity when we 
identify a causal relation among objects. Hume sets out to discover the impressions from 
which the idea of causality is derived. The question of what we presume to be the case is not 
really relevant. It does not explain how we get the idea that all causally related objects are 
contiguous in the first place. A similar problem emerges from Hume's treatment of priority. 
The temporal priority of cause to effect is also said by Hume to be 'essential to causes and 
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effect'(T.75-6). However, it is not true to say that we always get such an impression. As Stroud 
remarks, when we attribute a causal relation between two moving billiard balls, we 'do not 
actually see the contact of two billiard balls to be slightly earlier than the beginning of the 
motion of the second ball.'(p.44) 
14.Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: MacMillan, 1941), pp.91-2, 
makes much of the point in opposing the regularity view of Hume on causation. Kemp Smith 
can point to a number of passages in the Treatise which appear to support his reading (see, 
for example, T.77; T.407; T.409). These passages seem to support the suggestion that, for 
Hume, necessity is an essential part of the idea of causation. Nevertheless, commentators 
have continued to take Hume's first definition of causation(T.170) as the basis for the sort of 
reading of Hume on causation that Kemp Smith objects to. I offer my own reading of Hume's 
two definitions and the interpretive puzzle surrounding them in 2.2. 
15.Stroud, op.cit., p.47, remarks the importance of the argument for Hume, but adds that it is 
nonetheless 'difficult to know what to make of it'. He argues, on the familiar grounds that 
conceivability is not an adequate test of possibility, that Hume has failed to show that it is not 
impossible for something to begin to exist without a cause. I offer my own treatment of some 
of these themes and of their role in Hume's philosophy, in 2.2. Hume's treatment of the 
subject is sketchy, to say the least, but, as Stroud points out, Hume's real interests, at this 
point at least, lie elsewhere(p.50). 
16.Baier, op.cit., p.64-5, treats Hume's conclusion as anticipating the whole of his story about 
inductive inference. She writes: 'as early as Section III we find Hume implicitly anticipating his 
claim, made explicitly in Section VI, that it is only experience, not deductive reason even when 
it is helped by experience, that is responsible for our conviction that fire will continue to bring 
painful burns to human flesh coming in contact with it, that water in human lungs will continue 
to bring death.' Fogelin, op.cit., p.42, observes, I think rightly, that Hume anticipates only 'one 
half of the dilemma' he poses for inductive reasoning. 
17.Fogelin, op.cit., p.47. Fogelin describes this as Hume's 'reversal of his field', but appears to 
believe it to take place only in Section VI of Part III. 
18.1 will show in 2.2 how Hume thinks the idea of necessity arises from the inferences we 
make to unobserved matters of fact. This is an important part of Hume's account. But it is not, 
as, for example, Fogelin, op.cit., p.47, appears to believe, Hume's main or only task in Part III. 
19.Millican, op. cit. , p.95, makes the point in contrast to Flew, op.cit., pp.71-2, who appears to 
think of Hume's argument concerning induction as having to do exclusively with inferences 
from particular cases to general conclusions. 
20.Like Hume, I prefer to concentrate my attention on those sorts of probable inferences he 
characterises as 'proofs'. In Sections XI and XII, Hume discusses the origins of those beliefs 
which are 'still attended with uncertainty'(T.124}. Much of our reasoning concerning causes 
proceeds on the basis of 'mixed' or imperfect correlations of events. 'Contrary experiments', 
Hume tells us, 'produce an imperfect belief, either by weakening the habit, or by dividing and 
afterwards joining in different parts, that perfect habit, which makes us conclude in general, 
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that instances. of which we have no experience. must necessarily resemble those of which we 
have.'(T.135) It is with inferences arising from a perfect habit or perfect correlation of events 
that Hume is most concerned. He presents the sections on probability in support of the 
principles which he has used to explain those arguments 'which are deriv'd from the relation of 
cause and effect. and which are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty'(T.124) and. in 
particular, of the role played by constant conjunction in that explanation. He appears to have 
seen probability in terms of a dropping-off or degradation of proof. For a fuller account. 
touching on some of the issues I raise in 2.2, see Baier, op.cit., pp.83-5. 
21.Stove, op.cit., p.32, makes Hume's stress on conceivability take all the weight of the 
argument. It suits Stove to do so because it is part of his case to suggest that Hume is 
concerned exclusively with deductive forms of argument. Hume is alleged to have made the 
assumption that causal inference is only justified where the separation of cause and effect is 
inconceivable. But Hume places only part of the stress on the conceivability of alternatives. 
Less dramatically, what he seems to argue is that the a priori justification of an inductive 
inference would require some discernible causal connection between cause and effect such 
that the survey of one would suggest the other. Hume's reasons for thinking that the 
apprehension of such a fact would imply 'the absolute contradiction and impossibility of 
conceiving any thing different'(T.8l) will be explored in 2.2. 
22.Simon Blackburn. op. cit. , pp.98-9, shows that Hume is sensitive to the distinction between 
what he calls a desire for a causal nexus and the desire for 'a straightjacket'(see T.90-91). 
Hume nevertheless appears to exclude the possibility of apprehending a nexus, or a particular 
'must', on the grounds that no apprehension could have the consequences of a straightjacket, 
which is to say, of 'casting its net' over all future events of the sort. Blackburn argues, 
convincingly. I think, that Hume saw 'that nothing would really count as an apprehension of a 
particular "must" unless it carried with it implications of uniformity for the general case'(p.99). I 
put off a consideration of these issues untif 2.2. 
23.ln terming the proposition upon which Hume thinks all probable argument is 'founded' the 
'uniformity principle' I take over the usage adopted by P.J.R. Millican, op. cit. , p.94, among 
others. The principle is also sometimes termed the 'resemblance thesis'. See, for example, N. 
Scott Arnold, op.cit., p.34. 
24.Millican, op.cit., p.91, describes Hume's argument as 'the foundation stone of his 
philosophical system'. Don Garrett, op.cit., p.l6, writes that it is usually thought to constitute 
'the essential core of Hume's philosophy'. One dissenting voice belongs to Ruth Weintraub, 
'What was Hume's Contribution to the Problem of Induction?' in The Philosophical Quarterly, 
Vo1.45, No.181, pp.460-470. Weintraub argues that Hume's argument is neither original nor 
especially significant, at least, not in any of the ways in which it is usually thought of as being. 
25.Stroud, op.cit., p.52. The argument is said by Stroud to form an important part of what he 
characterises as the 'negative phase' of Hume's philosophy. 
26.Similar arguments have now been made out by a number of distinguished commentators, 
including Baier, op.cit.; and Beauchamp and Rosenberg, op.cit. 
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27.D.C. Stove, op.cit. Flew, op.cit., p.82, gives a classic statement of this sort of view when he 
writes of Hume that he 'presupposes an exclusively deductive ideal of reason' which leads him 
to reject as unwarranted any argument that is not deductively valid. 
28.Stove, op.cit., p.S9. 
29.lbid, p.43. 
30. Ibid. , p.43. See also, Stove, 'Hume, Probability and Induction' in Hume, Ed. V.C. Chappell 
(New York: Doubleday, 1966), p.203. 
31.Stove, op.cit., 1973, p.44. 
32.P.J.R. Millican, op.cit., p.1 04, makes explicit the role Hume's 'middle term' is alleged to be 
playing in this argument. He also points up the parallel between Hume's use of the notion and 
that of Locke (pp.1 OS-6). 
33.See Millican, op.cit., pp.103-1 09; and Stroud, op.cit., p.2S6. 
34.John Locke, op. cit. , IV.XV.1. 
35.Millican, op.cit., p.105. 
36.Locke, op.cit., IV.XV.1. 
37. Ibid., IV.11.3. 
38. Ibid., IV.XVII.1S. 
39. Ibid. , IV.XVII.16. 
40.See Millican, op.cit., p.1 06-7. Millican argues that Hume, like Locke, 'is quite untainted by 
the now apparently common but always gratuitous assumption that only a demonstrative 
argument can contain a "middle term"'. Millican has little direct textual evidence to call upon. 
He does, however, cite a passage in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Nelson, 
1947) Ed. Norman Kemp Smith, p.143, in which Hume has Demea talk dismissively of the 
merely probable 'mediums' by which Cleanthes attempts to establish the existence of God. 
41.Stove, op.cit., 1973, p.30, claims to base his version of Hume's argument on a close 
reading of the texts of the Treatise, the Enquiry, and the Abstract. He nevertheless presents a 
number of his 'translations' of theses he alleges were held by Hume without full textual 
support. Among these is his translation of Hume's statement of 'inductive scepticism'. 
42.Stove, op.cit., 1966, p.198. 
43.Stove, op.cit., 1973, p.120. 
44.lbid., p.120. 
4S.Ernest C. Mossner, The Life of David Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp.11 0-2, 
shows that the section 'Of Miracles' which appears in the Enquiry and from which the 
quotation is taken had originally been intended for inclusion in the Treatise. Hume took the 
decision to withdraw the section in order to avoid causing offence to Joseph Butler, then Dean 
of St Paul's, whose endorsement of the work Hume had hoped to solicit. 
46.Millican, op.cit., p.123, presents a version of this argumeni which shows up the 
weaknesses in Stove's structure-diagram of Hume's argument. 
47. Stove , op.cit., 1973, p.43. 
48.Stroud, op. cit. , p.255. 
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49. Ibid, pp.255-6. 
50.As argued by N. Scott Arnold, op.cit., p.35. 
51.Stroud, op. cit. , p.256. 
52,Robert J. Fogelin, op.cit., p.157. 
53.Stroud, op. cit. , p.56. 
54.lbid., pp.56-7. 
55.lbid., p.60. 
56.lbid., pp.60-1. 
57. Ibid., p.61. 
58. Ibid., p.61. 
59. Ibid. , p.62. 
60. Ibid. , p.62. 
61.This sort of objection is made by N. Scott Arnold, op.cit., p.36. 
62.Stroud, op.cit., p.62. 
63.T.175. Hume is clear about the fallibility of inductive argument. He writes that in arguing 
from experience we can never be sure that we have taken into account the full 'complication of 
circumstances', many of the factors responsible for a given effect being 'not only 
unaccountable in their causes, but even unknown in their existence.' 
64.Stroud, op.cit., p.63. 
65.Stroud, op.cit., p.65-66, notes that Hume would also be obliged to reject any appeal to a 
priori knowledge of what sort of thing is a good reason to believe a thing of another sort. It is 
possible, Hume thinks, for two things to be merely accidentaly correlated, and, so, there being 
some reason to believe that it will continue could not, for Hume, follow logically from the fact 
that the correlation has held up to now. 
66.See, for example, Beauchamp and Rosenberg, op.cit.; Annette Baier, op.cit.; N.Scott 
Arnold, op.cit.; Janet Broughton, op.cit, and Beauchamp and Mappes, 'Is Hume Really a 
Sceptic about Induction' in American Philosophical Quarterly. Vo1.12. No.2, pp.119-129. 
67.Beauchamp and Rosenberg, op.cit., p.74. 
68.Scott Arnold, op.cit., p.41. 
69.lbid., p.55. 
70.Beachamp and Mappes, op.cit., p.119. 
71.As Garrett, op.cit., pp.78-80, argues. Garrett observes that: 'Hume's theories about the 
psychology of philosophizing entail that philosophers will sometimes say radically different 
things in radically different moods'(p.78). 
72.Beauchamp and Rosenberg, op.cit., p.44. 
73.lbid., p.43. 
74. Ibid. , p.41. 
75.lbid., p.37. 
76.Baier, op.cit., p.60. Baier quotes in this context the OED definition of 'intelligible' as: 
'Capable of being apprehended only by the understanding (not the senses)'. 
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77.Beauchamp and Rosenberg, op.cit., p.43. 
78.Baier, op. cit. , pp.60-1. 
79.Locke, op.cit., IV.XVII.2. 
80.lbid., IV.XVII.1. 
81.With some small adjustment, the same general points can be extended and made to count 
effectively against the broadly similar readings of Baier, Broughton and Scott Arnold. 
82.Beauchamp and Rosenberg, op.cit., p.44. 
83.Millican, op.cit., p.136, notes that such a claim would amount to no more than a re-
affirmation of the 'Lockean orthodoxy'. He cites Locke's remark that 'most of the Propositions 
we think, reason, discourse, nay act upon, are such, as we cannot have undoubted 
Knowledge of their Truth', op. cit. , IV.XV.2. 
84.John Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), Ed. W. von 
Leyden, p.111. 
85.Locke describes reason as that 'natural Revelation, whereby the eternal Father of Light, 
and Fountain of all Knowledge communicates to Mankind that portion of Truth, which he had 
laid within the reach of their natural Faculties', op.cit., 1979, IV.IXX.4. For an account of the 
prevalence of this conception of reason, see Edward Craig, op.cit. 
86.Fogelin, op.cit., p.46, aptly calls this argument of Hume's the 'no-argument argument'. 
87.Locke, op.cit., 1979, IV.XVII.2. 
88. Ibid. , IV.XVII.11. 
89.lbid., IV.XV.1. 
90.Baier, op.cit., pp.93-96, gives an account of how Hume observes each of the eight rules in 
the sections leading up to their endorsement. She suggests that the rules get their 'normative 
force' from the fact that the 'reasoning conformable to them' has been demonstrated to be 
capable of being turned successfully on itself(p.93). 
91.The success of Hume's reflexive move in the case of causal reasoning can be contrasted 
with the failure of demonstrative reasoning to survive its own reflexive examination in Section I 
of Part IV. 
2.2 Hume and the New Hume 
92.John Mackie, The Cement of The Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974) p.3. 
93.See, for example, J.A. Robinson 'Hume's Two Definitions of Cause' in The Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vo1.12, 1962; and Mackie, op. cit. , p.3-4. 
94.Galen Strawson, op.cit., p.7. 
95.A.J. Ayer, The Central Questions of Philosophy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p.183. 
96.Similar view's to Ayer's are defended by, among others, Mackie, 0p.cit.; Terence 
Penelhum, Hume (London: Macmillan, 1975); and J.A. Robinson, op.cit. Thomas Reid, 
Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind in The Works of Thomas Reid (Edinburgh: 
Maclachlan and Stewart, 1863), p.627, describes Hume's position as follows: 'I know of no 
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author before Mr. Hume, who maintained, that we have no other notion of a cause, but that it 
is something prior to the effect, which has been found by experience to be constantly followed 
by the effect.' 
97.As mentioned, these include Edward Craig, op.cit.; Galen Strawson, op.cit.; and John 
Wright, op.cit. 
98.Jonathan Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1971), p.300-1, is among those commentators who ascribe this mistake to Hume. According 
to Bennett, in considering the 'intellectual standing' of a belief, 'all Hume will do is demand its 
birth-certificate; and so, confronted with a belief for which there are reasons, he asks only 
whether it is arrived at through a consideration of reasons'. Bennett argues that Hume has 
confused the genetic question of a belief's causal origin with the normative question of its 
reasonableness. We saw in 2.1, however, that Hume keeps these questions firmly separate, 
answering, as, in Section VI, he does, a straightforward question within cognitive psychology. 
The 'logical' or normative question of the reasonableness of inductive belief is not treated of 
until Part IV of Book One. 
99.Fogelin, op.cit., p.47. Fogelin, however, is wrong to suggest that Hume's 'reversal of field', 
away from the search for an impression of necessary connection 'in objects' and towards an 
account using 'transparently causal notions', occurs only after Section VI. Hume has already 
abandoned the idea of grounding our causal inference in the idea of a necessary connection, 
and done so as early as Section III of Part III. 
100.Norman Kemp Smith, op.cit., p.401, was, I think, the first commentator to give special 
emphasis to the causal nature of Hume's account of causal belief. 
1 01.Kemp Smith, op.cit., is aware of the difficulty. He argues that Hume's second 'natural' 
definition of causation, in which the causal notion 'determines' occurs, should be understood 
as 'in the main ostensive'(p.401). Wade L. Robison 'Hume's Causal Scepticism' in David 
Hume: Bicentenary Papers (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1977) pp.156-166, puts 
an alternative view. 
102.Robison, op.cit., p.159, makes this point. 
1 03.As argued by Garrett, op.cit., p.112. 
104.8aier, op.cit., p.99. 
105.Kemp Smith, op.cit., p.401. 
106.Hume, like Malebranche, associates necessary connection with the notion of active 
causal powers. He describes the terms 'agency', 'power and 'force' as 'nearly synominous' 
with 'necessity' and 'connexion'(T.157). 
107.Nicolas Malebranche, The Search After Truth, translated and edited by Thomas M. 
Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p450. 
108.See Malebranche, op.cit., pp.449-51. 
109.lbid., p.449. 
11 O.They are discussed by, among other, Charles McCracken, op.cit., pp.254-290; and John 
P. Wright, op.cit., pp.126-176. 
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111.Hume writes: 'I begin with observing that the terms of efficacy, agency, power, force, 
energy, necessity, connexion, and productive quality, are all nearly synominous'(T.157). 
112.See T.78. One of the ways in which Hume sets out his store to investigate the idea of 
necessary connection is by asking why we believe that a particular cause must necessarily 
have a particular effect? 
113.Hume writes in the Enquiry that 'the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, 
attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any 
particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other'(E.27). It is clear from this the 
nature of the experience Hume has in mind. In other passages, Hume does not always make 
clear whether he has in mind reasonings ahead of all experience or reasonings prior to the 
experience of constant conjunction(E.28). I take him to mean the latter. Hume makes clear 
that he considers there to be nothing in our experience of single instances of conjunction that 
would warrant a projection into the future. The mind, he writes, 'can never possibly find the 
effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is 
totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it.'(E.29). 
114.Stroud, op.cit., p.80. 
115.See Stroud, op.cit., pp.80-1. 
116.For a discussion of this aspect of Hume's procedure, see Blackburn, op.cit., 1993, pp.98-
100. Craig, op.cit., p.97, offers a significantly different interpretation to Blackburn's. I pick up 
these themes again in my discussion of the sceptical realist view of Hume on causation. 
117.Kemp Smith, op.cit., pp.91-2. 
118. The version of the two definitions presented in the Enquiry is similar to that of the 
Treatise, but not identical(E.76-7). The first definition of the Enquiry makes no mention of 
spatial contiguity. Hume indicates in the Treatise that he finds this relation problematic, adding 
that we may suppose the relation of contiguity essential to causation at least 'till we can find a 
more proper occasion to clear up the matter, by examining what objects are or are not 
susceptible of juxtaposition and conjunction'(T.75). Beside the omission of any reference to 
the relations of precedence and contiguity, the second definition of the Enquiry also differs 
somewhat from that of the Treatise. These differences reflect Hume's concern with the 
refinement of his definitions rather than any significant change in his thinking. The Enquiry 
definition does not mention the inference from original impression to enlivened idea, nor does 
it contain the Treatise definition's reference to inference from idea to idea. 
119.1 have in mind, in particular, J.A. Robinson, 'Hume's two Definitions of "Cause''', in The 
Philosophical Quarterly, VoI.XII, 1962, pp.162-171; Nicholas Capaldi, David Hume: The 
Newtonian Philosopher (Boston: Twayne, 1975) pp.95-129; and A.H. Basson, David Hume 
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1958), pp.73-76. 
120.Robinson, op.cit., p.67. 
121.lbid. 
122. Ibid. 
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123.T.J. Richards, 'Hume's Two Definitions of "Cause''', in The Philosophical Quarterly, 
VoI.XV, 1965, pp.247-253, criticises Robinson on these grounds. 
124.Beauchamp and Rosenberg, op.cit., p.16, suggest that the second definition could just as 
plausibly be taken as the only true definition as the first. There is some textual support for the 
view. In the Enquiry, Hume writes that when we say that one object is connected with another 
'we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this 
inference, by which they become proofs of each other's eXistence'(E.76). This would suggest 
that only the second definition, referring as it does, albeit obliquely, to the impression from 
which the 'essential' idea of necessity is derived, could strictly be considered the correct one. 
This view should be resisted. Not only is there no direct textual evidence in its favour, but 
holding it would commit Hume to the unpalatable view that any instance of conjunction, 
however unrepresentative, could properly be regarded as causal, provided one event is 
psychologically associated with the other. 
12S.See Wright, The Sceptical Realism af David Hume (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1983), pp.123-186. A similar defence is laid out by Galen Strawson, op.cit. Strawson 
writes that 'even if there were good grounds for thinking that Hume's theory of ideas licensed 
the strange claim that all we can suppose a thing to be is what we can detect or experience or 
know of it, because we cannot manage to mean anything more than what we can detect or 
experience of know of it when we think or talk, the following problem would remain: the claim 
that causation is nothing but regular succession, which makes a positive ontological assertion, 
is violently at odds with Hume's scepticism - his strictly non-committal scepticism with respect 
to knowledge claims about what we can know to exist, or know not to exist, in reality.'(p.276) 
126.Hume's free use of these terms is reflected, in particular, in Section IV of the Enquiry. 
127.Wright, op.cit., p.13. 
128.lbid., p.129. 
129.lbid., p.135. 
130.Malebranche, ap. cit. , p.451. 
131.lbid., p.450. 
132.lbid., p.450. 
133.0f these philosophers, it is only to Malebranche that Hume refers directly, Citing him as 
among those 'who have pretended to explain the secret force and energy of causes'(T.158). It 
is obviously Malebranche's occasionalism which Hume has in mind during his attacks on the 
theory of causation of the 'Cartesians'. The influence of Malebranche on Hume has been well 
enough attested to by, among others, Wright, and McCracken, op.cit. Wright singles out 
Malebranche's insistence that when we lack knowledge of necessary connection we lack 
awareness of the power by which a cause produces its effects as particularly important to 
Hume(p.139). 
i34.Wright, ap.cit., p.i27. 
i3S.lbid. 
138 
136.Martin Bell, 'Hume and Causal Power: The Influences of Malebranche and Newton' in 
The British Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol.5, No.1, 1997, pp.67-86. 
137.Bell, op.cit., p.76. 
138.lbid., p.77. 
139.1bid., pp. 77 -8. 
140.Malebranche, op.cit., pp.236-7. 
141.There is no doubt that Hume was a highly attentive reader of Malebranche. Hume not only 
refers the reader to his work, and to crucial passages in it, but clearly models the wording of a 
number of important passages on passages from Malebranche. McCracken, op.cit., pp.257-
258, cites a number of them. Such passages, he argues, 'suggest that Hume not only kept the 
Search in mind, as he wrote on causality, but that he even had it open for consultation while 
writing'. 
142.Bell, op.cit., p.7S. 
143.lbid., pp.78-9. 
144.Wright, op.cit., p.143. 
145.Hume warns us that when he talks of our ignorance of 'natural powers' he has in mind the 
'loose and popular' sense of the term(E.33), which, he explains later, is 'obscure and 
uncertain'(E.66}. This is the use of the term Hume has in mind when he writes of 'secret' and 
'conceal'd' powers and forces. The causal power or necessary connection itself remains 
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Chapter Three 
Hume's Scepticism with Regard to the Senses 
Hume argues that the mind has no adequate idea of causal power or necessary connection as 
it is commonly understood. The 'generality of mankind' believe that in apprehending a 
particular causal relation 'they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is 
connected with its effect, and is forever infallible in its operation'{E.69). The negative 
conclusion of the section 'Of the idea of necessary connection' is that we have no idea of 
necessity so understood. Hume's positive theory of causation gives an account of how the 
mind comes to mistake the idea of necessary connection which it does possess for an idea of 
necessary connection as that 'quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one 
an infallible consequence of the other'(E.63). The tendency the mind has of projecting 
qualities onto objects is to be explained on the basis of the principles of the association of 
ideas. The mind has 'a great propensity to spread itself on external objects, and to conjoin 
with them any internal impressions, which they occasion, and which always make their 
appearance at the same time that these objects discover themselves to the senses'(T.167). 
Hume shows how the idea of necessity arises from the customary transition the mind makes 
from cause to effect. This is an important part of Hume's constructive project in Part III. In 
Section XV, Hume offers a set of normative rules for judging of causes and effects. We can 
be confident, Hume thinks, in endorsing those rutes which have survived their own reflexive 
scrutiny{1). Most of Hume's applications of causal reasoning to itself in Part III can be 
described as constructive. Certain of our central habits of mind are endorsable because they 
bear up under their own standards of evaluation. The same process of reasoning leads Hume 
to reject unphilosophical species of probability(T.143-154). Hume's rules for judging of causes 
and effects, his account of necessity and his two definitions of causation, are aI/ the outcome 
of reflexive causal reasoning. This is in line with Hume's intention, announced in the 
introduction to the Treatise, of giving to the science of man a foundation 'laid on experience 
and observation', and so providing a 'compleat system of the sciences', the only one upon 
which they can stand with any security(T.xvi). In Part IV of Book One, however, Hume 
unravels a knot of sceptical doubts which threaten to 'turn into ridicule all our past pains and 
industry, and to discourage us from future enquiries'(T.266). He proposes a number of 
sceptical arguments and treats of a number of important assumptions and beliefs which, he 
argues, are unwarranted or false. By the end of Part IV, Hume is reduced 'almost to despair' 
at the weakness and disorder to which these 'desponding reflections' have exposed his 
faculties and beliefs(T.264). Our normal assumptions about ourselves, and about the external 
world, are exposed as 'fictions', mere tricks of the imagination. Hume's sceptical arguments 
raise important questions about the nature and viability of his constructive project. My purpose 
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in this and in the following chapter is to critically examine Hume's arguments, and the 
assumptions which underpin them, and to consider some of the difficulties urged against 
them. 
It is in these sections that Hume displays the arguments of 'that fantastic sect' of radical or 
'total scepticism'(T. 183), appearing, to some commentators, to endorse the same Pyrrhonian 
arguments which seem to throw into uncertainty the theoretical and scientific ambitions 
announced at the outset of the Treatise(2). We found in Chapter Two that there were 
compelling textual grounds for resisting the positivist reading of Hume on causation and 
induction. The upshot of Hume's argument concerning induction, I argued, is not sceptical. 
The normative question of the justification of inductive inference only arises in Part IV, once 
Hume has considered those conclusions 'that persuade us of the continu'd and independent 
existence of body'(T.231). Questions are posed about the legitimacy of causal reasoning by 
the serious doubts its application raises about the 'equally natural and necessary' operations 
of the senses(T.266). There is, Hume finds, a 'direct and total opposition' between reason and 
the senses(T.231). Not only do certain of our basic beliefs about the world and about 
ourselves go beyond what causal reasoning can strictly warrant, but, when applied to our 
perceptual judgments and beliefs, causal reasoning appears to 'leave nothing in the universe' 
which has a continued and distinct existence(T.231). The experimental method of reasoning 
shows that a number of our common sense beliefs are false, and, in Part IV, at least, appears 
to tip the scales against the possibility of founding upon its basis the sort of Newtonian 
enterprise Hume has in mind. 
Hume expects his theory of mind to be able to explain not only those beliefs which causal 
inference can warrant, but those which it cannot. This reflects a fundamental aim of the first 
book of the Treatise. Hume intends to investigate the origin of our basic ontological beliefs. He 
uses the principles of the association of ideas to explain the tendency of the mind to 
mistakenly attribute necessity to objects. Hume's finished position has to be understood with 
care. Hume argues that we make a mistake when we think we perceive a necessary 
connection between causally-related objects or events. But he does not suggest that we are 
mistaken or unjustified in forming the habits of expectation we form on the basis of past 
regularities. He does not deny that there exist unknown causes. It is important to separate the 
genetic question from the question of justification. When we talk of causes in this sense, 
however, we do so in a 'loose and popular' way, as do the 'generality of mankind'. We do not 
possess an idea of the cause of the regularities we observe in nature. The idea we do 
possess is an effect of those regularities. The mind has a tendency to mistake the latter for 
the former and to project the effect of natural constancy back upon its cause. Two important 
features of Hume's treatment are worth underlining: Hume is concerned with the opinion of the 
'generality of mankind' rather than with the view of philosophers; he is not concerned to deny 
that there are secret or concealed causes, powers or forces, in nature. I have argued against 
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the positivistic regularity interpretation of Hume's theory of causation. Hume can give us no 
strict definition of cause because, as he recognises, 'any just definition of cause'(E.76) must 
involve ideas drawn from the supposed effects of causes of which we have no adequate 
idea(3). 
A third important point warrants reiteration. I complained in Chapter Two that Hume has said 
far too little about the way in which he thinks something which 'belongs entirely to the 
soul'(T.166) comes to be thought of as a quality or relation of or between the objects. The 
pressures of his theory of ideas lead him to attempt to characterise the content of the 'internal 
impression' in terms of an impression of inevitability or determination of the mind which is 
something like, or even identical with, an impression of necessity. In the Enquiry. Hume is at 
great pains to distance his account from any such implication(E.60-73). and. indeed. in the 
Treatise itself, he makes clear that there can be no apprehension of necessary connection. 
even between events in the mind(T.168). He is nevertheless led in this unfortunate direction 
by his commitment to accounting for the feeling of inevitability which accompanies the 
customary transition of the mind from cause to effect in terms of an impression. Hume is. at 
times, prepared to go as far as to say that we 'feel' the 'connexion' by which the mind is 
carried to form the idea of an object upon the appearance of its usual attendant(E.75}. Hume 
leaves himself open to the sort of interpretation he has spent much of the past fifteen pages of 
the Enquiry attempting to prevent. He wants to avoid saying that the impression from which 
the idea of necessity which the mind possesses arises is itself an impression of necessary 
connection. What Hume needs is some means of saying that we experience the customary 
transition from cause to effect as inevitable without saying that we have an impreSSion of 
inevitability or determination. But his commitment to the theory of ideas means that he can 
only characterise the way in which necessity gets to be regarded as part of the world in the 
most misleading terms. It is important to note the sort of hold this theory has on Hume's 
philosophical imagination. He perseveres with it even where it is obviously at odds with his 
attempts to causally explain our fundamental concepts and beliefs(4). It will not do Simply to 
elevate one commitment of Hume's at the expense of another. Such an attempt. even coming 
from those sympathetic to Hume, is misguided. Whatever the faults of Hume's account it 
must. at least. be taken for what it is. Hume's advocacy of. and commitment to. the theory of 
ideas will be to the fore in the sections to follow, and. as I will argue. it is only against its 
background that his associationalist investigation of the causes which induce us to believe in 
lasting bodies and identical persons can be understood. In the first part of this chapter. I 
attempt to show the role Hume's commitment to the theory of ideas plays in the development 
of his argument. 
In Section 3.2 I will argue against the suggestion that Hume sought to offload some or all of 
his commitments to the theory of ideas(5). It is doubtful whether Hume would have welcomed 
any such favours from sympathetic commentators. The theory of ideas had its value for 
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Hume, in providing a means of impartially challenging or placing under suspicion certain of our 
ideas and of interrogating our everyday beliefs. It also brings with it certain constraints. At 
times, these constraints restrict Hume to giving an explanation of a certain sort, or to pointing 
the reader in a certain, sometimes misleading, direction. It is true that Hume does not put 
forward any strong or convincing sceptical arguments against our faculties of sense, nor, 
indeed, does he give the issue any sustained treatment at all(6). It quickly becomes clear, 
however, that among the common perceptual judgments which Hume believes to be false is 
the belief that we are aware of a world of public objects, located in physical space, with an 
existence independent of our perception of them. By the end of Section" of Part IV, Hume 
writes that he is inclined 'to repose no faith at all in my senses'(T.217). It is, he complains, a 
'gross illusion to suppose, that our resembling perceptions are numerically the same; and 'tis 
this illusion, which leads us into the opinion, that these perceptions are uninterrupted, and are 
still existent, even when they are not present to the senses'(T.217). Despite beginning Section 
" by promising to take for granted the vulgar belief in 'continu'd and distinct existence', by the 
end of the section Hume complains that he cannot 'conceive how such trivial qualities of the 
fancy, conducted by such false suppositions, can ever lead to any solid and rational 
system'(T.217). 
The 'intense view' of these 'manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason', leads 
him, by the end of Part IV, to consider the rejection of all belief and reasoning and to 'look 
upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another'(T.268-9). Hume's constructive 
project of giving a reflexive turn to causal reasoning, so as to found a 'compleat system of the 
sciences', has been thrown into doubt by Hume's own destructive sceptical work. It is not until 
the second half of the conclusion to Book One of the Treatise that the mask of the Pyrrhonian 
sceptic begins to slip. It has seemed to a number of commentators that Hume's own position 
cannot survive the sorts of sceptical doubts he raises(7). Hume's attempts to mitigate his 
sceptical doubts, and so to save science, and his own scientific programme, fails, because, in 
Passmore's words, 'Hume could not succeed in the impossible - a science founded on 
scepticism no degree of ingenuity can successfully construct'(8). Hume's sceptical arguments 
seem, on the face of it, impossible to reconcile with his now largely ignored or too-readily 
dismissed scientific ambitions. A consideration of Hume's own assessment of his sceptical 
arguments will have to wait a while(9). In this chapter, I attempt to unravel Hume's particularly 
tangled and difficult discussion of our idea of body, and of the causes of our belief in lasting 
objects. In Chapter Four, I critically examine Hume's treatment of our assumptions about the 
identity of our own minds over time. In both sections, Hume is concerned with our common 
assumptions about identity over time. But it is the difficult Section" 'Of scepticism with regard 
to the senses' that, I think, best captures the temper and ambition of Hume's sceptical 
philosophy, raising, as it does, important questions about the role and purpose of philosophical 
thought(T.267), and it is to the main argument of this section that I now turn. 
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3.1 The Argument in Detail 
While few philosophers would wish to endorse its conclusions, Section II of Part IV is among 
the most widely discussed and admired passages of Hume's philosophy(10). Having dealt, in 
the main, with beliefs about future events in Part III of Book One, Hume turns to a second 
class of beliefs about the unobserved. He has in mind the 'simple supposition' of the continued 
and distinct existence of bodies or objects(T.198). His interest is in the causes which induce 
us to believe in the existence of such objects. The problem concerns what leads us to attribute 
identity to an object over gaps in observation. It is the tendency of the mind to assume that its 
objects have an uninterrupted existence that Hume wants to investigate. The section begins 
with Hume drawing a comparison between the sceptical doubts he has raised about 
demonstrative reason and the doubts he is about to raise concerning the senses. The sceptic, 
he says, 'still continues to reason and believe, even tho' he asserts, that he cannot defend his 
reason by reason; and by the same rule he must assent to the principle concerning the 
existence of body, tho' he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its 
veracity'(T.187). Hume concludes the first section of Part IV by remarking that, while the 
sceptical arguments directed at demonstrative reason are unanswerable, 'nature breaks the 
force of all sceptical arguments in time, and keeps them from having any considerable 
influence on the understanding'(T.187). Hume's argument attempts to turn reason on itself by 
showing how the probability of error in calculation reduces the probability of the conclusions of 
chains of reasoning 'to nothing'(182-4). Hume concludes that 'all the rules of logic require a 
continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence'(11). While Hume 
does not direct any sustained sceptical arguments against the faculties of sense, he does call 
into serious question the supposition that the objects of which we are aware have a distinct 
and continued existence. By the end of Section II, Hume is inclined, he says, to repose no 
faith at all in his senses(T.217). He believes the arguments against the supposition to be 
rationally unanswerable, although they produce little conviction, and have only slight effect 
upon our beliefs. Nature keeps them from having any lasting or 'considerable influence' on the 
understanding, although, as we will see, they are not without some influence. Unchecked by 
nature, sceptical arguments would 'utterly subvert all belief and opinion', terminating in 'a total 
suspense of judgment'(T.184). These effects of nature seem to be what Hume has in mind 
when he adds that '[W]e may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of 
body? but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must 
take for granted in all our reasonings.'(T.187) There is no point in asking the question with a 
view to establishing what we ought to believe. Nature, it appears, has not left this to choice, 
esteeming it 'an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and 
speculations.'(T.187) We have no choice but to proceed upon the supposition Hume has 
himself followed up to now that 'there is both an external and internal world'(T.217). 
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The subject of our present enquiry, Hume says, 'is concerning the causes which induce us to 
believe in the existence of body'(T.187 -8). The contrast Hume has in mind is clear. He wishes 
to distinguish the legitimate causal investigation of a belief, and its findings, the result of 
empirical analysis, from the vain endeavours of the sceptic, who must assent to the belief, in 
spite of all his philosophy. His own scepticism is one which is 'consequent to science and 
enquiry'(E.150). The connection between Hume's sceptical arguments and his genetic 
account of belief is carefully brought out in Section I. Hume describes his intention in 
displaying the arguments of 'that fantastic sect', the Pyrrhonian or total sceptics, as being 'only 
to make the reader sensible of the truth of my hypothesis, that a/l our reasonings concerning 
causes and effects are deriv'd from nothing but custom: and that belief is more properly an act 
of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures.'(T.183) Hume's claim that many of 
our normal perceptual beliefs are false is the result of causal reasoning from observation and 
experience. When he finds that some of our beliefs go beyond what inference of this sort can 
warrant, he turns his mind to causally explaining what leads us to subscribe to the erroneous 
beliefs. I have attempted to stress the importance of this sceptical dimension in Hume. There 
is no doubt that Hume does regard many of our ordinary perceptual beliefs as false. But he 
does not suggest we abandon them or that we suspend our judgment about them. His is not 
that sort of scepticism. He is not asking what we should believe. As a good Newtonian, Hume 
is interested in the causes of the beliefs we have. The discovery of the falsehood of certain 
ordinary perceptual judgments is the outcome of an empirical investigation of their causes. 
One part of this investigation will have to do with the question of whether or not we can supply 
reasons for these beliefs. 
Hume sees the question of our belief in the continued and distinct existence of body as a 
straightforward empirical question which falls naturally within the province of his science of 
man. Hume is interested in the sceptical arguments, but he no more than alludes to them, 
before moving on to his difficult, lengthy and extremely complicated examination of the causes 
of that belief(12). It is important to note that the belief Hume is interested in is the belief of the 
'generality of mankind', including, for the greater part of their lives, philosophers 
themselves(T.206). He looks to start his investigation from what he thinks is a theoretically 
uncommitted starting point. Hume wants to explain the origin of the vulgar belief in the distinct 
and continued existence of bodies. This is significant. The vulgar belief in body entails that 
'[T]hose very sensations, which enter by the eye or ear, are with them the true objects, nor can 
they readily conceive that this pen or paper, which is immediately perceiv'd, represents 
another, which is different from, but resembling it'(T.202). Hume needs to be able to formulate 
the problem and describe the pre-theoretical condition of our beliefs without committing 
himself or us to holding the 'objects' in question to be either physical objects causing 
impressions, or sense-impressions going proxy for unobserved objects which are their 
causes. The pre-theoretical belief in body is, importantly, uncommitted to either of these two 
alternatives. Hume must not presuppose that we already, in this pre-theoretical stage, have 
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some notion of what it is for a body to have a distinct and continued existence. This is what is 
to be explained. He intends his account of the belief in question to conform to what he 
understands to be the belief of the vulgar(13}. The distinction between perceptions and 
physical objects is one which the vulgar are in no position to make. Hume attributes to the 
vulgar two important suppositions. The vulgar, Hume says, 'confound perceptions and objects, 
and attribute a distinct continu'd existence to the very things they feel or see'(T.193}. 
Hume begins his argument by drawing a distinction between the elements of the vulgar belief 
in body, which is to say, between our belief in the continued existence and our belief in the 
distinct existence of objects. We ought, Hume says, 'to examine apart those two questions, 
which are commonly confounded together, viz. Why we attribute a CONTINU'D existence to 
objects, even when they are not present to the senses; and why we suppose them to have an 
existence DISTINCT from the mind and perception.'(T.188) Under this last heading, Hume 
goes on, 'I comprehend their situation as well as relations, their external position as well as the 
independence of their existence and operation.'(T.188) The questions, Hume allows, are 
'intimately connected together', for 'if the objects of our senses continue to exist, even when 
they are not perceiv'd, their existence is of course independent of and distinct from the 
perception; and vice versa, if their existence be independent from the perception and distinct 
from it, they must continue to exist, even tho' they be not perceiv'd'(T.188). The second of 
these two points is perhaps arguable. It does not seem that the independence of an object of 
perception need imply its continued existence when unperceived(14). Hume does not attempt 
to defend the claim. He is more interested in stressing that our belief in enduring bodies is a 
belief in both the continued existence of these objects when unperceived and in their 
distinctness or independence of mind. A satisfactory account will need to explain the origin of 
both attributions. So intimate is the connection Hume believes to hold between these two 
beliefs that 'the decision of the one question decides the other'(T.188}. He nonetheless sets 
out to keep the distinction in mind in considering 'whether it be the senses, reason, or the 
imagination, that produces the opinion of a continu'd or of a distinct existence'(T.188). 
Hume's strategy over the next few pages will be familiar from his discussion of our idea of 
necessary connection. He draws a similar conclusion. The notion of continued and distinct 
existence must, Hume thinks, arise from either the senses, reason or the imagination. Hume 
considers the three possible origins of our belief in body, only to reject the first two in favour of 
the third. Hume begins with a number of arguments intended to show that the senses cannot 
by themselves give rise to the opinion of the continued and distinct existence of bodies. Like 
so much in Hume, these arguments are the tip of a substantial theoretical iceberg. He 
observes first that we cannot get the idea of continued existence directly from the senses 
since that would imply that we had a perception of something continuing to exist when 
unperceived, and that, he says, 'is a contradiction in terms, and supposes that the senses 
continue to operate, even after they have ceased all manner of operation'(T.188). Hume can 
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make out this argument without violating his commitment to maintaining the 'ontological 
neutrality'(15) of the vulgar belief in body. His point is simply that the senses cannot convey 
the idea since this would involve perceiving what is unperceived. 
If the senses are to have any influence in the present case it must be in the production of the 
opinion of the distinct existence of body. In order to produce the idea of distinct existence our 
senses would need to 'present their impressions either as images and representations, or as 
these very distinct and external existences'(T.189). It is obvious, Hume thinks, that our senses 
do not offer their impressions as images or representations of something distinct or 
independent 'because they convey to us nothing but a single perception, and never give us the 
least intimation of anything beyond'. A single perception, Hume says, can never produce the 
idea of an existence distinct from ourselves, except with the aid of some inference 'either of 
the reason or imagination(T.189). To offer an impression 'as represented' the senses must 
present both the image and the original. It is obvious, for reasons already stated, that they 
cannot possibly do so. We cannot tell how or whether an impression adequately represents 
the world as long as we have only the impression to go by. It is important to note that Hume is 
asking what causes us to believe that the objects of the senses have an independent 
existence. He is not asking what causes us to believe that there is an object beyond the 
impressions of the senses, causing them. The mind must look farther than the senses if it is to 
infer a 'double existence' and suppose the relations of resemblance and causation to hold 
between them. As I have already noted, Hume is extremely dismissive of such attempts. Much 
of his sceptical ire, in this section, and elsewhere in the Treatise, is directed against the 
doctrine of double existence. Near the end of Part II of Book One of the Treatise, Hume writes 
that since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, 'and since all ideas are deriv'd 
from something antecedantly present to the mind; it follows, that 'tis impossible for us to so 
much as conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and 
impressions.'(T.67) The mind cannot advance a step beyond its perceptions, nor can it 
'conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appear'd in that narrow 
compass'(T.67). 
Do our senses then present their impressions as these 'very distinct and external existences' 
Hume writes about? Once again, Hume thinks it is evident that they do not. He has already 
argued that the senses present to the mind only the image or 'representation' and not the 
supposed object. If our senses do suggest any idea of distinct existences 'they must convey 
the impressions as those existences, by a kind of fallacy and iliusion'(T.189). To make an 
impression appear as the original, the senses must 'convey a falsehood'(T.192). This, as 
Hume explains, is because all our perceptions, external or internal, pains and pleasures, as 
well as sensations, are originally 'on the same footing; and whatever other differences we may 
observe among them, they appear, all of them, in their true colours, as impressions or 
perceptions'(T.190). When we doubt whether our impressions present themselves as distinct 
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objects or mere perceptions, our doubt concerns not their nature, for they are all felt by the 
mind 'such as they really are', but 'their relations and situation'(T.189). If the senses presented 
our impressions as distinct and external existences, both the objects and ourselves would 
need to be obvious to the senses. But to what extent, if any, are we really aware of ourselves? 
The difficulty in this, according to Hume, concerns 'how far we are ourselves the objects of our 
senses'(T.189). Hume thinks this question too abstruse a one to be settled without 'recourse 
to the most profound metaphysics'(T.189). In common life, we have no fixed or determinate 
idea of self or person and it is, therefore, absurd to suppose that the senses can ever 
distinguish between ourselves and external objects(T.189-90). 
Even if we ignore the complexities of personal identity and think of 'ourselves' as bodies we 
run into difficulties, for, strictly speaking, "tis not our body we perceive, when we regard our 
limbs and members, but certain impressions, which enter by the senses; so that ascribing a 
real and corporeal existence to these impressions, or to their objects, is an act of mind as 
difficult to explain, as that which we examine at present'(T.191). Everything that enters the 
mind 'being in reality a perception'(T.190), an impression or an idea, we cannot appeal to 
something distinct from our own bodies in explaining the origin of the idea of external 
existence, without presupposing that we already possess the idea which we are interested in 
explaining. Hume believes that when we perceive parts of our bodies, we in fact perceive only 
'certain impressions'(16). How do we come to ascribe external existence to our bodies in the 
first place? In order to explain how we get the idea of external existence by perceiving 
something independent of our own bodies, we must first explain how we come to ascribe 'a 
real and corporeal existence' to the impressions which are, strictly speaking, all we ever 
perceive. In no way better off for our excursion, we are brought back to our original difficulty. 
We may, Hume thinks, 'conclude with certainty, that the opinion of a continu'd and of a distinct 
existence never arises from the senses.'(T.192). 
Hume argues that we cannot possibly have the illusion that perceptions are distinct and 
independent from ourselves since this would be to suppose 'that even where we are most 
intimately conscious, we might be mistaken'(T.190). This is impossible 'since all actions and 
sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness' and 'must necessarily appear in 
every particular what they are, and be what they appear'(T.190). To confirm his thesis, Hume 
observes that there are broadly only three different kinds of impression conveyed to us by our 
senses: The first are those of the figure, bulk, motion and solidity of bodies. The second those 
of colours, tastes, smells, sounds, heat and cold. The third are the pains and pleasures, that 
arise from the application of objects to our bodies, as by the cutting of our flesh with steel, and 
such like.'(T.192) Both philosophers and the vulgar consider the first, primary, qualities, to 
have 'a distinct continu'd existence'. The vulgar alone regard secondary qualities as having the 
same status, while philosopher and non-philosopher alike consider pains and pleasures to 
have no such existence in objects. Hume is not here concerned with whether or not these 
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ascriptions are correct or justified. His point is that we do as a matter of fact make these 
distinctions, and that we make them on some basis other than the senses alone. It is evident, 
Hume says, that 'whatever may be our philosophical opinion, colours, sounds, heat and cold, 
as far as appears to the senses, exist after the same manner with motion and solidity, and that 
the difference we make betwixt them in this respect, arises not from the mere 
perception'(T.192). So great, and, indeed, pervasive, is the 'prejudice' for the distinct existence 
of primary qualities 'that when the contrary opinion is advanc'd by modern philosophers, 
people imagine they can almost refute it from their feeling and experience, and that their very 
senses contradict this phiiosophy'(T.192). Hume is happy to make the assumption that the 
immediate objects of our awareness are perceptions(17). Our impressions of primary qualities 
are on the same footing as our impressions of secondary qualities, and of pains and 
pleasures, when seen 'in their true colours'(T.190), as perceptions. As far as the senses are 
the judges 'all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence'{T.193). The idea of 
distinct existence must therefore be derived from some source other than from the senses 
alone. 
Despite the surface lucidity of Hume's argument, there are a number of difficulties arising from 
it, and a number of important assumptions, as yet unargued for, which need to be assessed. 
Hume has tended thus far to construe externality and independence almost exclusively in 
terms having to do with physical bodies lying beyond the senses. This is problematic. Not only 
does Hume fail to observe the commitment to ontological neutrality which, as we saw, he 
needs to observe at this point in his argument, but in failing to do so, he effectively ignores 
alternative possibilities which he ought to have considered. We should keep in mind that 
Hume is attempting to explain a belief in body which, as Pears observes, 'antedates the 
categorical question and does not presuppose an answer to it'(18). Crucially, it is Hume's 
assumption about the actual nature of the objects of sense that counts against the vulgar 
view. He has in mind a number of other assumptions, among them, as I will argue, a 
physicalist understanding of body, which we will need to grasp if we are to appreciate why 
Hume places belief in body 'in a far weaker position than belief in causation or belief in 
personal identity'(19). The special difficulties which attend Hume's account of the vulgar belief 
in body quickly become apparent in his description of the character of that belief and in his 
account of its origin. 
Hume thinks the question of personal identity too abstruse a one to allow us, in common life, 
to distinguish, on the basis of our awareness of ourselves, our awareness of something 
distinct from ourselves. We might proceed by ignoring the metaphysical question and 
construing 'ourselves' as physical bodies. This line, however, is not open to us, since, properly 
speaking, it is not our 'limbs and members' we perceive, but certain impressions 'which enter 
by the senses'{T.191). Hume makes a valid point. The idea of external existence cannot 
simply be 'read off' from our impressions(20). The claim that my limbs and members have 'a 
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real and corporeal existence' itself stands in need of explanation and cannot be appealed to in 
explanation of the origin of the idea of externality. But Hume's opponent might complain, as 
Jonathan Bennett does, that 'he has been made to construe "external" as meaning (a) 
"somewhere other than where my body is" rather than (b) "somewhere other than where I 
am".'(21) While the apparent distinctness of our impressions of objects from our impressions 
of body is no basis upon which to ground our belief in distinct existence, the distinctness of 
these impressions from one's perceptual point of view might well be. The notion of 'where I 
am' does not require the supposition of a physical body, located in space, but 'can be 
adequately based on my perceptual slant on the world'(22). Hume does not consider the 
possibility. Nor does he give any weight to the possibility that the idea of distinct existence 
might be derived from our awareness of an impression existing apart from any of the 
perceptions which might constitute a mind. What he ought to mean by 'distinct existence', as 
Pears points out, 'is existence outside any mind, and this should cover impartially the two 
possible ways in which an object might exist independently of any mind: it might be an 
impression existing in complete isolation from the impressions and ideas which constitute any 
mind, or it might be a physical object in physical space'(23). Hume's problem is that he 
neglects entirely the first alternative, or any variation of it, preferring to ask whether our senses 
offer their impressions as something distinct from perceptions, from what appears 
immediately to the mind(T.189). He considers only one way in which an object might exist 
independently of a mind: as a physical object lying beyond the impressions of the senses. But 
the belief Hume is attempting to explain is supposed to be impartial between this and the 
alternative possibility. Hume already has in mind the representative theory of double 
existence, identified with Locke, which he later argues is philosophically unacceptable and 
fails to consider, or give any weight to, the possibility that our idea of distinct existence is 
founded on the distinctness of an impression from a perceptual view-point or from the 
impressions and ideas which make up the mind. The problem is that Hume bases his 
argument on two important and pervasive assumptions: one concerning the nature of the 
objects which are before the senses; the other having to do with the possible ways in which an 
object might exist independently of a mind. Hume is already facing difficulties in maintaining 
his commitment to ontological neutrality in explaining the vulgar belief in body, and, as we will 
see, the difficulties prove endemic in Hume's attempts to characterise the content of the 
vulgar belief. 
Hume gives even shorter shrift to the pretensions of reason to be the source of our idea of 
and belief in the continued and distinct existence of bodies. The arguments of philosophers, 
however convincing in themselves, are of no interest to 'the greatest part of mankind'(T.193), 
who neither know of them, nor are influenced by them. The conclusions which the vulgar form 
are 'directly contrary to those, which are confirm'd by philosophy'(T.193). The vulgar 'attribute 
a distinct continu'd existence to the very things they feel or see' and fail to observe the 
philosophical conclusion that 'every thing, which appears to the mind, is nothing but a 
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perception, and is interrupted, and dependent on the mind'(T.193}. It cannot then be by the 
arguments of the philosophers that we are 'induc'd to attribute objects to some impressions, 
and deny them to others'(T.193). Even after we have distinguished our perceptions from our 
objects, we find that we are still incapable of 'reasoning from the existence of the one to that of 
the other'(T.193}. We can infer one from the other only on the basis of the relation of cause 
and effect. But the acquisition of the relevant habit of inference demands, in this case, the 
perception of a constant conjunction between perception and object. Since the only immediate 
objects of sense are perceptions, a conjunction between perception and object can never be 
perceived. Causal inference cannot take us from perceptions to their objects. Perceptions are 
perceived; their objects are not. This assumption of Hume's is pervasive. Once again, he 
appears not only to assume the unobserved 'object' to be of a kind specifically different from 
the objects of mind with which we are familiar, but to have in mind a particular conception of 
the kind of object which is unobserved: one which makes the problem of explaining gaps in 
observation in terms of continued and distinct existence seem doubly difficult. This is an 
important point. Hume's case, as he presents it here, amounts to the claim that reasoning 
cannot give rise to our belief in the distinct continued existence of body, and rests on the 
premise that distinguishing perception from object involves treating the object as lying beyond 
those perceptions, which are our only immediate objects of awareness, and which cause 
them. Reason, Hume is able to conclude, 'neither does, nor is it possible it ever shou'd, upon 
any supposition, give us an assurance of the continu'd and distinct existence of body. That 
opinion must be entirely owing to the IMAGINATION: which must now be the subject of our 
enquiry'(T.193}. The imagination triumphs by default. 
Since all of our impressions, Hume writes, 'are internal and perishing existences, and appear 
as such, the notion of their distinct and continu'd existence must arise from a concurrence of 
some of their qualities with the qualities of the imagination; and since this notion does not 
extend to all of them, it will arise from certain qualities peculiar to some impressions'(T.194}. 
Hume's first task is to identify the features of our experience which, together with the qualities 
of the imagination, produce the belief in the distinct and continued existence of body. Hume 
observes that we do not attribute a distinct and continued existence to all our impressions. In 
what circumstances are we led to make the attribution of external existence to our 
perceptions? There must be some qualities which are peculiar to these impressions. Hume 
begins with a comparison of those impressions to which we attribute existence and those 
which we regard as 'internal and perishing'. We may observe, Hume writes, 'that 'tis neither 
upon account of the involuntariness of certain impressions, as is commonly suppos'd, nor of 
their superior force and violence, that we attribute to them a reality, and continu'd existence, 
which we refuse to others, that are voluntary or feeble'(T.194). It is evident, he goes on, that 
pains and pleasures, to which we would never think to attribute such an existence, are 
apprehended with as much violence, and as involuntarily, as those impreSSions to which we 
do. It cannot then be on account of these features of certain of our impreSSions that we come 
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to have this belief about them. We are led to attribute a distinct and continued existence only 
to some of those impressions which can be characterised as involuntary or as violent and 
forceful. 
Hume finds that there are two distinct qualities of impressions which cause us to ascribe to 
them an independent, enduring existence. After a little examination, Hume writes, we find 'that 
all those objects, to which we attribute a continu'd existence, have a peculiar constancy, which 
distinguishes them from the impressions, whose existence depends upon our 
perceptions'(T.194), and that, even, where change is evident after an absence or interruption, 
'they preserve a coherence, and have a regular dependence on each other'(T.195). Hume 
describes the constancy in our experience in the following terms. It is worth quoting him at 
length: 'These mountains, and houses, and trees, which lie at present under my eye, have 
always appear'd to me in the same order; and when I lose sight of them by shutting my eyes 
or turning my head, I soon after find them return upon me without the least alteration. My bed 
and table, my books and papers, present themselves in the same uniform manner, and 
change not upon account of any interruption in my seeing or perceiving them. This is the case 
with all the impressions, whose objects are suppos'd to have an external existence; and is the 
case with no other impressions, whether gentle or violent, voluntary or involuntary'(T.194-5). 
Bodies, however, often change in their qualities and positions, Hume says, 'and after a little 
absence or interruption may become hardly knowable. But here 'tis observable that even in 
these changes they preserve a coherence, and have a regular dependence on each other; 
which is the foundation of a kind of reasoning from causation, and produces the opinion of 
their continu'd existence'(T.195). Hume treats coherence as a kind of 'imperfect' 
constancy(24). When he returns to his chamber after an interval of an hour he finds the 
situation of his fire altered, but supposes something to have been existent the whole time of 
his absence: 'But then I am accustom'd in other instances to see a like alteration produc'd in a 
like time, whether I am present or absent, near or remote. This coherence, therefore, in their 
changes is one of the characteristics of external objects, as well as their constancy'(T.195). 
Constancy and coherence are the qualities of our impressions with which the imagination 
interacts to produce the belief in their continued and distinct existence. These qualities provide 
the only basis for the supposition that there is a world of objects with a continued existence, 
independent of a perceiver. Having found, Hume writes, 'that the opinion of the continu'd 
existence of body depends on the COHERENCE and CONSTANCY of certain impressions, I 
now proceed to examine after what manner these qualities give rise to so extraordinary an 
opinion'(T.195). In the following few pages, Hume presents his complex and highly demanding 
account of the way in which these features of our experience combine with the imagination to 
cause our belief in body. We should bear in mind that in the account Hume gives he is 
explaining not the philosophical belief in double existence, but the pre-theoretical vulgar belief 
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in body. It would also be a mistake to identify the belief in question with a kind of 
phenomenalism. The belief Hume is examining is a belief about what actually occupies the 
gaps in our observation. The vulgar, Hume tells us, attribute a continued and distinct existence 
to the immediate objects of sense without ascribing to them either physical or mind-dependent 
existence. The causal explanation which Hume offers of the opinion 'that any of our objects, or 
perceptions, are identically the same after an interruption' is intended to show both the falsity 
of the belief and how the imagination is seduced into such an extraordinary and groundless 
opinion(T.209). As we shall see, Hume does consider what he thinks of as the only 
philosophical alternatives to the 'vulgar system', but only once he has completed his 
explanation of our pre-theoretical belief. He goes on to suggest that what strength or 
influence they have is imported directly from the 'false opinion' of the vulgar. Certain 
restrictions should be borne in mind in the assessment of Hume's account. If the features of 
our impressions which Hume identifies as responsible for the supposition of continued and 
distinct existence are to do the job Hume wants them to do, it must be possible to characterise 
them in terms which do not presuppose our already possessing the belief, or already having 
an idea of external existence. We must be able to get the idea, from the features of our 
experience described by Hume, without having the idea in the first place. In the passages 
quoted above, Hume describes constancy and coherence as though they were the observable 
properties of objects in physical space and not of our impressions. The task Hume has is to 
find the qualities of constancy and coherence in the observable features of our impressions, 
and not in the 'objects' we assume them to be. 
Hume has identified two important features of our experience which he thinks help persuade 
us that the objects of our observation have a continued and distinct existence during absences 
or interruptions in observation. I receive a letter, Hume writes, ' which upon opening it I 
perceive by the hand-writing and subscription to have come from a friend, who says he is two 
hundred leagues distant. 'Tis evident I can never account for this phaenomenon, conformable 
to my experience in other instances, without spreading out in my mind the whole sea and 
continent between us, and supposing the effects and continu'd existence of posts and ferries, 
according to my memory and observation'(T.196). In accounting for the phenomenon Hume 
describes, we cannot, it seems, help but form conclusions about the continued existence of 
objects on the basis of memory and observation. There is scarcely a moment of life, Hume 
says, 'wherein there is not a similar instance presented to me, and I have not occasion to 
suppose the continu'd existence of objects in order to connect their past and present 
appearances, and give them such an union with each other, as I have found by experience to 
be suitable to their particular natures and circumstances'(T.197). We are led quite naturally to 
regard the world as something 'real and durable' which preserves its existence 'even when it is 
no longer present to my perception'(T.197). We appear to be led to our conclusions about the 
continued existence of body on the same basis upon which we form our inferences from 
cause and effect. However, Hume continues, 'tho' this conclusion from the coherence of 
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appearances may seem to be of the same nature with out reasonings concerning causes and 
effects; as being deriv'd from custom, and regulated by past experience; we shall find upon 
examination, that they are at bottom considerably different from each other, and that this 
inference arises from the understanding, and from custom in an indirect and oblique 
manner'(T.197). Since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, "tis not only 
impossible, that any habit shou'd ever be acquired otherwise than by the regular succession of 
these perceptions, but also that any habit shou'd ever exceed that degree of regularity. Any 
degree, therefore, of regularity in our perceptions, can never be a foundation for us to infer a 
greater degree of regularity in some objects, which are not perceiv'd; since this supposes a 
contradiction, viz. a habit acquir'd by what was never present to the mind'(T.197). 
Any analogy between the production of this belief and the conclusions of causal inference is 
bound to be misleading. I want to consider Hume's argument for this conclusion in detail. The 
conclusion Hume forms about the continued existence of his object appears to be of the same 
nature as those drawn on the basis of the causal relation. It may well appear, in other words, 
that we arrive at our belief by means of an inference from a present impression to an 
enlivened idea of its regular conjunct, which memory and observation has afforded us. But 
Hume wants to draw a clear line between these two species of belief. There is more than one 
way in which we come to form beliefs about the unobserved. Since, as Hume remarks, 
nothing is ever present to the mind 'besides its own perceptions', we can never, in this or 
similar cases, acquire the habit required for an inference from cause to effect. We can infer 
the existence of an unobserved effect on the basis of an observed cause only on the basis of 
an observed constant conjunction between cause and effect. It is evident, Hume goes on, 'that 
whenever we infer the continu'd existence of the objects of sense from their coherence, and 
the frequency of their union, 'tis in order to bestow on the objects a greater regularity than 
what is observ'd in our mere perceptions'(T.197). In making the inference we seek to go 
beyond the degree of regularity which we find in our perceptions, from which, Hume thinks, we 
might 'directly and naturally' be led to infer the one from the other. The habit which serves as 
the basis of all 'causal reasoning' can be acquired only by the repeated conjunction of 
perceptions. We observe 'a connexion betwixt two kinds of objects in their past appearance to 
the senses, but are not able to observe this connexion to be perfectly constant, since the 
turning about of our head, or the shutting of our eyes is able to break it.' In this case, we 
suppose that these objects continue their usual connection, notwithstanding the apparent 
interruption, and that their appearances are connected by something of which we are 
insensible: 'But as all reasoning concerning matters of fact arises only from custom, and 
custom can only be the effect of repeated perceptions, the extending of custom and 
reasoning beyond the perceptions can never be the direct and natural effect of the constant 
repetition and connexion, but must arise from the co-operation of some other 
principles'(T.197-8). 
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The distinction Hume draws between these two kinds of belief underlines both his distinct 
construal of the two problems and the special difficulties which attend his characterisation of 
the vulgar idea of body. Hume sees the conclusions we form concerning the continued 
existence of the objects of the senses as especially problematic. He argues that causal 
inference can never produce the vulgar belief in distinct and continued existence. The 
problem, as Hume sees it, concerns what the vulgar believe to actually fill the gaps during 
interruptions in observation. As already noted, the vulgar position is not to be identified with 
any form of phenomenalism. Had Hume construed it in this way, the problem would indeed 
have been susceptible of the same sort of treatment Hume gives to causation(25). The 
problem would have to do merely with what would have happened had observation occupied 
the appropriate gaps: a question parallel to that which would arise from our considering what 
would have happened had Hume added fuel to his fire rather than not. What is inferred is, in 
other words, a fact of the same nature as those upon which the inference is based. In the 
case in hand, however, what Hume believes we infer is the existence of a thing of an 
essentially different kind, which is, of its nature, unobservable, and which no appropriately 
directed observation could disclose(26). Hume directs his attention to the question of what 
actually exists during these gaps in observation. He construes the problem as having to do 
with inference to 'objects' lying inaccessibly behind the veil of perception, objects of a 
specifically different kind from those of sensation. He does not consider the possibility that 
unobserved objects might themselves be impressions: objects of the same sort as those with 
which we are familiar. It is the nature of Hume's construal of the problem of perception which 
gives his inquiry its distinct and distinctly pessimistic character. Just how Hume's construal of 
the question influences his conclusions becomes clear once we begin to look at his argument 
in detail. 
Objects, Hume writes, 'have a certain coherence even as they appear to our senses; but this 
coherence is much greater and more uniform, if we suppose the objects to have a continu'd 
existence; and as the mind is once in the train of observing an uniformity among objects, it 
naturally continues, till it renders the uniformity as compleat as possible'(T.198). The 'simple 
supposition' of the continued existence of bodies gives us a notion of much greater regularity 
among objects than we could ever get from the senses alone. To give a satisfactory account 
of the opinion of 'the continu'd existence of all external bodies', however, we must 'join the 
constancy of their appearance to their coherence'(T.199). Coherence alone is 'too weak to 
support so vast an edifice, as is that of the continu'd existence of all external bodies'(T.198-9). 
It is the inference from the constancy of our perceptions that 'gives rise to the opinion of the 
continu'd existence of body, which is prior to that of its distinct existence, and produces that 
latter principle'(T.199). Hume explains this in the following way: When we have grown 
accustomed to observing a constancy in certain impressions, as, for example, we do, when 
we find that the perception of the sun or ocean returns to us, after an interruption in 
observation, 'with like parts and in a like order', we are led to regard these interrupted 
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perceptions not as different, as they really are, but 'as individually the same'(T.199). But as 
this interruption of their existence is contrary to the 'perfect identity' of these perceptions, 'and 
makes us regard the first impression as annihilated, and the second as newly created', we find 
ourselves involved in a kind of conflict or 'contradiction'. In order to free itself from this conflict, 
the mind seeks to 'disguise, as much as possible, the interruption, or rather remove it entirely, 
by supposing that these interrupted perceptions are connected by a real existence, of which 
we are insensible'(T.199). 
Having found in certain of our impressions, or in certain series of impressions, a constancy of 
appearance, we are inclined, upon account of their resemblance, to ascribe to the perception 
following a gap in observation a perfect identity with that preceding it. But our awareness of 
the interruption, which, Hume says, we have no way of avoiding, involves us in 'a kind of 
contradiction'. Our way of dealing with this contradiction is to suppose, contrary to 
appearances, a real existence beyond our interrupted impressions, connecting them. The idea 
of continued existence gains its force and vivacity, the qualities which are are 'the very 
essence of belief', from 'the memory of these broken impressions', and our natural propensity 
to treat them as identical(T.199). The imagination, Hume explains, once set upon a certain 
course, 'is apt to continue, even when its object fails it, and like a galley set in motion by the 
oars, carries on its course without any new impulse'(T.198). 
It is, Hume thinks, the constancy in certain of our impressions which produces in the mind the 
propensity to ascribe a perfect identity to our impressions(27). The conflict into which this 
throws the mind can be resolved only by the supposition of real existence. It must be possible 
for us to get the idea of constancy, crucial as it is to the above account, without already having 
the belief, and the idea, Hume wants to explain in terms of it. It was suggested earlier that 
Hume needs to give a more precise characterisation of constancy than the one sketched 
above. He is less than careful when it comes to characterising these features of our 
experience, as he must, in terms other than those of objects, and phYSical objects, in 
particular. It may still be that Hume's lack of sensitivity on this point can be ascribed more to a 
slip of the pen, understandable given that he is endeavouring to account for a belief he and 
everybody else already holds, rather than to a potentially fatal explanatory error. We must see 
whether we can gather from his account a characterisation of constancy in terms conducive to 
the good conduct of Hume's inquiry. 
What, according to Hume, does it mean to 'observe a constancy' in our impressions? An 
uninterrupted perceptual series could, following Stroud(28), be described as having the form 
PPPPPPPPPPP where each P stands for one separate, 'fleeting' impression in the series. An 
interrupted series would then have the form: PPPPOOOPPPP. In this case, we can take Q to 
denote 'the turning about of our head, or the shutting of our eyes'(T.198). This is the situation 
Hume has in mind in talking about constancy. The similarity between the two situations, as 
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well as the similar mental effects produced by the two kinds of series, leads the mind to slip 
easily into taking both series to be of the same sort, and to take the perceptions either side of 
the interruption to be 'individually the same'. In other words, we ascribe to the impressions 
either side of the gap a 'perfect identity'. Hume regards the idea of identity, much as Locke 
did, as an idea of a thing being individually the same at a number of different times(29). We 
ascribe perfect identity to an uninterrupted series of impressions. An interrupted series of 
similar perceptions is almost the same to the mind as an uninterrupted series and places it in 
a similar disposition. Whatever ideas place the mind in the same or similar dispositions, 'are 
apt to be confounded'. The mind 'readily passes from one to the other, and perceives not the 
change without a strict attention, of which, generally speaking, 'tis wholly incapable'(T.203). 
The mind's natural inclination to take one of the two dispositions for the other explains how we 
come mistakenly to take the second case to be an instance of the first. Despite the obvious 
difference between the two series, their effects on the mind are similar, and this helps explain 
the conflict into which the mind gets itself. The other side of the conflict or 'contradiction' is the 
'interrupted manner' of the appearance of the perceptions(T.205). More than this, though, we 
falsely believe that what is now observed is identical with what was observed prior to the break 
in observation. What this means is that we must take the first situation as being a 'continu'd 
view' of an object 'individually the same', rather than what Hume takes it to be, a series of 
momentary, fleeting impressions. But if this is all there is to our perception of an uninterrupted 
series of impressions, how do we get the idea that the first sequence represents 'a continued 
view of the same object'? 
Hume must explain how it is we come to think of an uninterrupted series of similar or 
'resembling' impressions as being 'individually the same'. We must come by the idea of 
identity or 'perfect identity' somehow before we can make the mistake of attributing it to an 
interrupted series of impressions. The nature of our experience means that we cannot get it 
from the senses. All we are ever aware of is a constant flux of diverse, discrete perceptions. 
Hume is aware of the difficulty. He is aware that he needs the idea to explain how we come to 
make the original mistake of taking an uninterrupted series of discrete objects for a 'continu'd 
view of the same object'. The view of anyone 'object', Hume writes, 'is not sufficient to convey 
the idea of identity. For in that proposition, an object is the same with itself, if the idea 
express'd by the word, object, were no ways distinguish'd from that meant by itself, we really 
shou'd mean nothing, nor wou'd the proposition contain a predicate and a subject, which 
however are imply'd in this affirmation'(T.200). A single object cannot produce the idea of 
identity. Nor can 'a multiplicity of objects' produce the idea, since 'the mind always pronounces 
the one not to be the other, and considers them as forming two, three, or any determinate 
number of objects, whose existences are entirely distinct and independent'(T.200). Since both 
'number' and 'unity' are 'incompatible with the idea of identity', Hume says, the idea 'must lie in 
something that is neither of them'(T.200). Hume looks to 'the idea of time or duration' to 
remove the difficulty. Time, Hume writes, implies succession, and it is only 'by a fiction of the 
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imagination' that 'the unchangeable object is suppos'd to participate of the changes of the co-
existent objects, and in particular of that of our perceptions'(T.201). This 'fiction', he continues, 
'almost universally takes place; and 'tis by means of it, that a single object, plac'd before us, 
and survey'd for any time without our discovering in it any interruption or variation, is able to 
give us the notion of identity'(T.200-1). 
The idea of identity, Hume explains, combines both our idea of unity and our idea of 
multiplicity. If we consider any two points of time, we can place them in different lights: 'We 
may either survey them at the very same instant; in which case they give us the idea of 
number, both by themselves, and by the object; which must be multiply'd, in order to be 
conceived at once, as existent in these two different points of time: Or on the other hand, we 
may trace the succession of time by a like succession of ideas, and conceiving first one 
moment, along with the object then existent. imagine afterwards a change in the time without 
any variation or interruption in the object; in which case it gives us the idea of unity. Here then 
is an idea, which is a medium betwixt unity and number; or more properly speaking, is either 
of them, according to the view, in which we take it: and this idea we call that of identity'(T.201). 
The idea, in other, simpler, words, is that of a single object existing at a number of different 
times. It could not arise merely from the consideration of a unitary object perceived at one 
moment of time. Nor could we come by it from the observation of different objects existing at a 
multiplicity of different times. However, if we consider either instance from the perspective of 
the other we can thereby account for the origin of this 'fiction'. Given that sense experience 
cannot supply us with the requisite impressions for such an idea, it is to the imagination that 
we must look to supply the deficit. The 'principle of individuation' is nothing other than 'the 
invariableness and uninterruptedness of any object, thro' a suppos'd variation of time, by 
which the mind can trace it in the different periods of its existence, without any break of the 
view, and without being oblig'd to form the idea of multiplicity or number'(T.201). When we fix 
our attention on any object, Hume goes on to say, 'and suppose it to continue the same for 
some time; 'tis evident we suppose the change to lie only in the time, and never exert 
ourselves to produce any new image or idea of the object'(T.203). The passage from one 
moment to the next in an uninterrupted series of impressions 'is scarce felt, and distinguishes 
not itself by a different perception or idea, which may require a different direction of the spirits, 
in order to its conception'(T.203). We make no distinction among the fleeting moments of the 
impression series. Instead, the mind reposes itself so as to 'take no more exercise, than what 
is necessary to continue that idea, of which we were formerly possest, and which subsists 
without variation or interruption'(T.203). As was the case in our confounding of the interrupted 
with the uninterrupted series of impressions, we slip into the fiction not by any action of the 
mind but rather by its inaction and inattention(30). We simply fail to remark the change from 
moment to moment, wrongly supposing 'the change to lie only in the time'. The mind 
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'perceives not' the passage from one moment to the next 'without a strict attention, of which, 
generally speaking, 'tis wholly incapable'(T.203). 
Hume then finds the idea of identity to be that of an object, invariable and uninterrupted, 
existing through a 'suppos'd' variation of time. We get the idea, Hume thinks, by first 
conceiving of an object existing at a point of time, then imagining that unitary object to persist, 
without variation, through changes in time. Since nothing in our experience corresponds to this 
supposition, the idea of identity, or perfect identity, is a fiction. We have already noted the 
importance of this idea to Hume. Hume must have the idea of identity in hand before he can 
explain our ascription of perfect identity to a series of uninterrupted impressions, and our 
confounding of this series with our 'broken and interrupted perceptions'(T.200). I do not think 
Hume has succeeded. It is difficult to see how the above account can do the job he intends it 
to. The problem lies in our imagining a unitary object to exist continuously through a change in 
time 'without any variation or interruption'. In order to make such a bold imaginative step it 
would appear we must already have in hand the idea of what it is for a body to continue with 
no variation or interruption through time. Before we reach the point of imagining the object to 
exist unbrokenly we must, it seems to me, have some understanding of what it is for a thing to 
do so. We must, in other words, already have an idea of something other and more than 
Hume's fleeting impressions of the senses. We must know what it is for a unitary object to 
endure through changes in time. To imagine one must first have some idea of what it is one is 
imagining. Without our already having a notion of what it means to have a 'continued view' of 
the same object, it is difficult to understand how we can conceive of or imagine such a thing. 
Hume's account of the origin of our idea of identity seems to presuppose our already having 
that idea in the first place. And Hume needs this idea if he is to successfully explain the error 
from which arises the conflict which the 'simple supposition' of continued existence is meant to 
resolve. 
Once the idea of identity is in hand, Hume thinks he is in a position to explain how we come to 
ascribe identity to the interrupted but resembling impressions of the senses, and so succumb 
to the conflict we propose to resolve through the supposition of continued existence. The 
constancy of our impressions 'makes us ascribe to them a perfect numerical identity, tho' 
there be very long intervals betwixt their appearance, and they have only one of the essential 
qualities of identity, viz. invariableness'{T.202). The invariableness of the impressions in the 
uninterrupted sequence leads us to slip, in virtue of a disposition of the mind, into making, on 
the basis of their similarity, the same mistaken ascription of numerical identity to the 
interrupted series. It is in virtue of the invariableness shared by both sequences that the mind 
is placed in the resembling dispositions it is so apt to confound. The passage 'betwixt related 
ideas', Hume observes, is 'so smooth and easy, that it produces little alteration on the mind, 
and seems like the continuation of the same action; and as the continuation of the same 
action is an effect of the continu'd view of the same object, 'tis for this reason we attribute 
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sameness to every succession of related objects. The thought slides along the succession 
with equal facility, as if it consider'd only one object; and therefore confounds the succession 
with the identity'(T.204). In both cases the mind finds itself with the same disposition to 
attribute numerical identity on the basis of the perceived invariableness of our perceptions. An 
easy transition or passage of the imagination, 'along the ideas of these different and 
interrupted perceptions, is almost the same disposition of mind with that in which we consider 
one constant and uninterrupted perception. 'Tis therefore very natural for us to mistake the 
one for the other'(T.204). The similarity of the dispositions in virtue of which the mind slips as 
easily from the observation of an interrupted series of perceptions to an assignment of perfect 
identity as it does from the observation of an uninterrupted series inclines us to believe that 
those impressions either side of a gap in observation are individually the same. 
We are led, by these resembling dispositions, to ascribe to the interrupted series the same 
fiction of numerical identity we attributed to the uninterrupted series. It is to these interrupted 
images, those fleeting impressions presented to the senses, that we ascribe identity: 'But as 
the interruption of the appearance seems contrary to the identity, and naturally leads us to 
regard these resembling perceptions as different from each other, we here find ourselves at a 
loss how to reconcile such opposite opinions'(T.205). Once we have the fictional idea of 
identity we can deny it to a series on the grounds of interruptions. The perplexity arising from 
this conflict, Hume says, 'produces a propension to unite these broken appearances by the 
fiction of a continu'd existence'(T.205). 
Nothing, Hume writes, is more certain from experience 'than that any contradiction either to 
the sentiments or passions gives a sensible uneasiness, whether it proceeds from without or 
within; from the opposition of external objects, or from the combat of internal 
principles'(T.205). There being in this case 'an opposition betwixt the notion of the identity of 
resembling perceptions, and the interruption of their appearance, the mind must be uneasy in 
that situation, and will naturally seek relief from the uneasiness'(T.206). Since the uneasiness 
in this case arises from the opposition of two contrary principles, the mind 'must look for relief 
by sacrificing the one to the other'. But 'as the smooth passage of our thought along our 
resembling perceptions makes us ascribe to them an identity, we can never without reluctance 
yield up that opinion'. We are led instead to suppose that our perceptions are not interrupted 
but 'preserve a continu'd as well as an invariable existence'. But here too, we find the 
supposition psychologically unsupportable. The interruptions in the appearance of our 
perceptions 'are so long and frequent, that 'tis impossible to overlook them' and 'it may be 
doubted, whether we can ever assent to so palpable a contradiction, and suppose a 
perception to exist without being present to the mind'(T.206). The conflict into which the mind 
is thrown is not to be resolved by the sacrifice of one opinion for the other. The contrary 
opinions are, however, in a sense, both satisfied by our postulating the connection of these 
interrupted perceptions 'by a real existence, of which we are insensible'(T.199). The conflict is 
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resolved by means of this further fiction in virtue of which we disguise the interruption in our 
perceptions, 'or rather remove it entirely'(T.199). 
Hume is troubled by the possibility that the belief which he ascribes to the vulgar is not merely 
false but conceptually absurd. It may be doubted, he concedes, whether 'so palpable a 
contradiction' could meet so readily with our assent. The problem, the apparent contradiction, 
as Hume understands it, has to do with the identification of the 'appearance' of a perception 
with its 'existence', the attribution of continued existence to the very things we perceive, which 
are for Hume, of course, the perceptions themselves. Given that everything that is present to 
the mind is a dependent perception, can the false vulgar belief in real existence be defended, 
or even conceived of, without self-contradiction? The vulgar, Hume tells us, 'take their 
perceptions to be their only objects, and suppose, that the very being, which is intimately 
present to the mind, is the real body or material eXistence'(T.206). Hume does not mean to 
say that the vulgar really confuse two sorts of thing(T.202). His point is that the vulgar simply 
never do distinguish perception from object. For Hume, we should remember, the fleeting and 
perishing impressions of the senses are the only objects of our perception. The vulgar, while 
not countenancing this philosophical view of impressions, nevertheless take them to be 'their 
only objects'. They simply fail to distinguish perception from object and so, of course, can 
have no notion of perceptions as Hume understands them. Hume, however, at times, appears 
to forget the point. This is important because it is not at all clear that the contradiction, which 
Hume takes to threaten with absurdity the vulgar belief, would arise, or be at all relevant, were 
Hume to stick to his official account of what the vulgar think. I will return to this in a moment. It 
will be useful to allow Hume the leisure to conclude his argument. 
It is to the undistinguished objects of their senses, their very perceptions, Hume thinks, that 
the vulgar, which is to say, 'almost aI/ mankind, and even philosophers themselves, for the 
greatest part of their lives'(T.206), ascribe a continued existence when not perceived. It is 
certain, Hume continues, 'that this very perception is suppos'd to have a continu'd 
uninterrupted being, and neither to be annihilated by our absence, nor to be brought into 
existence by our presence'(T.206-7). How, he asks, can we satisfy ourselves 'in supposing a 
perception to be absent from the mind without being annihiiated'(T.207)? We may observe 
'that what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united 
together by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endow'd with a perfect simplicity 
and identity'(T.207). Every perception being allowed to be distinguishable and, so, separable, 
from another, 'it evidently follows, that there is no absurdity in separating any particular 
perception from the mind; that is, in breaking off all its relations, with that connected mass of 
perceptions, which constitute a thinking being'(T.207). To say of a perception that it is present 
to the mind is to say no more than that it is one perception among others in 'a heap or 
collection of perceptions'. The mind, for Hume, is no more than this, a bundle of perceptions, 
each of which may properly be considered as separately existent from the others. Since all our 
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perceptions are different from each other, Hume writes later, 'and from everything else in the 
universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may be consider'd as separately existent, 
and may exist separately, and have no need of anything else to support their 
existence'(T.233). There need then be no absurdity in taking any perception to be separately 
existent from the other perceptions found in the same heap or bundle. There is then no 
inconsistency in our supposing any perception to exist during gaps in its appearance to the 
mind. By that same token, there is no evident absurdity in the vulgar ascribing a continued 
existence to their only objects, which are, according to Hume, their perceptions. The belief, on 
the account Hume gives, is simply false. It is not self-contradictory. 
Hume's concern is with whether 'so palpable a contradiction' could sensibly be ascribed to the 
vulgar. He has Berkeley in mind when he raises the question. Berkeley argues that the opinion 
that there are things which exist independently of the mind is conceptually absurd or 
incoherent, a 'contradiction'(31). Hume follows Berkeley in saying that everything which can be 
present to the mind is a perception and 'dependent upon the mind'(T.193). But, unlike 
Berkeley, he does not conclude that it is, on these grounds, a 'manifest contradiction' to 
suppose that 'sensible objects' have an existence distinct from their being perceived. He 
wants to save the vulgar from commitment to a belief so obviously absurd that their assent 
might appear to us less than credible. This at least is his announced intent. It is evidently not 
to his purpose to establish the philosophical well-groundedness of the belief. This is not his 
intention. However, when it comes to developing his defence against the charge of 
inconsistency he seems intent on attributing to the vulgar his own sophisticated, eminently 
arguable, philosophical account of mind and personal identity(32). What Hume is doing here is 
clearly not in line with what he ought to be arguing given the explanatory commitment he 
incurs at the outset. As we have seen, Hume has already argued that the difficulties inherent 
in such a reasoning place them beyond the thought of the plain man. He does not, I think, 
want to suggest that such a thesis can be attributed to him now. He wants to argue that the 
vulgar belief does not involve any conceptual absurdity in fact, irrespective of what thinking 
leads to their assent. It is enough, for the moment, to remark the irrelevancy of the paint to 
this stage of Hume's argument. For the real source of Hume's problems here we must trace 
our path back a step or two. 
The contradiction which appears to Hume to threaten the credibility of our ready assent to the 
vulgar belief arises only if they already have in mind the sort of thesis about perception which 
he would regard as philosophical. The vulgar would have already to subscribe to the view that 
what we see and feel are themselves perceptions, fleeting appearances, in order to be 
troubled by the possibility of inconsistency in their attribution to these of continued existence. 
But this is a view which Hume ought not ascribe to them, given both his official line about the 
content of the vulgar belief, and his account of how the philosophical belief arises. It is 
important to bear in mind that it is the non-philosophical belief in body that Hume is attempting 
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to explain. As we will see shortly, the belief in double existence imports all its force and 
influence from the non-philosophical belief to which, Hume thinks, we all at some point 
subscribe. Hume's account of the origin of this belief requires that it never occur to us in the 
pre-theoretical stage of belief that there is a distinction to be made between perception and 
object. If we realised that all we perceived were in fact momentary and fleeting perceptions we 
would never get the idea of identity or the belief in distinct and continued existence. Even if we 
take Hume at his word and work on the basis of what he clearly takes the vulgar belief about 
our perceptions to be, then we will find still further difficulties along the line. The vulgar, Hume 
thinks, simply fail to make any distinction between perceptions and objects. This makes it 
difficult to see how they would be able to make the necessary attribution unless they already 
possessed an idea of continued and distinct existence. In order to believe that the things we 
see and feel continue to exist independently, even when we no longer see or feel them, it 
seems that we must already have some idea of what it is for something to have continued and 
distinct existence. We must already have the idea of continued, distinct existence before we 
can have the belief that the things we see and feel have a continuous independent existence. 
Some explanation of how we come by this idea in the first place is needed. It remains to be 
seen whether Hume can provide a formulation of his problem, and the situation in which it 
arises, which is successful on the terms within which he is bound to work. What is clear is that 
he cannot do this if he takes the vulgar to make the sort of philosophical distinction between 
perceptions and objects which he makes. 
Hume, we have seen, does not want to argue against the vulgar belief in body on grounds of 
its conceptual incoherence. For important theoretical reasons of his own, Hume is committed 
to saying that in holding such a belief we are safe from the charge of self-contradiction(33). 
Hume's principle of the separability of our ideas and impressions plays a crucial role in his 
discussions of substance and personal identity. The supposition 'of the continu'd existence of 
sensible objects or perceptions', Hume says, 'involves no contradiction'(T.208). We get the 
idea of identity and, so, get into the conflict which this 'simple supposition' is supposed to 
resolve, through our misapprehension of certain facts about perception and the nature of the 
things that we perceive. All we ever perceive are 'internal and fleeting existences' which 
'appear as such'(T.194). Though false, the belief is nevertheless conceivable and that without 
absurdity. The vulgar belief in body, a belief which we all at one time or another have held, 
gains our assent by means of a propensity already familiar to us. Our memory, Hume writes, 
'presents us with a vast number of instances of perceptions perfectly resembling each other, 
that return at different distances of time, and after considerable interruptions. This 
resemblance gives us a propension to consider these interrupted perceptions as the same· , 
and also a propension to connect them by a continu'd existence, in order to justify this identity, 
and avoid the contradiction, in which the interrupted appearance of these perceptions seems 
necessarily to involve us.'(T.208-9). We have a natural propensity to 'feign the continu'd 
existence of all sensible objects', and it is the lively perceptions of the memory which, Hume 
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says, bestow upon this fiction a forcefulness and vivacity and 'makes us believe the continu'd 
existence of body'(T.209). 
Hume claims that the vulgar 'take their perceptions to be their only objects, and suppose, that 
the very being, which is intimately present to the mind, is the real body or material 
existence'(T.206). Their supposition gathers force and vivacity from the impressions of the 
memory sufficient to make that supposition a belief. Hume provides a naturalistic explanation 
of the vulgar belief in body which shows it to be both false and incredible. The imagination is 
seduced into the opinion in virtue of the resemblances it finds in our experience and its natural 
propensity to consider resembling perceptions the same. He provides us with a summary of 
his method. Given that the vulgar suppose 'their perceptions to be their only objects' while at 
the same time believing in 'the continu'd existence of matter', we must, Hume has argued, 
'account for the origin of the belief upon that supposition'(T.209). Upon the basis of that 
supposition, it can only be a false opinion that our only objects of awareness, our perceptions. 
are 'identically the same after an interruption; and consequently the opinion of their identity 
can never arise from reason, but must arise from the imagination'. The imagination is seduced 
into this groundless opinion only because of its 'propension' to 'bestow an identity on our 
resembling perceptions', which, in turn, 'produces the fiction of a continu'd existence'(T.209). 
This natural propensity of the imagination 'causes belief by means of the present impressions 
of the memory; since without the remembrance of former sensations, 'tis plain we never 
shou'd have any belief of the continu'd existence of body'(T.209-1 0). 
Once Hume has the fiction of identity, he is in a position to explain the conflict into which the 
mind is thrown, a conflict which we can resolve only by postulating another fiction, that of the 
continued and distinct existence of body. It is by means of this fiction that we disguise the 
interruption in our resembling perceptions and ascribe to the 'very image which is present to 
the senses' a 'real body' and perfect identity(T.205). A 'very little reflection and philosophy' is 
all that is needed 'to make us perceive the fallacy of that opinion'(T.21 0). Only by means of the 
errors Hume describes can we come by the belief, for 'when we compare experiments, and 
reason a little upon them, we quickly perceive, that the doctrine of the independent existence 
of our sensible perceptions is contrary to the plainest experience'(T.21 0). Since, as we saw, all 
we ever perceive are internal and perishing existences(T.194), what inferential habits we 
might acquire can never 'exceed the degree of regularity' we find in our perceptions, nor can 
that regularity 'be a foundation for us to infer a greater degree of regularity in some objects. 
which are not perceiv'd'(T.197). 
A comparison of experiments and a little reasoning thereon might serve to convince us that 
our perceptions 'are not possest of any independent existence'. Hume uses a number of 
arguments which appeal to perceptual variability. He writes: 
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When we press one eye with a finger, we immediately perceive all the objects 
to become double, and one half of them to be remov'd from their common and 
natural position. But as we do not attribute a continu'd existence to both these 
perceptions, and as they are both of the same nature, we clearly perceive, that 
all our perceptions are dependent on our organs, and the disposition of our 
nerves and animal spirits. This opinion is confirm'd by the seeming encrease 
and diminution of objects, according to their distance; by the apparent 
alterations in their figure; by the changes in their colour and other qualities 
from our sickness and distempers; and by an infinite number of other experiments 
of the same kind; from all which we learn, that our sensible perceptions 
are not possest of any distinct or independent existence.(T.21 0-11) 
The brevity with which Hume acquits himself here suggests that he has presented a case to 
which he thinks no adequate response can be argued. It is far from clear that he is right. 
Hume recycles some familiar arguments but it is easily seen that they fall short of their 
intended mark. Evidently, the vulgar view as Hume outlines and develops it can, to his mind, 
do little to offset the force of the weakest, or most cursory, critical scrutiny. No doubt, the belief 
as he presents it has little to recommend it, even to those to whom he attributes it. Given that 
it is to the very things they see and feel, their perceptions as such, that the vulgar are meant to 
ascribe continued and distinct existence, it is unsurprising that Hume should feel able to 
dispose so quickly of the belief. Nevertheless, it is worth remarking that Hume's aim is not 
good in this case. All that he can be said to have shown is that the appearance of what is 
perceived depends upon the successful functioning of our faculties of sense. This is not to say 
that the objects of that perception are themselves mind-dependent, just that our perception of 
them is. He goes no way here towards establishing what we see and feel to be those very 
'internal and perishing existences' he takes them to be. It is perhaps not all that surprising that 
we should observe an 'encrease and diminution of objects' according to the position we 
occupy in relation to them. As Reid shows, in an exemplary passage, this is preCisely what we 
would expect to observe were it a real object we were seeing(34). The object would appearto 
alter in magnitude according to our distance from it, though its actual magnitude remains the 
same. Hume fails to provide any good or convincing argument for his understanding of the 
problem of perception, or for the theory of ideas which supports it. Hume does not seem to 
have thought it a point much worth arguing for. What I want to suggest is that the assumptions 
Hume makes determine the sort of questions he asks and are ultimately restrictive of the 
sorts of answers he can give to them. 
Convinced that what we perceive are internal and perishing existences, momentary and 
fleeting impressions of the senses, it is tempting to suggest that some of our impressions are 
images of external objects lying beyond them. Hume's response to this view, which he 
ascribes to Locke(T.202), is highly sceptical. Philosophers, Hume writes, 'have so far run into 
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this opinion, that they change their system, and distinguish, (as we shall do for the future) 
betwixt perceptions and objects, of which the former are suppos'd to be interrupted, and 
perishing, and different at every turn; the latter to be uninterrupted, and to preserve a continu'd 
existence and identity'(T.211). The doctrine of double existence, while allowing that our private 
perceptions are all we are directly aware of, insists upon there being a world of real and 
continuously existent objects for which these momentary images go proxy in our experience. 
This 'remedy', such as it is, can be no more than a 'palliative'. There are no arguments or 
principles, Hume says, 'either of the understanding or fancy, which leads us directly to 
embrace this opinion of the double existence of perceptions and objects, nor can we arrive at 
it but by passing thro' the common hypothesis of the identity and continuance of our 
interrupted perceptions'(T.211). Were it not for our being first convinced of the 'false opinion' 
of the vulgar, that it is the very things we see and feel that continue to exist unperceived, we 
could never be persuaded that our perceptions are different from our objects 'and that our 
objects alone preserve a continu'd existence'(T.211). The hypothesis of double existence 'has 
no primary recommendation either to reason or the imagination, but acquires all its influence 
on the imagination from the former'(T.211). Only by having first been seduced by the fictions 
and fancies of the imagination into the vulgar belief can we be led to accept the doctrine of 
double existence. 
The philosophical theory of double existence arises, quite naturally, from philosophical 
reflection upon the inadequacies and falsity of the vulgar view. The vulgar falsely attribute 
continued and distinct existence to their own perceptions. A 'little philosophy' exposes this 
ascription as false(T.21 0-11). This new contradiction in our opinions 'we elude by a new 
fiction, which is conformable to the hypotheses both of reflection and fancy, by ascribing these 
contrary qualities to different existences; the interruption to perceptions and the continuance to 
objects'(T.215). But, like the vulgar view, this opinion is found to have no 'primary 
recommendation' to reason(T.212). Causal reasoning can prove of no use since, perceptions 
being the only objects 'immediately present to us by consciousness'(T.212), we observe only 
the effect but never the cause and so can form no appropriate habit of inference(35). Nor 
could the imagination 'of itself, and by its original tendency, have fallen upon such a 
principle'(T.212). Having no authority of its own, it derives 'all its authority from the vulgar 
system'(T.213}. Philosophers 'deny our resembling perceptions to be identically the same, and 
uninterrupted', but the force of this original belief is such that, instead of rejecting the notion, 
'they arbitrarily invent a new set of perceptions to which they attribute these qualities'(T.218). 
Were we secure from the pull of our former beliefs, which incline us to attribute a continuous 
existence to something independent of ourselves, we would be led by reason to conclude 
there to be no such thing as body. 
Since 'a little reflection' suffices to destroy the conclusion that our resembling perceptions 
have a continued existence, "twou'd naturally be expected, that we must altogether reject the 
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opinion, that there is such a thing in nature as continu'd existence, which is preserv'd even 
when it no longer appears to the senses'(T.214). However, while we clearly perceive the 
'dependence and interruption' of our perceptions, 'we stop short in our carreer, and never 
upon that account reject the notion of an independent and continu'd existence. That opinion 
has taken such deep root in the imagination, that 'tis impossible ever to eradicate it, nor will 
any strain'd metaphysical conviction of the dependence of our perceptions be sufficient for 
that purpose.'(T.214) While seeing clearly the flaws of the vulgar belief, Hume's philosophers 
nevertheless continue to find a place in their systems for a notion the appeal of which lies 
purely with their former opinion. Nature, Hume writes, 'is obstinate, and will not quit the field, 
however strongly attack'd by reason; and at the same time reason is so clear in the point, that 
there is no possibility of disguising her. Not being able to reconcile these two enemies, we 
endeavour to set ourselves at ease as much as possible, by successively granting to each 
whatever it demands, and by feigning a double existence, where each may find something, 
that has a" the conditions it desires'(T.215). 
The persuasiveness of the philosophical opinion of double existence is based entirely on the 
irresistible pull of the vulgar system. It has no primary recommendation either to reason or the 
imagination because all its influence derives from the vulgar belief in continued and distinct 
existence which, as Hume has argued, has no basis in causal reasoning. Hume offers an 
explanation of the philosophical doctrine which shows it to be based on error, albeit an error to 
which our natures, happily or unhappily, dispose us. The doctrine of double existence corrects 
the errors of the vulgar system by showing that our perceptions do not have a continued and 
distinct existence. Hume offers a number of arguments intended to show the dependency of 
perceptions on the perceiver. I noted that, at best, these arguments might be said to establish 
only the dependency of how a thing appears on the status, situation and condition of the 
perceiver. Hume's arguments tell against the vulgar system in the way intended only on the 
basis of the characterisation of that view in terms of the philosophical view of perceptions with 
which it is to be replaced. What is not addressed, or argued for, in these arguments is the 
question of just what is the nature of the things we observe. It is this question which Hume, in 
explaining the origin of the vulgar belief in body, must not prejudge. Hume must not attribute 
his own philosophical thesis about perception to the plain man who has no tincture of 
philosophy. The vulgar are in no position to make the necessary philosophical distinctions. Not 
only does the attribution of this belief to the vulgar conflict with what we outlined as Hume's 
official line, but the possession of the opinion at this stage would seem to rule out our ever 
coming by it in the way Hume describes. It is only by way of the errors of the vulgar system 
that we come to indulge the belief in the first place and it is only by its association with this 
view that the philosophical doctrine gains what recommendation it has to reason and the 
imagination. 
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The conflict which the philosophical doctrine of double existence is intended to disguise or 
remove altogether can only gain a hold on the imagination once we have been persuaded of 
the continued and distinct existence of our perceptions. This much is, I think, clear. What is 
less so is the way in which Hume thinks we come by the idea of continued and distinct 
existence in the first place. Hume has argued that it is impossible that reason should, 'upon 
any supposition, give us an assurance of the continu'd and distinct existence of body' and that 
this opinion is owing entirely to the imagination(T.193). Hume argues that the mind forms the 
simple supposition of continued and distinct existence of objects in order to remove the 
conflict into which it is thrown by its propensity to ascribe numerical identity to its resembling 
impressions and its awareness of their interruptedness. But this, by itself, does not tell us how 
we come to be able to attribute a distinct and continued existence to these perceptions in the 
first place(36). It is important to note that in forming the supposition that our perceptions have 
a continued and distinct existence we do not simply select, on the basis of its greater 
explanatory power, one from a number of competing ready-formed hypotheses. We make use 
of an idea we did not already have. As Barry Stroud points out, 'coming to have a certain belief 
on a particular occasion, once one already has the ideas that form the content of that belief, is 
much easier to explain than coming to have a certain very complicated idea in the first 
place'(37). In acquiring an idea 'we come to find something intelligible or to understand 
something that we did not understand before'. The vulgar supposition that it is the things we 
see and feel which continue to exist during the gaps in our observation requires that we 
already have in hand some idea of what it is for a thing to have a continued and distinct 
existence. Without this idea, there would be no belief, no conflict for philosophers to explain, 
no reason for, or source of, the philosophical doctrine of double existence. That theory, as 
Hume presents it, seems all the less credible and more fantastic, for his initially denying to the 
vulgar any grounds or even any inclination to distinguish perceptions from objects. It is against 
this background that Hume develops his account and it is because of it, I would suggest, that it 
must ultimately fail. Hume, as I have already suggested. formulates the problem in such a way 
that the belief is bound, by the end of his story, to appear indefensible. Yet in formulating it in a 
way so obviously bound to prove restrictive of any solution, as we will now see, he makes use 
of the very tools by which a ready solution might have been wrought(38). 
If Hume is to make out his case successfully, if he is to explain how the vulgar belief in 
continued and distinct existence arises in the first place, he must avoid from the outset 
attributing to the vulgar either his own philosophical view of perceptions, or any idea of what it 
is for a thing to exist independently and continuously. In the pre-theoretical condition Hume 
describes, we are simply in no position to make the necessary philosophical distinction 
between perceptions and objects. It is not a distinction which, according to Hume, it even 
occurs to us to make. Is Hume able to explain the circumstances from which the vulgar belief 
in body arises without presupposing that we have already some idea of continued and distinct 
existence? What Hume must not do is to formulate the problem in the terms which we use in 
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our ordinary way of describing the world. To account for gaps in observation in these terms, 
as, in fact, Hume attempts to, for example, in describing the coherence of his observations of 
the fire in his chamber 'after an hour's absence'(T.1 95), obviously takes for granted a theory of 
objects as occupying fixed points in physical space, apart from, and independent of, the 
observer. But this is far from the description of vulgar consciousness which Hume needs. We 
need to know what it is about these features of our experience which give rise to the idea of 
continued and distinct existence in the first place. To appreciate the difficulties Hume faces, 
we need to be clear about the position in which Hume initially places us. It is our inability at 
this stage to distinguish our sense impressions from objects which gives the problem raised 
by interruptions to our observation its seemingly inexplicable character. In our pre-theoretical 
condition, we do not distinguish, even implicitly, between perceptions and objects. Gaps in 
observation would, in such a world, have the character of unexplained interruptions, not of 
gaps in observation per se. If we really made no use of the distinction between sense 
experience and physical objects, we would, as Pears says, 'regard the changes merely as 
changes in our sensory fields. It would not even occur to us that they involved gaps in our 
observation'(39). At this point, according to Hume, we can have no understanding of what it 
would be for a body to exist in physical space. Without our already having some idea of what it 
is for an object to have a continued and distinct existence how could we begin to suppose 
these theoretically-neutral objects to have qualities of this sort? Were we given, at this stage, 
the cognitive tools we would need to distinguish our impressions from their objects, then the 
gaps would be susceptible of a ready explanation - one we were fully-equipped to make. 
Hume himself makes use of these resources when he describes the gaps in our observation 
in terms that take for granted our ability to distinguish objects from sense impreSSions. In 
presenting the problem as he does, however, Hume makes it seem hopelessly restrictive of 
any possible solution. But his own, admittedly misleading, account of the problem 
presupposes the very resources which he could make use of, were he of a mind to, in 
resolving the difficulty. 
The problem for Hume lies in giving an account of these inexplicable gaps in a way which 
does not presuppose our having the cognitive tools with which to solve the mystery. Clearly, 
Hume cannot do this if he begins by taking constancy and coherence to be qualities of objects 
rather than of series of impressions as he describes them. On the basis of the account Hume 
gives of pre-theoretical vulgar consciousness, we are in no position even to distinguish 
changes in the condition of an observed object from changes in the circumstances of the 
observer. But this is the very distinction Hume exploits in explaining how his observation of the 
fire gives rise to the idea of coherence. Had we already in hand the tools with which to make 
such a distinction we would have far less cause to be puzzled by these interruptions when 
they occur. But on Hume's own account this is not a distinction we are in any position to make. 
Hume wants to be able to describe these gaps in such a way as to present them as 
problematic, but in attempting to do so makes use of the very distinction which, on the one 
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hand, would make them seem a good deal less hard of explanation and, on the other, would 
serve us well, at this initial stage, in dissolving the problem altogether. What Hume needs to 
do is to describe these gaps so as to make them truly problematical for those lacking the 
ideas with which to make the relevant distinctions. But he is unable to do so. 
If the features of our impressions are to serve in the manner Hume intends he must be able to 
characterise them in terms not presupposing our having already in hand the belief or the idea 
the origin of which they are intended to explain. We must be able to explain how we acquire 
the idea of constancy without having the belief which Hume wants to explain in terms of it. We 
saw much earlier that in considering what influence the senses might have upon the belief in 
question, Hume effectively fails to consider the possibility that the distinction of impressions 
from our perceptual point of view might provide some basis upon which to ground a belief in 
distinct existence. Hume, as I suggested, seems already to have in mind an especially 
problematised form of inference. The point looks more plausible when we consider how 
Hume's treatment of the problem of the external world differs from his treatment of causality. 
What makes the question in hand seem to him especially problematic is his implicit construal 
of it in terms of inference not merely to objects lying beyond observation but to facts of a 
specifically different kind to those of sensation - to a thing which no amount of appropriately 
directed observation could disclose. The kind of thing subject to the inference ought to have 
been characterised in terms neither of physical nor mind-dependent existence. Instead, Hume 
chooses to formulate the question of whether it is possible to make any causal inference from 
one thing to another in such a way as to admit only of one answer. Not only does Hume 
appear to be addressing a question tellingly different from the one initially posed but he does 
so using resources which the terms of his argument ought to have led him to disavow. From 
the start of his argument, Hume would appear to construe the problem as having to do with 
inference to physical objects lying beyond the veil of perception - objects which, on the 
traditional empiricist account, are of a highly problematic and specifically different kind to 
those with which we are familiar from perception. The failure of Hume's account of the origin 
of the vulgar belief in body is the price he pays for his uncritical adoption of the theory of ideas 
he inherited from Locke. 
Before we can even get into the conflict Hume describes as giving rise to our belief in 
continued and distinct existence we must have in hand the idea of identity. But to imagine a 
unitary object to exist through changes in time without either variation or interruption it seems 
we must have already at our disposal some idea of what it is for a thing to exist through time 
without variation or interruption. As we saw, the account Hume offers of how we come by this 
idea seems to require, for its success, our having the idea in question in the first place. Hume 
needs to have the idea of identity safely under his belt before he can go on to explain the error 
in virtue of which the mind is thrown into the state of conflict it seeks to remove with the 
supposition of real existence. The doctrine of double eXistence, Hume explains, cannot arise 
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unless we have already passed through 'the common hypothesis of the identity and 
continuance of our interrupted perceptions'(T.211). Were we not in the first case convinced of 
the vulgar hypothesis we could never be persuaded of the view that our perceptions are 
different from our objects and that it is those objects which continue unobserved. Yet this is a 
distinction which Hume seems unable to do without in formulating the problem which the 
vulgar ultimately seek to resolve by the fiction of continued and distinct existence. That he 
does so suggests both the restrictive nature of the problem as he formulates it, and his 
inability, in articulating it, to do without those resources with which he might well have forged a 
solution. 
Despite his initial urging that we ought to have an 'implicit faith' in our senses, Hume, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, given the error-strewn route he has described, by the end of his story, inclines 
'to repose no faith at all' in his senses 'or rather imagination'(T.217). 'I cannot conceive', he 
writes, 'how such trivial qualities of the fancy, conducted by such false suppositions, can ever 
lead to any solid and rational system'(T.217). The philosophical theory fares no better than the 
vulgar one, being 'over-and-above loaded with this absurdity, that it at once denies and 
establishes the vulgar supposition'(T.218). This sceptical doubt, Hume concludes, 'both with 
respect to reason and the senses, is a malady, which can never be radically cur'd, but must 
return upon us every moment, however we may chace it away, and sometimes may seem 
entirely free from it. 'Tis impossible upon any system to defend either our understanding or 
senses; and we must expose them farther when we endeavour to justify them in that 
manner'(T.218). The sceptical doubt, arising as it does, quite naturally, from 'a profound and 
intense reflection' on these subjects, 'always encreases, the farther we carry our reflections, 
whether in opposition or conformity to it. Carelessness and in-attention alone can afford us 
any remedy. For this reason I rely entirely upon them; and take it for granted, whatever may be 
the reader's opinion at this present moment, that an hour hence he will be persuaded there is 
both an external and internal world'(T.218). 
Both vulgar and philosophical beliefs in continued and distinct existences depend on the trivial 
qualities of the imagination and are 'conducted by such false suppositions' as the fiction of 
numerical identity. As such, they can never lead to 'any solid and rational system'(T.217). We 
can have no reason to believe, Hume suggests, that either the workings of the senses or the 
imagination, or the operations of reason upon them, will provide us with a set of perceptual 
beliefs which we have reason to think are true. The more we reason, the worse our position 
becomes. Given the respect, or lack of it, with which Hume suggests we treat the conclusions 
of philosophy, we are led to ask again the question, posed at the outset, of just what is the 
relation between Hume's sceptical arguments, and his constructive philosophical programme. 
Hume seems, quite explicitly and self-consciously, to be undermining the very practice he is 
engaged in. It is to the moral which might be drawn from this that I wish to turn in the section 
that follows. Philosophy, Hume argues, can provide us with no solution to these doubts. It just 
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makes things worse. We must ask to what degree, if any, Hume's scepticism can be mitigated 
in light of his Newtonian ambitions? Hume's interest in the question of the vulgar belief in body 
takes the form of asking what the causes of the idea of, and the belief in, continued and 
distinct existence are. But his conclusions seem to call into question the whole edifice of 
experimental reasoning. What role has Hume left for science or philosophy among the debris 
of his sceptical attack? Why should we continue to do philosophy at all? We need to ask to 
what degree Hume thinks it proper for us to yield to 'an illusion of the imagination'(T.267)? 
The role which Hume thinks ought properly to be ascribed to philosophy will here again, I 
suggest, prove significant to an understanding of Hume's thought. One important corollary of 
all of this will be an answer to the question of how, if at all, Hume's sceptical doubts can be 
squared with the presumption, felt throughout the Treatise, that there is both an internal and 
an external world. In the next section, I will attempt to convey something of the nature of 
Hume's sceptical thought, and its relation to his own constructive scientific ambitions. I take 
seriously Thomas Reid's impressive and important critique of Hume's section 'Of scepticism 
with regard to the senses' and attempt to develop some responses to it. In doing so, I seek to 
explain the implications of Hume's sceptical arguments and conclusions, and to assess the 
nature of Hume's own attitude to them. 
3.2 Common Sense and True Philosophy 
The problem of understanding the relationship between Hume's sceptical arguments and 
conclusions and his constructive philosophical project is perhaps the central interpretive 
problem for students of Book One of the Treatise(40). Hume proposes a 'compleat system of 
the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can 
stand with any security'(T.xvi). But in Section II of Part IV, Hume considers a number of 
sceptical arguments which seem to call into question these ambitions. The experimental 
method of reasoning, which, in Part III, had led Hume to the formulation of a set of normative 
rules by which to judge of causes and effects, in Part IV, seems to show that many of our 
ordinary beliefs, and, in particular, most of our common perceptual judgments, are false. In 
the section 'Of the idea of necessary connexion', Hume argued that, while the causal theorist 
may make the mistake of taking the mind to have an idea of necessary connection which it 
does not have, and so, of misrepresenting the nature of the inference we make from cause to 
effect, we make no comparable mistake in our ordinary use of causal language to express our 
belief in the existence of a causal relation. We found that there was decisive textual evidence 
supporting the view that Hume believed causal reasoning, and our commitment to seeing the 
world in causal terms, to be justified. Hume goes on to offer a set of rules to tell us how we 
can best discover whether one thing is the cause of another. His objection turns out to be to 
the philosophical presumption that when we talk about causal connections in nature we 
represent to ourselves some feature of reality which sanctions or legitimises causal practice. It 
is important to note how different Hume's position is with regard to the external world and why 
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this scepticism of his calls into question the positive and constructive applications of causal 
reasoning in Part III. Hume not only raises doubts about the philosophical view that we know 
about external objects through the perceptions we have of them, but also attacks the natural 
belief in the external world. He shows that our common belief in the external world involves a 
mistake, or a series of mistakes, and that the natural propensities of the human mind lead 
unequivocally to a falsehood. Hume believes that most of our everyday perceptual judgments 
and beliefs are simply false. Section II is, for the most part, concerned with Hume's genetic 
account of the origin of these beliefs. But Hume is also sceptical about the philosophical 
doctrine which is supposed to improve upon and correct the vulgar belief. He believes that 
there are irrefutable sceptical arguments against the philosophical position and offers an 
account of the origin of the belief which explains how so extraordinary a view can come to 
command the assent of theorists. Hume argues that only causal reasoning could assure us of 
the continued and distinct existence of bodies, but, since we observe only perceptions, and, 
so, can never observe a conjunction of perception and object, it is impossible that from the 
existence of any of the qualities of perceptions 'we can ever form any conclusion concerning 
the existence' of external objects, 'or ever satisfy our reason in this particular'(T.212). The 
false opinion of the continued and distinct existence of body is entirely owing to the 
imagination. 
I remarked in 3.1 that Hume was aware of some of the possible pitfalls facing the sort of 
account of the belief in continued and distinct existence he was attempting to give(41). I 
attributed Hume's failure to avoid a number of these to his uncritical commitment to the theory 
of ideas, and to the substantial, though implicit, influence Locke's theory had on the 
development of his argument. In the Enquiry, Hume makes no attempt to explain the origin of 
the vulgar belief in continued and distinct existences. He remarks merely that 'we always 
suppose an external universe, which depends not upon our perception, but would exist, 
though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihiiated'(E.151). It could be argued 
that Hume's decision to drop the argument altogether from his later work should be put down 
to his growing dissatisfaction with the argument. Such a view should be resisted. There is no 
real textual evidence of Hume's dissatisfaction and no reason to suppose that Hume's 
decision to omit the discussion is attributable to anything other than the different set of 
intentions with which he approached the writing of the Enquiry(42). In any case, Hume seems 
to have seen no reason to relent of the sceptical conclusions of his argument. He writes that it 
seems evident 'that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in 
their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we 
always suppose an external universe'(E.151). This, he tells us, is a topic 'in which the 
profounder and more philosophical sceptics will always triumph, when they endeavour to 
introduce an universal doubt into all subjects of human knowledge and enquiry'(E.153). 
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Hume continues to regard the arguments of the sceptics as irrefutable. He makes no bones 
about his acceptance of the force of these arguments. He also continues to stress the 
naturalness of the vulgar belief. Philosophy, Hume tells us in the Abstract, 'wou'd render us 
entirely Pyrrhonian, were not nature too strong for it'(T.657). He writes in the Enquiry, that 
men, in following 'this blind and powerful instinct of nature', always 'suppose the very images, 
presented by the senses, to be external objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the 
one are nothing but representations of the other'(E.151). At the beginning of Section II of the 
Treatise, Hume wrote that it is 'in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, 
which we must take for granted in all our reasonings'(T.187). Fogelin observes that this last 
sentence 'admits of a double reading that reflects the two sides of Hume's position. We must 
take the existence of body for granted, first, because it is incapable of proof and, second, 
because we are incapable of doubting it'(43). I see no reason to suppose that in emphasising 
the second of these two pOints in the body of the Enquiry, Hume was neglecting or dismissing 
the first. 
Despite the 'implicit confidence' which Hume is prepared to place in the existence of both an 
external and an internal world at the beginning of Section II, by the end of that section, he is 
ready to admit that this confidence rests on a 'gross iliusion'(T.217). He nevertheless 
continues to insist that we proceed upon the supposition that there is a world of external 
objects which continue to exist when unperceived. Hume takes the view that while philosophy 
reveals the errors upon which the false belief of the vulgar rests, bringing us to a point at 
which we are fully prepared to suspend our judgment on these matters altogether, its influence 
is shortlived. Nature, it seems, has 'esteem'd it an affair of too great importance to be trusted 
to our uncertain reasonings and speculations'(T.187). We are carried to the opinion by a kind 
of 'natural instinct or prepossession'(E.151). The naturalness of the vulgar belief also provides 
the philosophical view of these matters with what persuasiveness it has. Were we not in the 
first instance convinced that our 'resembling perceptions' were 'continu'd, and identical, and 
independent' we should never come to the opinion that while our perceptions are mind-
dependent 'and different at every turn'(T.211), there are other objects, which are the causes of 
our impressions, and which have a continued and distinct existence and identity. The 
philosophical system, Hume says, 'is over-and-above loaded with this absurdity, that it at once 
denies and establishes the vulgar supposition'. Philosophers, like the rest of mankind, have so 
great a propensity to believe their perceptions to be identically the same and uninterrupted that 
'they arbitrarily invent a new set of perceptions, to which they attribute these qualities'(T.218). 
Reason, however, is, in this matter, 'so clear in the point, that there is no possibility of 
disguising her'(T.215). A 'very little reflection and philosophy' is all that is needed to show that 
the attribution of continued and distinct existence to impreSSions is mistaken. Reason does 
not convince us of the continued and distinct existence of bodies. Hume is prepared to 
suggest not only that the process is entirely owing to the principles of the imagination, but 
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that those principles are themselves 'trivial qualities' which can never 'lead to any solid and 
rational system'(T.217). 
Nevertheless, without these apparently trivial qualities of the fancy, neither the vulgar, nor the 
philosopher, could ever 'attribute any existence, but what was dependent on the 
senses'(T.265). This is the point of Hume's argument to show that the doctrine of double 
existence has no primary recommendation to the imagination(T.212). The philosophical fiction 
of double existence is causally dependent on the 'common hypothesis of the identity and 
continuance' of our perceptions(T.211). The natural view of the vulgar alone has primary 
recommendation to the imagination even though it is obviously false. The upshot of this is the 
replacement of the fiction of the vulgar supposition of continued and distinct existence with 'a 
new fiction' which ascribes the interruption to the perceptions and the continuance to the 
objects(T.215). This new fiction arises as naturally and inevitably as the first from a critical 
reflection upon the vulgar opinion. But we are led to accept it only because of the appeal and 
persuasiveness of the false belief of the vulgar. This is the only source of the notion of 
continued, unperceived existence which the philosopher applies to external objects. The 
doctrine of double existence is, at best, a 'palliative remedy' in that 'it contains all the 
difficulties of the vulgar system, and some others, that are peculiar to itself'(T.211). The 
sceptical doubt with respect to reason and the senses can 'never be radically cur'd' but by 
'[C]arelessness and in-attention' which alone can afford us any remedy(T.218). 
Hume's conclusion prompts a number of important questions, not least concerning the degree 
to which we can, or ought to, withhold our assent from 'this confusion of groundless and 
extraordinary opinions'(T.218). Why, indeed, should we continue to do philosophy at all given 
what appears to be our ultimate and inevitable alienation from its conclusions? Philosophy, it 
would seem, can do no more than inform us of its own inadequacies. The more we reflect, the 
deeper into the mire of doubt we sink. Despite his suggestion that Pyrrhonian arguments can 
have little influence, Hume nevertheless goes on to complain that the 'intense view' of the 
'manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason' he presents in Part IV has 'so 
wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and 
can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another'(T.268-9). Nature alone 
can dispel these doubts and cure me 'of this philosophical melancholy and delirium' either 'by 
relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses'(T.269). 
When, after two or three hour's amusement, Hume returns to these speculations 'they appear 
so cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any 
further'(T.269). The philosopher finds himself 'absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live, 
and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life' and in his blind submission to 
the current of nature shows most perfectly his sceptical disposition and principles(T.269). 
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Must Hume's use and endorsement of those intense sceptical arguments which expose the 
'infirmities and imperfections' of human reason redound against reason itself and undo the 
constructive philosophical work of Part III and the subsequent books of the Treatise? A 
number of influential critics have believed so(44). Hume appears to have left philosophy in the 
absurd and embarrassing position of having undermined whatever confidence we might have 
entertained about its conclusions at the beginning of our philosophical investigation. Hume 
does not discuss the implications of the sceptical arguments of Section II in much depth until 
near the end of Part IV. But he makes it clear that he does not consider the matter to end 
here. He does not think that the amusements and diversions by which nature deflects the 
'philosophical melancholy and delirium' induced by these arguments constitute the answer to 
the important theoretical question of whether or not scepticism can be reconciled with science 
and psychology. Hume's solution turns out to be much more complex and considerably more 
interesting. The distaste we feel for the 'cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous' speculations of 
philosophy after a few hours avocation is itself just a stage in the development of the 
philosophical consciousness. We cannot 'forbear having a curiosity to be acquainted with the 
principles of moral good and evil, the nature and foundation of government, and the cause of 
those several passions and inclinations' by which we are governed(T.271). Scepticism and 
philosophical curiosity return but their return is not an atavistic reversion to type or a slide back 
into the morbidly self-reflective meditations of the solitary philosopher. In the sections to follow, 
and in the final chapter and conclusion to this work, I attempt to show the sort of solution 
Hume has in mind to his sceptical doubts, and the nature of his eventual recommitment to 
reason and philosophy. Hume characterises the move towards this reconciliation as the 
development of 'true philosophy' or 'true scepticism'. In the remainder of this chapter, I begin 
my account of this development, and of its ambitious aim to base upon sceptical principles a 
system of the sciences within which both reason and philosophy retain their special value and 
integrity(T.270). 
H.A. Prichard describes Hume's chief philosophical object as being 'to carry further the 
negative argument initiated by Berkeley, by showing that what we know is limited to a series of 
sensations, passions and emotions, together with mental images of them, and that it is 
groundless to believe in the existence of anything else, even ourselves'(45). The 
characterisation of Hume's philosophy as 'a form of phenomenalism'(46) can be traced back 
to the critical work of Thomas Reid, who, in his Inquiry into the Human Mind, presented Hume 
as a radically sceptical philosopher concerned to draw the overwhelmingly negative conclusion 
that since 'my impressions and ideas are the only existences of which I can have any 
knowledge or conception' the 'whole universe about me' and everything 'which I imagined to 
have a permanent existence, whether I thought of them or not, vanish at once'(47). Hume took 
Reid's criticisms of his work seriously(48). I do not believe that they are as easily dismissed as 
some recent commentators have suggested(49). There is decisive textual evidence against 
the view that Hume's intention in the Treatise was to carry further the negative philosophy of 
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Berkeley. Hume's chief philosophical interests and intentions are constructive. He writes 
dismissively that the arguments of Berkeley's philosophy are 'in reality, merely sceptical' and 
'that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that 
momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of 
scepticism'(E.155n). Nevertheless, as Passmore remarks, quite rightly, in my view, 'it is still 
necessary to insist upon the merits of the Reid-Green criticism of Hume, still necessary to 
insist upon the importance of the "theory of ideas" in Hume's philosophy, for all that the 
destruction of that theory does not carry with it, as an inevitable consequence, a complete 
"answer to Hume"'(50). While the important constructive side to Hume's intentions should be 
acknowledged, it is important not to neglect the real and Significant sceptical dimension to his 
thought and the theory of ideas within which he developed it. I give weight to this part of 
Hume's philosophy and to Reid's criticism of it. Hume, of course, is not the sceptic Reid thinks 
he is, and, as I suggest later in the chapter, Reid would have been surprised by the amount of 
ground he shared with his famous adversary. The comparison, however, should not be 
pushed too far. An assessment of Reid's common-sense solution to the problems raised by 
Hume not only sheds light on the nature and difficulty of those problems but shows that the 
two philosophers drew some very different conclusions. 
The theory of ideas Hume inherited from Locke and Berkeley has not stood up well. Hume 
has frequently been castigated for failing to examine in any great detail the assumptions of 
that theory(51). The exposition of the theory of ideas in Hume's philosophy is careless, even 
nonchalant, and, at times, quite confused. Hume, nevertheless, continued to insist upon its 
importance, as well as its obviousness. He observes that "Tis universally allowed by 
philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the 
mind but its perceptions, or impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known 
to us only through those perceptions they occasion'(T.67). Hume's commitment to the theory 
is such that he perseveres with it even where it seems to be at odds with his genetiC account 
of belief. Some of Hume's arguments can be translated quite happily into more neutral terms 
without serious loss of content or damage to his naturalistic programme. At a number of other 
places, however, Hume's commitment to the theory of ideas plays a significant part in the 
development of his argument. In accounting for the idea of necessary connection, the 
background of the theory of ideas restricted Hume to giving an explanation of the content of 
that idea in terms so misleading that he felt obliged to devote a large portion of the Enquiry to 
clearing up any misunderstanding(E.60-73). As I argued in 3.1, it is Hume's uncritical 
commitment to this theory in his discussion of scepticism with regard to the senses which 
leads him to formulate the problem of the origin of the vulgar belief in body in terms certain to 
prove restrictive of any possible solution. It is, however, important to see the value which the 
theory had for Hume. It provided him with a means of impartially interrogating the beliefs of the 
vulgar and of challenging the presumptions of the philosophers. He brings the theory into play 
in the context both of meaning and of belief. I have argued that it is the second of these 
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concerns which best captures Hume's intentions in Book One of the Treatise. An 
overattentiveness among commentators to the first of these concerns has led to Hume being 
quite erroneously characterised as a positivist concerned with the conceptual analysis of 
ordinary language terms. I have argued against this view. To understand the importance of the 
theory of ideas to Hume we need to appreciate the interests it serves, and, in particular, the 
role it plays in his explanations of the origins of our fundamental beliefs. 
One puzzling aspect of Hume's procedure in his discussion of the belief in the continued and 
distinct existence of bodies is his failure to make use of his theory of meaning where it would 
seem it would have been most appropriate. Hume argues that the doctrine of double 
existence has no primary recommendation either to reason or to the imagination on the 
grounds that it is causally dependent on the false vulgar view of body and owes its influence 
on the imagination entirely to the force of that view. There is no doubt that Hume took the 
vulgar attribution of continued existence to sense impressions to be flatly false. He does 
consider, briefly and unsystematically, at a number of points in the text, the possibility that the 
vulgar belief in body might be something other than what he has, for the most part, 
unquestioningly taken it to be. He argues that the senses do not present their impressions 'as 
external to, and independent of ourselves'(T.189). Properly speaking, it is not our body we 
perceive when we regard our 'limbs and members' but 'certain impressions, which enter by the 
senses'(T.191). According to Hume, there are only two possible categories of object to which 
a continued and distinct existence could be attributed. We can take our objects to be either 
sense impressions or physical objects causing our impressions. Hume spends some time 
clearing of self-contradiction and absurdity what he takes to be the vulgar attribution of 
continued and distinct existence to their perceptions or sense impressions. I tried to show that 
the vulgar view is threatened with contradiction only if, per impossibile, they already subscribe 
to something like Hume's philosophical theory of perception. The vulgar, Hume tells us, 'take 
their perceptions to be their only objects, and suppose, that the very being, which is intimately 
present to the mind, is the real body or material existence'(T.206). This is not to say that the 
vulgar distinguish their perceptions from material objects. Almost all mankind fail to distinguish 
between perceptions and objects and suppose there to be only a 'single existence' to which 
they attribute an uninterrupted existence. Hume is nevertheless at pains to show that the 
attribution of a separate, independent existence to sense impressions does not involve a 
conceptual impossibility and so can be intelligibly made out on the basis of his theory of 
meaning. Berkeley had argued that the attribution of 'absolute existence of unthinking things 
without any relation to their being perceived' is 'perfectly unintelligible'(52). His argument is an 
attempt to show that the vulgar belief in the continued existence of perceptions is conceptually 
incoherent and, for that reason, unintelligible. Hume rejects Berkeley's conceptual 
scepticism(T.207). Instead, he argues that a few simple experiments will convince us that 'our 
sensible perceptions are not possest of any distinct or independent existence'(T.21 0). This 
opinion, Hume says, 'is confirm'd by the seeming encrease and diminution of objects, 
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according to their distance; by the apparent alterations in their figure; by the changes in their 
colour and other qualities from our sickness and distempers; and by an infinite number of 
other experiments of the same kind'(T.211). Hume argues that the attribution of continued and 
distinct existence to perceptions is simply false(T.219). The supposition that our perceptions 
continue to exist when unperceived, while not, according to Hume, involving a conceptual 
absurdity, is, nevertheless, at odds with other things that we know about our perceptions. 
Hume does consider what might be thought an alternative interpretation of the vulgar belief in 
body. It might be argued that it is to a second class of 'objects', lying beyond the impressions 
of the senses, and causing them, that the vulgar attribute a continued and distinct existence. 
Philosophers, Hume writes, have been so far convinced by the arguments against the 
attribution of uninterrupted existence to perceptions that 'they change their system, and 
distinguish ... betwixt perceptions and objects' of which the former are interrupted while the 
latter preserves 'a continu'd existence and identity'(T.211). Hume argues that the 
philosopher's adoption of the theory of double existence has no primary recommendation 
either to reason or the imagination. The doctrine cannot be a demonstrative or a priori truth 
since "[T]he only conclusion we can draw from the existence of one thing to that of another, is 
by means of the relation of cause and effect'(T.212). The philosophical theory can be based 
only on causal reasoning, but this too is impossible since 'no beings are ever present to the 
mind but perceptions' and '[TJhe idea of this relation is deriv'd from past experience, by which 
we find, that two beings are constantly conjoin'd together, and are always present at once to 
the mind'(T.212). The theory of double existence only arises because of the influence of the 
discredited vulgar view that it is 'our resembling perceptions' that have a continued and 
uninterrupted existence. 
Once again, Hume concerns himself not with the meaningfulness of the attribution of 
continued and distinct existence to objects, but with the question of whether or not the doctrine 
of double existence can be derived directly from either demonstrative or causal reasoning. 
Hume's conclusion is, of course, from his point of view, damning enough. But it would seem 
that there is a much simpler and more direct argument concerning the meaningfulness of 
such attributions which Hume might have employed to discredit the philosopher's theory. 
Given Hume's endorsement of Berkeley's theory of ideas, he might very well have argued, as 
Berkeley does, that we have no adequate idea of body or external existence, and so employ 
these words without design or Signification. Hume could have argued, quite simply, on the 
basis of the theory of ideas, that as all our ideas are derived from impressions, and we have 
no impressions of external objects, we can have no adequate idea of material existences. He 
uses a similar argument when, a little later in the Treatise, he argues that those philosophers 
who fancy there to be a substance in which the accidental qualities of objects inhere 'carry 
their fictions still farther in their sentiments concerning occult qualities, and suppose a 
substance supporting, which they do not understand, and an accident supported, of which 
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they have as imperfect an idea. The whole system, therefore, is entirely 
incomprehensible'(T.222). A few pages on, he writes that '[A]s every idea is deriv'd from a 
precedent impression, had we any idea of the substance of our minds, we must also have an 
impression of it; which is very difficult, if not impossible, to be conceiv'd. For how can an 
impression represent a substance, otherwise than by resembling it?'(T.232-3) He goes on to 
say that '[W]e have no perfect idea of any thing but of a perception. A substance is entirely 
different from a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of a substance'(T.234). It seems that 
Hume might very naturally have made use of the same sort of argument in discrediting the 
philosophical theory of double existence. He could have argued, on the basis of the same sort 
of premises used in the argument concerning substance, that the philosophical system of 
Locke was entirely incomprehensible. That he does not do so poses an interesting interpretive 
question. 
Hume avoids invoking any argument from the meaningfulness of our attributions in Section II. 
But he does, elsewhere in the Treatise, make explicit his commitment to the general thesis 
that we have no idea of anything specifically different from ideas and impressions. Hume 
makes the point somewhat earlier in the Treatise, as prelude to the discussion of Part IV, 
Section II. Observing that it is 'pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with 
the mind but its perceptions', Hume goes on to argue that 'since all ideas are deriv'd from 
something antecedantly present to the mind; it follows, that 'tis impossible for us so much as 
to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and 
impressions'(T.67). The farthest we can go 'towards a conception of external objects, when 
supposed specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without 
pretending to comprehend the related objects'. Generally speaking, however, 'we do not 
suppose them specifically different; but only attribute to them different relations, connexions 
and durations'(T.68). Hume appears to reaffirm his commitment to the general thesis in 
Section" when he writes that philosophers who adopt the view that it is material objects which 
preserve a continued existence and identity 'arbitrarily invent a new set of perceptions' to 
which they attribute an uninterrupted existence, for, in general, "tis impossible for us distinctly 
to conceive, objects to be in their nature any thing but exactly the same with 
perceptions'(T.218). Hume does not deny that we have some idea of material existence. We 
have a 'relative idea' of these objects. But he does deny that we have any idea of anything 
specifically different from impressions. The distinction is important. A number of recent 
commentators have seized upon the notion of 'relative ideas' in support of the claim that 
Hume's scepticism about the external world is of less importance to his philosophy than his 
rea/ism(53). These commentators downplay the significance of Hume's conceptual scepticism 
to his accounts of causal connections and the vulgar idea of body. They take less seriously 
than Hume appears to his sceptical attack on our ideas of body and necessary connection. 
The above passages are supposed to provide the basis for a form of realism or 'sceptical 
realism'. Hume's suggestion that we might form a relative idea of something whose specific 
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difference from the things we know about is incomprehensible to us is to be understood as an 
important concession to realism. I have already given reasons for disputing this view(54). The 
passages in question give us no reason to suppose that Hume thought that by forming a 
relative idea of external existence we somehow gain an improved understanding of what it is 
supposedly lying beyond our perceptions. In both cases, Hume's emphasis is on the 
impossibility of our conceiving of anything specificaHy different from our perceptions. It is hard 
to believe that Hume understood them to provide the basis for a form of sceptical realism. 
Nevertheless, Hume's concession has been read as an important qualification of his theory of 
ideas. Although Hume stresses the impossibility of forming a conception of anything 
specifically different from our perceptions, he does not argue that we have no idea at all. We 
need to take seriously the suggestion that Hume might have entertained what Pears calls 'a 
more liberal theory of meaning'(55) than that usually attributed to him. 
The suggestion implicit in the sceptical realist view is that Hume intends the relative ideas we 
form 'towards a conception of external objects' to count as genuine exceptions, or, at least, 
substantive modifications. to his first principle of the derivation of ideas from impressions. It 
might be argued that Hume's failure to explicitly invoke his theory of meaning in the context of 
his discussion of continued and distinct existence bears out the suggestion that we can have a 
genuine or 'referentially efficacious'(56) idea of external existence which does not require a 
precedent impression. The 'first proposition', as Hume describes it in the Abstract, 'is that all 
our ideas. or weak perceptions, are derived from our impressions, or strong perceptions; and 
that we can never think of anything we have not seen without us or felt in our own 
minds'(T.647-8). He reiterates the point in the Enquiry, observing that all our ideas or 'more 
feeble impressions' are 'copies of our impressions or more lively ones'(E.19). When we 
entertain any suspicion that a philosophical term is used without meaning or Signification, 
Hume says, 'we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if 
it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion'(E.22). He makes the 
same point in the Abstract. If no impression can be produced for a supposed or 'pretended' 
idea we must conclude that the term which is supposed to signify it 'is altogether 
insignificant'(T.649). This principle provides Hume with a framework for impartially 
interrogating our everyday beliefs and for exposing the pretentions and chimeras of 
philosophical thinking. It also provides him with the background against which he investigates 
'that set of complicated, but primitive operations or dispositions of the mind which lead us to 
acquire, manipulate, shuffle and even confuse the multitude of perceptions that come to 
us'(57). Hume treats the copy principle as the conclusion of a well-grounded inductive 
inference(58). I argued that the premises from which Hume derives his conclusion only 
support it on the basis of the assumptions that what is before the mind, when it thinks, tastes, 
sees, or smells, is a perception, and that the perceptions which are before the mind in sense 
perception are impressions. It is the first of these assumptions which Hume has in mind when 
he writes just prior to the first passage concerning relative ideas that "[TJis universally allowed 
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by philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present to 
the mind but its perceptions, or impressions and ideas'(T.67). We saw the sort of work 
Hume's uncritical commitment to the theory of ideas does in the development of his argument 
in Section II. It also plays a part in the development of his argument for the copy principle. 
Hume uses the copy principle to challenge the legitimacy of certain ideas, including, most 
famously, the idea of necessary connection. My suggestion is that Hume might well have used 
this principle to argue against the meaningfulness of attributions of continued and distinct 
existence to external objects, and that, in fact, he does so, implicitly, in arguing for the general 
thesis that we can have no idea of anything lying beyond our perceptions, and, explicitly, in 
reiterating the point in Section II. Hume, in my view, considers such attributions to be 
unintelligible since, as he argues, 'a single perception can never produce the idea of a double 
existence'(T.189), and only an idea which we really have can feature in a belief. It is because 
we lack any adequate idea of external existence that the philosophical system must 'acquire 
all its influence on the imagination from the vulgar one'(T.213). Hume, nevertheless, goes on 
to complicate the picture by suggesting that we can form a relative idea of external objects, 
and, as Strawson remarks, 'a relative idea is not no idea at all'(59). Strawson argues that while 
we can form no 'positively or descriptively contentful conception of the nature of external 
objects' where they are considered as something specifically different from perceptions, we 
can, nevertheless, 'conceive it as something that stands in a certain relation (the relation of 
cause) to our perceptions'(60). In the last chapter, I argued against taking the few passages in 
which Hume discusses relative ideas as the basis for anything like the sceptical realist view of 
causation advocated by Strawson, Wright, and others. Hume introduces the notion only in the 
context of his affirmation of the sceptical thesis that 'we never really advance a step beyond 
ourselves'(T.67), and, then, only to dismiss its effects, arguing that the philosophers who form 
such suppositions 'arbitrarily invent a new set of perceptions'(T.218). Hume does nevertheless 
introduce the notion and we need to consider what weight we are to attach to it. 
We need to ask whether Hume's remarks about relative ideas amount to a significant revision 
or modification of the theory of ideas, allowing us to form a genuine idea of material objects 
without any directly corresponding impression. It is important to note that, in the above two 
passages, Hume is dismissive of the Lockean suggestion that we can form some idea of 
those objects which are supposed to lie beyond the impressions of the senses, causing them. 
It would be surprising to find Hume taking such a line if his concern here was to show that we 
can form a 'referentially efficacious' idea of external body. Hume makes clear that to form an 
idea of external existence would be to form an idea of something specifically different from 
impressions and ideas(61). He rejects L.ocke's claim that there is a resemblance between our 
ideas of primary qualities and the actual qualities of objects. Hume's object in raising the 
distinction between relative and specific ideas is not to press upon the reader his belief that we 
can have some notion of external existence, although we have no way of verifying our belief in 
such objects, but to argue that we can have no intelligible notion of external objects, and no 
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adequate idea which can figure in this belief. The philosophers who adopt the theory of double 
existence take themselves to attribute continued and distinct existence to a new class of 
object specifically different from their perceptions, but, in fact, only 'invent a new set of 
perceptions'. In the only other original reference to relative or relational ideas in the Treatise, 
Hume complains that whatever difference we may suppose between a perception and an 
object or external existence "tis still incomprehensible to us; and we are oblig'd either to 
conceive an external object merely as a relation without a relative, or to make it the very 
same with a perception or impression'(T.241). Hume is endorsing the sceptical conclusion 
Berkeley draws directly from his understanding of the theory of ideas that relative ideas are 
comprehensible to us only in contexts where we have particular examples of the sort of 
relation in question to go on. If we do what Hume is supposed to have done and 'assert, that 
matter is an unknown somewhat, neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea, inert, 
thoughtless, indivisible, immoveable, unextended, existing in no place' we shall 'use the word 
matter in the same sense, that other men use nothing' since 'I do not find that there is any kind 
of effect or impression made on my mind, different from what is excited by the term 
nothing'(62). When those 'who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas' talk as 
though they had such an idea 'which is, they say, the most abstract and general notion of all, 
that is to me the most incomprehensible of all others'(63). This is why, as Hume says, it is 
impossible for us to conceive distinctly of external objects as 'in their nature any thing but 
exactly the same with perceptions'. Hume would, I think, agree with Berkeley that 'if what you 
mean by the word matter be only the unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter 
whether there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us'(64). These are the sort of 
sentiments Hume echoes when he writes of the suggestion that there may be qualities of 
material objects with which we are unacquainted that 'if we please to call these power or 
efficacy, 'twill be of little consequence to the world'(T.168). Hume's concern is overwhelmingly 
to do with the denial of sense to propositions which make attributions of this sort to objects or 
entities of which we have no adequate idea. He is dismissive of philosophers who conduct 
their enquiries in these terms. We can have an idea of something as 'whatever it is causes 
these impressions' but whatever we say of this something will be of 'little consequence to the 
world' and, as Berkeley suggests, this is as good, or as bad, as having no idea of matter or 
external existence at all. 
Hume's attitude to notions of external existence and material objects is the same as the 
attitude he, like Berkeley, takes towards the 'unintelligible chimera' of substance(T.222). Hume 
writes that '[W]e have no perfect idea of any thing but a perception. A substance is entirely 
different from a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of a substance'{T.234). The 'whole 
system' of substance and accident is, Hume says, for that reason, 'entirely 
incomprehensible'(T.222). Relative ideas, whether of substance or of the external world, play 
no part in our understanding of ourselves or of our experience of the world. Hume's aim in the 
passages in which he draws his distinction between relative and specific ideas is to discredit 
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or dismiss the suggestion that such ideas in any way add to our understanding of the world. 
To make his point Hume does not need to traverse the line between impressions and ideas 
and the supposed causes of our impressions, he has merely to show that this line is 
untraversable. This seems to me to be Hume's chief purpose in raising the notion of relative 
ideas of external objects. It would be a serious mistake to take these passages as the basis 
for some kind of realism about the external world. The question of whether or not there are 
such things as external objects is not really relevant to Hume's intentions here. He does not 
deny that there is a world of external objects, any more than he denies that there exist causes. 
He is more interested in saying that an idea of 'whatever it is causes our impressions' can play 
no part in our scientific understanding of the world or in the formation of the concepts we use 
to talk about it. Our normal sayings and commitments need to be explained on the basis of 
real features of our experience, and of our natural ways of responding to them. Hume's real 
critical target is the belief that ideas of this sort can give us some understanding of nature, or 
ourselves, which, on the basis of these principles, we cannot possibly have. 
The conclusion of Hume's discussion of continued and distinct existence is that neither the 
vulgar belief in body, nor the philosophical theory of double existence with which it is to be 
replaced, can be defended on rational grounds. The philosophical theory is in an even worse 
position than the vulgar opinion. Not only does it have all the difficulties of the vulgar system, 
but 'is over-and-above loaded with this absurdity, that it at once denies and establishes the 
vulgar supposition'(T.218). The philosopher too has a strong propensity to believe in the 
continued and distinct existence of the things he perceives. This simple supposition is, Hume 
says, unequivocally false. The vulgar attribute continued and distinct existence to the 
immediate objects of awareness, their perceptions. It is the failure of the vulgar to distinguish, 
at the pre-theoretical stage of belief, between physical objects and sense impressions that 
makes the acquisition of the idea of continued and distinct existence particularly problematic. 
As noted in 3.1, Hume is unable to do without the distinction in giving an account of the vulgar 
consciousness from which this idea emerges. The vulgar attribute an uninterrupted existence 
to their sense impressions and believe that it is these impressions that continue to exist during 
gaps in observation. Hume's view, as I understand it, is that we come to see the world of 
experience as a public world of lasting objects, located in space, on the basis of sets of private 
perceptual experiences. He does not consider the possibility that we start by accepting the 
distinction between our impressions and the world even though he is unable to account for the 
vulgar experience of observational gaps without these resources. Hume's pessimism about 
the belief in body stems from his peculiar construal of the problem and his contention that the 
vulgar belief is a belief about private images or impressions. A number of recent 
commentators have challenged the view that Hume thought about perceptions in this way. 
These commentators take issue with the standard interpretation, also Reid's, that for Hume 
'nothing is perceived but what is in the mind which perceives it: That we do not really perceive 
things that are external, but only certain images and pictures of them imprinted upon the mind, 
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which are called impressions and ideas '(65). William Davie contrasts Reid's view of Hume 
with his own, that Hume's perceptions 'are the things that we know, both private and 
public'(66). Donald Livingston too urges 'a radically different and distinctively Humean' usage 
of the term(67). His case is developed in more depth. He quotes approvingly Hume's remark 
that the mind 'can never exert itself in any action, which we may not comprehend under the 
term perception'(T.456), but adds that 'Hume is not saying that the actions are perceptions (in 
the sense of logically private mental images); he is saying, rather, that we are to understand 
perceptions to include actions conceived of in the common way. And because perceptions can 
be thought of in a physicalist context, the actions of one mind can be public to another.'(68) 
The standard interpretation, according to Livingston, consists of two theses: '(1) that ideas are 
nothing but logically private images and (2) that the meanings of words are ideas.'(69) The 
first thesis, he goes on to say, 'is false: ideas are internal to the public world of common life, 
and, therefore, admit of different sorts of physical interpretation including the extreme 
possibility that identifies them with motions of the brain. The second thesis is so far 
undetermined because Hume did not develop a theory of how words have meaning'(70). 
Livingston suggests that Hume's account of perception, such as it is, be understood 
'narratively', which is to say, we ought to consider Hume's starting paint in the Treatise in the 
light of his more studied conclusions towards the end of the book(71). The view is worth 
considering, given that, in both the Treatise and the Enquiry, Hume often writes as though he 
were a realist about external objects. 
If livingston's contention is correct, we might reasonably expect to find the mature Hume of 
the Enquiry playing a rather different tune to that played in the Treatise. Instead, we find the 
mature Hume little disposed to change his earlier view. The 'universal and primary opinion of 
all men' that supposes the 'very images' presented by the senses to be external objects, 
Hume writes, 'is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing 
can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the 
inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any 
immediate intercourse between the mind and the object'(E.152}. Hume reiterates the standard 
sceptical arguments of the Treatise: 'The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we 
remove farther from it: but the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: 
it was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious 
dictates of reason; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we 
consider, when we say, this house and that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and 
fleeting copies or representations of other existences, which remain uniform and 
independent.'(E.152) It is by arguments of this sort that the sceptical philosopher of the 
Treatise convinces himself 'that our perceptions are not possest of any independent 
existence'(T.210). Hume rejects the 'pretended philosophical system' of double existence not 
because he still entertains the possibility that our perceptions are something other than the 
very images to which, he says, the vulgar attribute uninterrupted existence, but because he 
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can find no argument to prove 'that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external 
objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them'(E.152-3). The mind, he says 
emphatically, 'has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach 
any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, 
therefore, without any foundation in reasoning'(E.153). It is only in virtue of a 'natural instinct or 
prepossession'(E.151) that we continue to repose any faith at a/l in our senses. 
Livingston, I think, is wrong on a number of counts, but his problems really start with his 
account of the 'popular' system Hume unequivocally rejects as false. Under the popular 
system, Livingston writes, 'perceptions are conceived as objects (continuous, independent 
eXistences),(72). The philosopher's consciousness, he continues, 'contains within itself a 
"struggle and opposition" between the belief that we perceive public objects and the belief that 
we perceive only private mental images'(73). This rather misrepresents what Hume actually 
says. The vulgar, in their pre-theoretical condition, do not, as Livingston suggests, make any 
distinction at all between perception and object, let alone subscribe to the philosophical theory 
that what we experience is a world of public objects distinct from their impressions. The 
opposition Livingston describes simply does not arise. It is only because it is to their very 
perceptions that the vulgar unreflectively attribute continued existence that the mind can be 
thrown into the conflict between this attribution and the obvious interruptedness of our 
perceptions that Hume actually describes. The vulgar do not entertain any philosophical 
notions about these perceptions. They do not take them to be the internal and perishing 
existences which Hume takes them to be. It is, however, for Hume, a straightforward matter of 
fact that it is to such internal objects that the vulgar make their attributions of distinct and 
continued existence. A 'very little reflection and philosophy' is a/l that ;s required to show that 
these attributions are false. The theory of double existence fares no better, being in the absurd 
position of needing both to affirm and deny 'the vulgar supposition'(T.218) Hume describes as 
false. Philosophy, Hume is able to conclude, 'would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not 
nature too strong for it'(T.657). Philosophical scepticism about the senses is the natural 
outgrowth of reflection upon the nature of the objects to which the vulgar make their common-
sense attributions. Such scepticism is 'extravagant'(T.214) not because, as Livingston 
suggests, Hume thinks it false or even refutable, but because its conclusions, though soundly 
drawn, are nevertheless absurd and self-stultifying, neither producing conviction nor admitting 
refutation(E.155n). This is a topic, Hume concludes, 'in which the profounder and more 
philosophical sceptics will always triumph, when they endeavour to introduce an universal 
doubt into all subjects of human knowledge and enquiry'(E.153). This is some way from 
meeting Livingston's claim that, for Hume, scepticism is 'somehow cognitively defective'(74). 
The problem with the popular system, Livingston writes, 'is that in identifying perceptions with 
objects it completely ignores the world of consciousness'(75) brought to our attention by the 
apparent dependency of our perceptions on the successful functioning of our sense organs. 
But, as we have seen, the vulgar are in no position to subscribe in the first place to the idea 
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Livingston attributes to them, that 'what we perceive is a public world of objects'(76). There is 
no question of the vulgar making the philosophical distinction between perceptions and 
objects, let alone of their embracing a relatively sophisticated philosophical thesis about the 
nature of those objects. Our conception of things in the world cannot be simply read off from 
reality. The vulgar ascribe an uninterrupted existence to the very images they find before their 
minds, un reflectively, without countenancing any refined or philosophical distinctions between 
sensation and object. Their position, the position in which we all at some stage must have 
found ourselves, is not theoretical, not, strictly, even a system in the sense in which Livingston 
intends it. Were it not for the operation of the imagination 'by which the mind enlivens some 
ideas beyond others' we could never 'assent to any argument, nor carry our view beyond 
those few objects, which are present to our senses'(T.265). Hume argues succinctly that no 
argument can establish the existence of external objects because 'no beings are ever present 
to the mind but perceptions' and, for this reason, we can never observe a constant conjunction 
between perceptions and objects(T.212). The same argument is sketched in the Enquiry: 
'[T]he mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach 
any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, 
therefore, without any foundation in reasoning'(E.1S3). The relevant habit of inference is, in 
principle, unavailable to us. This appears to Hume to be the case just because he construes 
the inference in question as being to a special sort of object specifically different to those met 
with in perception. Even to these latter objects, 'we cou'd never attribute any existence, but 
what was dependent on the senses; and must comprehend them entirely in that succession of 
perceptions, which constitutes our self or person'(T.265). 
It is evident, Hume writes near the beginning of Section II, that 'our senses offer not their 
impressions as the images of something distinct, or independent, and external. Our 
impressions 'convey to us nothing but a single perception, and never give us the least 
intimation of any thing beyond'(T.189). The philosophical theory of double existence arises 
quite naturally from a critical assessment of the vulgar opinion that it is the things of which we 
are directly aware that have a continued and distinct existence. This view turns out to be as 
indefensible as the vulgar one. The philosopher's theory has no foundation either in 
demonstrative or causal reasoning. We cannot infer the existence of uninterrupted external 
objects from our episodic and internal impressions because, Hume says, 'no beings are ever 
present to the mind but perceptions'(T.212). Philosophical reflection on the nature of our 
perceptual judgments leads inevitably to scepticism. Philosophers who insist that they have an 
idea of an external world of lasting and identical objects, if only a relative one, do no more than 
'arbitrarily invent a new set of perceptions, to which they attribute these qualities'(T.218). We 
found there to be little sign of Hume having modified or revised, in any significant way, the 
theory of ideas he inherited from Locke and Berkeley. His uncritical commitment to the theory 
plays a significant part in the development of his argument in Section II. Since 'nothing is ever 
present to the mind but perceptions. and since all ideas are deriv'd from something 
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antecedantly present to the mind; it follows, that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive 
or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions'(T.67). It is 
impossible for us to form an idea of anything which can be thought of as being specifically 
different from our perceptions. Our philosophical conception of things in the world is the 
natural result of a number of the fictions of the imagination and of the continuing influence of 
the vulgar view of the uninterrupted existence of perceptions. 
The way in which Hume formulates the problem of the vulgar idea of body, together with his 
underlying commitment to the thesis that all we ever perceive are only mental contents, makes 
it highly unlikely that he will find any explanation of our belief in continued and distinct 
existence that is at all defensible. He is too much constrained as to the sorts of answers he 
can give to the questions he raises. Our senses do not offer their impressions as images of 
anything external or independent. The relevant habit of inference which might allow us to 
reason our way to a conception of external objects apart from and independent of our senses 
is in principle unobtainable. The explanation Hume does give of our ordinary belief shows it up 
as false and incredible. There is little comfort here for those who would read Hume as 
defending something like a common sense view of perception. Hume thinks this view 
hopelessly confused. A few simple experiments convince us that the perceptions which the 
vulgar believe to be 'their only objects' are not 'possest of any independent existence'. Hume 
presents a number of standard arguments from perceptual variability to show that the objects 
of our awareness do not have an existence independent of the mind that perceives 
them(T.210-11). The arguments do not show what Hume thinks they show. At best, they can 
be said to establish the dependence of how the things perceived appear on the successful 
operation of the faculties of sense which perceive them. This falls rather short of showing that 
the things perceived are the mind-dependent, internal existences, 'interrupted, and perishing, 
and different at every turn'(T.211), that Hume believes them to be. Reid pointed out that these 
arguments afford a very weak foundation for the theory of ideas(?7). In defence of Hume, it 
needs to be said that he did not expect these arguments to perform this role. The truth of the 
theory of ideas is assumed by Hume from the beginning of the Treatise(78). He considers it 
an obvious point, too obvious to require much explanation or argument, that nothing is ever 
really present to the mind but perceptions, or impressions and ideas(T.67). Philosophers 'have 
so far run into this opinion, that they change their system, and distinguish, (as we shall do for 
the future), betwixt perceptions and objects'(T.211). Hume feels safe in assuming the truth of 
what he regards as a fairly uncontroversial fact about human experience, well-supported and 
well-argued-for by philosophers like Berkeley and Malebranche. It is still necessary to inSist 
upon the importance the theory of ideas had for Hume. We have seen, in a number of 
instances, the kind of influence Hume's acceptance of the theory has on the development of 
his thinking(79). To see, feel, think, taste, or smell, is, Hume thinks, for there to be a 
perception before the mind. Our ideas 'reach no farther than our experience'(80) and our 
experience is restricted to this succession of private and momentary images, objects or 
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entities. We can have no ideas of anything which has not been a perception and can form no 
intelligible, rational beliefs in which such ideas figure. The senses are only the inlets through 
which the image or perception is conveyed and can never 'produce any immediate intercourse 
between the mind and the object'(E.152). Hume, as Passmore notes, regarded 
phenomenalism as a 'variety of "excessive scepticism"'(81). He does not argue that we should 
abandon our attempts to go beyond the appearances of the senses or suspend judgment on 
the question of whether or not there is such a thing as continued and distinct existence. Hume 
is committed to thinking of reality and of science in terms like these. It is, nevertheless, quite 
clear from the text that Hume believed the only objects of awareness to be perceptions and 
that he thought we could have no reason to infer upon their basis the existence of anything 
else. 
Hume has been widely portrayed, by Reid, Green and others, as presenting a reductio ad 
absurdum of the theory of ideas. Reid drew the conclusion that the theory of ideas should, on 
the basis of Hume's argument, and its lack of any real evidential support, be abandoned. If the 
assumptions of the theory were true, Reid complains, then 'supposing certain impressions and 
ideas to exist in my mind, I cannot, from their existence, infer the existence of anything else: 
my impressions and ideas are the only existences of which I can have any knowledge or 
conception; and they are such fleeting and transitory beings that they can have no existence at 
all, any longer than I am conscious of them'(82). To Reid's mind, Hume's difficulties in 
accounting satisfactorily for the plain man's belief in body have to do with the starting point he 
adopts. Reid does not disagree with Hume's claim that it is the perceptions which are before 
the mind when an agent thinks, sees, tastes, or feels, which are the empirical data of natural 
science. But he does question Hume's understanding of what perception is. The assumptions 
upon which the theory of ideas rests are not only unfounded, but lead, on Reid's account, to 
absurd and highly sceptical conclusions which are at odds with the truth, most notably, the 
ontological thesis that there exist no entities but ideas and impressions. It is worth noting that 
this not a conclusion Hume himself draws. We need to consider whether, as Reid suspects, 
he is committed to it. I want first to examine Reid's account of the assumptions of the doctrine 
of ideas and the data of empirical enquiry. 
Reid writes that no solid proof 'has ever been advanced of the existence of ideas'. They are, 
he complains, 'a mere fiction and hypothesis, contrived to solve the phaenomenon of the 
human understanding'(83). But the fiction, as stated, is ill-equipped to solve and explain even 
the questions and phenomenon for which it was framed in the first place. Reid, as we saw, 
gives short shrift to the arguments from perceptual variability which Hume Uses to show the 
dependency of what is perceived upon the mind of the perceiver(84). The fact that an object 
appears to be of a greater or lesser magnitude according to the spatial relation of the 
perceiver to it does not establish that object's dependence upon the mind of the perceiver. I 
warned against attaching too much significance to these arguments within Hume's system. 
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Reid, however, is more interested in the explanatory value of the theory, in the question of 
whether or not it is fitted to do what, Reid thinks, it is intended to do. What is to be shown, 
according to Reid, is 'the manner in which our senses make us acquainted with external 
things'(85). To this purpose, Reid writes, human invention appears to have produced but one 
hypothesis, that is, 'that the mind, like a mirror, receives the images of things from without, by 
means of the senses; so that their use must be to convey these images to the mind'(86). If we 
suppose that these momentary existences or images are all we are directly acquainted with, 
Reid complains, we could never be in a position to infer the existence of anything else. The 
principle, or 'prejudice', that 'in all the operations of the understanding, there must be some 
immediate intercourse between the mind and its object, so that one may act upon the other', 
Reid writes, 'has led philosophers to think that, as the external objects of sense are too remote 
to act upon the mind immediately, there must be some image or shadow of them that is 
present to the mind, and is the immediate object of perception. That there is such an 
immediate object of perception, distinct from the external object, has been very unanimously 
held by philosophers, though they have differed much about the name, the nature, and the 
origin of those immediate objects'(87). 
This is the first of two 'prejudices' which Reid thinks are the source of the theory of ideas. The 
notion that 'in perception, the object must be contiguous to the percipient, seems, with many 
other prejudices, to be borrowed from analogy', Reid observes. Many philosophers, he 
continues, with Hume very much in mind, 'resolve almost every operation of the mind into 
impressions and feelings, words manifestly borrowed from the sense of touch. And it is very 
natural to conceive contiguity necessary between that which makes the impression, and that 
which receives it'(88). However, as Reid is quick to note, the presence of an image or 
representation in the mind, in no way instructs us as to how the mind could perceive the image 
or how the presence of the image in the mind facilitates the perception of anything else. This, 
Reid says, is what wants explaining. We are no better off for admitting there to be an image or 
impression which is present with or contiguous to the mind during perception, for 'we know as 
little how perception may be produced by this image as by the most distant object'(89). We are 
no closer to an understanding of how it is our senses acquaint us with the external world. The 
'manner and mechanism' of mind's perception remains, as before, 'quite beyond our 
comprehension'(90). It makes no difference whether we construe what is present to the mind 
as a physical or as a mental object. When we posit such existences and take them to be the 
first and only direct objects of experience, we make it difficult to see how we can have any 
knowledge of anything beyond them. The theory of ideas, in attempting to account for the 
phenomena of perception, leads only to scepticism about the senses. Hume, Reid concludes, 
'proceeds upon the same principles' as Berkeley, 'but carries them to their ful/length', leaving, 
he says, 'nothing in nature but ideas and impressions, without any subject on which they may 
be impressed'(91). 
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The second 'prejudice' which Reid believes to have given rise to the theory of ideas is that 'in 
all the operations of the understanding, there must be an object of thought, which really exists 
while we think of it; or, as some philosophers have expressed it, that which is not cannot be 
inteliigible'(92). Philosophers, Reid believes, have been led by this principle to conclude that 
any given object of thought or belief must be an idea or perception. There must, he writes, 'be 
an immediate object which really exists; for that which is not, cannot be an object of thought. 
The idea must be perceived by the mind, and, if it does not exist there, there can be no 
perception of it, no operation of the mind about it'(93). But this, Reid thinks, is flatly 
contradicted by the fact that we can conceive distinctly of things which never existed: 
The philosopher says, I cannot conceive a centaur without having an idea 
of it in my mind. I am at a loss to understand what he means. He surely does 
not mean that I cannot conceive it without conceiving it. This would make me 
no wiser. What then is this idea? Is it an animal, half horse and half man? No. 
Then I am certain it is not the thing I conceive. Perhaps he will say, that the 
idea is an image of the animal, and is the immediate object of my conception, 
and that the animal is the mediate or remote object.(94) 
But this too will not do, for this 'one object which I conceive, is not the image of an animal - it is 
an animal. I know what it is to conceive an image of an animal, and what it is to conceive an 
animal; and I can distinguish the one of these from the other without any danger of mistake. 
The thing I conceive is a body of a certain figure and colour, having life and spontaneous 
motion'(95). To conceive of a centaur, a mythical being, half-man and half-horse, is not the 
same thing as to conceive of an image of such a creature. A centaur is evidently not the same 
as an image or representation of a centaur. To have a distinct image before the mind is, for 
the plain man, Reid says, just to have a distinct conception, but 'to infer from this that there is 
really an image in the mind, distinct from the operation of conceiving the object, is to be misled 
by an analogical expression'(96). Reid, here as elsewhere, insists upon a distinction between 
the operations of the mind, which are really in the mind, and their objects, which are not. All 
those who use language with understanding, Reid writes, distinguish as different 'the 
operations of the mind, which are expressed by active verbs; the mind itself, which is the 
nominative to those verbs, and the object, which is, in the oblique case, governed by 
them'(97}. To have an idea of something, according to our normal way of talking, is just to 
conceive of it. But philosophers have accorded the term a special meaning, according to 
which 'it does not signify that act of the mind which we call thought or conception, but some 
object of thought'(98). Ideas, in this sense, are mere 'fictions', founded on a misuse of 
language. When I think of a past sensation, Reid believes, what I think of is not a presently 
existent idea, an image or representation of that sensation, but the sensation itself, which no 
longer exists. 
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Reid argues that the theory of ideas is simply incapable of explaining or making consistent 
sense of these basic facts about thought and conception. According to the proponents of this 
doctrine, Reid says, when I think of a past event, there is always a present idea which is the 
immediate object of thought. The event itself is merely the mediate object. In other words, 
when one thinks of something that no longer exists, one does so by means of something 
which really does. But, as Reid makes clear, to conceive of an object and to conceive of an 
image of that object are two different operations of the faculty of conception between which we 
can readily distinguish. Both perception and memory involve the conception of and belief in 
either the present or past existence of an object(99). Since we can both conceive of and 
believe in what does not exist, Reid thinks, the theory of ideas yields conclusions which not 
only lack evidential support but are at odds with what we actually know about thought and 
conception. Reid believes there is a general problem with explaining conception in terms of 
representation. I cannot construe my present idea, whatever its content, as representing the 
past impression or sensation, without having in the first instance some conception of that 
impression or sensation, which is what, Reid says, wants explaining. If that idea is to represent 
to me that original object, I must already have some conception of that object. The operation 
of representation therefore presupposes conception and so cannot be used to explain it. Our 
original conceptions of objects cannot be explained in terms of the representative nature of 
our present ideas. If we are to interpret our ideas as signs or representations we must have in 
hand some conception of the objects they represent. Perception, according to Reid, is itself 
concept-dependent in as much as we cannot perceive something without having some notion 
or conception of it. We cannot be supposed simply to acquire this from the given of sensation. 
Sensations have no intentional object, they 'can have no existence but when they are felt, from 
the things suggested by them'(100). There must, therefore, be certain innate principles of the 
mind, which explain our possession of the conception of an object by what Reid calls 'a natural 
kind of magic'(1 01). In perception we have not only 'a notion more or less distinct of the object 
perceived, but also an irresistible conviction and belief of its existence'(102) which is, 
furthermore, 'immediate; that is, it is not by a train of reasoning and argumentation that we 
come to be convinced of the existence of what we perceive; we ask no argument for the 
existence of the object, but that we perceive it; perception commands our belief upon its own 
authority, and disdains to rest its authority upon any reasoning whatsoever'(1 03) 
Our basic conceptions and beliefs arise irresistibly from these innate principles in response to 
our experience of the world. The beliefs themselves neither admit of direct proof, nor do they, 
Reid contends, require it. When I hear a certain sound, Reid writes, 'I conclude immediately, 
without reasoning, that a coach passes by. There are no premises from which this conclusion 
is inferred by any rules of logic'(1 04), Common sense is the faculty of mind which judges of 
the self-evidence of such beliefs, the principles of which 'irresistibly govern the belief and the 
conduct of all mankind in the common concerns of life'(105). To reason either for or against 
the evidence of sense or the evidence of memory 'is absurd. They are first principles; and 
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such fall not within the province of reason, but of common sense'(1 06). The innate principles 
of our natural constitution give rise to our basic conceptions of and beliefs about the qualities 
of objects, the workings of our own minds, and the laws of nature. These convictions and 
conceptions, which include many of our ordinary perceptual and memory beliefs, are self-
evident and uninferred. They are evident and, Reid thinks, justified, without any use of or 
appeal to reason. Our perceptual beliefs arise immediately from the innate first principles of 
our faculties. These principles give rise both to a conception of the object and to an irresistible 
conviction as to its existence. The beliefs resulting from these principles are neither the 
product of reasoning nor can they be justified by an appeal to it. The doubts of the sceptic can 
therefore make no great impression upon his perceptual beliefs. Reid writes: 
The sceptic asks me, Why do you believe in the existence of the external 
objects which you perceive? This belief, sir, is none of my manufacture; it 
came from the mint of Nature; it bears her image and superscription; and, 
if it is not right, the fault is not mine: I even took it upon trust, and without 
suspicion. Reason, says the sceptic, is the only judge of truth, and you 
ought to throw off every opinion and every belief that is not grounded on 
reason. Why, sir, should I believe the faculty of reason more than that of 
perception? - they came both out of the same shop, and were made by 
the same artist; and if he puts one piece of false ware into my hands, what 
should hinder him from putting another? (107) 
Reid argues that Hume uncritically adopts the false and explanatorily inadequate assumptions 
of the theory of ideas of Descartes, Malebranche, and Berkeley, and that our original 
perceptions and common sense perceptual beliefs are to be explained as arising from innate 
first principles of the mind. There is little evidence of Hume's considered response to Reid's 
criticisms. Until fairly recently what Hume made of Reid's criticisms was purely a matter for 
speculation. However, a recently discovered letter of Hume's to Hugh Blair suggests not only 
Hume's awareness of the problems Reid raises but his own critical response to them(1 08). It 
is worth quoting the key passage from the letter at length. It is the only passage in which 
Hume seeks explicitly to defend his theory against the attacks of Reid. Hume writes: 
If I comprehend the Author's Doctrine, which, I own, I can hitherto do 
but imperfectly, it leads us bac\< to innate Ideas. This I do not advance 
as an Objection: For nothing ought ever to be supposed finally decided in 
Philosophy, so as not to admit of a new scrutiny; but only that, I think, the 
Author affirms I had been hasty, & not supported any Colour of Argument 
when I affirm, that all our Ideas are copyed from ImpreSSions. I have 
endeavourd to build that Principle on two Arguments. The first is desiring 
anyone to make a particular Detail of all his Ideas, where he woud always 
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find that every Idea had a correspondent and preceding Impression. If no 
Exception can ever be found, the Principle must remain incontestable. The 
second is, that if you exclude any particular Impression, such as Colours to 
the blind, Sound to the Deaf, you also exclude the Ideas.(109) 
It was noted earlier that one of Hume's chief purposes in formulating the first principle of his 
theory of ideas was to dispense summarily with the question of innate ideas(11 0). Hume 
believed the principle of the derivation of ideas from impressions to be decisive in the matter. 
If every idea can be shown to be derived, either directly or indirectly, from our impressions of 
sensation and reflection, then, Hume thinks, the doctrine of innate ideas has been defeated. 
Hume's point is that all the materials which we make use of in thought and belief must, in one 
way or another, be derived from perception or sensation. His charge, in the above passage, 
seems to be that in attempting to do away with the doctrine of ideas, as he understood it, Reid 
had let innate ideas back into the picture, or, as Hume puts it, led us 'back to innate Ideas'. 
What are we to make of Hume's criticism? On the face of it, the sense of the passage is 
unclear, and Hume's aim, at best, confused. Reid's claim that there are innate first principles 
of the mind seems to be empirical, and based on the data of observation. He does not 
suggest that there is any direct apprehension of the truth of these principles. I do, however, 
think that Hume's criticism must be taken seriously. We need to consider what evidence there 
is for thinking that Reid subscribed to the doctrine of innate ideas. 
There is some obscurity in Reid's account of the principles of common sense which we need 
to dispel at this point. Reid writes of common sense in two different ways which we need to get 
clear. In the first sense, the principles of common sense are those innate natural principles of 
mind by which we judge of the self-evidence of our beliefs and which incline us irresistibly to 
the beliefs we hold. In the second sense, Reid means those judgments themselves, that body 
of beliefs, which gain the consent of all, and irresistibly govern our conduct in all the common 
concerns of life. Those conceptions and beliefs which command the common consent of 
humanity are derived directly from innate first principles. If we take the second sense first, it is 
easily seen that Hume's charge would be seriously misplaced. Reid's common sense 
principles are, in this sense, judgements and not a sort of mental object, the clarity and 
distinctness of which might be introspected upon. Although to judge of first prinCiples 'requires 
no more than a sound mind free of prejudice, and a distinct conception of the question'(111), it 
is nevertheless 'contrary to the nature of first principles to admit of direct or apodictical 
proof'(112). Turning to the first sense in which Reid writes of first principles, we can see that 
Hume would have as little ground for the sort of charge he wants to level. It seems clear that 
Hume would not have taken the sort of natural principles of mind Reid talks about to be in any 
sense necessarily grounded in innate ideas. Hume himself, in a passage quoted approvingly 
by Reid(113), allows that in many of our ordinary judgments we are 'absolutely and necessarily 
determined, to live and talk and act like other people in the common affairs of life'(T.269). 
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Observing the inadequacy of reason to dispel the clouds of scepticism which crowd in upon 
him when he reflects upon our common perceptual judgments, Hume says that 'nature herself 
suffices to that purpose, and cures him of this philosophical melancholy and delirium'(T.269). 
Hume, no less than Reid, allows that many of our ordinary judgments are the result of the 
operation of faculties of mind which are innate. 
Is Hume simply wrong to suggest that Reid's thought is based on some version of the theory 
of innate ideas? A recent paper by John Wright has thrown light on the question(114). Wright 
makes a plausible suggestion as to the particular passages to which Hume's criticism is 
directed. Having posed as key the question of how our sensations can give rise to notions or 
conceptions 'of sensible things which are no ways like them'(115), central to Reid's concern, 
Wright says, is the thesis that we can have some non-sensory awareness of external 
objects(116). The feelings of touch, Reid writes in his Inquiry, 'pass through the mind 
instantaneously, and serve only to introduce the notion and belief of external things, which, by 
our constitution, are connected with them. They are natural signs, and the mind immediately 
passes to the thing signified, without making the least reflection upon the sign, or observing 
that there was any such thing.'(117) So 'naturally and necessarily' does sensation convey 'the 
notion and belief of hardness', Reid writes in an earlier passage, 'that hitherto they have been 
confounded by the most acute inquirers into the prinCiples of human nature, although they 
appear, upon accurate reflection, not only to be different things, but as unlike as pain is to the 
point of a sword'(118). In a similar way, to return to the example of the first passage, our 
notion of extension is far different from the feelings or sensations which, to use Reid's term, 
'suggest' it. 'I have sought', Reid writes, 'to find out how this idea can be got by feeling; but I 
have sought in vain. Yet it is one of the clearest and most distinct notions we have'(119). We 
have, he says, 'clear and distinct conceptions of extension, figure, motion, and other attributes 
of body, which are neither sensations, nor like any sensation'(120). It is to these passages, 
Wright suggests, that Hume refers when he writes in his letter to Hugh Blair that Reid has 
affirmed 'that our Idea of Extension is nothing like the Objects of Touch'(121), or, as Reid puts 
it, the feelings or sensations of touch. It seems plausible to argue, as Wright does(122), that it 
is to these and other similar passages that Hume refers us when he suggests that Reid has 
led us back to the doctrine of innate ideas. If this is right, then Hume's point in the above 
passage is to defend the first principle of his theory of ideas against the obvious threat, which 
he rightly perceived in Reid, of our being shown to have some idea, some thought or 
conception, not in some sense derived from precedent impressions of reflection or sensation. 
Hume, it must be said, presses his case only tentatively, and I would not seek to make much 
more of it than he does. Our primary concern here is to ascertain the rightness of Reid's 
objections to Hume. What is interesting, and for our purposes, more strictly to the paint, is 
what this says of how Reid and Hume viewed the key issues between them. Reid himself 
writes in the abstract of his Inquiry that the task he had set himself was to discover whether a/l 
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his 'thoughts and conceptions' were copies of preceding impressions(123). He admits, in the 
cited passages on extension, to have vainly sought to find out how the idea in question might 
be got from 'feeling'. In his later Essays on the Active Powers of Man, as Wright is quick to 
point out, Reid draws a similar conclusion as to the 'conception or idea' he has of power. 
Power, he says, is 'not an object of any of our external senses, nor even an object of 
consciousness'(124). Yet, if power 'were a thing of which we have no idea, as some 
philosophers have taken much pains to prove - that is, if power were a word without any 
meaning - we could neither affirm nor deny anything concerning it with understanding'(125). 
Since what can be said of power is apt to be both readily understood and assented to, Reid 
concludes, we must have 'a distinct notion of power', an idea, he suggests, 'relative to its 
exertions or effects'(126). It follows, Reid says, 'from men's having this opinion, that they have 
an idea of power. A false opinion about power, no less than a true, implies an idea of power; 
for how can men have any opinion, true or false, about a thing of which they have no 
idea?'(127) 
It is important to note just where Reid takes the difference to lie between the theory he is 
defending and that of his opponent, David Hume. It is, Reid writes, 'a capital doctrine in a late 
celebrated system of human nature, that we have no idea of power, not even in the Deity; that 
we are not able to discover a single instance of it, either in body or spirit, either in superior or 
inferior natures; and that we deceive ourselves when we imagine that we are possessed of 
any idea of this kind'(118). Reid, as I understand him, from this and from other passages, is 
sympathetic to the first part of Hume's analysis. What is less obvious is the conclusions Reid 
sees fit to draw from the point. Hume, as we saw, is at pains to deny that we can have any 
impression of the relation of dependency or necessary connection supposed to lie between 
causally related objects or events. We never, he writes, 'have any impression, that contains 
any power or efficacy. We never therefore have any idea of power'(T.161). In a letter to James 
Gregory, cited by Wright, Reid observes that: 'What D. Hume says of causes, in general, is 
very just when applied to physical causes, that a constant conjunction with the effect is 
essential to such causes, and implied in the very conception of them'(129). In a later letter, on 
the same subject, Reid insists, for philosophical purposes, upon a distinction between cause 
and causation, terms which he takes to have been much confounded in popular usage(130). 
Modern philosophers, he writes, 'know that we have no ground to ascribe efficiency to natural 
causes, or even necessary connection with the effect. But we can still call them causes, 
including nothing under the name but priority and constant conjunction'(131). To give the 
name of causation to 'the relation of connected events in physicks' is, Reid says, 'a kind of 
abuse of the name, because we know that the thing most essential to causation in its proper 
meaning - to wit, efficiency - is wanting'(132). This does not, however, 'hinder Our notion of a 
physical cause from being distinct and determinate, though, I think, it cannot be said to be of 
the same genus with an efficient cause or agent'(133). 
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Reid's conclusions are interesting and instructive not least because he evidently takes them to 
be of a piece with those of the 'modern philosophers' among whom he would most certainly 
have had in mind Hume. It will, however, be obvious, from what has been argued for so far in 
this chapter, that Reid's views are some way from being those of Hume. The interpretation 
Reid gives and the conclusions he wants to draw reveal both an important source of 
philosophical misunderstanding and a crucial point at which the philosophical projects of the 
two philosophers are at odds. Reid's view requires a little unpicking. To have a belief of any 
sort concerning power or 'efficiency', to either affirm or deny with understanding that which is 
at issue, Reid assumes, is, of necessity, to make use of an idea or conception of power. To 
have a given belief implies that one has an idea of a certain sort which is capable of figuring in 
the belief. Could it be shown that we have no such idea, then it would also have been shown 
that we can form no intelligible belief concerning it. Reid argues that we can have no grounds 
for attributing 'efficiency' to physical causes. There is, he says, nothing in nature which 
corresponds to this supposed idea. Indeed, it is a 'kind of abuse' of the term to apply it to 
natural connections where it is wanting. Since what can be said of causation is readily 
comprehensible to us, the idea we have of power must 'very obviously' be the product of 
'[R]eason alone'(134). The 'absurd' conclusion which he takes Hume to have drawn is that we 
have and can have no such idea, that is, no idea which properly comprehends the notion of 
necessity. In Reid's view, Hume not only denies that we have any clear and distinct notion of 
power or natural necessity, but draws from this the conclusion that our common sense 
attributions of causal relations are groundless or mistaken. , argued that there were decisive 
textual grounds for rejecting this view of Hume. Nevertheless, this is the view which Reid sees 
himself as resisting. What convinces Reid that he has the idea of power is 'that I am 
conscious that I know what I mean by that word, and, while I have this consciousness, I 
disdain equally to hear arguments for or against my having such an idea'(135). 
It follows from this that Reid's critique of Hume does the philosopher a significant disservice. 
Hume does not deny that there exist causes in nature or argue that we are mistaken in 
making the kinds of causal attributions we make. He does not suggest that propositions 
concerning causal relations can be analysed, without loss of content, into propositions about 
the regular conjunction of events. Hume's interest, as I have argued, lies in showing how we 
come to use the language we use, and think in the terms we think in, when we talk and think 
of causes as we do. To do so he must explain how we come to be committed to a view of the 
world which is only partly borne out in our experience. Hume conSistently argues that any just 
definition of the causal relation must include some reference to necessity or necessary 
connection. He writes in the Enquiry. '[L]et anyone det;ne a cause, without comprehending, as 
a part of the definition, a necessary connexion with its effect; and let him show distinctly the 
origin of the idea, expressed by the definition; and I shall readily give up the whole 
controversy. But if the foregoing explication of the matter be received, this must be absolutely 
impracticab/e'(E.95-6). This, as we saw, does not make Hume a realist about causal 
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connections. The ideas which we form of cause and effect are, Hume says, 'so imperfect' that 
'it is impossible to give any just definition of cause, except what is drawn from something 
extraneous and foreign to it'(E.76). He argues simply that we are disposed by our natures to a 
belief in natural necessity. To prepare the ground for his own explanation of the belief Hume 
needs only show that we represent to ourselves no extra feature of reality when we talk of 
causal connections. He does not, as Reid suggests he does, argue that there are no causal 
connections in nature on the basis of the absence of any representative ideas of such 
connections. Hume does not reject, or even suggest that any mistake is involved in, the 
normal attribution of causal relations to conjoined objects or events. He wants to show that a 
realist ontology is not the only possible explanation for this feature of human belief. To 
construe Hume either as offering an analysis of our causal claims into ones to do with mere 
regularity of succession or as rejecting a belief or commitment on the basis of the absence of 
a properly representative idea is a serious mistake. 
We can apply the moral of this story to the account Hume offers of the origin of our belief in 
continued and distinct existence, and to Reid's criticism of that account. It is in Section II of 
Part IV, Reid suggests, that Hume carries the subjectivist principles of Berkeley to their 'full 
length' leaving, at last, 'nothing in nature but impressions and ideas'(136}. Reid takes Hume to 
be rejecting the belief in external existence and drawing instead the sceptical conclusion that 
there is nothing but perceptions or impressions and ideas. Hume, however, is not concerned 
to deny that there are such things as real and independent existences, anymore than it was a 
concern of his to deny that there are causes in nature. Just as we are mistaken when we think 
that the idea of necessary connection we possess is an idea of whatever quality it is binds 
together cause and effect, so we are mistaken when we attribute a continued and distinct 
existence to our perceptions. But Hume does not deny, nor is he concerned to question, that 
there are such things as necessary connections or external objects in nature. His concern is to 
show how, faced with a reality in which we find none of the essentially relevant features, the 
mind still 'spreads itself upon the world' forming commitments and beliefs which it then 
projects back upon that reality. As to the question of 'Whether there be body or not', Hume's 
answer is clear; "tis in vain to ask,' since this 'is a point which we must take for granted in all 
our reasonings'(T.187}. Nature, Hume says, has 'esteem'd it a matter of too great importance 
to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations'(T.187). Hume is about as far as 
can be from suggesting, as Reid would argue he does, that we 'throw off every opinion and 
every belief not grounded on reason'(137). 
There are really two questions here which we can usefully separate. The first concerns the 
sorts of sceptical questions Hume raises about our beliefs, and the ways in which he takes 
them to arise; the second has to do with the normative question of whether or not we ought to 
accept them. Both are important to an understanding of Hume's philosophy. Hume, writing in 
the Enquiry, draws a distinction between two sorts of scepticism: one' antecedent to all study 
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and philosophy'; the other 'consequent to science and enquiry'(E.149-S0). He rejects the first 
form of scepticism on the grounds that it 'recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our 
former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, they say, we 
must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some original principle, which 
cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful'(E.149-S0). This 'Cartesian' doubt, were it ever 
attainable, would prove 'entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of 
assurance and conviction upon any subject.' There is, however, another species of scepticism 
'consequent to science and enquiry, when men are supposed to have discovered, either the 
absolute fallaciousness of their mental faculties, or their unfitness to reach any fixed 
determination in all those curious subjects of speculation, about which they are commonly 
employed'(E.1S0). The latter sort of sceptic, while resisting the demands of universal doubt, 
nevertheless finds doubt to arise as a consequence of his enquiries, of scientific practice, 
bringing into dispute 'the maxims of common life' as well as 'the most profound principles or 
conclusions of metaphysics and theology.' Hume's scepticism, as much as Reid's concern 
with first principles, arises from an attempt to apply the methods of Newtonian science to 
philosophical subjects(138). His empirical investigations lead him to conclude in the Abstract 
that philosophy 'would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not nature too strong for it'(T.6S7). 
It turns out to be in virtue of the 'illusions' of the imagination that we come to have the beliefs 
we have about causal connection and the external world. The understanding, Hume says, 
'when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and 
leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common 
Iife'(T.267-8). The philosophical analysis of our ideas, Hume is clear, can lead only to a self-
stultifying scepticism. We cannot pretend, by any arguments of philosophy, to establish the 
veracity of those basic beliefs to which our constitutions irresistibly incline us. But Hume does 
not suggest we throw off or reject our beliefs on these grounds. These are things which we 
must 'take for granted in all our reasonings'. He does not, for this reason, deny that there are 
causes or physical objects. He is more concerned to explain how it is the imagination 
combines our ideas to form beliefs for which no directly correspondent impressions can be 
found. To ignore this fact is to ignore, as Reid and many subsequent philosophers have done, 
the important and interesting work to which Hume sees his own philosophical writing as a 
contribution. Far from taking the principles of Berkeley to an absurd conclusion, Hume was 
perhaps the first philosopher to attempt to explain how, from a strictly limited stock of 
experiences, we get the beliefs and commitments we do. He does not argue that these 
commitments should be abandoned. His endorsement of them is often explicit. It is, Hume 
thinks, the imagination which is 'the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy'(T.22S). 
Hume's scepticism prepares the ground for his chief insight that it is the 'inconstant and 
fallacious' principle of the imagination which is primarily responsible for belief. It is this 
principle, he writes, 'which makes us reason from causes and effects; and 'tis the same 
principle, which convinces us of the continu'd existence of external objects, when absent from 
the senses'(T.266). 
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Nature, Hume writes, 'by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin'd us to judge 
as well as to breathe and feel'(T.183). At the beginning of this section, I raised the question of 
the degree to which Hume thought the philosopher ought to yield to the illusions of the 
imagination, to beliefs from which, at one level at least, he feels himself alienated. Both Reid 
and Hume, we saw, allow that many of our judgments are deeply rooted in the 'original 
constitution of our nature'. Sense experience alone cannot provide us with all the materials we 
need in order to form a going conception of a world of real and lasting existences ordered by 
natural laws. It cannot explain our commitment to seeing the world in these terms. Reid poses 
the question of how our sense experience can give rise to conceptions of 'sensible things 
which are no ways like them'(139). Ignoring Hume's extended working through of the problem, 
Reid asserts that our basic conceptions and beliefs turn out to be the result of the operation of 
certain innate principles of mind. The conceptions and beliefs which arise from these 
principles are self-evident and uninferred. They neither result from the operation of reason nor 
can they be legitimated by appeal to it. Just as Newton laid down 'the common principles or 
axioms, on which the reasonings in natural philosophy are built'{140), Reid took his first 
principles to be the foundational first premises of knowledge in general. These are principles 
which, he says, 'though they have not the same kind of evidence that mathematical axioms 
have; yet have such evidence that every man of common understanding readily assents to 
them, and finds it absolutely necessary to conduct his actions and opinions by them, in the 
ordinary affairs of life'{141). Among these principles are the claims that 'Those things really did 
happen that I distinctly remember' and that 'Those things really do exist which we distinctly 
perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be'(142). These are judgments to 
which we cannot withhold our assent, yet which do not depend upon any sort of inference or 
process of reasoning. Once understood, they cannot be doubted. This is what Reid has in 
mind when he writes of their self-evidence. Any attempt to justify these first principles by 
reason is not only unnecessary, Reid thinks, but bound to failure, since the first principles of 
common sense are also the axiomatic first principles of reason. They must, in other words, be 
taken for granted in all our thought and enquiry. 
Whenever I recall a past event or see an object, this, Reid says, 'commands my belief no less 
than an axiom'{143). Hume would agree that our ordinary perceptual judgments are both 
immediate and irresistible. Certain of our beliefs, like the belief in the continued and distinct 
existence of body, must, Hume says, be taken for granted in all our reasonings. We are 
transported to the belief by 'a natural instinct or prepossession'(E.151). Hume describes a sort 
of natural psychological compulsion to believe which effectively submerges the sceptical 
doubts of the philosopher as soon as he leaves his study. It is, however, obvious to Hume that 
none of this amounts to a refutation of the sceptic's position. Nothing in the operation of the 
imagination underwrites its deliverances with a guarantee of truth. We cannot be sure that our 
thoughts are putting us in touch with the truth about the world. Reid, of course, wants to say 
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rather more than this. According to Reid, our ordinary perceptual and memory judgments are 
justified because we are warranted in relying upon our uninferred, self-evident principles. Their 
evidence is such that we are absolutely determined to conduct our 'actions and opinions by 
them, in the ordinary affairs of life'. But the irresistibility of these beliefs does not, by itself, 
show that we are justified in placing in them the confidence we do. 
Reid appeals to the claim that it is absurd to trust in certain of our faculties, say, reason or 
consciousness, while distrusting others, our senses, for example. The sceptic must assume 
the veracity of one in order to undermine the other. Yet both, Reid says, came 'out of the same 
shop, and were made by the same artist; and if he puts one piece of false ware into my hands, 
what should hinder him from putting another?'(144) To reason against 'any of these kinds of 
evidence, is absurd; nay, to reason for them is absurd. They are first principles; and such fall 
not within the province of reason, but of common sense'(145). It is absurd and self-
contradictory for the sceptic to assume one, but not another, since both are as much the result 
of our natural faculties. His sceptical doubts are belied by his own practice. Though we can 
offer no reasons for our continued reliance upon those faculties, the burden of proof, Reid 
says, lies with the sceptic, and the sceptic cannot, without evident absurdity, give support to 
his own position. Reid, like Hume, does not think we can come up with a conclusive refutation 
of the sceptic's position. It is enough, he supposes, to have shown that the sceptic can have 
no good grounds for doubt. Hume accepts that the existence of body is something which we 
must take for granted in all our reasonings. He is not concerned either to defend or attack the 
sceptical position. His scepticism is not of the prescriptive sort. The arguments of the sceptic 
do not convince us, not do they admit of refutation. This is not the issue between Reid and 
Hume. Hume would perhaps find little to take issue with in any of Reid's first principles. He 
does not seek to reject or 'throw out' our elementary beliefs on the grounds that they cannot 
be proved to be true. What is at issue is the role Reid takes these principles to play in 
legitimating our beliefs. For Hume, the imagination has an important role to play in forming 
commitments and beliefs about ourselves and the world which are useful, and which we 
project back upon our experience, but which have no necessary connection with the truth. 
Many of our elementary concepts and beliefs about things in the world turn out to be the 
'fictitious' creations of the imagination. Reid wants to go further than this. Common sense not 
only produces an irresistible conviction in our basic judgments, but warrants those judgments 
and our reliance upon them. It is, to put it crudely, a matter of common sense that objects 
have the qualities we take them to. 
Reid takes it for granted 'that the evidence of sense, when the proper circumstances concur, 
is good evidence, and a just ground for belief'(146). But it is not clear that Reid has earned a 
right to his conclusion. We may allow, as Hume does, that our ordinary judgments about 
objects and their qualities, about memory and consciousness, are an irresistible part of our 
thinking, whether we think as the plain man does or as the philosopher, but this does not entail 
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that these judgments are true or justified. Every man of 'common understanding', Reid says, 
readily assents to his principles, and finds himself under a necessity to conduct his actions 
and opinions in accordance with them in 'the ordinary affairs of life'. Hume again would find 
little to quarrel about here. I find myself, Hume says, 'absolutely and necessarily determin'd to 
live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of Iife'(T.269). At the same time, 
Hume writes, upon a little reflection, 'I feel my mind all collected within itself, and am naturally 
inclin'd to carry my view into all those subjects, about which I have met with so many disputes 
in the course of my reading and conversation. I cannot forbear having a curiosity to be 
acquainted with the principles of moral good and evil, the nature and foundation of 
government, and the cause of those several passions and inclinations, which actuate and 
govern me'(T.270-1). The Slightest reflection upon these subjects is apt to produce in us an 
inclination to consider the principles which underlie them. Hume makes clear that the picture 
of reality produced by those 'causes' in my nature which 'actuate and govern me' in 'the 
common affairs of life' may very well be an illusory one. Nature has fitted us to form 
conceptions and beliefs which are likely to prove useful to us in everyday life, but which carry 
with them no guarantee that they will lead to the discovery of truth. The naturalness or 
irresistibility of Reid's principles does not by itself explain why we are justified in relying on 
them, or how that reliance will put us in touch with the truth about the world. It may well be that 
in the 'ordinary affairs of life' we must and do habitually trust our natural faculties. We have a 
need to act unreflectively in circumstances where reflection would be inappropriate or 
irresponsible. Our success in practical matters depends upon our being able to do so. But for 
the purposes of scientific inquiry, where our intention is to determine the 'laws and forces' by 
which natural phenomena are 'governed and directed', where, quite often, those laws seem at 
odds with common sense truisms, then it is appropriate for us to take a more reflective and 
critical attitude to those phenomena and to our natural ways of taking them. Hume recognises 
that more must be asked of the premises of scientific inquiry than that they be natural if we are 
to be justified in uncritically relying upon them in the way in which Reid thinks we are. Hume's 
response to scepticism is to say that although our fundamental beliefs are largely the result of 
the natural principles of the imagination, we have no guarantee that its deliverances put us in 
touch with the truth about reality. Hume's is a scepticism which is, as he puts it, 'consequent to 
science and enquiry'; it arises from the application of the tools and resources of science to the 
foundations of that practice. It judges of our faculties' fitted ness to 'reach any fixed 
determination in all the curious subjects of speculation, about which they are commonly 
employed'(E.150). What he finds at the end of his own enquiries is that it is only because of 
certain fictions of the imagination that we come to have the picture of the world we do and that 
we can say little more about them than that they are natural and irresistible. 
The vulgar view that our perceptions have a continued and distinct existence is, Hume thinks, 
unarguably false. The attribution of uninterrupted existences to the momentary and internal 
impressions of the senses cannot stand up to the most cursory philosophical analysis. Our 
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experience gives us no basis from which to reason our way to a conception of external objects 
distinct from the impressions which they cause. We can never hope to infer the existence of 
anything specifically different to our perceptions. This is the logical upshot of the assumptions 
of the theory of ideas. Philosophers have so great a propensity to believe their perceptions 
uninterrupted that they 'arbitrarily invent a new set of perceptions' to which they attribute the 
qualities of continued and distinct existence. We are led by a 'blind and powerful instinct of 
nature' to 'suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the external objects', and, 
for the most part, 'never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations 
of the other'(E.151). Philosophy may well show up the falsity of the vulgar belief in body, but it 
is of litt/e avail in dissuading us of it. The philosophical theory of double existence owes all its 
plausibility and influence on the imagination to the force of the vulgar belief it means to usurp. 
These fictions are unwarranted yet play so important a role in human survival that 'upon their 
removal human nature must immediately perish and go to ruin'(T.225). What can we look for, 
Hume asks, 'from this confusion of groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and 
falsehood?'(T.218) How far ought we to yield to the 'illusion of the imagination' which makes 
us believe in the continued and distinct existence of the objects of our awareness? The same 
reasonings which, Hume says, must take for granted the vulgar belief in body throw doubt 
upon the rational credentials of that belief. Yet Hume does not recommend a philosophical 
suspension of belief or commitment in the light of his sceptical worries. He does not see his 
own philosophy as leading to a sceptical position on these matters. Hume's main concern is 
with the origin of our everyday beliefs rather than with their rejection or abandonment. 
Philosophical reflection on the operation of our faculties nevertheless leads naturally and 
inevitably to scepticism about them. Hume, by the end of his inquiries, is inclined 'to repose no 
faith at al/' in his senses(T.217). This sceptical doubt, Hume says, is a 'malady, which can 
never be radically cur'd'(T.218), least of all by more philosophising about it. The obvious 
question prompted by al/ of this concerns the attitude we ought to take to our own participation 
in the philosophical project. What attitude does Hume take to the sceptical arguments of 
Section II? 
Since reason 'is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, 
and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium'(T.269). Away from his study, the 
philosopher yields himself up to 'action, and employment, and the occupations of common 
life', finding his sceptical principles to 'vanish like smoke', leaving 'the most determined sceptic 
in the same condition as other mortals'(E.159). Despite this fortunate dispensation of nature, 
"tis almost impossible for the mind of man to rest, like those of beasts, in that narrow circle of 
objects, which are the subject of daily conversation and action'(T.271). Nature cannot entirely 
cure us of our passion for inquiry and speculation; nor are the arguments of the sceptics 
without their influence. Where the mind 'pursues any end with passion', Hume says, that 
passion is only partly derived from 'a concern for the end itself'(T.451). Though the end of our 
action 'may in itself be despis'd, yet in the heat of the action we acquire such an attention to 
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this end, that we are very uneasy under any disappointments'(T.452). What is 'easy and 
obvious', Hume says, 'is never valu'd'. What prompts our inquiries is 'a love of truth' and the 
obligation 'to fix our attention or exert our genius; which of all other exercises of the mind is 
the most pleasant and agreeable'(T.449). Although this is, Hume finds, the 'principal source' of 
our satisfaction in inquiry, some further importance or usefulness must be esteemed to attach 
to our inquiries if we are to be led to pursue them. Were philosophers 'convinc'd, that their 
discoveries were of no consequence, they wou'd entirely lose all relish for their 
studies'(T.450). Some other value, Hume suggests, must be seen to accrue from the practice. 
To understand the value Hume took his enquiries to have, and, indeed, how he saw the nature 
of useful and important philosophical activity, we need first to gain a grasp of how he saw its 
limits. There is, Hume writes in the Enquiry, 'a more mitigated scepticism or academical 
philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in part, be the result of this 
Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when its undisguised doubts are, in some measure, 
corrected by common sense and reflection'(E.161). One way in which a 'tincture' of 
Pyrrhonism might be useful to us is in informing our enquiries with a due sense of caution and 
modesty both in our doubts and in our convictions. Were the 'dogmatic reasoners' who make 
up the greater run of men, more sensible of the 'strange infirmities of human understanding, 
even in its most perfect state,' such a reflection would 'inspire them with more modesty and 
reserve, and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice against 
antagonists'(E.161). In assenting to 'every trivial suggestion of the fancy' we allow ourselves to 
be led 'into such errors, absurdities, and obscurities, that we must at last become asham'd of 
our credulity'. Nothing, Hume says, 'is more dangerous to reason that the flights of the 
imagination, and nothing has been the occasion of more mistakes among 
philosophers'(T.267). We must, however, give our assent to certain of those 'suggestions of 
the fancy'. Not to do so, Hume writes, is not only to 'cut off entirely all science and philosophy' 
but to 'expressly contradict yourself; since this maxim must be built on the preceding 
reasoning, which will be allow'd to be sufficiently refin'd and metaphysical'(T.268). To reject 'all 
refin'd and elaborate reasoning' on philosophical grounds, Hume makes clear, is manifestly 
'absurd': 'If we reject it in favour of these reasonings, we subvert entirely the human 
understanding'(T.268). We must, Hume writes in 'Of the modern philosophy: 'distinguish in 
the imagination betwixt the principles which are permanent, irresistible, and universal; such as 
the customary transition from causes to effects, and from effects to causes: And the 
principles, which are changeable, weak, and irregular'(T.225) The former, Hume says, 'are the 
foundation of all our thoughts and actions, so that upon their removal human nature must 
immediately perish and go to ruin'(T.225). 
In so far as we must yield to certain of the principles of the imagination, it is best that we yield 
to those which are both unavoidable and necessary to the conduct of life. The judgment of the 
intellect, unaided by any fiction or illusion of the fancy, would leave us without any belief in 
external existence or causal connection. The understanding, when left to act alone, 'according 
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to its most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of 
evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life'(T.627). This, Hume says, is 
'the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are 
not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of 
these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised against them'(E.160). Our 
belief in the continued and distinct existence of body rests upon the irrational illusions of the 
imagination. The sceptic, as much as the unphilosophical portion of humanity, finds himself 
under a psychological compulsion to assent to 'the prinCiple concerning body, 'tho' he cannot 
pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity'(T.187). The 'undisguised 
doubts' of the Pyrrhonian sceptic can, nevertheless, be 'in some measure, corrected by 
common sense and reflection'. In considering the subject, Hume writes, 'we may observe a 
gradation of three opinions, that rise above each other, according as the persons, who form 
them, acquire new degrees of reason and knowledge. These opinions are that of the vulgar, 
that of a false philosophy, and that of the true; where we shall find upon enquiry, that the true 
philosophy approaches nearer to the sentiments of the vulgar, than to those of a mistaken 
knowledge'(T.223). The false philosophers allow themselves to be guided 'by every trivial 
propensity of the imagination' and by this means 'set themselves at ease, and arrive at last, by 
an illusion, at the same indifference, which people attain by their stupidity, and true 
philosophers by their moderate scepticism'(T.224). The greater part of mankind are apt to be 
'affirmative and dogmatical' in their opinions, and 'throw themselves precipitately into the 
principles, to which they are inclined'(E.161). A 'small tincture of Pyrrhonism', however, 
inclines us to 'a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and 
decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner'(E.162). An awareness of the narrow 
compass of human understanding leads us to limit our enquiries to such subjects as it is fitted 
to deal with. The 'just reasoner' brings to bear upon his reflections an acknowledgement of the 
dependency of his enquiries upon the 'illusions' of the imagination. It is not merely the intellect 
but the 'mind all collected within itself' which he brings to the subjects of philosophical dispute. 
He accepts that the faculties which give rise to our basic beliefs and conceptions have no 
necessary connection to the truth and, as Hume suggests, frequently play us false. Once we 
realise the dependency of our beliefs upon natural ways of taking our experience which are 
both irresistible and non-rational, we become less inclined to fanciful hypothesis, and more 
attentive to those principles of the imagination which we cannot do without. These are 
principles which, Hume thinks, are open to discovery by the kind of enquiry into the way the 
mind works which he has engaged in. Philosophy, if it is to retain what value it has, must 
confine itself to 'common life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and 
experience'(E.162). To bring us to so salutary a determination, Hume writes, 'nothing can be 
more serviceable, than to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt, 
and of the impossibility, that anything, but the strong power of natural instinct could free us 
from it'{E.162}. 
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The true philosopher, while subject to this same natural instinct, no longer supposes the 'very 
images' of his perception to have a continuous existence independent of him. But he is 
cautious in his own belief, knowing it to owe what plausibility and influence it has to the same 
trick of the imagination which gives rise to the vulgar belief. The philosopher shows up the 
falsity of that belief, yet finds that he too must take it for granted in 'all his reasonings'. His own 
belief has no 'primary recommendation' either to reason or to the imagination. He only has the 
belief he has because he originally had a false belief in the independent existence of his 
fleeting and distinct 'resembling' impressions. Nevertheless, the philosophical 'hypothesis' of 
double existence 'pleases our reason, in allowing, that our dependent perceptions are 
interrupted and different'. At the same time, it is 'agreeable to the imagination, in attributing a 
continu'd existence to something else, which we call objects'(T.215). The philosophical system 
is the 'monstrous offspring' of two inimical principles which are yet 'unable mutually to destroy 
each other'(T.215). The belief in body survives because of an 'illusion' of the imagination, but it 
survives in a form modified by reason. The philosopher, in so far as he reflects upon the 
matter, no longer takes his very perceptions or sensation to have a continued and 
independent existence. The vulgar view fails to make any distinction between sensation and 
object. The philosophical view, in so much as it might be said to modify it, leaves us on one 
side of the distinction. This, I think, is Hume's own considered position. It is also the 
perspective of 'true philosophy'. The philosopher shows that the vulgar belief that 'the very 
perception or sensible image is the external object' is false, but does not, nor can he, show the 
truth of his own opinion. Do we, Hume asks, disclaim this principle in order to embrace 'the 
more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external'? In 
doing so we not only depart from our 'natural propensities and more obvious sentiments' but 
are unable to satisfy our reason 'which can never find any convincing argument from 
experience to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any external objects'(E.154). 
The theory of double existence is, Hume thinks, the 'more rational' of the options available to 
us. Another advantage of the philosophical system, according to Hume, one which clearly 
identifies it with that of the 'true' philosophy, 'is its similarity to the vulgar one; by which means 
we can humour our reason for a moment, when it becomes troublesome and sollicitous; and 
yet upon its least negligence or inattention, can easily return to our vulgar and natural 
notions'(T.216). The true philosophy, we saw Hume remark, 'approaches nearer to the 
sentiments of the vulgar'. In making the point, Hume is at once distancing his understanding of 
philosophy from that of the 'false' philosophers, and streSSing the intimacy of the relationship 
between true philosophy and common life. The false philosopher lacks a due humility in his 
reasonings. In rejecting the vulgar view, he takes it that he has freed himself from the illusions 
of the imagination. But, as Hume pOints out, this opinion 'has taken such deep root in the 
imagination, that 'tis impossible ever to eradicate it'(324). Since sense experience can in no 
way allow us to reason our way to our conception of the world and the things in it, we have no 
choice but to trust our reasonings to some or other non-rational principles. Any other 
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conception of philosophy is liable to lead to absurd conclusions both in philosophy and in 
common life. Philosophy must take as its starting point those principles which are 'received' 
both by philosophy and in 'common life'. We can only begin within the framework of common 
life, hoping to retrospectively develop the cognitive tools with which to correct and modify our 
pre-theoretical beliefs. When we see 'that we have arrived at the utmost extent of human 
reason, we sit down contented; tho' we be perfectly satisfied in the main of our ignorance, and 
perceive that we can give no reason for our most general and most refined principles, beside 
our experience of their reality; which is the reason of the mere vulgar, and what it required no 
study at first to have discovered for the most particular and most extraordinary 
phaenomenon'(T.xviii}. Once the more fanciful speculations of the false philosophy have been 
removed, we might hope 'to establish a system or set of opinions, which if not true (for that, 
perhaps, is too much to be hop'd for) might at least be satisfactory to the human mind, and 
might stand the test of the most critical examination'(T.272}. Philosophical decisions turn out 
to be 'nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected'(E.162}. We 
cannot do without the opinions of the common man but we need not subscribe uncritically to 
them. We bring to our inquiries a critical self-consciousness, an awareness of their 
dependency upon the illusions of the imagination, allowing, at the same time, that their 
'ultimate cause' will always be 'perfectly inexplicable by human reason,' and that "twill always 
be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are 
produc'd by the creative power of the mind, or are deriv'd from the author of our being'(T.84). 
The explanation Hume gives of the irresistibility and naturalness of our beliefs undermines 
their rational credibility. The beliefs in question turn out to be the result of the operations of the 
imagination, rather than of sense or the understanding. But Hume does not think that in 
explaining our beliefs in terms of a non-rational faculty of mind he necessarily undermines 
them. It becomes more obvious, on the account Hume gives, just what role those beliefs have 
and the form they must take. Hume is far from saying that we must passively accept all that 
nature leads us to believe. Belief can still be subject to the influence of philosophical 
reasoning, but only in so far as it is informed by an understanding of its limits and an 
awareness of its role. 
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Chapter Three 
Hume's Scepticism with Regard to the Senses 
1.Annette Baier, op.cit., pp.93-97, shows in detail how each of the eight rules Hume sets out in 
Section XV of Part III are used to 'arrive at, and confirm, his hypothesis concerning what 
causes our ideas, our inferences, and our degrees of belief and disbelief.'(p.93). 
2.Richard H. Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism (San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 1980), 
p.103, cites John Laird's remark, in his Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature (London: 
Methuen and Co., 1932), p.180, that: 'Hume remained a complete Pyrrhonian regarding all 
ultimate principles.' Popkin, more realistically, shows up Hume's resistance to the radically 
sceptical doctrines of Pyrrhonian philosophy (cf.T.183). I will return to the question of the 
nature of Hume's critique of Pyrrhonian scepticism in 3.2 and in the conclusion of the work. 
3.We saw in 2.2 that, for Hume, we can form at best only a relative idea of necessary 
connection in nature (see T.67-8fT.218). It is clear from the text that Hume does not believe 
the distinctions he makes in these passages to form the basis for anything like the sceptical 
realist position argued for by Wright, op.cit., and Strawson, op.cit. Hume raises the question of 
the distinction between specific and relative ideas only to dismiss out of hand its effectiveness 
or usefulness in either science or philosophy. 
4.Craig, op.cit., pp.100-101, argues that Hume's carelessness with the 'conceptual branch' of 
his account of necessity reflects the greater draw and importance of 'the epistemological side 
of Hume's enterprise'. I agree with Craig that Hume's overriding concern, the one which best 
captures his interests in the Treatise, is with the causal explanation of belief. It would, 
nevertheless, be a mistake to suppose that the theory of ideas was of only marginal 
importance to Hume. As we will see in the sections under discussion, the theory reasserts 
itself frequently, and, despite Hume's occasional discomfort with it, there are, to my mind, no 
strong textual indications of his having abandoned it. 
5.See, for example, William Davie, 'Perceptions and Persons' in Hume Studies X, 1984; and 
Donald Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Common Life (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1984). 
6.Robert J. Fogelin, op. cit. , p.64, complains that even the title of Section II is perplexing, on 
the grounds that 'for the most part, Hume does not put forward skeptical arguments against 
our perceptual faculties'. 
7.See, for example, John Passmore, op. cit. , p.133. Passmore writes that '[I]n the Treatise, the 
scepticism which Hume learnt from Bayle simply overlays the positivist-associationist structure 
of his original argument; in consequence, Hume lapses into inconsistencies of the most 
startling character'. See also, Anthony Flew, op.cit., p.109. 
8.Passmore, op.cit., p.1S1. 
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9.1 discuss Hume's assessment of these arguments in Section VII of Part IV, and of their 
relation to his scientific programme, in the conclusion. 
3.1 The Argument in Detail 
10.lmportant discussions include Stroud, op. cit. , pp.96-117; John P. Wright, op.cit., pp.38-84; 
David Pears, op.cit., pp.152-197; Fogelin, op.cit., pp.64-79; and H.H. Price, Hume's Theory of 
the External World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940). 
11.T.183. I give a fuller account of Hume's argument in 2.1. For a critical examination of the 
discussion, see Fogelin, op.cit., pp.13-24. For the purposes of this work, I have preferred 
merely to give the gist of the argument and of Hume's sceptical solution, rather than go in to 
the detail of its content. 
12.Hume does eventually come to discuss the sceptical arguments in question (T.21 0-11) but 
does so, in my opinion, only half-heartedly, and with some lack of originality. I consider these 
arguments later in the chapter. 
13.Pears, op.cit., pp.152-3, compares Hume's attribution of these suppositions to the vulgar 
with the view 'of what Sartre would call "pre-reflective consciousness"'. According to Pears, 
'[T]hey simply take what is given as it comes without making any attempt to categorize it'. 
14.Price, op.cit., p.18, suggests that independent existences might, quite coincidentally, exist 
for just as long as we perceive them. 
15. Pears, op.cit., p.153. 
16. Wright. op.cit., p.42, argues that Hume's doctrine that parts of the body are not directly 
perceived has been taken over from Malebranche. He also remarks, in accordance with his 
own interpretive thesis, that Malebranche, like Hume, held a firm belief in the independent 
existence of the material world. There are strong parallels to be made between Hume's 
account of ideas and association and Malebranche's account of sensation and imagination. 
Some of these are made out by Charles McCracken, op.cit., pp.277-283. The most striking 
concerns the terminology employed by the two philosophers. Hume writes of the 'force and 
vivacity' of our perceptions, while the other speaks of sensations as 'fortes et vives~ where 
Hume speaks of the ideas of the imagination being 'faint and languid', Malebranche describes 
the ideas of the imagination as 'faible et languissantes', p.280. See Malebranche, op.cit., 
pp.57~8;261-263. Malebranche writes of our '[S]trong and lively sensations' such as 'pain, 
tickling sensations, extremes of heat or cold', and contrasts them with other 'weak and 
languid' sensations which 'can become intermediate, and finally strong and lively'(pp.57-8). He 
writes in the conclusion to the first three books of the Search that when the mind receives 
ideas mixed with images, it receives only a 'weak and languid sensation'(p.261). There are 
also a number of striking similarities between Hume's suggestion that we cannot directly 
perceive parts of the body, and Malebranche's doctrine concerning perception and material 
body. He presents this most clearly in the sixth elucidation of the SearCh, where he writes that 
'our eyes represent colours to us on the surface of bodies and light in the air and in the sun; 
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our ears make us hear sounds as if spread out through the air and in the resounding bodies; 
and if we believe what the other senses report, heat will be in fire, sweetness will be in sugar, 
musk will have an odor, and all the sensible qualities will be in bodies that seem to exude or 
diffuse them. Yet it is certain ... that all these qualities do not exist outside the soul that 
perceives them - at least it is not evident that they are in the bodies that surround us. Why 
should we conclude then, merely on the testimony of the senses that deceive us on all sides, 
that these really are external bodies'(p.569-570). Given that these qualities exist only in the 
soul that perceives them, it is clearly a mistake to think as do those who 'believe that their 
body is like the one they sense, i.e., like their mind's immediate object when they consider 
themselves'(p.570). 
17.0ne again, Hume appears to have in mind a passage from Malebranche's sixth 
elucidation, op. cit. , p.269: 'But since men are more impressionable than reasonable, and since 
they listen more readily to the testimony of their senses than to that of inner truth, they have 
always relied on their eyes to assure themselves of the existence of matter without bothering 
to consult their reason. This is why they are surprised when told that it is difficult to prove the 
existence of matter. They think that they have but to open their eyes in order to assure 
themselves that there are bodies, and if there is some reason to suspect an illusion, they think 
it suffices to approach the bodies and touch them - after which they have difficulty conceiving 
that one might yet have reasons for doubting their existence.' 
18.Pears, op.cit., p.153. The structure of my own interpretation of Hume's argument owes a 
good deal to that developed by Pears. 
19.1bid., p.154. 
20.Stroud, op.cit., p.98. 
21.Jonathan Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1971), pp.317-8. 
22.lbid., p.318. 
23.Pears, op. cit. , p.161. 
24.The expression is used by Annette Baier, op.cit., p.111. 
25.Pears, op.cit., p.165, writes that, had Hume been a phenomenalist, and had he ascribed 
the same sort of belief to the vulgar, 'the problem of perceptions would merely have been a 
special aspect of the problem of causation: the inferences covering the gaps in observation 
would simply have been counterlactual conditionals'. 
26.Pears, op. cit. , p.166, describes this as Hume's 'really fundamental mistake: he treats 
unobserved objects as objects of a determinate problematical kind'. 
27.Stroud, op. cit. , pp.259-60, suggests that in admitting the lesser role of coherence 'Hume is 
perhaps half acknowledging that on his account the "hypothesis" of the continued existence of 
bodies, once we have it, is used to explain the "coherence" we find in our experience, but that 
"coherence" alone would never give rise to that "hypothesis" in the first place, without some 
additional "principles'''. In order to infer the continued existence of objects from their 
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coherence 'it would seem that the notion of the continued existence of objects must already 
make sense to us'. 
28.lbid., p.101. 
29.Locke, op.cit., II.XXVI1.1, explains that 'when considering any thing as existing at any 
determin'd time and place, we compare it with it self existing at another time'. When we see 
any thing 'to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure, (be it what it will) that it is that 
very thing, and not another, which at the same time exists in another place, how like and 
undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: And in this consists Identity, when the 
Ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were at that moment, wherein we 
consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present'. The identity of a thing 
consists in its sameness with itself over time. 
30.Baier, op.cit., p.113, describes this principle as Hume's 'principle of mental inertia', echoing 
Stroud's account of it as 'a kind of inertia', op.cit., p.1 03. 
31.See George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous in The Works of 
George Berkeley, VoLlI, Ed. A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop (Thomas Nelson and Sons, London, 
1949). Other statements of the argument occur in A Treatise concerning the Principles of 
Human Knowledge in Philosophical Works, Ed. M.R. Ayers (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 
1992), pp.77-78. Having argued that 'the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the senses' 
cannot 'exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them', Berkeley writes that whosoever has a 
mind to call into question the prevailing opinion of men as to the existence of these objects will 
'perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the 
things we perceive by sense, and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations; 
and is it not plainly repugnant that anyone of these or any combination of them should exist 
unperceived?' 
32.Hume's argument reflects an important commitment to the separability of our ideas and 
impressions, the importance of which is especially clear from his discussion of personal 
identity. I offer a critical account of this discussion in Chapter Four. 
33.Hume states his principle as follows: 'We have observ'd, that whatever objects are different 
are distinguishable, and that whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the 
thought and imagination'(T.18). 
34.Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into The Human Mind on The Principles of Common Sense in 
The Works of Thomas Reid, Ed. William Hamilton, Sixth Edition (Edinburgh: Maclachlan and 
Stewart, 1863), p.304. Reid writes: 'Let us suppose, for a moment, that it is the real table we 
see: Must not this real table seem to diminish as we remove farther from it? It is demonstrable 
that it must. How then can this apparent diminution be an argument that it is not the real 
table?' I discuss Reid's critique of Hume in some depth in 3.2. 
3S.An important step in Hume's argument is provided in Section II of Part III where Hume sets 
forth his claim that any reasoning concerning unperceived existences must be based on the 
relation of cause and effect. The only one of Hume's three natural relations 'that can be trac'd 
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beyond our senses, and informs us of existences and objects, which we do not see or feel, is 
causation' (T. 74). 
36.Stroud, op.cit., p.1 06, complains that rather than providing a description of the vulgar 
consciousness, Hume tends to attribute to them both a belief in the continued and distinct 
existence of what they perceive and the philosophical view that all they perceive are 'internal 
and perishing existences'. Not only does Hume attribute to them an 'implicit inconsistency', but 
he leaves 'the origin of the belief in continued and distinct existence unexplained. No account 
which implies that the vulgar have that belief from the outset can explain how they originally 
come to have it.' 
37./bid. 
38.A similar point is made by Pears, op.cit., p.176. Pears argues that Hume specifies the gaps 
in our observation 'in the way that we specify them in the ordinary course of our lives' only to 
make no use of this ordinary way of thinking when he comes to 'explain his inferences to 
things actually existing in the gaps in his observation'. He reverts, instead, to 'a pre-theoretical 
consciousness which does not distinguish, and does not even ask if there is any distinction, 
between sense-impressions and physical objects'. My own account takes seriously a number 
of Pears' insights about Hume's procedure in this part of his argument. 
39. Pears, op.cit., p.181. 
3.2 Common Sense and True Philosophy 
40.1 argued in 1.1 that Hume's chief ambition in Book One of the Treatise was to ground a 
'compleat system of the sciences' on the basis of the reflexive application of causal reasoning, 
and, in doing so, to prepare the ground for the more robustly Newtonian investigations of 
Books Two and Three. 
41.Hume realises, for example, that it is not enough simply to say that the attribution of perfect 
identity removes or disguises the interruption in a series of perceptions, a good account must 
also 'explain the principium individuationis, or principle of identity'(T.199-200}. 
42.L.A. Se/by-Bigge observes, in his introduction to 1893 edition of the Enquiries, that the 
'wholesale omission and insertion' of matter from the Treatise 'cannot well be due to 
philosophical discontent with the positions or arguments, or to a general desire to fill up a gap 
in the system, but must be ascribed rather to a general desire to make the Enquiry 
readab/e'(E.xii). He adds, later in the introduction, that 'C/]n the Enquiry Hume merely confines 
himself to asserting the opposition between the vulgar belief, based on instinct and natural 
propenSity, in external objects on the one side, and the conclusions of philosophy, that we 
know nothing but perceptions in the mind, on the other hand'(E.xix-xx). To this, J add only that 
Hume continues to endorse the sceptical conclusions of the argument of the Treatise, 
although the argument itself is omitted(E.153). 
43.Fogelin, op.cit, pp.65-6. 
44.See Flew, op.cit., p.109; and Passmore, op.cit., pp.132-151. 
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45.H.A. Prichard, Knowledge and Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), p.178. The 
passage is cited by Passmore, op.cit., p.84, who identifies the view with that expressed by 
T.H. Green in his introduction to Hume's Philosophical Works, Ed. Green and T.H. Grose 
(Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1964). Passmore calls this interpretation of Hume the 'Reid-Green' 
interpretation. 
46.Donald W. Livingston, op.cit., p.9. 
47.Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, in The Works of Thomas Reid, Ed, William 
Hamilton, Sixth Edition, (Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart, 1863), p.96. 
48.Hume described the Enquiry as his 'compleat Answer to Dr. Reid' in a letter written to 
William Strahan, on 26 October 1775, The Letters of David Hume, Ed. J.Y.T. Greig, VoLlI 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), p.301. In a letter to Hugh Blair only recently discovered 
Hume gives a more direct answer to Reid. See P.B. Wood 'David Hume on Thomas Reid's An 
Inquiry into the Human Mind, On the Principles of Common Sense: A New Letter to Hugh Blair 
from July 1762' in Mind, 1986, pp.411-16. 
49.1 have in mind Livingston, op.cit., pp.60-90; and William Davie, 'Perceptions and Persons' 
in Hume Studies X, 1984. 
50. Passmore, op.cit., p.85. 
51.See, for example, Fogelin, op.cit., pp.1-3; and Passmore, op.cit., pp.88-104. 
52. George Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge in Philosophical Works, Ed. M.R. Ayers 
(London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1992), p.7S. 
53.1 refer, of course, to the work of Strawson, op.cit.; Wright, op.cit.; and Craig, op.cit. I 
consider the notion of 'relative ideas' at length in 2.2. 
54.ln 2.2, I argued that Hume does not, and could not have, understood these passages as 
providing the basis for the sort of position Wright, op.cit., for example, attributes to him. The 
definitive treatment of these issues is to be found in Blackburn, op.cit., pp.94-107. 
55. Pears, op.cit., p.192. 
56.Strawson, op.cit., p.52. 
57.Stroud, op.cit., p.23. 
58.ln 1.2, I argued that Hume understood the copy prinCiple to be the outcome of a 
straightforward inductive inference from the constant conjunction of impressions and ideas 
and the temporal priority of impressions over ideas. I found that the premises Hume cites only 
really support his conclusion on the basis of the assumptions that to think, see, smell, taste, 
and so on, is to have a perception before the mind; and that the perceptions which are before 
the mind in instances of sense perception are impressions. It is the second of these important 
assumptions that Reid, op.cit., p.285, has in mind when he writes of his own former 
commitment to the theory of ideas: 'lance believed this doctrine of ideas so firmly as to 
embrace the whole of Berkeley's system in consequence of it; till, finding other consequences 
to follow from it, which gave me more uneasiness than the want of a material world, it came to 
my mind, more than fifty years ago, to put the question, What evidence have I, for this 
doctrine, that all the objects of my knowledge are ideas in my own mind.' 
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59.Strawson, op.cit., p.50. 
60. Ibid. , pp.50-1. 
61.Locke takes the opposite line. He believes that ideas of primary qualities do resemble the 
qualities of objects and, so, that in forming an idea of external existence we do not form an 
idea of something which is, in every way, 'specifically different' from perceptions. 
62.Berkeley, op.cit., 1992, p.101. 
63. Ibid. 
64. Ibid. , pp.1 00-1 01. 
6S.Thomas Reid, op.cit., p.96. 
66.William Davie, 'Perceptions and Persons' in Hume Studies X, 1984, p.130. 
67.Donald Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Common Life (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1984), p.10. 
68.lbid., p.64. 
69.lbid., p.6S. 
70.lbid., p.6S. 
71.lbid., p.48. 
72.lbid., pp.13-14. 
73.lbid., p.14. 
74. Ibid., p.18. 
7S.lbid., p.19. 
76. Ibid. , p.19. 
77.Reid, op.cit., p.304. 
78.Passmore, op.cit., p.89, writes that there is nothing surprising 'in the fact that Hume, for all 
his strict scrutiny of assumptions, yet failed sufficiently to examine the theory of ideas' for 
Hume felt 'that on this point he need expect no serious criticism'. See T.67. 
79.Apart from the development of Hume's argument in the section 'Of scepticism with regard 
to the senses', I have in mind Hume's attempts to account for the content of our idea of 
necessity, discussed in 2.2, and his inductive inference to the conclusion that all our ideas are 
derived from corresponding impressions, discussed in 1.2. 
80.Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (London: Penguin, 1990), p.S3. 
81.Passmore, op.cit., pp.89-90, identifies this version of phenomenalism with Laird's definition, 
op.cit., p.25: 'phenomenalism is the doctrine that all our knowledge, all our belief, and all our 
conjectures begin and end with appearances; that we cannot go behind or beyond these; and 
that we should not try to do so'. I have argued against attributing this sort of phenomenalism to 
Hume. 
82.Reid, op.cit., p.96. 
83. Ibid. , p.106. 
84.lbid., p.304. 
8S.lbid., p.140. 
86. Ibid. 
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87. Ibid., pp.368-9. 
88.lbid., p.302. 
89. Ibid. 
90.lbid., p.157. 
91.lbid., p.1 02. 
92.lbid., p.368. 
93.lbid., p.369. 
94.lbid., p.373. 
95. Ibid. 
96. Ibid. 
97.lbid., p.224. 
98. Ibid. , p.225. 
99. Ibid. , p.198. 
1 00. Ibid., pp.130-1. 
101.lbid., p.122. 
1 02. Ibid., p.258. 
1 03. Ibid., p.259. 
1 04. Ibid., p.117. 
1 05. Ibid. , p.102. 
1 06. Ibid. , p.108. 
1 07. Ibid., p.183. 
108.P.B.Wood, 'David Hume on Thomas Reid's An Inquiry into the Human Mind, On the 
Principles of Common Sense: A New Letter to Hugh Blair from July 1762', Mind, 1986. pp.411-
16. 
1 09. Ibid. , p.416. 
110.See 1.2 for an extended discussion of the copy principle of Hume's theory of ideas. 
111.Reid, op. cit. , p.438. 
112.lbid., p.439. 
113.lbid., p.485. 
114.John P. Wright, 'Hume vs. Reid on Ideas: The New Hume Letter' in Mind 96, 1987, 
pp.392-398. 
115.D.F. Norton, 'Reid's Abstract of the Inquiry into the Human Mind' in Thomas Reid: Critical 
Interpretations, Ed. S.F. Barker and T.L. Beauchamp (Philadelphia, 1976), p.129. 
116.Wright, op.cit., pp.393-4. 
117.Reid, op.cit., p.124. 
118.lbid., p.122. 
119.lbid., p.124. 
120.lbid., p.132. 
121.Wood, op.cit., p.416. 
122. Wright, op.cit., p.394. 
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123.Norton, op.cit., p.128. 
124.Reid, op.cit., p.512. 
125.lbid., p.514. 
126.lbid., p.514. 
127.lbid., p.521. 
128.lbid., p.518. 
129.lbid., p.67. 
130.lbid., p.72. 
131.lbid., p.76. 
132.lbid. 
133.lbid. 
134.lbid., p.521. 
135.lbid., p.518. 
136.lbid., p.102. 
137.lbid., p.183. 
138.1 showed in 1.1 how differently Hume and Reid viewed Newton's science and the limits he 
placed upon it. I argued that Hume's reading was truer to Newton's intentions and to his actual 
working practice than was Reid's. 
139.Norton, op.cit., p.129. 
140.Reid, op.cit., p.231. 
141.lbid. 
142.lbid., pp.444-5. 
143.lbid., p.330. 
144.lbid., p.183. 
145.lbid., p.108. 
146.lbid., p.328. 
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Chapter Four 
Hume on Personal Identity 
Hume's concerns about identity in the first book of the Treatise are not restricted to his 
explanation of the vulgar belief in the continued and distinct existence of objects. Section VI of 
Part IV of the first book is given over to the question of our belief in personal identity, the 
conception we have of ourselves as continuous beings, simple at one time and identical 
through time. Where Hume's concern in Section II was with the 'simple supposition' of the 
uninterrupted existence of bodies, in Section VI, he considers the equally problematic 
supposition of the identity of persons(1). The problem, for philosophers of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, had important theological dimensions. The chief concern of Locke's 
theory of personal identity was with the question of the immortality of the human soul(2}. 
Hume's response to these difficulties is complex and, in a number of ways, unsatisfactory. 
The question of the origin of the idea of personal identity is, for Hume, notoriously vexed, his 
writing, at times, obscure and inconsistent, and his apparent self-doubts on the matter, 
perplexing, to say the least. Hume thought his discussion of personal identity to be attended 
by special difficulties and says as much in the Appendix to the Treatise(T.623-6). The 
secondary literature has typically taken Hume's apparent 'recantation'(3) as the taking-off point 
for extended and mostly pretty damning criticism. A good deal of this criticism does Hume a 
significant injustice. Without endorsing Hume's view in its entirety (even Hume felt unable to 
go so far), I believe it is possible to give a more just and plausibly self-consistent account, 
which makes sense of Hume's own doubts on the subject. Whether these doubts of Hume's 
amount to a recantation is a moot point to which I shall return. If we are to unravel these knots, 
we must, once more, observe a counsel of caution. We can only hope to resolve these 
problems if we bring to bear on our deliberations an appreciation of how Hume understood 
them. What this demands, at the very least, is a detailed and attentive reading of the text, and 
an acknowledgement that Hume has a number of general aims and interests in mind. In 
beginning Book Three of the Treatise, Hume suggests that the 'present system of philosophy' 
be best seen as acquiring 'new force as it advances'(T.455). It would be a serious mistake to 
treat Hume's discussion of personal identity as a self-contained argument which can be justly 
read without reference to other parts of the text. It must be read as a development and 
application of those resources with which Hume has already armed himself. Only by first 
grasping what Hume is about in the most general terms can we hope to illuminate the specific, 
and evidently tortuous, difficulties which stem from his discussion of personal identity. A good 
account needs not only to give a plausible reading to the self-doubts Hume entertains in the 
Appendix, but to do so in the broader context of his concern with the nature and origin of our 
ideas and with the ways in which we combine them in belief. 
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Hume suggests that we might look elsewhere in the text to illuminate and enrich the matter 
under discussion. We should take the suggestion seriously. This involves not only taking into 
account earlier clues to, and anticipations of, the discussion of personal identity(4), but 
evaluating Hume's argument in the light of his general philosophical intentions, honed and 
developed throughout the Treatise, and, in particular, in Book One. I want to begin by briefly 
placing what follows in the context of our emerging picture of Hume the philosopher. The 
discussion of personal identity ought to be seen as one part of Hume's evolving account of 
how, on the strictly limited basis of our ideas and impressions, we come to form certain 
commitments and beliefs about ourselves and the world we inhabit. Hume, as we have seen, 
is much more concerned with the matter-of-fact question of how we do think, than with the 
normative question of how we ought to think. Book One of the Treatise sees Hume apply his 
theory of the derivation and association of ideas to three main areas of belief: causation, the 
continuous existence of body, and personal identity. Hume's procedure in explaining the ideas 
of body and of necessary connection will, by this time, be familiar. Hume first asks what it is 
we believe when we have the belief which is in question. Having ascertained the nature and 
content of the belief, Hume looks to explain its origin in ideas and impressions. As we saw, in 
neither of the above two cases is Hume prepared to entertain the possibility that either sense 
or reason might give rise to the beliefs under discussion. Instead, it is to the imagination we 
must look for the source of our ordinary conceptions of things in the world. Hume offers a 
causal explanation of our 'vulgar' or everyday beliefs which shows them to be what he calls 
'fictions' of the imagination. These fictions, though often discoverably false, are nevertheless 
part of the important scaffolding out of which we construct and organise our thought and 
experience. Hume finds that we have no adequate idea either of causal power, as it is 
commonly understood, or of continued and distinct existence. Hume writes of the idea of 
necessary connection that 'we deceive ourselves, when we imagine we are possest of any 
idea of this kind, after the manner we commonly understand it'(T.161). It is the tendency of the 
mind to take itself to have an idea of necessary connection as 'some quality, which binds the 
effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other'(E.63) which 
Hume believes is mistaken. Employing his principle of the derivation of ideas from 
impressions, Hume gives a naturalistic explanation of our beliefs intended to explain both why 
we take ourselves to have such ideas, and how we come to have the ideas we do have. In the 
case of necessary connection, it is only because we have an idea of necessity, arising from a 
'determination of the mind', that we are able to mistake this idea for one which the mind does 
not possess. For Hume, as we saw, the question is not really about whether or not there exist 
such things as causal connections or lasting objects; it is about the extent to which we 
understand these things and about the role the supposed ideas of continued and distinct 
existence and causation play in a scientific understanding of nature. His real concern, as I 
read him, is with explaining how, from such unpromising material, we come to see the world 
and ourselves as we do. 
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Part IV of Book One of the Treatise deals with our beliefs about bodies and selves, and, in 
particular, our beliefs as to their identity over time. We believe not only in the continuous 
independent existence of objects, but in a mind which is identical with itself through time. As 
before, Hume is concerned with the sort of belief we actually have, and with the basis that 
belief has in ideas. Once again, as we will see, Hume finds our belief to go beyond what either 
sense or causal inference can strictly warrant. The imagination, Hume finds, makes an 'easy 
transition' from one state to another, though, as will become clear, his opinion differs as to 
what facilitates the easy passage in either case. It will be a significant part of my case to 
suggest that Hume's approach to the question of personal identity should be seen as differing 
markedly from another, perhaps more typically philosophical, approach. Hume needs to be 
seen not as offering an analysis of personal identity, of what it means for one person to be 
differentiated from others and from other things in the world, but as attempting to explain how 
we come to have the idea we have of ourselves as beings of that sort. The problem of how we 
identify A as the same person we met with yesterday, though crucial to most philosophical 
treatments of personal identity, is, at best, peripheral to Hume's. 
Our treatment of Hume's discussion of personal identity can usefully be broken up into a 
number of parts. In the first place, we need to understand just what Hume's theory is trying to 
achieve. How we view the question will depend, in some part, on the picture we have already 
gained of Hume's objectives and of the temper of his thought. Less generally, we need to ask 
of Hume the content of the belief which he attributes to the plain man, carefully distinguishing 
that belief from the philosophical view of the self which he further rejects. What is it like for us 
to think of ourselves as persons in this sense? The identity which we ordinarily ascribe 'to the 
mind of man', Hume finds, 'is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe 
to vegetables and animal bodies'(T.259). The account Hume offers, while denying us a certain 
sort of idea of mind, does not however deny that we have some idea of self. We have what 
Hume calls 'a true idea' of the mind, which his bundle theory of the self is intended to explain. 
A proper understanding of Hume on this point should illuminate the difficulties, even 
inconsistencies, often alleged to obtain between the view of the self given in Book One and 
that found in Book Two of the Treatise. I will go on to suggest that Hume is committed to no 
real inconsistency. Once an adequate account of Hume's intentions has emerged, we will be 
in a better position to understand the nature of his self-doubts, and the plausibility of the 
criticisms which have been informed by readings of it. I want to consider four main strands of 
criticism, rejecting three, while arguing for the fourth as, most probably, Hume's own. What I 
hope will emerge from an extended treatment of this final criticism, is a more sympathetic and 
just view of Hume's own attempts, which, while sensible of his mistakes, nevertheless 
presents a picture which is true to the text and to Hume's intentions. We need first to look at 
the substance of Hume's discussion. 
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4.1 Of Personal Identity 
Hume begins his discussion of personal identity with an allusion to the view of certain 
philosophers, among them, most obviously, Descartes and Leibniz, who take us to have an 
idea of ourselves as a simple substance, a 'perfectly identical' and simple self, of which we 
are, in some sense, immediately aware(5). According to these philosophers, Hume says, 'we 
are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence 
and continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both 
of its perfect identity and simplicity'(T.251). On this view, I have a readily inspectable internal 
impression of myself as the distinct and independent subject of my experiences. I am 
immediately aware of the simple essence of the immaterial substance to which my 
perceptions belong. But Hume finds the 'positive assertions' of this philosophy to be 'contrary 
to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self, after the 
manner it is here explain'd'(T.251). Accounts such as the one Hume describes fail even to 
properly characterise the experience to which they look for support. We have no impression of 
ourselves as the sort of simple substance that could endure without variation over time. 
Hume's argument is succinct. It must be some one impression, he thinks, that gives rise to 
every real idea, but 'self or person is not anyone impression, but that to which our several 
impressions and ideas are suppos'd to have a reference'(T.251). If any impression were to 
give rise to the idea of the self, that impression would need to 'continue invariably the same, 
thro' the whole course of our lives; since self is suppos'd to exist after that manner'. But, Hume 
says, there is no impression which is constant and invariable. We can therefore have no idea 
of the self, considered as a simple substance, with perfect identity and simplicity. Passions 
and sensations, Hume writes, 'succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It 
cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is 
deriv'd; and consequently there is no such idea'(T.251-2). 
These criticisms, with which Hume begins Section VI, need to be understood in the light both 
of his earlier assaults on the notion of substance, in 'Of the antient philosophy', and of the 
preceding section 'Of the Immateriality of the Soul', in which Hume rehearses the arguments 
he is to develop in discussion of personal identity. In the latter section, Hume argues that the 
only way in which an idea could represent a substance would be for that idea to possess all 
the qualities of a substance. Had we any idea of the substance of our minds, Hume writes, 'we 
must also have an impression of it; which is very difficult, if not impOSSible, to be conceiv'd. 
For how can an impression represent a substance, otherwise than by resembling it? And how 
can an impression resemble a substance, since, according to this philosophy, it is not a 
substance, and has none of the peculiar qualities or characteristics of a sUbstance?'(T.232-3) 
It will not do, Hume observes, simply to define a substance as something 'which may exist by 
itself' since, all our particular perceptions being distinct and separable by the imagination, they 
'may be consider'd as separately existent, and may exist separately, and have no need of any 
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thing else to support their existence. They are, therefore, substances, as far as this definition 
explains a substance'(T.233). The above definition of substance fails because it is unable 
even to adequately distinguish substances from our fleeting and perishing perceptions. Hume 
characterises the belief in substance as the belief in the simplicity and identity of an object 
over time. But when we introspect, we only ever stumble upon some perception or other. We 
have no 'perfect idea of any thing but of a perception. A substance is entirely different from a 
perception. We have, therefore, no idea of a substance'(T.234). The doctrine of substance 
requires that the substance be something other than the perceptions which are said to belong 
to it. But all I ever observe or, in any sense, experience, is a series of individual and variable 
perceptions, 'internal and perishing existences'(T.194) in a state of 'perpetual flux and 
movement'(T.252). I find nothing in my experience which could be justly called invariable or 
continuous. Hume returns to the point in his section on personal identity. The suggestion on 
the table is that we have an immediate awareness of the simple essence of an immaterial 
substance. The idea envisaged by philosophers like Descartes and the Cartesians must be a 
simple one derived from an impression which remains unchanged through time. We have no 
direct awareness of ourselves along these lines and, so, can have no idea of self as a simple 
substance. No single impression could alone give rise to the idea we have of ourselves as 
continuous beings. An impression of the right sort would have to be one which, per 
impossibile, had the properties of constancy and invariability through time which Hume 
equates with the possession of a perfect identity. 
The 'fictions' of what Hume calls the 'antient philosophy', though 'unreasonable and 
capricious', have, nevertheless, 'a very intimate connexion with the principles of human 
nature'(T.219). While these fictions arise very naturally from certain dispositions of mind, the 
same dispositions from which our vulgar notions of self arise, these separate notions ought 
not to be confused, nor should we make the mistake of taking the absence of an idea of a 
certain sort to imply the absence of another or of any idea of self. Hume ought not to be read 
as denying that we have an idea of self. He certainly does not. At this stage in his discussion, 
his point is merely to deny us a certain idea of self, which he finds implicit in the treatments of 
some philosophers. The view he considers he ascribes only to a number of thinkers whose 
opinion is confounded by the absence of an idea of the relevant sort. The 'propension' we 
nevertheless all have to suppose ourselves 'invariable and uninterrupted' throughout a lifetime 
is not synonymous with the propension to take ourselves to have an idea with those 
properties. We have no self-awareness of the kind envisaged by Descartes and others. For 
my part, Hume writes, 
when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some 
particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or 
hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a 
perception, and never can observe any thing but the perceptioll.(T.252) 
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We have no impression of any kind of perfectly identical and simple substance having those 
perceptions. There are the perceptions and that is all. There is no known extra in which these 
perceptions might be said to inhere, nor do we have any need of such a notion to come by the 
idea in question(6). Nothing in our experience is constant or invariable. Hume's point is a 
development of his earlier discussion of our ideas of external objects in 'Of the antient 
philosophy'. Our ideas of bodies, Hume writes there, 'are nothing but collections form'd by the 
mind of the ideas of the several distinct sensible qualities, of which objects are compos'd, and 
which we find to have a constant union with each other'(T.219). Though these qualities are 
distinct, we nevertheless 'commonly regard the compound, which they form, as ONE thing, 
and as continuing the SAME under very considerable alterations. The acknowledg'd 
composition is evidently contrary to this suppos'd simplicity, and the variation to the 
identity'(T.219). The identity or simplicity of an object is never disclosed in experience. All we 
ever find are collections of perceptions, never anyone thing continuing the same throughout 
the alterations Hume describes(7). We come to attribute identity to bodies not because we 
observe some part of them unchanged, but because of some operation of the imagination. It 
turns out to be the associative principles of resemblance and causation which explain how we 
come to entertain a belief in their identity over time. The effect of these relations in easing the 
transition of the mind is such that "tho every one must allow, that in a very few years both 
vegetables and animals endure a total change, yet we still attribute identity to them, while their 
form, size, and substance are entirely alter'd'(T.257). In the previous chapter, it will be 
remembered, we found Hume's concerns with the identity of objects to have to do much more 
with the interruptedness of our perceptions. We wrongly take our perceptions to have an 
existence uninterrupted by gaps in our observation. The disposition of the mind when 
considering an uninterrupted sequence is very similar to its disposition when considering an 
interrupted one. It is, Hume thinks, both easy and natural for us to confuse one with the other, 
and so take an example of the latter sort of sequence for an instance of the former. Our 
confidence in the existence of enduring bodies rests, Hume thinks, on the 'illusion' that 'our 
resembling perceptions are uninterrupted, and still existent, even when they are not present to 
the senses'(T.217). In this section and in the section concerning personal identity, however, 
Hume's special concern is overwhelmingly to do with change rather than with interruption. In 
order for us to be correct in attributing identity to an object, that object or some essential part 
of it must remain unaltered. Only what is invariable and uninterrupted can, properly speaking, 
correspond to the idea we have of identity or, more exactly, of perfect identity. But, as Hume 
makes clear, this is not true of any object. A change in any 'considerable part' of a body, 
Hume writes in 'Of personal identity', 
destroys its identity; but 'tis remarkable, that where the change is produc'd 
gradually and insensibly we are less apt to ascribe to it the same effect. 
The reason can plainly be no other, than that the mind, in following the 
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successive changes of the body, feels an easy passage from the surveying 
its condition in one moment to the viewing of it in another, and at no 
particular time perceives any interruption in its actions.(T.2S6) 
The 'smooth and easy' passage of the thought from the object as it stood before the change to 
the object as it stood after it is such that we 'are apt to imagine, that 'tis nothing but a continu'd 
survey of the same object'(T.256). It is the gradualness and systematicity of the change, and 
the resemblance between the actions of the imagination by which we consider an identical 
object and a succession of related ones, which allow the mind to pass so easily to the 
attribution of perfect identity to related bodies which in fact have none. 
We can now bring some of these insights to bear, as Hume does, in considering his 
explanation of how we come to think of ourselves, or our minds, as simple at one time and 
identical over time. Only what is invariable and uninterrupted can, according to Hume, satisfy 
our idea of identity. Despite the constant flux and motion of our perceptions, we nevertheless 
have a certain 'propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to 
suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro' the whole 
course of our Iives'(T.253). The mind, Hume says, 'is a kind of theatre, where several 
perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an 
infinite variety of postures and situations', yet we have not 'the most distant notion of the place, 
where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is compos'd'(T.2S3). We 
have, Hume thinks, distinct ideas both of 'an object, which remains invariable and 
uninterrupted thro' a suppos'd variation of time', which we call identity or sameness, and of 
'several different objects existing in succession, and connected together by a close relation', 
which we term diversity. It is certain, Hume says, that, though these ideas be perfectly distinct, 
in 'our common way of thinking they are generally confounded with each other'(T.253}. Since 
all we are aware of are perceptions, we can have no simple idea of ourselves as the sort of 
thing which possesses an unvaried and uninterrupted existence. Our perceptions lack what 
Hume calls 'perfect identity'(T.254}. Nevertheless, we are so constituted that it is natural for us 
to attribute to our perceptions such an identity, though strictly they have only a fictitious or 
imperfect identity. That operation of the imagination, Hume says, 'by which we consider the 
uninterrupted and invariable object, and that by which we reflect on the succession of related 
objects, are almost the same to the feeling, nor is there much more effort of thought requir'd in 
the latter case than in the former'(T.254}. The closeness of the relation among certain objects 
facilitates so smooth a passage of thought from one to the other that we are apt to confound 
the action of the imagination in this case for that felt when apprehending an identical object. 
This latter resemblance, Hume writes, 'is the cause of the confusion and mistake, and makes 
us substitute the notion of identity, instead of that of related objects'(T.254). As we will shortly 
see, a number of 'artifices' lead us to mistakenly take one act of the imagination for another 
and so induce us to attribute perfect identity when in fact there is none. We fall into the error 
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'before we are aware; and tho' we incessantly correct ourselves by reflexion, and return to a 
more accurate method of thinking, yet we cannot long sustain our philosophy, or take off this 
biass from the imagination'(T.254). It is very natural, as we saw, for us to resort to the fictions 
of the antient philosophy. We have, according to Hume, a pronounced tendency to attempt to 
resolve the apparent contradiction by positing the existence of a soul or simple substance 
which endures notWithstanding the 'flux and movement' of its perceptions. We feign 'some 
new and unintelligible principle, that connects the objects together, and prevents their 
interruption or variation. Thus we feign the continu'd existence of the perceptions of our 
senses, to remove the interruption; and run into the notion of a soul, and self, and substance, 
to disguise the variation'(T.254). Since it requires of us an idea which we cannot have, the 
notion of substance is, for Hume, not even intelligible. However, our tendency to confound 
identity with relation is, he thinks, so great, that 'we are apt to imagine something unknown 
and mysterious, connecting their parts, beside their relation', though we find nothing invariable 
or uninterrupted to justify our notion(T.254-5). The belief in a simple self is, Hume is clear, a 
mistake. We have no simple idea of the self. This, of course, is not to say that we have no 
idea of the self. We have an idea, but, as we shall shortly see, that idea is a complex one. 
The objects which we suppose to continue the same through time are, according to Hume, 
only such 'as consist of a succession of parts, connected together by resemblance, contiguity, 
or causation'(T.255). As such a succession answers only to our notion of diversity, 
it can only be by mistake we ascribe to it an identity; and as the relation 
of parts, which leads us into this mistake, is really nothing but a quality, 
which produces an association of ideas, and an easy transition of the 
imagination from one to another, it can only be from the resemblance, 
which this act of the mind bears to that, by which we contemplate one 
continu'd object, that the error arises.(T.255) 
We have no need of the doctrine of substance to make sense of our disposition to make 
attributions of identity to variable and interrupted objects. Hume's explanation of how we come 
to think of ourselves as simple at one time and identical through time runs parallel to his 
discussion of how we come to think of objects as having an invariable and uninterrupted 
existence. Hume asks us to suppose a mass of matter, 'of which the parts are contiguous and 
connected', to be placed before us. Provided the parts continue uninterruptedly and invariably 
the same, we must attribute a 'perfect identity' to this mass. But suppose 'some very small or 
inconsiderable part to be added to the mass, or subtracted from it', even though, strictly 
speaking, this change absolutely destroys the identity of the whole, we rarely think in such 
precise terms and 'scruple not to pronounce a mass of matter the same, where we find so 
trivial an alteration'(T.255-6). The passage of thought between related objects is so smooth 
and easy that we are apt to consider ourselves to observe one continuous existence. The 
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disposition of the mind when viewing an identical object is very similar to that of the mind when 
observing a succession of related objects. In this case it is the smallness of the alteration in 
proportion to the whole which sets us on to disregard it. It is the 'uninterrupted progress of the 
thought, which constitutes the imperfect identity'(T.256}. But even in the case of more 
extensive, less gradual, change, the imagination can contrive to 'disguise' it. There is, Hume 
says, 
another artifice, by which we may induce the imagination to advance a 
step farther; and that is, by producing a reference of the parts to each 
other, and a combination to some common end or purpose. A ship, 
of which a considerable part has been changed by frequent reparations, 
is still consider'd as the same; nor does the difference of the materials 
hinder us from ascribing an identity to it. The common end, in which 
the parts conspire, is the same under all their variations, and affords 
an easy transition of the imagination from one situation of the body to 
another.(T.257} 
The common end or purpose with which the parts are connected facilitates the easy passage 
of the mind from one state to another. It passes from one object to another so smoothly that 
we are apt to confuse this act of the imagination with that of considering a perfectly identical 
object. Even in the case of wholesale change, the imagination can work to disguise the 
variation. We still ascribe identity to related objects even where they endure a total change, as 
is the case, Hume says, with animals and vegetables. Here, not only do the several parts have 
a reference to some general purpose, but also some 'mutual dependence on, and connexion 
with each other'(T.257}. The constancy of the 'reciprocal relation of cause and effect'(T.2S7) 
between the parts allows us to think that an oak 'that grows from a small plant to a large tree, 
is still the same oak; tho' there be not one particle of matter, or figure of its parts the 
same'(T.257). By such artifices we are induced to take one act of the imagination for another 
and to attribute perfect identity to a succession of objects which have but an imperfect or 
fictitious identity. 
Similar considerations explain how we come to think of the successive perceptions which, 
Hume says, constitute the mind, as simple at one time and identical through time, though in 
reality they are neither. It is evident, Hume thinks, that 'the same method of reasoning must be 
continu'd, which has so successfully explain'd the identity of plants, and animals, and ships, 
and houses, and of all the compounded and changeable productions either of art or 
nature'(T.260). The identity which we attribute to the mind of man 'is only a fictitious one, and 
of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. It cannot, therefore, 
have a different origin but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like 
objects'(T.260). Notwithstanding the distinction and separability of our different perceptions, 
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'we suppose the whole train of perceptions to be united by identity'(T.260). Hume rejects the 
possibility that this relation of identity be something 'that really binds our several perceptions 
together'(T.260). The understanding never observes any such connection among its objects. 
Even the union of cause and effect, when strictly considered, 'resolves itself into a customary 
association of ideas'(T.260). We ascribe identity to our perceptions not because we observe 
some real connection among them but because of the effect those perceptions have on the 
imagination. It evidently follows, Hume writes, 'that identity is nothing really belonging to these 
different perceptions, and uniting them together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to 
them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon 
them'(T.260). The only qualities which can give ideas a union in the imagination are, Hume 
repeats, the natural relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation. Without these uniting 
principles each distinct object would appear to have no connection with any other object. The 
only question which remains for Hume is to ascertain which of these relations produce the 
'uninterrupted progress of our thought' when we consider 'the successive existence of a mind 
or thinking person'(T.260). Since, as Hume flatly insists, contiguity has little influence in the 
present case, we must confine our attention to resemblance and causation. 
The associative principles of resemblance and causation are, for Hume, conjointly sufficient to 
explain how we come to make the mistake of taking the related but variable and interrupted 
collection of our perceptions to be at once simple and identical over time. A 'more accurate 
method of thinking' WOUld, we saw, show up our minds as having no more than a fictitious or 
imperfect identity, and would command our assent, did our natures not incline us in another 
direction. Hume asks us to consider resemblance first: 
suppose we cou'd see clearly into the breast of another, and observe that 
succession of perceptions, which constitutes his mind or thinking principle, 
and suppose that he always preserves the memory of a considerable part of 
past perceptions; 'tis evident that nothing cou'd more contribute to the 
bestowing a relation on this succession amidst all its variations. But what is 
the memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions? 
And as an image necessarily resembles its object, must not the frequent placing 
of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought, convey the imagination 
more easily from one link to another, and make the whole seem like the 
continuance of one object?(T .260-1) 
In this particular, Hume continues, 'memory not only discovers the identity, but also 
contributes to its production, by producing the relation of resemblance among the 
perceptions'(T.261). Hume believes he has resolved the problem of whether, as Locke 
thought, memory produces personal identity, or whether, as some of Locke's opponents 
Suggested, it merely discovers it(8). It turns out that it has a hand in both. While memory 
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serves to discover the causal relations and resemblances among perceptions, it also plays a 
part in producing the resemblances. Memory produces images of past perceptions, 
themselves perceptions, which placed 'in the chain of thought' carry the imagination more 
readily from link to link. Since these images must necessarily resemble their objects, to 
remember is to have perceptions which resemble earlier perceptions in the chain. Hence, the 
memory can be said both to discover and produce the relation of resemblance, contributing in 
its own right to the passage of the imagination, to 'make the whole seem like the continuance 
of one object'. The relation of causation allows us to think of past perceptions which are no 
longer remembered as belonging to the same person. Hume writes: 
As to causation; we may observe, that the true idea of the human mind, is 
to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, 
which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually 
produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other. Our impressions give 
rise to their correspondent ideas; and these ideas in their turn produce other 
impressions. One thought chaces another, and draws after it a third, by 
which it is expell'd in its turn. In this respect, I cannot compare the soul 
more properly to any thing than to a republic or commonwealth, in which 
the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and 
subordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same 
republic in the incessant change of its parts.(T.261) 
Whatever changes a person endures, his 'several parts are still connected by the relation of 
causation'(T.261). Memory alone 'acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this 
succession of perceptions'(T.261). Without it we should never have any notion of the chain of 
causes and effects 'which constitute our self or person'(T.262). But once this notion has been 
acquired, we can 'extend the same chain of causes, and consequently the identity of our 
persons beyond our memory, and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, 
which we have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have eXisted'(T.262}. Memory 
discovers the relation, but, once discovered, it can take us beyond memory. As a republic may 
change both its members and its laws and constitution, so a person 'may vary his character 
and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity'(T.261). His 
character may change without his being obliged to think of himself as a different person. 
Throughout these changes, 'his several parts' are connected in a complex system of causes. 
As one thought causes another, so a past experience is the cause of a present belief and past 
perceptions of our memories of them. Memory shows us the relation of cause and effect 
'among our different perceptions'(T.262). The thought passes smoothly along the causal 
chain, making it easy for us to suppose not only that we have enjoyed a 'continu'd view' of one 
and the same object, but that that object has endured through time, beyond the reach of 
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memory. The same relations, Hume thinks, also explain our attributions of simplicity to diverse 
parts bound together by a close relation. 
Hume closes his discussion with the following remarks: 
The whole of this doctrine leads us to a conclusion, which is of great 
importance in the present affair, viz. that all the nice and subtile questions 
concerning personal identity can never possibly be decided, and are to 
be regarded rather as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties. 
Identity depends upon the relation of ideas; and these relations produce 
identity, by means of that transition they occasion. But as the relations, 
and the easiness of the transition may diminish by insensible degrees, we 
have no just standard, by which we can decide any dispute concerning the 
time, when they acquire or lose a title to the name of identity. All the 
disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely verbal, 
except so far as the relation of parts gives rise to some fiction or imaginary 
principle of union, as we have already observ'd.(T.262) 
Earlier in the discussion, Hume is at pains to stress that the dispute concerning identity 'is not 
merely a dispute of words'(T.255). When we mistakenly attribute identity to variable or 
interrupted objects, 'our mistake is not confin'd to the expression, but is commonly attended 
with a fiction, either of something invariable and uninterrupted, or of something mysterious and 
inexplicable, or at least with a propensity to such fictions'(T.255). Nevertheless, in so far as 
debate has to do with where identity begins or ends, the dispute is, according to Hume, 
'merely verbal'. We have no 'just standard' by which we can decide the dispute. Verbal 
disputes, Hume writes in his Dialogues, concern 'the degrees of any quality or circumstance', 
and, 'from the very nature of language and of human ideas', involve us in 'perpetual 
ambiguity', from which we 'can never, by any precaution or any definitions, be able to reach a 
reasonable certainty or precision'(9). The nature of the dispute of which Hume writes so 
dismissively here concerns the points at which a collection of related objects or perceptions 
might be said to either maintain or lose its identity. In such cases our inquiries are subject to 
an incurable ambiguity(10). It is with such enquiries that Hume means to contrast his own, 
philosophical interests. The philosophical difficulty, as Hume has it, concerns the fiction that 
the mind is simple at once time and continuous over time and the 'relation of parts' which 
gives rise to it. Identity gets ascribed to objects despite their being subject to change. Hume is 
not concerned with what would count as a case of genuine identity. This is just the sort of 
dispute Hume dismisses as incurably ambiguous. He does not suggest that we are wrong to 
attribute identity to the things we do. Where we err is in attributing perfect identity to a 
succession of related, but separable and variable, objects. There is, as Hume thinks, a fiction 
involved in these attributions. Since it can only be a mistake to ascribe an identity to what 
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consists only in a succession of parts. our chief business. as philosophers. must be to prove 
that those variable and interrupted objects to which we attribute an identity 'are such as 
consist of a succession of related objects'(T.255). This dispute is evidently more than merely 
verbal since we can both expose as mistaken the attribution of identity in such cases and 
explain the mistake in terms of the relatedness of the objects and the associative tendencies 
of the human mind. As we saw. the close relation found among related objects facilitates the 
smooth and easy passage of thought from one object to the next and so leads us, mistakenly, 
to take one action of the imagination for another. 
Hume confidently presents the foregoing account not only as settling the sUbstantive issues to 
do with personal identity but as exposing 'all the nice and subtile questions concerning 
personal identity' as being merely grammatical. In spite of this. by the time he came to write 
the Appendix, Hume was less inclined to express satisfaction with his account. Hume rests 
content with his finding that we have no notion of a substantial self, as distinct from our 
particular perceptions: 
But having thus loosen'd all our particular perceptions, when I proceed 
to explain the principle of connexion. which binds them together, and 
makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity; I am sensible. 
that my account is very defective. and that nothing but the seeming 
evidence of the precedent reasonings cou'd have induc'd me to receive 
it. (T.635) 
No connections among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. 
We apprehend only 'a connexion or a determination of the thought to pass from one object to 
another'. The ideas of past perceptions are 'felt to be connected together, and naturally 
introduce each other.' This conclusion. however. Hume thinks, need not surprise us: 
Most philosophers seem inclin'd to think. that personal identity arises from 
consciousness; and consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or 
perception. The present philosophy, therefore. has so far a promising aspect. 
But all my hopes vanish. when I come to explain the principles. that unite 
our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot 
discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head. 
In short, there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor 
is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct 
perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives 
any real connexion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions 
either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive 
some real connexion among them. there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. 
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For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this 
difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to 
pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon 
more mature reflection, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile 
those contradictions.(T.635-6) 
The account which we saw Hume present with some satisfaction in 'Of personal identity' is 
now, to Hume's thinking, inadequate and inconsistent. On a 'more strict review' of the section, 
Hume writes, 'I find myself involv'd in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how 
to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent'(T.633). It is far from clear 
why, though, as we will now see, critics have consistently found reason enough for 
dissatisfaction. The puzzle for commentators remains the question of precisely where Hume 
takes this inconsistency to lie. It seems evident that the two principles Hume 'cannot render 
consistent' in the above passage are not inconsistent with each other. Presumably, then, 
Hume considers the principles conjointly inconsistent with some other principle or commitment 
incurred earlier or elsewhere in the text. The question of what inconsistency Hume thought he 
had found, should not, of course, distract us from the question of what legitimate sources of 
dissatisfaction are to be found in his discussion. We need to consider in what respects 
Hume's account might be said to be internally inconsistent, irrespective of what Hume is likely 
to have thought about it. To do this, we need to bear in mind the kind of problem Hume takes 
himself to be wrestling with. What problem is his account intended to solve? Only by seeing 
the question clearly can we hope to assess Hume's answer and his later doubts as to its 
adequacy. I want to consider a number of well-known interpretations of Hume's alleged 
'recantation'. Many of the concems expressed here would not have worried Hume, nor, as I 
will suggest, need they have, given the kind of question Hume wanted to answer. In the 
account that follows, it will, I hope, become clear just what kind of criticism ought to have 
worried Hume, as well as the sort of worry which is most likely to be at the root of his own self-
doubts. 
4.2 Hume's 'Recantation' and His Critics 
Most critics agree that the account of personal identity I have just sketched is, in one way or 
another, deeply flawed. Hume's treatment appears cursory and superficial when compared to 
the longer and more detailed sections dealing with our ideas of causation and of the continued 
existence of body. The perfunctory style in which he despatches the topic has made it easy for 
critics to find flaws and obscurities, failing, very often, to heed Hume's own plea for his work to 
be read as a whole of mutually-dependent, inter-related parts. Hume begins with an 
assumption, a 'simple supposition', as he describes it, which we are all, he believes, inclined 
to make. It is because of this inclination, this fiction which our natures lead us to entertain, that 
Hume takes his inquiry to be more than merely grammatical. We might, and indeed should, 
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ask whether this is an assumption we ever really make. Hume can point to the fictions of the 
'antient philosophy' which he believes to have an intimate relation to our ordinary ways of 
taking reality. It is, Hume thinks, perfectly natural for us to invent some constant and invariable 
substance to explain the variability of our ideas. We incline to do so only to resolve the conflict 
that arises between the assumption of identity and the real and obvious flux of our 
perceptions. It is only because we mistakenly take our minds to have a perfect identity and 
simplicity that the tension can take hold in the first place. The supposition of something 
uninterrupted and unchanging behind the constant flux of changes we observe resolves the 
conflict. The substance in which these continually changing qualities inhere remains the same. 
Hume's thesis as to the distinctness and variability of our perceptions does not, however, 
prompt him to abandon talk of an identical self entirely. The complex 'idea of ourselves' which 
is the outcome of Hume's deliberations in Book One is presented as an unproblematic 
assumption behind the discussion of the passions found in Book Two. In the Appendix, as we 
saw, Hume is much more inclined not only to dissatisfaction, but to near despair, at difficulties 
which he fears too hard for his understanding. Hume was, evidently, deeply troubled by the 
problems arising from the section on personal identity. Doubtless, there are real flaws, and 
real obscurities in Hume's thinking. There is, however, remarkably little agreement as to where 
the main flaws and obscurities of Hume's treatment actually lie. Critics differ, often crucially, as 
to the nature of the thesis Hume is defending. With many of these critics we may find 
ourselves in agreement while rejecting outright their criticisms as they apply to Hume. Another 
path lies open to those more sympathetic to Hume's approach: to deny that the discredited 
view is one which Hume defended or would be interested in defending. A good interpretation 
will be one which, while acknowledging the flaws where they occur, attempts to see them from 
Hume's own perspective and, in doing so, places them within the context of his broader 
theoretical intentions. It is only the 'precedent reasonings' which induce Hume to receive the 
present philosophy, though he apparently, upon reflection, finds it far from his taste. To 
understand Hume's reasons for pleading 'the privilege of a sceptic' we need to appreciate both 
the sorts of commitments incurred by his broader enterprise, and the kinds of difficulties which 
are likely to have troubled a philosopher like Hume. Only in this way can we hope to develop 
and clarify our emerging general picture of his thought, in what is already an over-crowded 
and troublingly uneven field. I want to begin with what is perhaps the most emphatically 
damning, and, for reasons which will quickly emerge, least well-founded, allegation of internal 
inconsistency in Hume's account. 
The story Hume offers in Book One of the Treatise, is, it is suggested, inconsistent with the 
view of the self presented in Book Two, and with the philosophical commitments that view 
demands. At the beginning of his discussion of personal identity, Hume says that we must 
distinguish 'betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it 
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regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves'(T.253). When, in Book Two, he 
comes to discuss identity 'as it regards our passions', Hume writes: 
'Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always 
intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively 
a conception of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that 
any thing can in this particular go beyond it. Whatever object, therefore, 
is related to ourselves must be conceived with a like vivacity of 
conception, according to the foregoing principles; and tho' this relation 
shou'd not be so strong as that of causation, it must still have a considerable 
influence.(T.317) 
A little later in Book Two, Hume remarks that we are 'at all times intimately conscious of 
ourselves, our sentiments and passions'(T.339). Hume, as we have already seen, consistently 
denies that we can have any impression which has the qualities of a simple substance, 
constancy and invariability, and so, that one has, or can have, an impression of self, construed 
in this 'strict and philosophical' way. It has appeared to some commentators that while, in 
Book Two, Hume affirms the existence of a mind or self, in Book One, he explicitly denies it. 
According to Kemp Smith's influential account, in Book One of the Treatise, 'the existence of 
an impression of the self is explicitly denied, while his theory of the "indirect" passions 
propounded at length in Book II is made to rest on the assumption that we do in fact 
experience an impression of the self, and that this impression is ever-present to us'(11). Hume 
claims both that we have an impression of the self and that that impression is intimately 
present to us. Yet in Book One he appears to deny both these claims. On Kemp Smith's 
interpretation, it is the reliance of Hume's account of the indirect passions on an awareness of 
personal identity, which is at the heart of his own doubts concerning the discussion in Book 
One(12). By the time he came to write the Appendix, it is suggested, Hume realised that the 
account of the passions he offered in Book Two was predicated upon an awareness of self 
which the story offered in Book One could not allow for. 
To take the latter point first, there are a number of reasons for thinking this an inadequate 
explanation of Hume's own dissatisfaction. Hume makes it clear in the Appendix that it is from 
a strict review of the section concerning personal identity that his 'labyrinthine' worries emerge. 
The account of his misgivings that follows makes no mention of the allegedly different self of 
the passions, nor indeed of the sections in which we are supposed to find it. The case is made 
still more difficult for Kemp Smith, when we find Hume, in the Appendix, still inclined to 
express satisfaction with the parts of his story about which he is meant to have misgivings of 
the most serious sort. Hume's concern in the opening pages of the section dealing with 
personal identity, it will be remembered, is with those philosophers who imagine we are 'every 
moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF', and that we are certain 'beyond the 
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evidence of a demonstration 'both of its identity and its simplicity. We have no idea of self, 
Hume complains, 'after the manner it is here explain'd'(T.251). Hume repeats the point in the 
Appendix. We have, he writes, 'no impression of self or substance, as something simple and 
individual. We have, therefore, no idea of them in that sense'(T.633). We have no notion 
either of self or substance 'when conceiv'd distinct from particular perceptions'(T.635). The 
'thought alone finds personal identity' when it reflects upon the past perceptions which, Hume 
continues still to insist, 'compose a mind'. Most philosophers, Hume assures us, concur in the 
view that identity 'arises from consciousness; and consciousness is nothing but a reflected 
thought or perception'. Hume seems content that this much of his theory, as he originally 
formulated it, is right, and likely to yield good and useful results. The 'present philosophy', he 
finds, 'has so far a promising aspect'(T.635). 
It is clear, I think, from any fair reading, that the passages thought to be at the core of Hume's 
worries in Book One have at their heart some thesis more modest than the one Kemp Smith 
attributes to them. Hume is only committed to the sort of inconsistency described if the thesis 
offered there denies us any idea or impression of self whatsoever. It does not. It is clearly a 
part, and a vital one, of Hume's account to say that we neither experience, nor have we any 
idea, of a self simple at one time and identical over time. But Hume no less requires the 
existence of an idea of self of another sort. That to which we tend to attribute what Hume calls 
'perfect identity' is a mere collection or bundle of variable and interrupted perceptions, which 
have, in reality, only an imperfect or fictitious identity. Had we no such idea, we would not be 
inclined to suppose the mind possessed of a perfect identity and simplicity. It is important to 
Hume to show that the idea of personal identity, as it is commonly understood, be one that, in 
spite of its illusory nature, is capable of gripping us. Nowhere does Hume suggest we 
abandon our ordinary talk of an identical self or of identical objects. For other purposes, he is 
more than prepared to take for granted the fact of personal identity over time. Where he thinks 
we err is in unreflectively taking the idea we have of an imperfectly identical object to be an 
idea of perfect identity. The mind, considered as composed purely of a train of perceptions, 
between which some connection is felt to hold, has, strictly speaking, no perfect identity. Nor 
do we have any notion of self or substance as distinct from the particular perceptions. This 
does not mean that we are never right to attribute identity to our minds. There is some sense 
in which the mind can be said to be identical through time. What Hume does deny is the 
Cartesian suggestion that we have any idea of a self which is perfectly identical and simple. At 
no point in the Appendix, nor anywhere else, does Hume suggest that this much of his 
account enjoys anything less than the promising philosophical prospect of which he writes so 
approvingly. 
The discussion in Book Two is intended not only to endorse but to corroborate the idea of the 
self propounded in the previous book. Hume's target in the early passages of Book One is 
those philosophers who take us to have an awareness of self which he finds 'contrary to that 
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very experience, which is pleaded for them'(T.2S1). We find the key point of this part of his 
discussion reiterated in Book Two. 'Ourself', Hume writes, 'independent of the perception of 
every other object, is in reality nothing'(T.340). But Hume is equally clear that we have an 
awareness of self of some other sort. We are, he says, 'at all times intimately conscious of 
ourselves, our sentiments and passions'(T.339). The 'impression of ourselves' is always 
'intimately present with us'. The indirect passions require both a cause and an object, in other 
words, oneself. We must, Hume says in his discussion of pride and humility, 'make a 
distinction betwixt the cause and the object of these passions; betwixt that idea which excites 
them, and that to which they direct their view, when excited.' The first idea presented to the 
mind is that of the 'cause or productive principle', which excites the passion associated with it. 
That passion, once excited, 'turns our view to another idea, which is that of the self'(T.278). 
The idea of the self, Hume says, is the object of the passion. We do not, of course, have any 
idea of self as simple at one time and perfectly identical through time, though it is natural for 
us to suppose so. We do, however, have an idea of the human mind as a bundle or system of 
different perceptions, linked together by the relations of resemblance and cause and 
effect(T.261). The object to which pride and humility refer is self, Hume writes in Book Two, 'or 
that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and 
consciousness'(T.277). It is to this complex idea of ourselves to which Hume unabashedly 
refers us throughout Book Two. The 'true idea of the human mind' as a system of interrelated 
perceptions, united together by causation and resemblance, is a view which 'our identity with 
regard to the passions serves to corroborate' by making 'our distant perceptions influence 
each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or 
pleasures'(T.261). Our present concerns show us both the influence of past pains and 
pleasures and the influence of our like expectations for the future. Memory, the 'chief source' 
of personal identity, acquaints us with 'the continuance and extent of this succession of 
perceptions'(T.261). Whatever objects may be comprehended by the mind, Hume says in 
Book Two, 'they are always consider'd with a view to ourselves: otherwise they wou'd never be 
able either to excite these passions, or produce the smallest encrease or diminution of 
them'(T.277). In this way, it is not merely an idea, but rather an impression of ourselves that is 
intimately present to the mind. Any impression could serve in the role, since the idea we have 
of the self is a general or abstract one which, when annexed to a general term, makes us 
recall other perceptions associated with the bundle by the relations of resemblance and cause 
and effect. All our perceptions share this feature of being related in one of these ways to other 
of our perceptions. The 'connected succession of perceptions, which we call self' is always the 
object of our passions. Whatever we comprehend, we do so with a view to ourselves. Were 
this not so, Hume makes clear, no person or object could have any influence upon us(T.280). 
The 'true idea' of the self expounded in Book One is corroborated in Book Two in another 
important way. As the immediate object of the indirect passions, pride and humility, is 'self or 
that identical person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensation we are intimately conscious; 
235 
so the object of love and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions, and 
sensations we are not conscious'(T.339). Our love and hatred is always directed to some 
person 'external to us'. The cause of love and hatred, Hume says, 'must be related to a person 
or thinking being, in order to produce these passions'(T.331). Presumably, one comes to 
attribute identity to other persons in the same way as one comes to treat any complex object, 
animate or inanimate, as identical. Once we are aware of others, we become less inclined to 
view our experience solipsistically and are more inclined to think of ourselves as persons with 
minds and bodies, related to others in ways which contribute to the way in which we think of 
ourselves. The passage of the imagination 'is smooth and open from the consideration of any 
person related to us to that of ourself, of whom we are every moment conscious'(T.340). We 
come to recognise ourselves not only as beings with concerns for others but as beings for 
whom others are concerned and for whom those concerns matter. An important part of what it 
means to be self-conscious is to think of oneself as a potential object of the attention and 
concern of others, of their contempt or of their esteem and admiration. There are few persons 
'that are satisfy'd with their own character, or genius, or fortune, who are not desirous of 
shewing themselves to the world, and of acquiring the love and approbation of 
mankind'(T.331-2). Nothing 'more readily produces kindness and affection to any person, than 
his approbation of our conduct and character: As on the other hand, nothing inspires us with a 
stronger hatred, than his blame or contempt'(T.346}. What is a source of esteem in others is a 
source of pride in oneself. If love and esteem 'were not produc'd by the same qualities as 
pride, according as these qualities are related to ourselves or others, this method of 
proceeding wou'd be very absurd, nor cou'd men expect a correspondence in the sentiments 
of every other person, with those themselves have entertain'd'(T.332}. We see others in 
relation to the qualities which elicit our esteem or disapprobation, in the same way as we see 
ourselves in relation to the qualities which produce in us feelings of pride or shame. Our self-
understanding, both as persons among others, minds and bodies with a definite lifespan, and 
as the sorts of persons we take ourselves to be or would wish to be, depends quite largely 
upon those others who are the objects of our passions. The sentiments of others always play 
a considerable part in the way in which we think of ourselves. None of this should be read as 
contradicting the substantive doctrinal claims of Book One. An interesting question, to which 
we will, however, need to return, lies in the possibility that Hume might have considered some 
of the data which he makes use of in Book Two as resources useful to the explanation found 
in Book One. Why he does not, I will suggest, tells us something crucial about the kind of task 
Hume has set himself. 
Hume, tellingly enough, finds it unnecessary either to recant his denial of the existence of a 
simple self or to review the notion of self propounded in Book One and, as we saw, fully 
endorsed in Book Two. Hume is not concerned to show that the ascription of identity to any 
changed or changing thing is wrong. Change is, of course, crucial to his account, but it is the 
ascription of perfect identity to variable and inconstant objects that he thinks is illusory. This is 
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as true of the self as it is of a river or a church. If the point fails to stick it is because we fail to 
take seriously some of the key distinctions Hume insists upon. We can draw an important 
parallel with Hume's treatment of the idea of necessary connection. Hume dispenses with the 
idea of necessary connection as philosophers like Malebranche thought of it. The mind, he 
believes, has no genuine idea of power in nature as anything more than mere regular 
succession among objects. We nevertheless have an idea of necessary connection drawn 
from the association of ideas which takes place in a mind when it perceives the regular 
succession of events. It is this idea which we unreflectively take for an idea of 'real' or 'true' 
necessity in nature. The 'generality of mankind' continue, mistakenly, to think that 'they 
perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is connected with its effect, and is 
for ever infallible in its operation'(E.69). In the same way, while Hume does deny that we have 
an idea of personal identity which has all the properties we unreflectively take it to have, he 
does not deny that we have some idea of personal identity. As before, the account he gives is 
intended to explain both the origin of the idea we have, and our propensity to take it for 
another, which, he makes clear, we very certainly lack. A failure to appreciate this important 
parallel stems simply from a failure to take Hume's writing at face value. Hume's initial target 
is the philosophical doctrine of simple substance which improperly and implausibly 
characterises the only experience to which it can look for support. The fictions of these 
philosophers, though unreasonable, have nevertheless an 'intimate connexion with the 
principles of human nature' which accounts for our mistaken ascriptions of perfect identity. 
The study of human thought and belief has to be disentangled from the fictions of the 'antient 
philosophy'. Hume finds that it is natural for us to confound one action of the imagination with 
another and so to attribute to our perceptions a perfect identity when they have only a fictitious 
one. It is to our true idea of ourselves as a bundle or heap of related perceptions that we 
ascribe a perfect identity. Hume is careful to distinguish perfect from imperfect or, as he also 
terms it, 'fictitious' identity. Since we are aware only of a fleeting and unstable succession of 
perceptions, we cannot have impressions of anything 'simple and continu'd'(T.2S2) from which 
we could derive a genuine idea of self conceived of as distinct from our particular perceptions. 
Instead we have an idea of imperfect identity which the mind mistakes for an idea which it 
does not possess. Hume shows that we can have no idea of a simple self. But he does not 
suggest, nor is it in any way to his purpose to argue, that we are never right to attribute identity 
to an object, or, indeed, to ourselves. 
Hume relies on a number of tendencies and principles of mind to explain how, faced only with 
the perpetual flux of our perceptions, we get the idea of ourselves as Simple at one time and 
identical through time. The action of these principles explains how we come to regard what 
turn out to be pure fictions of the imagination as real connections, obtaining between the 
events and objects of our experience. It seems then natural to ask of Hume just what it is that 
is led to mistakenly take one action of the imagination for another, that has the beliefs and 
forms the expectations it has. Hume treats many of our fundamental ideas as fictions. but 
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surely, it is suggested, it must be something other than a fictitious self which does all of these 
things. On this reading, what Hume's account crucially lacks, and what he perhaps came to 
realise it lacked, is a real enduring self, subject to and owner of the experiences and 
tendencies Hume describes. What is it that has these experiences, is affected by them in 
certain ways, and comes to entertain certain beliefs as to their nature? The suggestion is that 
Hume's theory, as presented in Book One, is unable to account for, or leaves no room for, the 
sort of constant, lasting self, his discussion, at every turn, presupposes. Hume speaks 
confidently of a mind or self which combines and, frequently, confuses its perceptions, orders 
them according to laws, and, often mistakenly, ascribes identity to some of them. What can it 
be that does a/l these things? A mere bundle of perceptions? How, we might ask, can a 
bundle do anything? Hume, it would appear, is drawn back to the sort of notion of self as 
something distinct and apart from our particular perceptions that he rejects at the outset of his 
discussion. It is this realisation, which, it is suggested, causes Hume to despair of ever 
reconciling the conflicting parts of his system. 
The problem, as Macnabb formulates it, is not that the 'series of conscious states' is 'required 
to be aware of itself. We are not self-conscious all the time. We are self-conscious at certain 
times. It is some of the members of the series that must be aware of themselves as members 
of the series. Just as when a nation is said to be conscious of itself as a nation, it is really the 
members of the nation, or some of them, who are aware of themselves as members of the 
nation.' What then is it, MacNabb asks, for 'a perception to be aware of itself as a member of 
that relational unity of perceptions we call mind? I do not know the answer to this 
question'(13}. Macnabb's complaint is that Hume requires a perception to do what he readily, 
and plausibly, supposes it cannot, that is, be aware of itself. Hume must, if he is to be 
consistent, admit of the existence of something other than the perceptions themselves, 
something which is able to combine, confuse and associate, as well as be aware of, the 
perceptions. 
Is Hume committed to a view like the one Macnabb outlines? I think it is clear that he is not. 
The suggestion is that Hume's theory is inconsistent with the existence of the propensities and 
operations of mind he describes. Hume does not suggest that it is anything other than the self 
which thinks, comprehends, believes, and is aware. He is, rather, asking us to think about 
what it means to say so. While Hume speaks freely of our individual perceptions influencing 
and attracting each other, he never, to my knowledge, credits them with thought, 
understanding or awareness. Hume has said that we have a true idea of the self as a bundle 
of perceptions. But it is not the bundle or series, as such, which is aware of itself. According to 
Nelson Pike, Hume could, quite properly, 'translate' the statement 'I am aware of myself as a 
"bundle'" into another statement making explicit mention of mind: 'An awareness of myself as 
a series of perceptions is presently occurring in my mind'(14). Hume, as Pike rightly observes, 
is not offering his theory as an analysis of the meaning of 'I'. To say that I am aware of myself 
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as a bundle of perceptions is just to say that an idea of self, a 'true' one, by Hume's lights, has 
occurred in a particular bundle. In Pike's terms, an 'awareness of the series of perceptions' is 
'presently occurring within the series of perceptions'. To say that x is aware of y is just to say 
that y is occurring within a given bundle. To say that x is aware of him or herself as a bundle of 
perceptions is just to say that just such an idea is occurring in the bundle. A perception cannot 
be aware of itself. Yet an awareness of a certain perception as related to others in the bundle 
in one or other of the two ways Hume describes can be a present member of that bundle. 
We can generalise the point as Pike goes on to do. There is thought to be a problem in Hume 
as to what it is that confuses, combines or associates one perception with another. As 
Passmore puts the point: 'If all that happened is that a series of very similar (or causally 
linked) perceptions succeed one another, there is no possible way in which this series of itself 
could generate the fiction of personal identity'(15), or, indeed, perform many of the other 
complex mental activities Hume describes. According to Hume, I come, mistakenly, to 
attribute perfect identity to my variable and interrupted perceptions. Passmore thinks that 
Hume cannot explain how we are able to entertain this 'fiction' without specifying what it is 
'which confuses succession and identity'. The idea of a self with associative tendencies and 
mechanisms presupposes some notion of self beyond what can be specified purely in terms of 
perceptual occurrences. But I think it is clear that Hume has no need of positing such a self. 
To say that the mind confounds one perception or idea with another is, in Hume's terms, just 
to say that one idea causes another in the same bundle. To have a belief in the perfect identity 
of one's perceptions means just that there occurs in the series a lively idea of a certain sort. 
Statements containing verbs like 'sees' or 'believes' are all, according to Pike, 'translatable into 
statements mentioning only the presence of a certain perception ... within a certain collection of 
perceptions'(16). Any statement specifying a mental activity such as thinking or understanding 
can be replaced without change or loss of sense with a statement specifying the occurrence of 
certain perceptions within a bundle. The various activities of the mind can be accounted for, 
on Hume's theory, in terms of the ways and circumstances in which perceptions occur. To say 
that the mind associates one idea with another is just to say that ideas of a certain sort tend to 
be followed by ideas of another definite sort. Hume can, and, doubtless, would, explain the 
other tendencies and dispositions of mind solely in terms of what perceptions occur. Any 
mental activity or act can be explained in terms of the occurrence of perceptions in the mind. 
This is just what it is to discover tendencies among mental events and this is all the mind's 
activity consists in. The lesson of Hume's treatment of causation is that this is all it can be. To 
speak of the tendencies and principles of mind is to do no more than to specify the ways and 
circumstances in which certain perceptions occur. Hume can quite consistently speak of the 
associative mechanisms of the mind without positing the existence of a self which is 
something more than the bundle of perceptions. Hume does not deny that the mind does the 
things it does, he simply has a different notion of what it means to say so. 
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Whatever it was troubling Hume in the Appendix it is unlikely to have been the need to 
consistently account for the activities of the mind without positing the existence of a genuine 
and enduring self, combining, associating and, at times, confusing, its perceptions. He should 
easily have seen that the suggestion poses no real problem for him. Hume is quite able to 
explain the activities and tendencies of the mind purely in terms of the ways in which 
perceptions occur. To make a charge of inconsistency in these terms is already to 
misconstrue Hume's central point. He is attempting to show that a realist ontology is not the 
only way of accounting for our various cognitive commitments. But Hume may still be 
vulnerable to another, related, though distinct, complaint. Even supposing Hume's principles 
of causation and resemblance to be equal to the task of explaining how we come to ascribe 
identity to a bundle of separate, individual perceptions, it may still seem that Hume has not 
done enough to explain how our experiential data are presented to us as they are. It may 
appear that the mechanisms which underlie the tendencies and principles of mind which lead 
us to ascribe to our successive perceptions a real simplicity and identity are in some crucial 
sense underexplained. Stroud, while conceding the point that Hume is committed to no real 
inconsistency in denying the existence of a real rather than a fictitious self, thinks that Hume 
must say more if he is to specify all that is the case when I believe that p. Although I am 
nothing but a 'personal' or causally-contained bundle of perceptions, Stroud says, 'we cannot 
say that all that is the case when I believe that p, for example, is that the lively idea or belief 
that p occurs in some "personal" bundle of perceptions or other. It must occur in a certain 
particular bundle, viz. the bundle that I am, in order to constitute my believing that p, and as 
long as there are at least two minds or persons in existence, not every 'personal' bundle is 
what I am'(17). Let us assume for the moment that Hume has shown that all our perceptions 
can be linked in the mind by either one of the relations of resemblance and causation. It 
seems that we ought still to be asking for something more than this. This more is whatever it 
is in virtue of which our perceptions are presented in the way they are, that is, in discrete, 
causally-contained bundles. Stroud goes on to put the point in this way: 
It is ... clear that Hume's explanation of the origin of the idea of the 
self or mind is not necessarily deficient in failing to give an account of how 
a certain idea arises from certain 'data', but that it leaves completely 
unintelligible and mysterious the fact that those 'data' are as they are. When 
we press on to that level of inquiry we find it is simply taken as a given 
fact about the universe of perceptions that the range of reflective vision 
of anyone of them does not extend to all the rest. And it is only because 
one's gaze is thus restricted to a certain subset of all the perceptions there 
are that it is possible for a person to get an idea of himself. (18) 
What, Stroud ask_s, 'accounts for the fact that one cannot survey in the same way all the 
perceptions there are?'(19) We never learn from Hume how it is the data with which a mind 
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has to work are restricted to a subset of all perceptions. What explains the presence of 
perceptions 'in discrete, separate bundles'(20} rather than in one vast, undifferentiated 
bundle? Hume, Stroud says, 'leaves unanswered the most important question about the self 
or self-consciousness'(21}. Hume 'cannot explain how or why the "data" from which the idea of 
personal identity is constructed present themselves in the way they do. And if they did not 
present themselves that way, his explanation would collapse'(22}. Stroud's tentative 
suggestion is that Hume's self-doubts in the Appendix can be traced to his growing awareness 
of the inadequacy of his theory of ideas to the task of answering this crucial question. 
We come to think of ourselves as beings which are 'simple and continu'd'(T.2S2) only because 
we have an unphilosophical tendency to mistake our true idea of ourselves as a bundle of 
related perceptions for an idea of something perfectly identical. We can only acquire the idea if 
all our perceptions can be seen to be related to others in the same bundle in one of two ways. 
We see ourselves in such a way only because our experience is restricted in the way Stroud 
describes, to a particular subset or causally-contained bundle. Were our experience not 
restricted in this way, we would either find that only a few of those perceptions available to us 
were related in appropriate ways, or that all those perceptions were in fact related, but in a 
single, solipsistic mind. In neither case could we come by the idea of ourselves as minds 
among others. What Hume's theory leaves 'completely unintelligible', according to Stroud, is 
the fact of the data from which our idea arises being as they are. Stroud's point has some 
obvious appeal. We do, as a matter of fact, make distinctions among minds. Perceptions do 
present themselves, as Stroud says, in separate, discrete bundles. The problem of explaining 
why perceptions come in many different, discrete bundles is one that does appear to arise as 
a corollary of one of Hume's key theoretical principles, that of the distinctness and separability 
of each individual perception from every other. Every 'distinct perception, which enters into the 
composition of the mind, is a distinct existence, and is different, and distinguishable, and 
separable from every other perception, either contemporary or successive'(T.259}. Having 
thus 'Ioosen'd all our particular perceptions'(T.635}, Hume seems at a loss when it comes to 
account for what it is 'binds them together'. 'All my hopes vanish', Hume says, 'when I come to 
explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or 
consciousness'(T.636}. So, Stroud's view can be seen to make a fairly plausible appeal to the 
text. 
I do, however, have a number of reservations about full-bloodedly attributing Stroud's view to 
Hume. Hume, we should remember, does not regard it as a defect of his theory of causation 
that he finds no real connection between causally related events. Hume claims there are no 
good grounds for asserting necessary connections to hold among our perceptions. His 
concern seems emphatically to be with what leads us to think of them as connected. Hume 
may be read, here as elsewhere, as suggesting that we very often have no choice but to rest 
content with certain brute facts about our experience(23}. It is just one such fact about our 
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experience that perceptions are presented in the way they are. Hume wants to explain how it 
is, on the basis of the perceptions we have, and the ways in which they appear to us, we come 
to think of ourselves and our world as we do. Of course, as Stroud points out, were the data 
from which our idea of the self arises not organised as they are, into discrete bundles, we 
could never acquire the idea in question in the first place. But it is a matter of fact that they 
are. The 'ultimate cause' of our perceptions is, Hume admits elsewhere, 'perfectly inexplicable 
by human reason'. Yet we may continue to 'draw inferences from the coherence of our 
perceptions, whether they be true or false; whether they represent nature justly, or be mere 
illusions of the senses'(T.84}. In an exactly parallel way, Hume need not put off his project of 
explaining the origin of our idea of self because he cannot explain the apparently perplexing 
fact that our perceptions come in discrete bundles. What matters in Hume's account is not 
why our gaze is restricted in the way it is, but that it is. My second reservation rests on the 
plausibility of explaining Hume's own dissatisfaction in these terms. Hume, writing in the 
Appendix, is concerned with the consistency of his account. Why should the unavailability of 
an explanation of another, deeper sort trouble him in the case of personal identity when it did 
not in the case of causation? Stroud admits that Hume's explanation of the origin of our idea 
of self is not necessarily deficient because he cannot explain the fact of the 'data' from which 
that idea arises being as they are. There does not seem to be any inconsistency in Hume 
holding, as he has done before, that this is just another brute fact of our experience. While the 
problem Stroud raises is not a trivial one, it does not, on the face of it, represent any very 
obvious inconsistency in Hume's account. 
Hume may well have sensed that the story he was giving depended somehow on some 
additional fact which he was unable to explain. But even were Hume aware of such a problem 
it is not clear why he would suppose this a defect of the sort of account he has given, still less 
how it represents an inconsistency with it. My suggestion was that while Hume's explanation of 
the origin of our idea of self could only be successful because of the way in which our data 
come, Hume does not need to explain that fact in order to successfully account for the origin 
of the idea. I do not, however, consider Stroud's view entirely disarmed. As we will see, he is 
on the right track in at least one important respect. I want to return to this suggestion but only 
after considering one further change of tack. Let us look again at the key passages from the 
Appendix. While we find Hume still inclined to the verdict of 'most philosophers', and Locke in 
particular, 'that personal identity arises from consciousness; and consciousness is nothing but 
a reflected thought or perception ... when I come to explain the principles, that unite our 
successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness ... 1 cannot discover any theory, which 
gives me satisfaction on this head.'(T.635-6} The passage is clearly equivocal. It is not at all 
clear from Hume's statement of his problem whether he understands it as having to do with 
the unity of our perceptions, with what really 'binds them together', as it were, or with the 
principles which unite them in thought. The distinction is quite crucial. 
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It might be helpful to consider again what we found to be Hume's larger project. Hume is 
concerned to explain how, and in virtue of what faculties and principles, we come to view the 
world and ourselves as we do. He is less concerned with how we ought to think about these 
things, than with how we do think about them. In this case, Hume wants to explain both how 
we come by the idea of self we have and how we are led to mistake it for another, and to do 
so in terms of certain principles and tendencies of mind. We saw that there was, in principle, 
no real obstacle to Hume's explaining these propensities in his preferred terms. On this view, 
it would seem likely that Hume's worry in the Appendix would have something to do with the 
adequacy of the 'connecting principles' of mind he describes, resemblance and causation, to 
generate the fiction in question, in other words, to unite our perceptions in thought. As Hume 
says, 'did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in 
the case'(T.636). Were we to apprehend such a connection there would be no question of how 
we come to think of consciousness as united, since it really would be, and we would observe it 
to be so. No connections 'among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human 
understanding. We only feel a connexion or determination of the thought, to pass from one to 
another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on 
the train of past perceptions, that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected 
together, and naturally introduce each other'(T.635). If, on the other hand, what troubles Hume 
is a lack of resources with which to explain the possibility of our perceptions being related in 
this way, then it seems he might really feel pushed to renounce one of his two 'inconsistent' 
principles, 'that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences', together with its partner and 
corollary, 'that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences'(T.636). 
It might be to this lack that Hume refers us when he complains that there would be no difficulty 
in the case did 'our perceptions inhere in something simple and individual'(T.636). Two points 
seem to count against this view. In the first place, it seems far less in tune with Hume's 
overwhelming concern with how we come to think of ourselves and our world as we do than 
does the former view. A satisfactory answer to this question would still leave untouched the 
strategically crucial question of how we get the idea of ourselves we actually have. In the 
second place, as we saw, the unavailability of an additional causal fact of this sort seems in no 
obvious way to issue in an inconsistency, and this clearly poses a difficulty for proponents of 
the view. The question of what binds together our perceptions in our thought seems a more 
likely and, indeed, more self-consistent source of worry for Hume, and it is to this question 
which I now turn. 
In what ways might Hume have considered his relations of causation and resemblance 
inadequate to the task of explaining how the fiction of personal identity is generated? I want 
first to consider another problem suggested by Stroud, though not, I should say, as a likely 
source of Hume's own misgivings. Although, Stroud says, Hume has established certain 
causal connections among our perceptions, in particular, that between our impressions and 
ideas, 
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the causality holding between impressions and their corresponding 
ideas is not of the right sort to help Hume solve the problem of how 
we come to ascribe identity to ourselves. Those causal connections 
run 'vertically', so to speak, from the impression up to the idea, and 
then perhaps to other ideas and impressions. What Hume needs is 
a causal chain that runs 'horizontally', as it were, along the whole 
series of incoming perceptions that we get from moment to moment. 
(24) 
Stroud's point is that no such causal chain exists. To put his point in another way, there exist 
perceptions, present to the mind, yet without any causal relation to the perceptions adjacent to 
them. These perceptions include impressions of sensation. If for example I am having an 
impression of the sheet of paper before me, then, shifting my attention, of my computer 
monitor, or the money tree on the window sill, it is easily seen that one impression is not the 
cause of the other. Since the content of any impression may similarly be entirely new and 
unrelatable, the relation of resemblance may not be of any help either. This is how Stroud's 
demand for a horizontal chain is to be understood. Our impressions lack the regularity they 
would need in order for us to gain the appropriate causal habits of thought to take them to be 
connected. ImpreSSions occur irregularly, with no regard or obvious relation to what has gone 
before. 
Since not all our perceptions, and certainly not all the right ones, appear to be causally related, 
it is suggested, the relation cannot be a necessary condition for membership in a given 
bundle. Impressions of sensation, Hume says, arise 'in the soul originally, from unknown 
causes'(T.7). Hume seems explicit in the fact of these impressions not being the cause of one 
another. Their cause is, he says, 'perfectly inexplicable to human reason'(T.84). But if this is 
so, how can Hume consistently argue for their being each a part of a single causal chain, 
running, as Stroud has it, horizontally across all impressions of sensation? Hume's argument 
is not, however, so easily disposed of. Hume might well respond by saying that nothing he has 
said does commit him to thinking of impressions in this way. I cannot, Hume says, 'compare 
the soul more properly to anything than to a republic or commonwealth'(T.261). As the same 
republic or commonwealth may vary its members, its laws and constitutions, so 'the same 
person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without 
losing his identity. Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the 
relation of causation'(T.261). The republic analogy is an apt one. Just as each member of the 
republic is so not in virtue of a direct relation to her neighbour but because of a complex set of 
interrelations with various of its other parts, so each member of the bundle might be said to be 
related just in virtue of being located at some point in a vast and overlapping system of 
relations. A causal relation extends from any memory of any perception to that originally 
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occurring perception, whatever it was. Beliefs about our present impressions depend indirectly 
upon past impressions and ideas. I get my present impression of the view from my window by 
an act of will of which I have an impression of reflection. We need not think of each 
succeeding perception as the causally-dependent effect of its predecessor. A citizen of 
Hume's commonwealth may remain a stranger to his neighbours while enjoying a real and 
complex set of indirect relations with them in virtue of which they might all be said to be 
members of the same system or community. Those impressions of sensation which, even 
given our pre-theoretical tendency to conflate perceptions with objects, exhibit no direct causal 
relations with any other, can still, we might think, be found a place within the complex system 
of interrelations, ideas and impressions of reflection, which constitute this republic. 
Another line of attack makes more of the sufficiency of the relations of causation and 
resemblance to do the job of producing the fiction of perfect identity. The idea is that the 
relations are not by themselves sufficient to the production of an idea as strong as the idea of 
self we possess. A case of this sort has been persuasively argued for by Don Garrett. The 
heart of Hume's problem and of his misgivings in the Appendix is, according to Garrett, 'the 
inability of causation and resemblance sufficiently to bind our perceptions in the way required 
by our true idea of personal identity'(25). Garrett asks us to suppose a pair of perceptions 
without spatial location occurring simultaneously in two separate bundles or minds. If these 
perceptions are qualitatively identical, then the only way in which they can be assigned causal 
relations in different bundles is in virtue of their spatial location. But, as Hume himself 
remarks, an 'object may be said to be no where, when its parts are not so situated with 
respect to each other, as to form any figure or quantity', as is the case with 'all our perceptions 
and objects, except those of the sight and feeling'{T.235-6). Let us assume the pair of 
perceptions is of this sort. If two persons simultaneously have qualitatively identical spatially 
non-locatable perceptions, a passion or 'moral reflection', say, then neither relations of 
causation nor relations of resemblance can distinguish them. Qualitatively identical 
perceptions can only be ascribed distinct causal relations in virtue either of their distinct spatial 
or temporal location. But in this case the pair of perceptions are neither temporally distinct, nor 
are they in any way spatially locatable. Hume is pressed to accept that 'either both of them will 
belong to a given bundle of perceptions or neither of them will'(26). In other words, our pair of 
perceptions cannot be located in different bundles in terms of either relation, and Hume is not 
prepared 'to accept it as a logical consequence of "the true idea of the mind" that Whenever 
two perceivers have the same experience - whether impression of sensation, passion, or idea 
_ at the same time, they are in fact literally sharing the same perception'(27). Hume's 
dissatisfaction in the Appendix, according to Garrett, stems particularly from his reluctance to 
accept that the existence of anyone perception can have implications for the non-existence of 
any simultaneous resembling perceptions. 
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While Garrett's problem is a real one, with serious implications for an account of the sort 
Hume is defending, I do not think it is the problem with which Hume was struggling in the 
Appendix. If it was as obvious to Hume, as it seems, on this account, it must have been, that 
two minds 'must somehow be given either a spatial location or some substitute for it'(28} if 
their perceptions are to be bound together in the distinct way required by our idea of personal 
identity, then it is surprising that Hume did not make the point himself. The problem for Garrett 
is not merely that Hume never characterises his problem in terms of other minds, but that 
Hume never seriously considers the possibility that the perceptions with which he has to work 
are anything other than his own. If Hume's problem really did stem from the possibility that two 
perceivers having qualitatively identical simultaneous perceptions are in fact sharing the same 
experience, then he might fairly be expected to have made his complaint in other, more 
specific, terms. Hume, it is true, leaves the boundaries between persons indistinct and 
indefinite. But while nothing he says explicitly disallows the possibility of one perception 
belonging to more than one bundle, while, indeed, he insists upon the possibility, there is 
nothing in the text to give us to believe that Hume took it to raise problems for his account of 
how the 'connecting principles' produce the true idea of personal identity, still less in the very 
specific way Garrett envisages. Hume simply accepts that the perceptions we have to work 
with will be our own, and that, whatever the sceptical implications for what lies beyond them, 
they give us resources enough to generate the idea. If perceptions are distinct existences, 
Hume writes in the Appendix, 'they form a whole only by being connected together. But no 
connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We 
only feel a connexion or determination of the thought, to pass from one to another'(T.635}. 
Hume's complaint, if I read him aright, is not that the thought is not, alone or with the 
resources Hume describes, able to 'find' personal identity when reflecting upon the 
perceptions which constitute a mind, but that the connection is only felt. There is no 
suggestion here that the relations Hume provides might be insufficient to the job at hand. As 
we saw, Hume's account of how the natural relations of causation and resemblance produce 
the fiction of personal identity is more resilient than many critics, Stroud among them, have 
supposed. All the weight here seems shifted to the question of what explains the union of 
perceptions in one consciousness. Our ideas of past perceptions 'are felt to be connected 
together, and naturally introduce each other'(T.635}. This 'extraordinary' conclusion, Hume 
says, need not surprise us. Where his hopes 'vanish' is when he comes to explain the 
principles that unite the successive perceptions in our consciousness. If Hume felt that his 
connecting principles were themselves conjointly insufficient to the job at hand, then he should 
surely say 50 here. He could easily have done so. But he does not. This much of his 
philosophy, he suggests, enjoys 'so far a promising aspect'. We might, then, expect a 
significant change of tack when Hume comes to explain those difficulties he finds 'too hard for 
his understanding'(T.635}. And this, I would suggest, is precisely what we do find. 
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If what I mean to suggest is correct, Hume's worries in the Appendix have to do with some 
question other than the one which has occupied him throughout the section on personal 
identity, and which best characterises his general theoretical intentions, that of the production 
of the idea of personal identity. A line like Garrett's may make some sense of Hume's second 
admission that were the mind to perceive some real connection among its perceptions there 
'wou'd be no difficulty in the case', but it seems less well-equipped to make sense of Hume's 
first, that the problem would disappear were our perceptions to 'inhere in something simple 
and individual'. Were the mind to apprehend some real and necessary connection among its 
perceptions then it would seem to clear up the problem of how we come to think of ourselves 
as distinct, discrete causal bundles, as Garrett characterises them. But even were our 
perceptions to inhere in a simple substance, this would still leave untouched Hume's primary 
concern with the origin of our idea of self. Hume would still be faced with the task of 
characterising our experience and the specific ways in which we take it in getting this idea. 
Whatever the problem Hume felt faced with in the Appendix it is likely to be something both 
more general and more deeply troubling to a philosopher with an agenda like Hume's than the 
one Garrett describes. Both Stroud and Garrett are on the right lines in making, in their 
different ways, the focus of the problem the question of the unity of mind or consciousness. It 
is the connectedness of this 'connected mass' of perceptions from which the idea of personal 
identity arises that Hume feels himself unable to explain. 
The 'principle of union', Hume says earlier in the Treatise, 'is regarded as the chief part of the 
complex idea'(T.16) of substance. The 'particular qualities' forming any substance 'are 
commonly refer'd to an unknown something, in which they are supposed to inhere; or granting 
this fiction should not take place, are at least supposed to be closely and inseparably 
connected by the relations of contiguity and causation.' Whatever new 'simple quality' we find 
connected with the others in one of these two ways 'we immediately comprehend it among 
them, even tho' it did not enter into the first conception of the substance'(T.16). We do not 
need our perceptions or objects either to exhibit real connections or to inhere in some simple 
substance in order to think of them as connected in the relevant causal sense. The indistinct 
and indefinitely-bounded kind of union Hume finds among the 'particular qualities' of 
'substances' is of the same sort memory discovers among the successive perceptions which 
constitute a mind. Philosophers, Hume writes in the Appendix, 'begin to be reconcil'd to the 
principle, that we have no idea of external substances, distinct from the ideas of particular 
qualities. This must pave the way for a like principle with regard to the mind, that we have no 
notion of it, distinct from the particular perceptions'(T.635). Why then, we must ask, is Hume 
inclined to bemoan the lack of any simple substance or necessary connection among our 
perceptions, in his discussion of personal identity, yet seems more than content to do without 
these resources when he discusses causation? The answer I have rejected is that Hume 
somehow came to think the relations of causation and resemblance insufficient to the task of 
yielding an idea of self as strong as the one we possess. In the cases both of causation and of 
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personal identity, Hume has it in mind to explain how, and on the basis of what features of our 
experience, we come to think of ourselves or of the world in the way we do. My suggestion is 
that, while, in dealing with causation, Hume is content to explain the origin of the idea in terms 
of the projective tendencies of mind, and to take for granted the fact that our successive 
perceptions are presented as they are, in discussing personal identity, Hume came to realise 
that he had not left himself resources enough to explain or allow for the principles in virtue of 
which these things are thus and so. He may have felt able to avoid raising the question in the 
section on personal identity, but by the time he came to write the Appendix, Hume became 
aware not merely that he had failed to account for the fact of the existence of discrete 
bundles, for this alone, given the sort of account he was giving, may not have troubled him, 
but that he seemed to have ruled out the possibility of anything uniting our successive 
perceptions in the mind or consciousness. Hume's problem is not that we must know how 
these data are organised before we can acquire the idea which very naturally arises from 
them. It is rather that the resources to which he has limited himself in the foregoing discussion 
seem to him to have left him with no means with which to explain how the 'smooth and easy' 
passage of thought from one perception to another is possible. 
Hume, of course, describes his problem in terms of an internal inconsistency of some sort. 
There are two principles, Hume writes, 'which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power 
to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and 
that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences'{T.636). As has 
been remarked, the 'inconsistent' principles are not inconsistent with each other. Where, I 
think, Hume found the conflict to lie was between these principles and the only two ways in 
which he considered the unity of the perceptions in one consciousness could be explained. 
Did our perceptions 'either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive 
some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case'{T.636). Were we 
able to apprehend some real connection among our perceptions, or were those perceptions to 
inhere in some simple substance, there would be no problem in explaining what unites our 
distinct perceptions in the mind. But, Hume, for obvious reasons, can bring himself to accept 
neither. Each individual perception, Hume tells us, may be termed a 'substance' where a 
substance is misguidedly understood to be any thing that may exist by itself. These distinct 
existences must be allowed to be separable, yet, as Hume discovers, they must be connected 
by some relation, some principle of connection, strong enough to make possible the 
experienced regularity from which the idea of self arises, if they are to constitute minds, or 
substances, in Hume's preferred sense. Hume finds himself drawn back to the problem of 
inhesion and the 'absurdities' he found in 'every system' concerning body. He says as much in 
the Appendix: 
I HAD entertain'd some hopes, that however deficient our theory of the 
intellectual world might be, it wou'd be free from those contradictions, 
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and absurdities, which seem to attend every explication, that human 
reason can give of the material world. But upon a more strict review 
of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involv'd 
in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct 
my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent. (T.633) 
Hume suggests a parallel between the inconsistencies he finds threatening the foundations of 
his own account of personal identity and the conflicts he found earlier to beset the 
philosophical understanding of the external world. The contradictions and absurdities which 
attend every explication of the material world concern, Hume believes, the attempt to explain 
how extended matter can be organised in the way it is. The question Hume has found 
'impossible to be answer'd with regard to matter and body' is the question of what is or can 
possibly be understood by 'substance' and 'inhesion'(T.232). Hume describes the tangle of 
difficulties which he finds to afflict every 'system concerning external objects' in the earlier 
section 'Of the antient philosophy'. When we 'look along the insensible changes of bodies', 
Hume says there, we suppose them to be of the same substance, but when we consider their 
'sensible differences', we are inclined to attribute to each 'a substantial and essential 
difference'. In order to remove the conflict and satisfy ourselves 'in both these ways of 
considering our objects, we suppose all bodies to have at once a substance and a substantial 
form'(T.222). Hume invokes the natural relations of causation and resemblance to explain our 
belief in the simplicity and identity of material objects. Once more, there is some fiction or 
'imaginary principle of union' to be explained. In endeavouring to disguise the conflict Hume 
describes we run into the contradictions concerning substance and inhesion which Hume had 
hoped to avoid in his discussion of personal identity. The 'notion of accidents', Hume finds, is 
'an unavoidable consequence of this method of thinking with regard to substances and 
substantial forms; nor can we forbear looking upon colours, sounds, tastes, figures, and other 
properties of bodies, as existences, which cannot subsist apart, but requires a subject of 
inhesion to sustain and support them'(T.222). This belief is the unpalatable, though natural, 
consequence of this kind of philosophy. Since all the particular qualities or accidents of body 
are distinct existences, each 'may be conceiv'd to exist apart, and may exist apart, not only 
from every other quality, but from that unintelligible chimera of a substance'(T.222). Hume 
repeats the point in the section on personal identity. All our particular perceptions are 
'different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately 
consider'd, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing to support their 
existence'{T.252). Whatever 'confus'd notions' we form of the union between an extended 
body and its accidents or between an immaterial substance and its perceptions "tis certain 
that upon reflection we must observe in this union something altogether unintelligible and 
contradictory'(T.238). Had we any idea of the 'substance of our minds', Hume reminds us, we 
would also have an impression of it 'which is very difficult, if not impossible, to be 
conceiv'd'(T.232-3). Hume makes perfectly clear the parallel he intends between the 
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difficulties and contradictions which undermine 'every system' concerning material objects and 
those absurdities which he found to re-emerge, critically and decisively, upon a strict review of 
his section on personal identity. By invoking the associative principles of causation and 
resemblance, Hume is quite able to account for our belief in the identity and simplicity of 
material objects without so much as raising the question of inhesion. But the problems he had 
hoped also to avoid in tackling the 'infinite obscurities' of the 'intellectual world'(T.232) return 
when he raises the question of how the features of our experience from which our idea of self 
arises come to be organised as they are. I do not need the particular qualities of objects to 
inhere in a material substance of some sort in order to come to think of those objects as 
simple and identical. Hume explains this belief with reference to certain natural relations of 
mind. But were there no principles connecting our successive perceptions we could never 
come to think of ourselves as we do. Hume can explain how we come to think of ourselves as 
persistent entities, simple at one time and identical through time, and this part of his story 
seems to satisfy him well enough, but he is not able to explain the unity of consciousness 
which makes this possible(29). If our successive perceptions are to give us the idea in 
question, they must be bound together in a single consciousness. Hume's difficulty, as I read 
him, is that while he comes to acknowledge this fact, he is quite unable to account for it. He 
has no resources left with which to make sense of the relation between an individual 
perception and the mind or consciousness to which it belongs. Hume can only think to explain 
this union amongst perceptions in terms either of inhesion or real connexion, yet finds neither 
solution compatible with those core principles he is understandably unwilling to do without. He 
can ultimately do no more than 'plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty 
is too hard for my understanding'(T.636). 
It should be clear that Hume's misgivings about his section on personal identity, aired, for the 
first and only time, in the Appendix, do not amount to a 'recantation' on his part, nor should he 
be read as rejecting any major part of the thesis presented there. Hume did not come to reject 
his story of the origin of our idea of self. As I have tried to suggest throughout, his account is 
both more defensible and more resilient than has typically been thought. He has good reasons 
to be satisfied with it. His dissatisfaction stems more from the feeling that his theory needed 
supplementing somehow, than from any thought that it should be rejected. He continues to 
hope that others 'perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflexion, may discover some 
hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions'(T.636) he found there. Hume's description 
of the difficulties and 'inconsistencies' which beset philosophical attempts to account for the 
organisation of matter make clear sense of his use of the terms 'inconsistency' and 
'contradiction' in the present case. Hume, as we saw, found it unnecessary to recant either of 
his rejection of the simple idea of self argued for by the Cartesians, or of the true idea of the 
self argued for in Book One of the Treatise. Hume needs to be seen as offering an 
explanation of how we come to think ourselves as continuous beings, persisting throughout a 
lifetime. His concern is emphatically not with the grammatical question of what it means for 
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one person to be differentiated from another, or for one person to be the same person we met 
with yesterday. Once we appreciate this point, we can readily understand why Hume does not 
make use of the resources implicit in the treatment of the self found in Book Two to illuminate 
or supplement his discussion of personal identity in Book One. In Book Two, Hume describes 
the self in terms of both 'the qualities of our mind and body'(T.303). It might be suggested that 
Hume presents himself with an impossible task by attempting to elucidate personal identity in 
Book One without reference to the body. Hume, we should remember. is attempting to explain 
how. from a first-personal perspective. we get the idea of ourselves or, since he uses the 
terms interchangably. our minds. as one entity. identical through change. The notion that one 
is identical in virtue of one's association with the same body throughout a lifetime is not one to 
which Hume could reasonably appeal. The question of the identity of one's body, or of any 
body. is not one that can be settled without reference to the activities of the mind the identity of 
which Hume wants to explain. I need to believe I am a self of this sort before I can begin to 
make sense of the identity of objects in terms of self-attributable activities like remembering. 
The belief Hume wants to explain is one's belief that one is the sort of being to which such 
attributions can be sensibly made. This is what Hume understands by 'personal identity, as it 
regards our thought or imagination'(T.253). Identity 'as it regards our passions or the concern 
we take in ourselves' confirms or corroborates this view of ourselves. indeed, seems almost to 
complete it, but it can never be antecedent to it. Where the association of mind and body 
might have been of use to Hume was in his attempts to explain or understand how it is our 
'successive perceptions' can belong to one consciousness. But, as Hume makes clear in the 
sections preceding that on personal identity, we run into the same set of contradictions 
whether we take our perceptions to inhere in material or immaterial substance. 
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Notes 
Chapter Four 
Hume On Personal Identity 
1.1 agree with Stroud's observation, op.cit., pp.260-1, that 'Hume intends his explanation of the 
origin of the idea of identity and of our tendency to regard certain series of perceptions as "a 
continu'd view of the same object" to carry over from the section "Of Scepticism With Regard 
to the Senses"'. It is clear that Hume's account of personal identity depends on his account of 
our idea of identity as an idea of 'the invariableness and uninterruptedness of any object, thro' 
a suppos'd variation of time'(T.201) in Section II. I discuss the adequacy of Hume's account of 
the origin of this idea in 3.1. In this chapter, I concentrate on Hume's special account of the 
origin of the idea of personal identity. 
2.Locke, op. cit. , II.XXVII, argued that the perceived unity and identity of a person could be 
accounted for on the level of conscious awareness without prejudging or entailing any answer 
to the question of what the substance or essence of a thinking thing was. Locke writes that: 
'All the great Ends of Morality and Religion are well enough secured, without philosophical 
Proofs of the Soul's Immateriality'(IV.1I1.6). He believed that the question of the identity of 
substance was irrelevant to the question of the continuity of persons. Scepticism concerning 
the proofs of philosophers is compatible with a continued belief in the immortality of the soul 
for "Tis past controversy, that we have in us something that thinks, our Very Doubts about 
what it is, confirm the certainty of its being, though we must content our selves in the 
ignorance of what kind of being it is: And 'tis in vain to go about to be sceptical in this, as it is 
unreasonable in most other cases to be positive against the being of any thing, because we 
cannot comprehend its Nature. For I would fain know what Substance exists that has not 
something in it, which manifestly baffles our Understandings.'(ibid) Butler objected to Locke's 
account that it undermined belief in the immortality of the soul and struck at the base of 
Christian morality. See the first appendix to Butler's The Analogy of Religion in The Works of 
Bishop Butler, Ed. W.E. Gladstone (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897). 
3.See David Pears, op.cit., p.120. Pears rightly observes that Hume's attempt to apply his 
theory of the derivation and association of ideas to the idea of personal identity turns out to be 
the most problematic of its applications. In 4.2, I dispute Pears' claim that these difficulties led 
Hume to retract or recant of his theory of personal identity. 
4.Apart from Section II of Part IV, I have in mind, in particular, Hume's important discussion 
concerning the immateriality of the soul which immediately precedes his account of personal 
identity and which, to a considerable extent, informs it. Hume's section 'Of the AnCient 
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Philosophy' also includes an interesting anticipation of the argument of Section VI. I discuss 
this in 4.1. 
4.1 Of Personal Identity 
5.Hume argues, as Locke had, against the suggestion of Descartes, Leibniz, and other 
Cartesians, that consciousness of oneself consists in an awareness of a simple immaterial 
substance, which thinks, and which is the owner of its various perceptions. Locke believed 
that I would be the same person I was in 1969 provided I remembered what that person did, 
irrespective of the unknown substance or substances in which awareness took place. The 
question of the identity of substance does not arise. It is important to note that other 
philosophers contemporary to Hume, like Reid and Butler, continued to believe that we have 
some awareness of the continuity of a simple self. Joseph Butler, op.cit., p.385, objected to 
Locke's account that 'the consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore 
cannot constitute, personal identity; any more than knowledge, in any other case, can 
constitute truth, which it presupposes'. Butler argued that our awareness of the continuity of 
consciousness was, or amounted to, an awareness of a simple self or substance. The 
continuity of consciousness appears to us a real numerical identity: identity in the 'strict and 
philosophical sense' required for the immortality of the soul. Hume may also have had Butler 
in mind in his rebuke to 'those philosophers'. His response to Butler's suggestion is to show 
that this consciousness of self;s an illusion(T.251-2). There is no simplicity in the mind at any 
one time, and no identity at different times 'whatever natural propension we may have to 
imagine that simplicity and identity'(T.2S3). Another philosopher indebted to Locke in this 
respect is Kant. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Ed. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 
1963), A363, argued that there is no immaterial simple substance presented in experience 
which could count as identical in Butler's strict and philosophical sense. The continuity of 
consciousness could just as well be accounted for in terms of transfers from one thinking 
substance to another. 
6.Hume is also in agreement with Locke on this point. Locke attempted to show that the 
question of the perceived identity of persons could be settled on the basis of the continuity or 
sameness of conscious phenomena without entailing any conclusion about the nature of any 
simple substance underlying them. Sameness of substance does not matter to personal 
identity. See IV.IIL6. There is no doubt that Hume is indebted to Locke on this and, as we 
have seen, on a number of other points. 
7.lt is clear from Section II, that Hume takes over Locke's use of the term 'identity' as 
consisting in a thing's sameness with itself over a period of time(T.200-1). Locke, op.cit., 
II.XXVI1.1, writes that 'when considering any thing as existing at any determin'd time and 
place, we compare it with it self existing at another time'. 'Person', Locke says, stands for 'a 
thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the 
same thinking thing in different times and places'(ILXXVIL9). 
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8.Locke's theory of personal identity, discussed in the chapter 'Of Identity and Diversity', 
op.cit., ILXXVII, contends that the perceived identity of a person is a matter of having the 
'same consciousness', and this, for Locke, is a matter of memory, rather than a matter of the 
simplicity of any immaterial substance to which the conscious phenomena belong: 'For the 
same consciousness being preserv'd, whether in the same or different Substances, the 
personal Identity is preserv'd'(ILXXVII.13). As far as the consciousness 'which is inseparable 
from thinking' can be 'extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the 
Identity of that Person; it is the same self now it was then; and 'tis by the same se/fwith this 
present one than now reflects on it, that that Action was done.'(II.XXVII.9). Joseph Butler is 
among those of Locke's opponents who suggest that memory merely 'discovers' personal 
identity. 
9.David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (London: Penguin, 1990), pp.128-9. 
1 O. Ibid. , p.129. 
4.2 Hume's 'Recantation' and His Critics 
11.Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: Macmillan, 1941), p.v. 
12.lbid, pp.555-58. 
13.D.G.C. Macnabb, David Hume: His Theory of Knowledge and Morality (London: 
Hutchinson, 1951), pp.251-52. A similar case is pressed by Wade Robison in 'Hume on 
Personal Identity' in Journal of the History of Philosophy, VoL12, No.2, April, 1974, pp.181-
193. Robison does not argue that a perception or bundle of perceptions cannot be aware of 
itself, but points instead to Hume's frequent appeal to an 'active self' capable of performing 
various actions, including mistaking one disposition or operation for another. Passmore, 
op.cit., pp.82-2, puts a variation of the same objection. The fundamental problem, according to 
Passmore, is 'what it is which confuses succession with identity; and, equally, what it is which 
comes to recognise that succession has been confused with identity'. In the following sections 
I attempt to show how Hume could have responded to these criticisms. 
14.Nelson Pike, 'Hume's Bundle Theory of the Self: A Limited Defence' in American 
Philosophical Quarterly, Volume Four, Number Two, 1967, p.162. 
15.Passmore, op.cit., p.82. 
16.Pike, op.cit., p.164. 
17.Stroud, op. cit. , p.132. 
18.lbid., p.138. 
19.1bid. 
20. Ibid. , p.140. 
21.lbid., p.136. 
22. Ibid. , p.137. Stroud goes on to clarify his point by remarking that to say that the existence 
of subsets of perceptions is, for Hume, 'inexplicable' 'is to say that it is inconsistent with the 
theory of ideas, which he takes to be the only way to make sense of psychological 
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phenomena'(p.140). I go on to give reasons for questioning Stroud's assessment of this 
alleged 'inconsistency'. 
23.The point is made by Don Garrett against Stroud in his article 'Hume on Personal Identity' 
in The Philosophical Review, XC, No.3, July 1981, a revised and somewhat extended version 
of which appears in his Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997) p.163-186. 
24.Stroud, op.cit., p.126. 
25.Garrett, op.cit., p.355. 
26.lbid., p.352. 
27. Ibid. , p.354. 
28.lbid., p.356. 
29.This appears to be Kant's criticism of Hume's theory of personal identity. Kant, op.cit., 
B 132-3, writes that my representations 'must conform to the condition under which alone they 
can stand together in one universal self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all 
without exception belong to me'. I have argued that the source of Hume's worries about 
personal identity was his awareness that his theory required some supplement of this sort, 
accounting for the unity of consciousness, but that he had left himself no scope in which to 
give it. 
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Conclusion 
The difficulty of reconciling Hume's use and endorsement of sceptical arguments concerning 
the operations of the understanding with his constructive philosophical programme is perhaps 
the chief interpretive puzzle of Hume's philosophy. Passmore characterises Hume's 
scepticism as an approving response to the pyrrhonian philosophy described by Bayle as '[A]n 
attempt to run down all science and to reject not only the testimony of Sense, but that of 
Reason too'(1). In Passmore's view, the scepticism comes eventually to overwhelm Hume's 
naturalistic programme, 'threatening the security of the social sciences, undermining common 
sense as well as metaphysics, opening the gates so wide to arbitrariness that the 
metaphysician could ride in as freely as the scientist'(2). There appears to the reader to be a 
prima facie lack of consistency between Hume's sceptical conclusions and his ambitions to 
found a science of man. Hume seems to concede as much when he writes that in attempting 
to trace up the human understanding to its first principles 'we find it to lead us into such 
sentiments, as seem to turn to ridicule all our past pains and industry, and to discourage us 
from future enquiries'(T.266). By the end of Section II of Part IV, Hume is prepared to endorse 
a number of obviously Pyrrhonian sentiments, complaining that the sceptical doubt he has 
introduced 'both with respect to reason and the senses, is a malady, which can never be 
radically cur'd, but must return upon us every moment, however we may chace it 
away'(T.218). He admits that he is unable to conceive 'how such trivial qualities of the fancy, 
conducted by such false suppositions, can ever lead to any solid and rational system'(T.217). 
These sentiments mark a significant reversal of mood. Hume no longer seems prepared to 
take for granted in his reasonings the common sense belief in the continued and distinct 
existence of body for, he says, ,[W]hat can we look for from this confusion of groundless and 
extraordinary opinions but error and falsehood? And how can we justify to ourselves any belief 
we repose in them?'(T.218) He nevertheless indicates his intention of proceeding upon the 
basis of the supposition of the existence of both an external and an internal world. It is far from 
clear from this whether, or to what extent, Hume endorses the conclusions of these 
Pyrrhonian arguments. In this final chapter, I consider Hume's own assessment of the 
sceptical arguments of Part IV, and the role they play in his constructive programme. 
The same doubts Hume aired at the end of Section II recur in the final section of Part IV, the 
conclusion to the first book of the Treatise, and the same endorsement of Pyrrhonian 
arguments can be found in the EnquiI}'(E.153-4). In the Abstract to the Treatise, Hume 
describes the philosophy contained in the book as 'very sceptical'(T.657). By the beginning of 
Section VII, Hume confesses himself reduced 'almost to despair' at the 'wretched condition, 
weakness, and disorder' to which his pyrrhonian arguments have exposed the faculties and 
operations of the understanding which he must employ in his enquiries(T.264). The force of 
the pyrrhonian doubt raises serious questions about the viability of Hume's philosophical 
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enterprise and, in particular, of his attempts to correct and improve causal reasoning by 
turning it on itself. Hume nevertheless continues to endorse the activity of philosophy, as he 
understands it, and to prefer philosophy to the excesses of the superstitious and the 
metaphysicians(T.271}. The difficulty for interpreters is to explain why, having called into 
question a number of fundamental areas of commitment in human cognitive life, Hume not 
only fails to reject the problematic ways in which we speak and think about these areas, but 
continues to write as though he too meant to endorse them. By the end of Section VII, Hume 
has recovered his appetite for philosophy. This is partly because, as he argues, philosophy is 
natural and pleasurable for its own sake. But, as we will see, he has a more important reason 
in mind. 
In Chapter Two, I characterised the upshot of Hume's extended application of causal 
reasoning to itself as, in the main, constructive. For the purposes of Part III of Book One, 
Hume is prepared to endorse those of our central habits of mind which can bear up under 
their own standards of evaluation. Hume acknowledges that a defence of reasoning must 
ultimately involve reasoning and that any adequate rule must be capable of bearing its own 
survey(T.620}. The investigations of Part "I lead Hume to formulate and endorse a set of 
normative rules by which to judge of causes and effects. These rules, the rules of inductive 
argument, represent a number of important habits of mind which Hume understands to be 
capable of surviving their own reflexive scrutiny(3}. They are the product of causal reasoning 
and are supported by that reasoning. This is the most obviously constructive of Hume's 
reflexive applications of probable argument. It is important to note that Hume's intentions in 
Part III are largely nonsceptical. He sees the self-application of causal reasoning as a means 
of improving and correcting our unreflective judgments about causes and effects. There are 
strong textual grounds for resisting the positivist or Humean readings of the key sections of 
Part III. Hume's 'sceptical attack on induction'(4} in Section VI in fact contains not a single 
reference to scepticism of any sort. The interpretation I recommend avoids attributing to Hume 
any substantive sceptical thesis about induction. As I understand it, the argument is an 
attempt to show that it is the imagination and not the argument-forming faculty of reason that 
is causally responsible for our adoption of induction. It does not raise the normative question 
of the justifiability of induction or draw the contentious conclusion that the reasonableness of 
induction depends upon its justification by argument. Hume is nevertheless aware of the 
normative question and he raises it, in a different context, in Section VII. 
Only in Sections IV and VII of Part IV does Hume express the sort of sceptical sentiments 
about causal reasoning that commentators have wanted to attribute to him at the end of 
Section VI of Part III. In the conclusion to Book One, Hume restates an argument first 
sketched in Section IV 'Of the modern philosophy'. He comments that he has found there to 
be 'a direct and total opposition betwixt...those conclusions we form from cause and effect, 
and those that persuade us of the continu'd and independent existence of body'(T.231). 
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Causal reasoning, when prosecuted justly, leads us to the conclusion that secondary qualities 
are mind-dependent effects without any independent existence, and that conclusion, Hume 
argues, also undermines belief in primary qualities(T.231). Hume offers a probable argument 
for the conclusion that secondary qualities are not independent qualities of objects but internal 
existences. He then uses a 8erkeleyan argument to show that we can conceive bodies to 
have primary qualities only if we can conceive them to have some secondary qualities(T.227-
9). We can form no adequate idea of body without them. The upshot of this, according to 
Hume, is the denial of existence to matter. When we reason from cause and effect, he writes, 
we are led to conclude 'that neither colour, sound, taste, nor smell have a continu'd and 
independent existence. When we exclude these sensible qualities there remains nothing in 
the universe, which has such an existence'(T.231). After the exclusion of colours, sounds, 
heat and cold, 'there remains nothing, which can afford us a just and consistent idea of 
body'(T.229). Instead of explaining the operations of external objects upon the senses 'we 
utterly annihilate all these objects'(T.228). Hume does not, however, suggest that we abandon 
or reject our commitment to this set of beliefs. He finds these operations to be 'equally natural 
and necessary in the human mind' with those of causal reasoning, although 'in some 
circumstances they are directly contrary'(T.266). Rather than argue for the rejection of either 
one, or both, of these commitments, Hume instead points to a general diminution of 
confidence in the faculties and operations of the understanding, and in causal inference, in 
particular. The 'total opposition' of these operations in the circumstances Hume describes 
calls into question the epistemic value of inductive argument. Hume writes that the 'intense 
view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought 
upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look 
upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another'(T.268-9). The 'principles of 
custom and reasoning' which are 'the foundation of all our thoughts and actions'(T.22S) 
appear to contradict and subvert one another, leaving the philosopher with little choice 'but 
betwixt a false reason and none at all'(T.267). Instead of explaining the operations of external 
objects, the modern philosophy leads to 'the most extravagant scepticism concerning 
them'(T.228). 
The memory, senses and the understanding are 'all of them founded on the imagination, or 
the vivacity of our ideas' and it is this principle which 'when implicitly follow'd (as it must be) in 
all its variations' makes us reason from causes to effects and convinces us of the continued 
existence of external objects(T.266). The same principle dictates that it is impossible to 
reason justly from causes and effects and at the same time to believe that objects have a 
continued and distinct existence. We are confronted with a choice between these two equally 
fundamental but perfectly incompatible operations of mind. If we follow the philosopher in 
preferring neither of them, but successively assenting to both, then 'with what confidence can 
we afterwards usurp that glorious title, when we thus knowingly embrace a manifest 
contradiction?'(T.266) Hume had earlier commented that his purpose in presenting the 
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arguments of 'that fantastic sect' of Pyrrhonian sceptics had been to convince the reader of 
the truth of his hypothesis 'that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv'd 
from nothing but custom'(T.183) but the inconsistent dictates of this principle now make our 
reliance upon it seem philosophically unsupportable. To assent successively to both would 
disqualify us from any claim upon the title of philosopher, but to assent to neither would mean 
the ruin of human nature(T.225). Hume restates one of the key conclusions of Part III. The tie 
which connects cause and effect, Hume observes, has been found to lie in nothing but 'that 
determination of the mind, which is acquired by custom, and causes us to make a transition 
from an object to its usual attendant, and from the impression of one to the lively idea of the 
other'(T.267}. But such a discovery not only cuts us off from any hope of attaining satisfaction 
in our search for 'the causes of every phaenomenon', but 'even prevents our very wishes; 
since it appears, that when we say we desire to know the ultimate and operating principle, as 
something, which resides in the external object, we either contradict ourselves, or talk without 
a meaning'(T.267). 
The supposition of some 'ultimate principle' binding together cause and effect in such a way 
so that one follows as an infallible consequence of the other rests on 'an illusion of the 
imagination'. These illusions are among the 'numberless infirmities' which are common to 
human nature. The question arises of 'how far we ought to yield to these iIIusions'(T.267). If 
we assent to all the trivial suggestions of the fancy we run into absurdity and obscurity such 
that 'we must at last become ashamed of our credulity', but if, on the other hand, we take a 
decision to reject them all, and adhere only to 'the general and more establish'd properties of 
the imagination' we find this resolution too is attended 'with the most fatal 
consequences'(T.267). The understanding 'when it acts alone, entirely subverts itself, and 
leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common 
life'(T.267-8). Philosophy, when guided only by the principles of reason or the understanding, 
entirely undermines itself. The 'general and more establish'd' principles of the imagination are 
those used in demonstration and probable argument. When the understanding acts in 
accordance with its own most general principles, as it does in demonstrative reasoning, it not 
only reduces all knowledge to probability, but it weakens the evidence of any particular 
judgment 'till at last there remains nothing of the original probability' and belief and evidence 
are totally extinguished(T.182-3). In any calculation there is a probability of error, and with 
every estimation of the probability of that error, a new probability that we have erred, and a 
further probability of error in our new estimation, weakening the evidence for the first judgment 
until, at last, there remains nothing of the original evidence. Hume's argument has two steps. 
The first, which shows how the probability of error reduces knowledge to probability, applies 
only to demonstration. The second, which shows how any estimation of probability reduces to 
nothing, applies to any probable argument. The reflexive application of causal reasoning, for 
all the promise of Part III, leads, in Part IV, to the subversion of common sense belief and the 
'utter annihilation' of external objects(T.228). Causal inference subverts belief and is itself 
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subverted by its direct opposition to other natural and necessary operations of the 
understanding. Should we then 'establish it for a general maxim, that no refin'd or elaborate 
reasoning is ever to be received?'(T.268) If we do, we 'cut off entirely all science and 
philosophy'. Not only this, but we expressly contradict ourselves, since 'this maxim must be 
built on the preceding reasoning, which will be allowed to be sufficiently refin'd and 
metaphysical'(T.268). What party, Hume asks, 'shall we choose among these difficulties? If 
we embrace this principle, and condemn all refin'd reasoning, we run into the most manifest 
absurdities. If we reject it in favour of these reasonings, we subvert entirely the human 
understanding.'(T.268) If we choose the former, we choose a 'false reason'; if we choose the 
latter we subvert all reasoning and must make do with 'no reason at all'. 
Since the difficulty is seldom thought of, or if it is, it is soon forgotten, these 'refin'd reflections', 
Hume says, can have little influence upon us. The doubts which reduce the philosopher to 'the 
most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron'd with the deepest darkness, and utterly 
deprived of the use of every member and faculty' are soon left behind in the study for '[M]ost 
fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself 
suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium'(T.269). 
When, after some avocation and lively impression of the senses, the philosopher returns to his 
speculations, he finds them 'cold, strain'd, and ridiculous' and, in his splenetic humour, is 
ready to throw his books and papers into the fire(T.269). The philosopher finds himself 
'absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live, and talk, and act like other people in the 
common affairs of life'(T.269). In his blind submission to the senses and to the understanding 
he best shows his 'sceptical disposition and principles'(T.269). Hume is not, however, 
prepared to let matters rest here. Any resolution on behalf of the philosopher to rest content 
with 'this indolent belief in the general maxims of the world' would all but extinguish any hope 
of supplying any rules or habits of mind which are endorsable. Hume complains that it is a 
'manifest contradiction' that refined reflections have little influence upon us, while we cannot 
'establish it for a rule, that they ought not to have any influence'(T.268). The philosopher 
continues to look for endorsable rules and to be troubled by the contradictions that threaten 
them. Those who arrive by reasoning at the resolution that refined reasoning ought not to have 
any influence on us, 'expressly contradict' themselves by building their conclusion upon 
reasons as 'refined and metaphysical' as those they reject. Those who unreflectingly adopt the 
general maxims of the world 'manifestly' contradict themselves, for in doing so they commit 
themselves to a norm-like habit of mind which they cannot establish as a rule. Hume appears 
to have thought that human beings tend naturally to some norm-like form of commitment in 
their thought and behaviour. Commitments of this sort are inevitable for creatures like us so 
that any attempt to do without them by committing unthinkingly to natural impulse will involve 
what Hume calls a 'manifest contradiction'. Any attempt to evade the illusions of the 
metaphysicians by adopting the common maxims of everyday life leads back into 
contradiction. This is not a state of affairs with which the philosopher can rest content. He is 
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looking for a set of commitments to which he can give his assent in good faith and without 
self-contradiction. 
The 'philosophical melancholy and delirium' which results from refined reflection upon the 
operations and faculties of the understanding gives way to a resolution 'never more to 
renounce the pleasures of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy'(T.269). But this mood 
or 'bent of mind' cannot last. The sentiments of 'spleen and indolence' which characterise the 
philosopher's submission to his senses and understanding are soon supplanted by a return of 
his natural appetite for knowledge and his natural propensity for seeking endorsable rules or 
habits of mind: 
I cannot forbear having a curiosity to be acquainted with the principles of moral 
good and evil, the nature and foundation of government, and the cause of those 
several passions and inclinations, which actuate and govern me. I am uneasy to 
think I approve of one object, and disapprove another; call one thing beautiful, 
and another deform'd; decide concerning truth and falsehood, reason and folly, 
without knowing upon what principles I proceed. I am concern'd for the good 
condition of the learned world, which lies under such a deplorable ignorance in 
all these particulars.(T.270-1) 
The philosopher begins, once again, to feel a curiosity and ambition of 'contributing to the 
instruction of mankind'(T.271). He feels naturally motivated to return to the books and papers 
of his study and to acquire a name by his inventions and discoveries. These sentiments 
'spring up naturally in my present disposition; and shou'd I endeavour to banish them, by 
attaching myself to any other business or diversion, I feel I shou'd be a loser in point of 
pleasure; and this is the origin of my philosophy'(T.271). 
It is almost impossible 'for the mind of man to rest, like those of beasts, in that narrow circle of 
objects, which are the subject of daily conversation and action'(T.271). We are naturally 
motivated by 'the love of truth' to 'fix our attention or exert our genius; which of all other 
exercises of the mind is the most pleasant and agreeable'(T.44B-9). We do so only partly from 
a concern with the end itself, but were philosophers 'convinc'd, that their discoveries were of 
no consequence, they would entirely lose all relish for their studies'(T.450). To avoid the 
excesses of superstition and to give our enterprise some hope of succeeding we ought 'to 
deliberate concerning the choice of our guide, and ought to prefer that which is safest and 
most agreeable'. In this respect, Hume says, 'I make bold to recommend philosophy, and shall 
not scruple to give it the preference to superstition of every kind or denomination'(T.271). 
While superstition is more readily latched onto by popular opinion, philosophy 'can present us 
only with mild and moderate sentiments' and is unlikely to disturb us in the conduct of our 
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lives(T.271-2). Generally speaking, the errors of religious superstition 'are dangerous; those in 
philosophy only ridiculous'(T.272). 
Nature can dispel the clouds of doubt which afflict the sceptical philosopher, but only once he 
has arrived at the 'intense view' of the 'manifold contradictions in human reason' and is ready 
to reject all belief and reasoning. Nature provides distraction and a relaxation of 'this bent of 
mind'. But the mood of spleen and indolence itself proves unstable and is overtaken by a 
return of the philosopher's appetite and ambition for learning and discovery. The natural 
course of our sentiments brings about a return to reasoning and philosophy. We cannot 
forbear a curiosity to be acquainted with the causes of the 'several passions and inclinations' 
which actuate and govern human nature. But the renewal of philosophical curiosity does not 
mark a return to the arrogant self-sufficiency of the solitary thinker or to the self-stultifying 
Pyrrhonian reflections which left the philosophical thinker 'in the most deplorable condition 
imaginable'. Reason, which 'first appears in possession of the throne, prescribing laws, and 
imposing maxims, with an absolute sway and authority'(T.186), gives way to the 'serious good-
humour'd disposition' of 'my mind all collected within itself'(T.270). The philosopher who has 
endured the despair of Pyrrhonian doubt and the spleen and indolence of his nature 
recognises where his natural sentiments have led him and resolves that '[W]here reason is 
lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it 
can never have any title to operates upon us'(T.270). This new resolution is the result not of 
prescriptive, authoritative reason, but of a natural inclination to reasoning and philosophy, and 
a recognition that the best means of satisfying that inclination is by adopting the safest and 
most agreeable guide to our deliberations. By attending to our natural inclination to these sorts 
of operations we stand a better chance of satisfying our philosophical curiosity than by 
adhering only to the 'general and more establish'd properties of the imagination' or by 
embracing the principle that no elaborate or refined reasoning be received. The philosopher, 
in this new stage, does not endorse the rejection of all refined and elaborate reasoning, but 
insists that '[I]n all the incidents of life we ought to preserve our scepticism'(T.270). It ought 
only to be 'upon sceptical principles, and from an inclination, which we feel to the employing 
ourselves after that manner' that we indulge a belief that fire warms or water refreshes. The 
scepticism Hume recommends is not the Pyrrhonian scepticism of much of Part IV but 'a 
more mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, 
and which may, in part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when its 
undisguised doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common sense and 
reflection'(E.161 ). 
The mitigated form of scepticism Hume advocates is the result of the combined and 
conflicting influences of Pyrrhonian scepticism and natural human instinct. Philosophy, Hume 
says, 'would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not nature too strong for it'(T.657). Hume 
does not believe the Pyrrhonian arguments can be refuted. But this does not lead him to 
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endorse their conclusions. He recommends the rejection of those principles of the imagination 
which are 'changeable, weak and irregular' in favour of those which are 'permanent, 
irresistible, and universal' such as the customary transition of cause and effect and the belief 
in the continued and distinct existence of body. These principles, Hume writes, 'are the 
foundation of all our thoughts and actions, so that upon their removal human nature must 
immediately perish and go to ruin'(T.225). His response to the contradiction between these 
two principles is not to reject or abandon either one, or both, of them, but to urge the 
endorsement of both, on the grounds of our natural propensity to make use of them. But the 
true philosopher or sceptic, having made the journey through despair and indolent belief, to an 
eventual reconciliation with reason and philosophy, recognises his reliance on these 
propensities for what it is. As a result, he is 'diffident of his philosophical doubts, as well as of 
his philosophical conviction; and will never refuse any innocent satisfaction, which offers itself, 
upon account of either of them'(T.273). His philosophy takes on a share of the 'gross earthy 
mixture' of common life(T.272), and he brings to his researches a due caution and 'deference 
to the public'(T.274). Hume acknowledges that this mitigated version of scepticism cannot be 
justified by argument. No one who does not already have the propensity to reason causally will 
recognise an argument for its adoption. It must, nevertheless, be a token of a rule's adequacy 
that it be capable of enduring its own reflexive scrutiny. The greater self-consciousness of the 
'true philosopher' makes him more confident in the endorsement and adoption of rules which 
can bear their own survey. An awareness of the 'strange infirmities of human understanding' 
also inspires him with a modesty and reserve in the judgment of his own opinions(E.161} and 
a resistance to the errors and absurdities of false philosophy(T.267). Once we have set aside 
the 'chimerical systems' of the metaphysicians, and weighed our doubts as carefully as our 
convictions, we might still hope 'to establish a system or set of opinions, which if not true (for 
that, perhaps, is too much to be hop'd for) might at least be satisfactory to the human mind, 
and might stand the test of the most critical examination'(T.272}. 
The true philosopher, while recognising that he cannot pretend 'by any arguments of 
philosophy' to maintain the veracity of these principles or habits of mind(T.187}, nevertheless 
continues to methodize and correct the 'reflections of common life'(E.162}. Philosophy, under 
Hume's reforms, confines itself to common life 'and to such subjects as fall under daily 
practice and experience'(E.162}. It is the spectre of Pyrrhonian doubt that brings the 
philosopher to this salutary determination. We cannot give a satisfactory reason why we 
believe 'after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall, or fire burn' or 'ever satisfy 
ourselves concerning any determination, which we may form, with regard to the origin of 
worlds, and the situation of nature, from, and to eternity'(E.162}. Any hypothesis pretending 'to 
discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature', or of matter, ought to be rejected 'as 
presumptuous and chimerical'(T.xvii}. The chief concern of Hume's discussion of necessary 
connection was to undermine the idea that we have or could have any conception of what it 
would be for one object or event to be causally dependent on another in such a way that one 
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is rendered an infallible consequence of the other. Not only are the 'ultimate springs and 
principles' shut up from human curiosity, but it is 'entirely incomprehensible' to us how one 
object operates on another(E.33). The most perfect natural philosophy 'only staves off our 
ignorance a little longer'(E.31). Hume presents a number of naturalistic explanations of belief 
which explain both how we come to have the ideas we have, and how we come to mistake 
those ideas for those which we do not. Hume has been thought of as an entirely unmitigated 
sceptic with regard to several of these areas of commitment. I have attempted to show how 
mistaken this view of Hume is. For Hume, the question is not really about whether or not there 
are such things as causal connections, or lasting selves or bodies, it is about the way in which 
we understand these things, and the role our understanding of them can play in a scientific 
understanding of the world or ourselves. Hume's main interest lies in showing how, on the 
strictly limited basis of our impressions and ideas, we come to talk and think about the world 
and ourselves as we do. 
Hume's sceptical arguments and conclusions emerge as part of a naturalistic programme of 
causally explaining our fundamental areas of commitment and belief. He never suggests that 
we reject or abandon the problematic ways in which we speak and think about these areas. 
He does not think that by explaining the authority of our beliefs in terms of a number of natural 
propensities he undermines them. Reasoning shows us that we stand a better chance of 
success in our enquiries if we attend to these propensities than by following either of the two 
other principles he considers. Our natural propensity to reason and believe as we do will lead 
us, Hume thinks, to conclude that by following these natural propensities we will be most likely 
to satisfy our philosophical curiosity. It would be a mistake to see Hume as joining or 
wholeheartedly endorsing the conclusions of 'that fantastic sect' of 'excessive' or Pyrrhonian 
sceptics. He is quite some way, about as far as can be, from throwing off every belief not 
grounded in reason(5). The sceptical arguments of Part IV are presented as part of a causal 
explanation of the sort of mitigated or true scepticism Hume ultimately recommends. Hume is 
preparing the ground for his explanation of 'the cause of those several passions and 
inclinations, which actuate and govern me' and of 'the principles of moral good and evil' in 
Books Two and Three of the Treatise. In dOing so, Hume hopes to 'contribute a little to the 
advancement of knowledge, by giving in some particulars a different turn to the speculations 
of philosophers, and pointing out to them more distinctly those subjects, where alone they can 
expect assurance and conviction'(T.273). 
To follow Hume in his 'future speculations', the reader must compose his temper 'from that 
spleen, and invigorate it from that indolence' which sometimes prevails upon it. If his mood 
inclines him still to indolence and impatience 'let him follow his inclination, and wait the returns 
of application and good humour' for, as Hume has shown, '.[T]he conduct of a man, who 
studies philosophy in this careless manner, is more truly sceptical than that of one, who 
feeling in himself an inclination to it, is yet so overwhelm'd with doubts and scruples, as totally 
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to reject it'(T.273). If scepticism convinces us of the many infirmities of human reason it ought 
to lead us to be as cautious in our doubts as in our convictions. The true sceptic brings a 
degree of doubt, caution and modesty to 'all kinds of scrutiny and decision'(T.162). If we are 
philosophers 'it ought only to be upon sceptical principles, and from an inclination which we 
feel to the employing ourselves after that manner'(T.270). Reason, when it acts alone, leaves 
'not the lowest degree of evidence' in any belief, either in philosophy or in common life. Only 
once we have been fully convinced of the force of Pyrrhonian arguments concerning the 
faculties and operations of the understanding, and of the infirmity of reason itself, are we 
ready to renew our commitment to our central habits and operations of mind. It is with a notion 
of 'the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding'(T.657} that we put out to sea 
'in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel' as before, conscious of our past errors and 
perplexities, but with renewed purpose and resolution(T.263-4}. Hume continued to endorse 
the pursuit of philosophy, and to do so, because, and not in spite, of his commitment to 
scepticism. It is upon these principles that Hume proposed 'a compleat system of the 
sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can 
stand with any security'(T.xvi}. 
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Notes 
1.Pierre Bayle, Dictionary, art. Arcesilas (Note G), cited by John Passmore, op.cit., p.132. 
2.Passmore, op.cit., p.1S1. 
3.Annette Baier, op. cit. , pp.93-97, shows that Hume observes each of the eight rules in the 
sections leading up to his endorsement of the rules in Section XV. 
4.Robert J. Fogelin, op.cit., p.38. 
S.See Thomas Reid, op.cit., p.183. 
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